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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to explore the dynamics of exchange operating in 
special relationships initially formed and largely sustained on an 
amicable basis between two states of vastly unequal power. The claim is 
made that the weak state is likely to be adversely affected in the longer 
term by the persistence of negative patterns of asymmetric exchange, 
despite the accrual of considerable benefits. To test the validity of this 
proposition, selected theoretical perspectives on exploitation and 
manipulation are examined and applied to the analyses of political, 
military, economic and development issues arising in respect of the 
Soviet-Ethiopian relationship in the Brezhnev and Gorbachev periods.
The findings indicate that the dynamics of asymmetric exchange are 
much more complex than originally envisaged. The Soviet-Ethiopian 
relationship involved far more than the changing interests of officials 
whose interests and priorities were sometimes compatible and 
sometimes conflicting. A special relationship developed between ruling 
elites in these two sovereign states in the Brezhnev era, largely as a 
consequence of Cold War competition and ideological bonding. Although 
evidence indicates that Mengistu’s administration had a lot to do with the 
relationship’s progression, the negative patterns of asymmetric exchange 
that subsequently developed adversely affected Ethiopia more than they 
did the Soviet Union. These patterns persisted after Gorbachev assumed 
power, and the adverse impact lingered on after both sovereign states 
had fragmented.
The complex dynamics and adverse impacts of asymmetric exchange are 
not unique to the Soviet Union and its relationship with non-capitalist 
states like Ethiopia. In this thesis, Cold War conditions may have largely 
determined the process of pattern formation, but the findings indicate 
that similar patterns have been demonstrated in relationships between 
powerful and weak states in the past and they continue to appear in the 
present.
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1INTRODUCTION.
This thesis aims to explore the dynamics of exchange operating in special 
relationships initially formed and largely sustained on an amicable basis between 
two states of vastly unequal power. The claim is made here that the weak state is 
more likely to be adversely affected in the longer term as a consequence of the 
persistence of negative patterns of asymmetric exchange than the strong one, despite 
the accrual of considerable benefits.
Certain historical features render the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship 
particularly appealing as a case study. First, at the onset of the relationship, prospects 
for good relations between ruling elites in these two sovereign states were facilitated 
by circumstances in history largely perceived to be similar. In both countries, 
revolution and the toppling of well-established hereditary monarchies had brought 
about radical changes. In addition, a feudal peasantry had comprised the largest 
stratum of the population in both states after the revolution. Moreover, 
modernisation had constituted a top priority for heads of state immediately 
thereafter. Second, as a consequence of territorial expansion and empire 
consolidation undertaken by powerful monarchs before the revolution, post­
revolutionary officials in both states found it necessary to strengthen national 
controls in order to retain pre-revolutionary boundaries. Third, ruling elites in the 
two states had historical precedents for developing stronger ties of cooperation in the 
1970s, as a consequence of Russian interests in the Red Sea region in Tsarist times 
and cooperative ventures undertaken with Menelik II to stave off Italian efforts to 
conquer the Ethiopian empire in the late 1800s.
The story of their relationship is well known and will not be described in 
detail in this thesis. Nevertheless, main change points are outlined briefly below to 
facilitate the reader’s understanding of the discussions that follow. After the 
Ethiopian revolution in 1974, Soviet opportunities for establishing special relations 
with Ethiopian elites in line with the principles of socialist orientation were 
strengthened, as a direct result of conflicting interests between American and 
Ethiopian officials. Despite a sharp decline in ideological affinities during the
2Gorbachev era, the special relationship between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia 
lingered on for around fifteen years, until Mengistu’s administration collapsed in 
May 1991. Thereafter, the relationship was stripped of its special associations, and 
relations between the new generation of Ethiopian revolutionary ruling elites and 
Gorbachev’s administration were normalised, just a few months before the demise of 
the Soviet Union.
In this thesis, political, military, economic and development concerns in the 
Soviet-Ethiopian relationship are examined with a view to explaining the changes 
that transpired over the fifteen year period and the dynamics of asymmetric exchange 
operating within the relationship. In respect of the changes, I argue that the 
prevailing interests of ruling elites drove the relationship. The broad outlines of this 
argument are that Soviet and Ethiopian officials pursued their own national interests 
and the special relationship existed only as long as it remained useful to both parties. 
In the heyday of the rhetoric of socialist orientation and Marxist/Leninist ideals, the 
national interests of the Brezhnev administration and Mengistu's military 
government did not conflict overtly. Consequently, ruling elites in both states were 
able to smooth over quite large differences. In the Gorbachev period, the 
compatibility of their national interests declined markedly, as a consequence of the 
following factors: the emergence of a radical new leadership in the Soviet Union, 
accompanied by a substantial modification of the existing ideology; a famine crisis 
of international proportions in Ethiopia, and substantial changes in the conduct of 
East-West relations. Over time, the priorities of the ruling elites in both states 
changed, and their national interests diverged. Eventually, chiefly as a consequence 
of two different social orientations, their national interests came into sharp conflict. 
However, a final rupture was avoided. New ruling elites emerged in Ethiopia, and 
Soviet-Ethiopian relations were re-established on a non-partial basis.
The situation becomes more complicated, however, when one attempts to 
explain the dynamics of asymmetric exchange within the relationship. Under the 
terms of the Friendship Treaty concluded in 1978 and technically still in force after 
Mengistu’s administration collapsed in 1991, the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship was 
supposed to be a mutually beneficial and cooperative arrangement, conducted on a 
most favoured nation basis, and the sovereignty of each state over its own internal 
affairs was supposed to be guaranteed. The theory was good, but the practice
3unlikely, given the vast disparity in their resource capabilities.
In the era of Brezhnev and his successors, Ethiopian officials in particular 
benefited from access to Soviet military technology, centralised structures for 
political and economic administration and assistance for large-scale development 
projects, at the considerable expense of their Soviet suppliers. Over time, however, 
Ethiopia was more adversely affected by the patterns of asymmetric exchange that 
developed than the Soviet Union, as a consequence of Mengistu’s reliance upon 
Soviet prescriptions for political, military, economic and development progress.
Given this unequal state of affairs, one might think it safe to conclude that 
Gorbachev’s administration with its radical prescriptions for reform significantly 
reduced the adverse effects associated with asymmetry. However, the evidence does 
not support this view. To begin with, the negative patterns of asymmetric exchange 
observable in Brezhnev's day continued to flourish for a significant portion of the 
Gorbachev era. When the changes finally occurred, Gorbachev's package of 
liberalisation and de-ideologisation, aimed at opening up relations with Third World 
states, had the unintended effect of leaving Ethiopia’s ruling elite even more 
vulnerable in terms of political, military, economic and agricultural development 
than they had been under the old Cold War order.
In the following chapters, facets of the relationship that relate directly to 
these two arguments are examined. In Chapter One, changing Soviet perspectives 
and policies about socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia are reviewed. Especially 
important are the propositions that Soviet analysts and officials viewed socialist 
orientation as a positive way forward and that ideas for restructuring the conduct of 
relations with non-capitalist states credited to Gorbachev’s administration had been 
formulated by Soviet Third World specialists well in advance of New Political 
Thinking.
In Chapter Two, some important dimensions of asymmetry customarily 
associated with powerful-weak relationships are explored. First, three explanations 
of asymmetric exchange particularly relevant to the case study are reviewed. Second, 
some prominent motives of weak states for undertaking special relationships with 
much stronger partners are outlined. Finally, I put forward my main arguments 
about the balance between exploitation and manipulation prevailing in the Soviet- 
Ethiopian relationship.
4In Chapters Three to Six, particular issues arising in respect of political, 
military and economic relations and the strategies advocated for development are 
examined. In each chapter, the changing features of the relationship are discussed to 
see what features of asymmetric exchange, if any, are demonstrated. In Chapter 
Three, special attention is paid to the changing character of political and ideological 
exchanges and the use made by Ethiopia’s ruling elite of Soviet-styled strategies and 
structures for political organisation to gain their own objectives. Military aspects of 
the relationship are discussed in Chapter Four. Particularly important here are the 
ideas that military provision remained the linchpin of the special Soviet-Ethiopian 
relationship over the fifteen-year period and that Soviet military transfers and 
assistance markedly increased the potential for fragmentation in Ethiopia. In Chapter 
Five, I argue that the importance of economic relations in establishing and 
maintaining patterns of asymmetric exchange detrimental to Ethiopia’s future 
development has been greatly underrated. As a consequence of the negative effects 
associated with trade, aid and debt, prospects for the Ethiopian population’s future 
well being were severely diminished. In Chapter Six, the issue of Soviet influence 
over Ethiopian strategies for agrarian development is examined. Particularly 
important here is the idea that although Ethiopian elites had the final say in policy 
implementation, Soviet support for large-scale agricultural projects provided 
Mengistu’s administration with a justification for overspending and diverting scarce 
resources from where they were most needed.
In Chapter Seven, I look at what happened when the Soviet-Ethiopian 
relationship was restructured and argue that negative patterns of asymmetric 
exchange persisted. Then the conclusions drawn from the Soviet-Ethiopian case 
study are examined to see if they can be used to explain Soviet relations with other 
non-capitalist Third World states. Finally, I consider whether the findings about the 
Soviet Union’s relationships with friendly developing countries can be applied on a 
wider basis to explain the dynamics of asymmetric exchange in relationships 
between powerful and weak sovereign states generally.
5CHAPTER ONE
CHANGING SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ABOUT 
SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a brief account of changing Soviet perspectives about 
socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia and the strategies recommended for maintaining 
relations and sponsoring development during the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras. In part 
one, particular attention is paid to the theory of socialist orientation and the 
prescriptions advocated for social progress in non-capitalist states before Gorbachev 
assumed power. In part two, I examine some changing views about the policies 
recommended by Soviet officials for maintaining relations with socialist-oriented states 
like Ethiopia and approving their plans for domestic development in Gorbachev’s time.
PART ONE: THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATES DURING 
BREZHNEV’S TIME IN OFFICE.
Four conceptual developments helped to shape the conduct of Soviet relations 
with non-capitalist states like Ethiopia in the decade before Gorbachev assumed power: 
the theory of socialist orientation; changing views about the political dimensions of 
socialist transformation; standardisation in the patterns of exchange recommended 
under economic cooperation, and the re-evaluation of Soviet prescriptions traditionally 
advocated for socialist development in the Third World. As we shall see, Soviet ideas 
about domestic conditions in non-capitalist states and maintaining relations with radical 
socialist leaders later associated with Gorbachev's radical plans for reform were very 
much in evidence before he assumed power. Nevertheless, Soviet policies for 
maintaining relations with officials in non-capitalist states and the prescriptions for 
socialist transformation remained firmly committed to the notions of scientific 
socialism and two hostile, competing world systems.
The theory of socialist orientation.
In November 1967, Soviet analysts formally introduced the theory of socialist
6orientation. According to the theory, developing countries that had professed allegiance 
to socialist goals, adopted anti-imperialist policies and rejected capitalist models of 
socio-economic development could be classified as socialist-oriented states.
In contrast to earlier theories of non-capitalist development, which had focused 
upon external relationships and largely ignored internal situations, the new theory 
recognised the importance of domestic factors and established some guidelines for 
states desiring to pursue non-capitalist paths of development. In socialist-oriented 
states, domestic and external policies were expected to be anti-imperialist, anti-feudal 
and, generally anti-capitalist.1 Longer-term goals advocated the construction of Soviet- 
styled political, economic, and developmental structures to facilitate the transition to 
socialism.2
The theory of socialist orientation had some important consequences for the 
conduct of Soviet relations with Third World states. First, it provided Moscow with a 
mechanism for selecting developing countries likely to favour alignment with the 
socialist world system.3 Second, it provided a theoretical rationale to reshape Soviet 
assistance policies towards socialist-oriented states. Under the new theoretical 
guidelines, Soviet military aid became the dominant instrument of support, and ruling 
elites in socialist-oriented states were encouraged to emulate Soviet administrative 
structures and to follow Soviet prescriptions for domestic and external reform in 
preparation for entry into the world socialist system.
1 The policies advocated for socialist-oriented states in the 1960s and 1970s closely resembled the action 
plan outlined in the 1928 Comintern programme for military-political transformation and socio-economic 
reform in colonized countries. In the 1928 plan, leaders of colonial countries were urged to overthrow 
foreign imperialism, to end feudalism and landlord bureaucracy, to secure national independence and 
political unification, to nationalise large foreign enterprises and private land holdings, and to establish a 
people’s army (Light 1988:97).
2 Brutents (1977, v 2:127) maintained that all socialist-oriented policies were fundamentally linked to each 
other. He also recognized that the rates of successful implementation in respect of each policy were likely to 
vary.
3 By 1979, three categories of non-capitalist countries had been officially recognized: the long-established 
socialist-oriented states, represented by Algeria, Burma, Guinea, PDR Yemen, Congo, Syria and Tanzania; 
the recently established socialist-oriented states, represented by Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ethiopia 
and 'others' (like Afghanistan); and the socialist states that had successfully avoided capitalism, represented 
by Vietnam, Korea, Laos and Cuba (Light 1988:143).
7Political and military dimensions.
The traditional approach to class analysis stressed the importance of the 
proletariat in the revolutionary process. This view undoubtedly complicated Soviet 
explanations of socialist transformation in Third World countries in the 1970s. In 
Ethiopia, for example, it was blatantly obvious even in Brezhnev's day that peasants 
comprised the bulk of the population and that the working class was far too small to 
have political significance in the foreseeable future.4 Since the proletariat could not act 
as the catalyst for initiating social change in non-capitalist states, Soviet analysts 
attempted to identify segments of the population capable of leading the revolutionary 
process towards socialist transformation. To this end, the roles of national elites, 
peasants and the intermediate strata were given serious consideration.
By the 1970s, Soviet analysts tended to regard local elites with considerable 
suspicion, especially when it came to assigning leadership roles in the process of 
socialist transformation. Previous experience in maintaining relations with Third 
World leaders in the Khrushchev era indicated that local ruling elites demonstrated a 
marked propensity for shifting ideological loyalties in order to gain nationalist 
objectives.5
Although they formed the largest and most exploited class in most Third World 
countries, Soviet analysts also demonstrated a great reluctance to allow the peasantry to 
assume the dominant role of guiding the revolutionary transformation. In the first 
instance, the existence of highly divergent social strata in peasant societies precluded 
the unification of classes traditionally deemed necessary for vanguard leadership. 
Second, peasant movements and revolutionary goals tended to be changeable and 
unpredictable. Third, the precise relationship between the peasantry and the petty 
bourgeoisie remained unclear.6
4 See Bratents (1977) and Light (1988) on the developments and complexities associated with Marxist- 
Leninist analyses of class structures in Revolutionary Democracies.
5 Under Khrushchev, Soviet relations with first generation Third World clients were conducted on an 
inter-state basis, at die expense of local communist parties and other indigenous opposition forces. Soviet 
officials cultivated ties with individual nationalist leaders like Nasser, Sukarno, and Nkrumah, without much 
regard for the ideological character of the political structures and institutions beneath them. Nationalist elites 
subsequently turned out to be ideologically unpredictable and politically unreliable (Fukuyama 1987:28-29).
6 Brutents (1977, v 1:226) argued that the pace of social development in emerging post colonial states had 
been too rapid to allow peasants and the petty bourgeoisie to be adequately educated and influenced by the
8Recognition of the intermediate strata as a vehicle for initiating social change 
provided a potentially satisfactory mechanism for explaining the dynamics of revolution 
in socialist-oriented states during Brezhnev’s administration. More progressive Soviet 
Third World specialists like G. Mirsky maintained that transitional or intermediate class 
structures made up of diverse social elements existed in Third World states where 
capitalism had not been fully consolidated. By taking this point of view, a wide variety 
of classes could be accommodated into the revolutionary process (Light 1988:122).
The concept of the intermediate strata was also very important because it 
provided Soviet Third World experts with a mechanism for justifying interventions by 
military regimes in state political activities (Light 1988:123). The Derg's intervention in 
the political processes of the Ethiopia's imperial regime before the 1974 revolution and 
the radical political transformations implemented by the Provisional Military 
Administrative Council (PMAC) shortly thereafter, for example, were both welcomed 
by Soviet officials because of their potential for initiating social change.
In respect of military leadership, many Soviet third world analysts perceived 
that radical elements of the military intelligentsia could facilitate political developments 
in national democratic revolutions. Brutents (1977,v 1:246-251) predicted that the 
political importance of the military intelligentsia would increase sharply during the 
second phase of national liberation movements. He thought that armed forces in 
developing countries would have special opportunities for influencing and controlling 
domestic situations and that military establishments in socialist-oriented states would 
exert considerable power over political activities.
Soviet accounts of revolutionary change in socialist-oriented states also became 
more complicated in Brezhnev's time. Brutents (1977,v 2:134), for example, argued 
that internal conflict between different but simultaneously existing orientations 
probably constituted the normal state of affairs in revolutionary democracies. He 
thought that all the ideological orientations and the basic issues of revolutionary 
democratic policy were objectives of continuous overt and covert struggle. He argued 
that ongoing struggles reflected conflicts between different social orientations, rather 
than a natural contention of different viewpoints within a common political framework.
proletariat. He maintained that both classes were becoming actively involved in revolutionary processes that 
could develop into socialist orientation.
9In the late Brezhnev era, more progressive Soviet third world analysts and 
officials also questioned the premise that socialist-oriented states would necessarily 
evolve in the direction of Soviet-styled scientific socialism. Some analysts examined 
issues associated with identity; others concentrated on evolutionary aspects; a third 
group examined the unintended consequences likely to occur when ruling elites of non­
capitalist states advocated a ‘declarative radicalism’ like socialist orientation. In 
respect of identity, Karen Brutents (1977, v 1:226,148) advanced the notion that the 
process of socialist orientation would display zigzag patterns of retreats, defeats and 
successes, due to mass class involvement in the revolutionary process. As a 
consequence of such zigzags, he argued that it could take a long time for national 
revolutions to determine their own social orientations. As regards evolution, Soviet 
editors of a research report on socialist orientation issued in 1982 concluded that, at 
best, socialist orientation represented only a ‘preparatory pre-socialist stage’ in 
development (Valkenier, 1987:25). In respect of unintended consequences, Soviet 
official Rostrislav Ul'yanovsky, the conservative deputy head of the Central 
Committee's International Department, argued in 1984 that adherence to a ‘declarative 
radicalism’ like socialist orientation could actually exacerbate difficulties in the 
socialist transformation process by triggering sharp internal opposition to the official 
regime (Fukuyama 1987:39).
In an effort to improve the utility of socialist orientation as a mechanism for 
drawing closer to scientific socialism, Soviet analysts recommended strategies for 
political organisation that provided Third World ruling elites with appropriate 
structures for implementing socialist transformation. Two of these were particularly 
important in the case of Ethiopia: establishing the dominance of the state in the socialist 
transformation process and the creation of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties (MLVP).
The national state was expected to occupy the dominant position in national 
liberation revolutions under the leadership of the intermediate strata. Brutents (1977, 
v 1:265), for example, maintained that the national state constituted the unique feature 
of class struggle in the new phase of national liberation revolutions. He thought that the 
state would serve as an instrument of anti-imperialist struggle and that it would 
implement major social transformation in the interests of the masses in socialist- 
oriented countries.
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet support for the establishment of 
Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Parties (MLVP) to supervise the process of socialist 
transformation in socialist-oriented states increased substantially. Many Soviet analysts 
and officials believed that socialist-oriented states would be more likely to remain on 
the non-capitalist path of development under vanguard party leadership. Brutents (1977, 
v2:233) stressed the importance of communist parties in consolidating support for the 
transformation effort. Parties were expected to embrace the masses and to influence the 
broader strata of the working class, peasantry and the intelligentsia with a view to 
consolidating all anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist forces into a single national front. 
Other supporters of MLVP strategies like B.N. Ponomarev argued that vanguard parties 
were necessary in socialist-oriented states because the policies implemented by 
revolutionary democrats tended to be inconsistent and contradictory. To counteract 
such defects, he recommended that political organisation be strengthened by creating 
vanguard parties, establishing strong party-state links with the masses, instituting 
effective cadre training programmes and strengthening political and military state 
structures (Light 1988:130).
The high hopes entertained for MLVP as a viable strategy for keeping non­
capitalist states on target for socialist transformation remained largely unfulfilled at the 
end of the Brezhnev era. In 1984, R. Ul'yanovsky complained that MLVPs had actually 
incurred the hostility of the population in many countries as a consequence of poor 
party-organisational efforts and repeated failures to secure mass support for their 
socialist programmes (Fukuyama 1987:39). Despite greater doubt over the utility of 
MLVP strategies, however, Soviet analysts and officials demonstrated a marked 
reluctance to abandon vanguard party strategies altogether, even in the Gorbachev era.
Economic cooperation
In general, Soviet analysts and officials rhetorically supported the notion that 
trade links with socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia should be conducted on a most 
favoured nation basis. They emphasised the importance of improving trade turnovers, 
as opposed to improving trade balances via a more equitable distribution of export and 
import exchanges. Analysts and elites alike justified granting preferential market 
access to socialist-oriented states for the purchases of key Soviet exports like fuel,
11
machinery and industrial products on the grounds that these particular exports would 
facilitate modernisation and engender economic growth in developing countries.
Trading policies with developing countries like Ethiopia were pragmatic and 
complex. Bilateral trading arrangements were often complicated by sophisticated 
preferential and barter trading exchanges. Of these, tied buying arrangements and the 
inclusion of grant elements in varying proportions were particularly important. In one 
commodity trade agreement with Ethiopia, for example, Soviet officials agreed to 
increase purchases of coffee, sesame oil, haricot beans, and other agricultural goods by 
about 50 percent, on the condition that Ethiopian purchases of Soviet machinery, 
vehicles, and petroleum products also increase by an additional 50 percent (Jinadu 
1987:234).
In Brezhnev’s time, Soviet analysts and officials also emphasised the 
importance of strengthening economic cooperation, as opposed to providing 
humanitarian aid or outright gifts.7 Soviet Third World experts and officials thought 
that the high grant content of Western economic aid to developing countries constituted 
conscience money for past exploitation. Since the Soviet Union had not participated in 
Western imperialism and colonialism, many Soviet analysts and officials took the view 
that no responsibilities for payments of high grant content had been incurred by 
socialist states (Bach 1985:269). Free gifts of Soviet aid to Ethiopia, for example, were 
extremely rare even on humanitarian grounds until reports of Ethiopia's famine crisis 
made global headlines in the fall of 1984.
Wide differentials in the composition of grant elements and ambiguities 
associated with the designation of favourable terms made it virtually impossible to 
assess accurately the level of assistance actually provided by Soviet officials to 
socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia. In the mid-1980s, seven categories of economic 
assistance were officially recognised in a list supplied to the Group of 77 during an 
UNCTAD conference. Two of the seven categories were allocated to grant 
arrangements (one 25% or more and one unspecified). The other five established
7 Moscow's first official disclosure of Soviet aid to developing countries did not appear until 1982. 
Estimates issued by officials at an annual ECOSOC meeting in that year put net aid contributions between 
1976 and 1980 in the region o f R30bn (c $44bn at the official exchange rate): a figure representing 
something like one percent o f the Soviet-GNP. No breakdowns o f the economic assistance actually given to 
individual socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia were provided (Machowski 1987:126).
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guidelines for specific transactions such as the purchase of Soviet personnel services 
abroad, the education of national cadres in developing countries, the transfer of 
technology and know-how, the conduct of foreign trade, and the extension of 
preferential marine transport tariffs (Bach 1985:269-275).
Under the umbrella of economic cooperation, Soviet officials commonly 
imposed the following conditions upon partner states. First, Soviet officials retained 
firm control over the quality and progress of development aid projects. Aid disbursals 
from Moscow remained tied to the purchase of Soviet goods and services throughout 
the duration of the project. Second, ruling elites in recipient states were expected to 
participate actively in the funding of most development aid schemes. Third, for most of 
the period, Soviet officials allowed loan repayments to be paid in local currency or 
goods. Finally, official Soviet repayment terms for development loans remained low in 
the pre-Gorbachev era, and, in some cases, appeared to offer better value than those 
operating in the West at that time. In 1982, for example, G. Kim maintained that 
repayment periods varied from 10-15 years, with a grace period of 1-3 years and that 
current interest rates remained in the region of 2-3 percent (Kim 1982:10; Bach 
1985:269).
Prescriptions for development
Throughout the Brezhnev era, Soviet prescriptions for development in socialist- 
oriented states emphasised the importance of centralised planning and industrialisation 
in the modernisation process. In the mid-1970s, analysts like Brutents expected 
revolutionary democrats in socialist-oriented states to carry out socio-economic reforms 
aimed at significantly changing important aspects of social life. He maintained that 
rapid economic progress and an end to economic backwardness constituted the 
principal goals of revolutionary democratic regimes and that strategies to achieve these 
objectives should emphasise the importance of long-term, detailed planning. Ruling 
elites were also expected to end the domination of foreign capital in key sectors in the 
economy and to implement policies aimed at limiting the development of a wealthy 
local bourgeoisie (Brutents 1977, v 2:96-100).
Revolutionary democrats were urged to establish or to expand the control of the 
state and of cooperative sectors over property relations in order to create effective
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instruments for capital accumulation, capable of providing funds for economic 
development and social undertakings. Once integrated, the state and cooperative sectors 
would provide the economic basis for the entire nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti­
capitalist policy of revolutionary democratic regimes (Brutents 1977, v 2:103,107-108).
In the early 1980s, prominent Soviet Third World experts like G. Kim and 
Anatoly Gromyko emphasised the importance of industrialisation in generating 
development in socialist-oriented states. Kim (1982:10), for example, maintained that 
industrial development and power engineering constituted top socialist priorities in 
extending aid to developing countries like Ethiopia. He estimated that over 50 percent 
of Soviet economic and technical aid had been spent on projects in these two areas. 
Anatoly Gromyko (1982:6-7) confirmed that the Soviet Union was still channelling 
support into certain basic industries: in particular, ferrous metallurgy, machine building, 
the production of chemicals and petroleum refining.
In the years immediately preceding Gorbachev’s rise to power, however, 
concerns about the prescriptions that had been traditional advocated for socialist- 
oriented development increased in respect of four issues: the pace of socialist 
transformation, the degree of involvement in the capitalist system, the constraints of 
backwardness, and prospects for bypassing the capitalist stage of development.
Empirical evidence indicated that traditional Soviet prescriptions for 
development had not facilitated the process of socialist transformation in non-capitalist 
states. Some analysts argued that the pace of transformation had been too rapid. They 
advocated slower, more balanced rates of change for socialist-oriented states.
Prominent analysts like Evgenii Primakov and Karen Brutents questioned the 
notion that non-capitalist states should avoid contact with capitalism. Primakov (1978) 
argued that besides the classic asymmetric dependency associated with exploitation and 
inequality, an ordinary dependency existed that affected all countries, as a consequence 
of the global nature of economic relations (Valkenier 1983:93-94). Brutents (1979) 
maintained that developing states could benefit from exposure to capitalism and 
proceeded to justify his position by arguing that two types of capitalism existed: 
‘national’ (beneficial) and ‘dependent’ (harmful) capitalism. National capitalism was 
construed to be a progressive force capable of contributing to economic development. 
Dependent capitalism, on the other hand, was perceived to be a malevolent force that
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nurtured and strengthened neo-colonial relationships (Valkenier 1983:93).
Soviet analysts also began to question traditional assumptions about the 
relationship between backwardness and exploitation. Traditionally, backwardness had 
been viewed as a by-product of imperialist exploitation inherent in the capitalist world 
system. Rymalov (1980:40), for example, maintained that backwardness was the logical 
outcome of the formation of the world exploitative system by international capital. He 
believed that capitalism had divided nation states into a small number of oppressor, 
great-power (imperialist), sovereign and privileged nations and a large number of 
oppressed, dependent and semi-dependent, non-sovereign nations. Analysts of this 
persuasion also supported the view that backwardness could be eliminated if 
developing countries adopted Soviet prescriptions for socialist development and opted 
out of the capitalist world system.
Theorists with more progressive points of view regarded backwardness as an 
independent phenomenon that persistently constrained development in Third World 
states. They claimed that it was an inherent impediment to permanent socialist 
transformation in developing countries. Anatoly Gromyko (1979:103), Director of the 
African Institute in the early 1980s, argued that that essential material prerequisites 
must be present in non-capitalist countries before socialism could begin to flourish.
In Brezhnev’s time, the idea that socialist-oriented states could bypass the 
capitalist path of development was substantially eroded, as a consequence of the 
analysis of empirical data on developing countries. Many Soviet Third World 
specialists and officials concluded that developing states would remain linked to the 
capitalist economic system, regardless of political orientation. Recognition of this fact 
reduced the need for Soviet analysts to accommodate socialist-oriented states within the 
world socialist system (Valkenier 1983:73-74). Moreover, recognition that minimum 
levels of economic development were necessary for socialist transformation cast serious 
doubts on the notion that certain stages in development could be eliminated if
g
substantial aid were provided by socialist states.
In the late Brezhnev era, Lenin's theories on mnogoukladnost (multi-structural
8 Brutents (1977, v 2:131), for example, argued that as a rule it was necessary for countries pursuing non­
capitalist paths of development to possess healthy economies with real prospects for efficient and profitable 
advancement.
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society) were revived to help explain complex socio-economic configurations in 
socialist-oriented states. Under conditions of mnogoukladnost, old and new forms of 
production and management co-existed simultaneously, with the state acting as a 
regulatory agent between layers. This approach was particularly useful for explaining 
developments in decolonised states where capitalist forms of production had been 
introduced during colonialism. In some cases, new forms had been grafted on to earlier 
production forms; in others, capitalism had replaced the old systems entirely (Light 
1988:135).
Although there were divergent views on the utility and application of 
mnogoukladnost, this mixed approach to economic development gained considerable 
momentum in the early 1980s. This was especially so with respect to the economic 
heterogeneity of developing countries, the existence of a global division of labour, and 
the recognition of local diversity in developing countries (Valkenier 1983:82-86).
On the eve of Gorbachev’s rise to power, progressive Soviet specialists 
advocated liberalised strategies for development in radical socialist-oriented states 
containing a mixture of economic policies and structures, vaguely resembling Lenin's 
initiatives under the New Economic Policy. In the mixed economic model that appeared 
in the early 1980s, no single set of economic policies was prescribed for socialist- 
oriented states, but ruling elites were actively encouraged to seek foreign investment 
from capitalist nations and to conduct external relations within a single global economy 
(Valkenier 1983:102). Nevertheless, Soviet conduct towards socialist-oriented states 
like Ethiopia remained rooted in the ideological traditions of two competitive, mutually 
exclusive world systems. Objectives still focused upon preparing socialist-oriented 
states for entry into the world socialist system and the ultimate triumph of that system 
over capitalism. Despite this fact, new conceptual foundations were laid during the 
Brezhnev era that provided the basis of Gorbachev's radical reform programmes for 
restructuring the Soviet Union’s relationships with socialist-oriented states.
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PART TWO: GORBACHEV, NEW THINKING AND SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATES.
In Gorbachev’s time, traditional Soviet priorities for relationships with socialist- 
oriented states were eclipsed and ultimately undermined by the domestic necessity to 
implement economic growth and to improve relations with the United States. 
Conceptual notions associated with New Thinking ultimately eliminated the ideological 
justification for Soviet officials to cultivate special relationships with radical leaders of 
developing countries electing to follow non-capitalist paths of development.
In the following sections, I identify some important ideas and representative 
spokesmen, before outlining the key points of Gorbachev's radical reform programme 
in relation to the Third World. In the final section I examine the impact of New 
Thinking upon Soviet views about socialist-oriented states and the strategies advocated 
for restructuring relations with them.
Important ideas and representative spokesmen.
Although traditional perspectives persisted throughout the Gorbachev era, the 
viewpoint of progressive analysts became increasingly widespread. More importantly, 
they became increasingly prominent in Gorbachev’s administration, while those 
associated with the old order largely disappeared from public view. David Albright’s 
account of the main schools of Soviet thought that existed in Gorbachev’s time 
demonstrates this. Four trends were identified: revolutionary-democrats and pro­
militarists, two schools that advocated traditional perspectives, and national-capitalists 
and economic integrationists, two schools that demonstrated more progressive 
approaches (Albright 1991:28). Although no perspective appears to have received the 
official, unqualified approval of Gorbachev’s administration, the two progressive 
schools of thought had a significant bearing upon the restructuring of Soviet relations 
with socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia.
Revolutionary democrats believed that the Soviet Union should continue to 
cultivate special ties with socialist-oriented states because they constituted the ‘wave of 
the future’. They maintained that radicalisation was deepening in developing areas and 
that socialist-oriented states were bypassing capitalism successfully and progressing 
towards socialism, despite occasional zig zags in direction. They thought that
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revolutionary democracies and vanguard parties would multiply, thereby increasing 
prospects for the creation of socialist-oriented states and full-fledged Communist 
parties.
Analysts of this persuasion like Grigorii Romanov, Boris Ponomarev, Rostislav 
Ul'yanovsky and Anatoly Gromyko thought that the Soviet Union should continue to 
provide assistance to socialist-oriented states, despite severe domestic economic 
constraints. They also believed that Soviet officials should continue to collaborate with 
the ruling elite of socialist-oriented regimes in building the military, governmental and 
party institutions deemed necessary to consolidate local authority. Collaboration along 
these lines was expected to strengthen structural relationships between the Soviet Union 
and developing countries and to expand Soviet prospects for advancement in Third 
World relations (Albright 1991:28-29). Their political influence, however, diminished 
markedly in the Gorbachev era. Romanov, Gorbachev's chief political rival as 
Cherchenko's successor, was ousted in 1985. Ponomarev and Ul'yanovsky lost 
important CPSU positions in 1986 (Albright 1991:29).
Pro-militarists were also in favour of continuing support for socialist-oriented 
states.9 They emphasised the importance of military rule in securing socialist 
transformation in developing countries and argued that a considerable number of 
military ruling elites had expressed the desire to implement major social transformation 
and were willing to develop close relations with the Soviet Union. Although they 
recognised the potential utility of vanguard parties, pro-militarists thought that the 
armed forces would be the dominant institutions in developing countries in the 
foreseeable future.
Strategists like Colonel E Rybkin, Major-General E. Dolgopolov and retired Lt- 
General Ivan Novoseletsky wanted to continue military assistance to pro-Soviet 
governments controlled by military regimes so that local leaders could defend 
themselves against domestic and external opposition. They also argued that Soviet 
military assistance would strengthen structural relations between the Soviet Union and 
progressive military regimes (Albright 1991:29-30).
National-capitalists, on the other hand, questioned the wisdom of providing
9 Albright (1991:30) maintained that in the 1980s only members of the Soviet military establishment still 
publicly articulated the pro militarist perspective.
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assistance to states like Ethiopia. They believed that socialist-oriented states would 
remain in the minority, even in the distant future. They argued that most developing 
countries had already embarked upon capitalist or non-socialist paths of development 
and that capitalist or non-socialist phases would be completed prior to the initiation of 
socialist transformation. They tended to criticise existing socialist-oriented states on 
the grounds that local political elites had failed to implement internal social 
transformation or to demonstrate consistent approaches in foreign policy.
Analysts like Karen Brutents, Evgenii Primakov and Aleksandr Yakovlev 
argued that the Soviet Union should expand political and economic relations with Third 
World states in general, as opposed to cultivating closer ties with socialist-oriented 
states. They maintained that profitable relations with a wide-variety of states would 
reduce the risks of Soviet setbacks in the Third World. (Albright 1991:31-32). Their 
political influence increased markedly during Gorbachev’s administration. Brutents 
became first deputy director of the CPSU International Department. Primakov, 
formerly head of the Institute of Oriental Studies and then IMEMO, served as one of 
Gorbachev's leading advisors and eventually became the Chairman of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union (Albright 1991:30-32). Yakovlev, one of the 
main architects of glasnost and the political reforms of Perestroika, assumed charge of 
progaganda and academic affairs in the CC Secretariat in 1986 and, following the 
abolition of the CC Secretariat in 1988, became head of the new International Policy 
Commission (Sakwa 1990:13,16,172).
Economic integrationists also downgraded the importance of maintaining 
relations with socialist-oriented states. They argued that most developing states had 
experienced low levels of economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, regardless of 
ideological inclination. They maintained that economic difficulties could only be 
overcome by participation in a coherent system of global economic interdependence, 
and within that system, traditional distinctions between capitalist-oriented and socialist- 
oriented developing states were meaningless.
Analysts of this persuasion, such as Vadim Zagladin, Georgii Arbatov, Vladimir 
Kamentsev and Eduard Shevardnadze, maintained that the Soviet Union should 
strengthen economic ties with a variety of developing countries. They thought that the 
Soviet Union could become an important supplier of secondary technology, machinery
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and manufactured goods for Third World states in general. They also believed that 
developing countries could acquire the skills and surpluses they needed for economic 
progress by exporting raw products to the Soviet Union and other socialist states, as 
well as to capitalist developed countries. They maintained that a global, economically 
interdependent system could improve prospects for long-term structural relationships 
between the Soviet Union and developing nations (Albright 1991:32-33). Their 
political influence also increased markedly under New Thinking. Zagladin retained a 
high position in the CPSU International Department and became a personal advisor to 
Gorbachev in 1988. Arbatov, Central Committee member, remained director of the 
Institute of the United States and Canada. Kamentsev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR 
Council of Ministers, also became Chairman of the Council's Foreign Economic 
Commission. Shevardnadze, full Politburo member, served as Gorbachev's foreign 
minister from 1985 to 1990 (Albright 1991:33).
Gorbachev's reforms
When Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985, Soviet 
analysts and officials were already making concerted efforts to generate ideas for 
internal and external reform aimed at reversing the process of economic decline in the 
Soviet Union. Their ideas, in turn, exerted a profound influence on the prescriptions 
advocated for socialist-oriented development. The new prescriptions closely resembled 
the policies traditionally advocated by the dominant powers in the world capitalist 
system. It took time, however, to transform Gorbachev's radical prescriptions into 
policy.10 In the case of socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia, timing had a direct 
bearing on the balance of traditional and progressive elements sustained in the 
strategies recommended by Soviet officials for Ethiopia’s internal development.
Mikhail Gorbachev outlined rough guidelines for perestroika and glasnost in
10 Sakwa (1990:8-11), for example, identified four phases in Gorbachev's reform effort: (1) from March 
1985 to mid-1986, basic guidelines were formulated; (2) from mid-1986 to mid-1988, glasnost was 
emphasised in an effort to generate ideas and to acquire new understandings on the political changes 
necessary for economic and social modernization; (3) from mid 1988 to early 1990, the pace of economic 
and political reforms accelerated, more radical economic reforms were introduced, new political institutions 
were created, and society became more political, as a consequence of elections; (4) from early 1990 on, 
reforms efforts were dominated by shock economic strategies and the emergence of multi-party politics; 
additionally, CPSU controls over the process of perestroika were substantially weakened as a consequence 
of deep-rooted political restructuring.
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December 1984, shortly before his selection as party leader in March 1985.11
Perestroika (restructuring) was conceived as a long-term programme for socio-
12economic modernisation. Implemented from the top down, the new strategy for 
economic progress was expected to improve the quality of Soviet economic and social 
life markedly by the year 2000. Initial reforms were geared to regenerate economic 
growth through the rapid increase of market participation and the downgrading of 
centralised planning. Glasnost (openness) was to provide the catalyst for the Soviet 
Union’s progressive development.13 Through the relaxation of censorship, Soviet 
society was expected to learn from past mistakes and to develop new solutions to old 
problems. Under glasnost, new opportunities for critical analyses and creative thinking 
were expected to mobilise social participation in the reform process at the grass roots 
level.
Links between domestic and foreign policy were also strengthened,14 and the 
ideas associated with perestroika and glasnost were extended to form the basis of New 
Political Thinking. Gorbachev’s new approach to international affairs emphasised the 
de-ideologisation of inter-state relations, greater reliance upon political means for 
resolving conflicts, participating in the international capitalist economy and prioritising 
universal values over class struggle. At the national level, respect for state sovereignty 
over domestic affairs was officially reaffirmed, thereby confirming the right of ruling 
elites in socialist-oriented states to exercise exclusive control over internal military, 
political, economic and development matters, without fear of external intervention.15 
The primacy of national interests was also sanctioned, thereby confirming in theory the 
right of ruling elites to shape the national interests in practice, without regard to 
external or internal political opposition (Gorbachev 1987:221). In time, however,
11 In a speech to ideological party workers on 10 December 1984, Gorbachev publicly advocated 
"Glasnost" (openness) and "Uskorenie" (acceleration), in conjunction with plans for radical economic and 
social transformation (Sakwa 1990:6-7).
12 See Sutela (1991), Cooper (1991) and Sakwa (1990) on perestroika and Soviet economic reform
13 See Sakwa (1990) and White (1990) on Glasnost.
14 See Pravda (1990) on linkage.
15 Gorbachev (1987:177) maintained that every nation was entitled to choose its own way o f development, 
to determine its own fate and to dispose o f its own territorial possessions, including human and natural 
resources.
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universalist goals and nationalist aims conflicted and gave rise to certain problems in 
the Soviet Union’s relationship with non-capitalist states like Ethiopia.
The New Thinking directives on newly liberated countries and socialist-oriented
thstates set out in 1986 by the CPSU in the 27 Communist Party Programme reaffirmed 
traditional commitments but also demonstrated evidence of Gorbachev’s new direction. 
CPSU guidelines still advocated the notion of developing a stronger world socialist 
system, but this was to be accomplished by establishing cooperative relations with 
capitalist-oriented developing countries. The Party still affirmed support for newly 
liberated countries struggling against neo-colonialism and imperialism, but the CPSU 
programme stipulated that relations with such countries would be based upon strict 
respect for their independence and equality. The Party confirmed that relations with 
revolutionary-democratic parties in newly liberated countries were deepening, but also 
sanctioned the cultivation of relations with any national-progressive parties adopting 
anti-imperialist and patriotic positions. The CPSU unreservedly stressed the Soviet 
Union's continued commitment to political and economic cooperation with socialist- 
oriented states, but maintained that each state should assume the primary responsibility 
for its own social transformation (CDSP, 1986, v 38, Special Supplement:20-22).
Eventually, Gorbachev's universalist rhetoric and radical prescriptions for 
domestic reform and improving relations with powerful capitalist states in effect 
eliminated ideological and practical necessities for the Soviet Union to cultivate special 
relations with socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia. In this respect, the recognition of 
global interdependence, the de-ideologisation of inter-state relations, and the 
prioritisation of universal human values were particularly important.
Recognition of global interdependence
Gorbachev's official recognition of global interdependence fundamentally 
undermined traditionalist notions of revolutionary development and economic progress 
in socialist-oriented states. His new emphasis on the political resolution of 
international conflict made the Marxist-Leninist explanation for supporting national 
liberation movements and socialist-oriented governments engaged in regional conflict
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obsolete.16 In line with perestroika, attempts to re-vitalise socialist economies through 
integration into the world capitalist economy invalidated traditional arguments that the 
Soviet Union should maintain preferential economic links with socialist-oriented states 
like Ethiopia.
Political and military support
Gorbachev's new emphasis upon the political resolution of regional conflict 
challenged the traditional argument that revolutionary national liberation movements 
were socially progressive and should be supported by the Soviet Union. Progressive 
analysts like Tsaglov, Mirsky, Kolosov, Primakov and Arbatov also mounted 
convincing justifications for changing the old way of thinking. Tsagolov (1988:145) 
argued that evidence accumulated in the 1980s indicated that the highest wave for the
17world revolutionary process and socialist-orientation was over. He believed that 
internal drives for national liberation were actually social revolutions brought on by the 
evolution of antagonistic classes and that revolution matured within a given society, not 
in relations between the colonies and mother countries. For these reasons, he thought 
that Soviet analysts should concentrate on explaining the common problems 
encountered during the formation of revolutionary majorities: in particular, the 
regrouping of social forces, defending progressive achievements and establishing 
criteria for reliable, practical steps that should be taken by revolutionary democratic 
movements. He recommended that Soviet analysts rethink the entire theoretical concept 
of socialist-orientation, starting from the present alignment of class forces and their 
socially progressive potential. Georgi Mirsky (1988:136) also argued that anti-colonial 
struggles were over. He maintained that present realities failed to confirm the existence 
of any natural alliance between the proletariat of developed socialist countries and the 
working people of developing countries based on fraternal class solidarity.
16 Before Gorbachev, Soviet analysts saw no intrinsic merit in Third World stability. Revolutionary 
change and conflict were regarded as unavoidable and progressive. Regional conflict was viewed as the 
product o f contradictions arising from imperialist attempts to impede the revolutionary process and national 
liberation struggles to acquire self-determination (MacFarlane 1989:6-7).
17 Tsagolov (1988:145-146) regarded ebbs and flows in world revolutionary waves as normal occurrences. 
He attributed the current ebb in socialist revolutionary activity to the rejuvenation of capitalism via 
technological innovation. He believed that the former appeal of socialism as a model could be restored only 
if  its material production exceeded those levels attained by capitalism
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Andrei Kolosov (1990:36-39) claimed that Soviet military cooperation and arms 
deliveries, traditionally the heart of Soviet relations with friendly developing states, had 
actually escalated Third World regional conflict. He thought that Soviet support should 
be withdrawn completely from parties engaged in regional conflict and that the only 
real assistance Moscow should render was to promote a formula for rapid political 
settlement which would enable warring populations to determine what form of 
administration and government they preferred.
Analysts like Primakov and Arbatov also advocated new strategies for dealing 
with regional conflict. Primakov (1988:7) believed that conflicts between internal 
forces in newly developed countries had always been waged against the background of 
socialist and capitalist world systems. He thought that if extra-national elements were 
withdrawn, national reconciliation would probably occur. A study group convened by 
Arbatov in 1988, on the other hand, expressed doubts about the natural inclination of 
internal forces in newly developed countries to reconcile their differences without 
external intervention. The group concluded that Soviet-American co-operation in 
regional conflict management would be necessary to bring about national reconciliation 
in a substantial number of cases.18
The views of these progressive analysts, in turn, were reflected in official 
policy. During the Gorbachev era, Soviet officials increasingly advocated greater Soviet 
participation in mediation efforts between warring national liberation movements and 
regional consultations with the United States and the United Nations. In 1991, 
Gorbachev formally confirmed his intention to reduce military involvement in Africa 
and to increase the Soviet Union’s diplomatic participation in the political resolution of 
conflict situations (USSR 1991:129-131).
Economic Cooperation
Gorbachev's official recognition of economic interdependence and the
18 In May 1988, results o f a three-year joint study on the demilitarization of East-West competition were 
released by a group of Soviet analysts, led by Arbatov and American experts. The authors recommended 
that Soviet officials end traditional military support for national liberation movements and that American 
officials stop military activities aimed at overthrowing communist governments. They also urged both 
powers to agree formally not to send troops, proxy groups, volunteers or covert paramilitary forces into 
conflicts, nor to send more than about 200 military advisers to developing countries (Washington Post, 6 
May 1988).
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dominance of the world capitalist system eventually undermined traditional arguments 
that preferential arrangements should characterise economic relations between the 
Soviet Union and socialist-oriented states. Nevertheless, mixed views about economic 
cooperation prevailed for most of the New Thinking era. In the last two years of 
Gorbachev’s administration, however, criticisms of Soviet economic relations with 
socialist-oriented states intensified, and new strategies aimed at ending preferential ties 
were adopted. Soviet views about economic relations with African states in the 
Gorbachev era demonstrate this.
In the early period of New Thinking, Lopatov (1987:110-111) maintained that 
the Soviet Union aimed to reduce the dependency of African states upon Western 
markets, but he also emphasised the importance of accommodating the interests of both 
groups of officials in each particular arrangement. With regard to trade, three aims 
were deemed to be particularly important: exchanging goods on a mutually beneficial 
basis, building trade relations based upon genuine equality and mutual respect, and 
conducting trade on a balanced basis. His review of Soviet attitudes towards the 
disbursal of humanitarian and development aid to African states at the time strongly 
implied that Soviet officials still favoured economic cooperation rather than charitable 
donation. He claimed that development aid was still viewed largely as a collaborative 
effort and that the central premise of economic cooperation rested in the notion that 
assistance should aim to promote self-reliance in recipient states.19 In his view, Soviet 
economic assistance to African countries still focused upon modernisation achieved by 
industrialisation. Consequently, more than 75% of all Soviet economic and technical 
aid destined to African states had been allocated to industry and energy (Lopatov 
1987:139).
Lopatov (1987:126-181) also described six areas of Soviet assistance provision 
and listed some specific responsibilities that recipient states were expected to assume in 
project ventures. His observations strongly implied that the principal categories of 
development aid projects favoured by Soviet elites in Brezhnev day remained very 
much in evidence in Gorbachev's time. First, Soviet officials conducted planning 
exercises and were actively engaged in prospecting for energy sources. Second, they
19 In theory, anyway, Soviet organisations, as a rule, were only supposed to perform jobs that their 
partners in recipient states were unable to do at a given time in history (Lopatov 1987:126-129).
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supplied equipment complexes, accessories, spare parts and materials that were not 
produced locally. Third, they provided specialists for the construction, assembly and 
maintenance of equipment. Fourth, they provided assistance for leaders to form 
national organisations to administer planning, construction and research activities and 
national geological services. Fifth, they provided training opportunities and facilities for 
local personnel. Finally, they sent advisors and consultants into individual African 
countries to advise on various development matters. In exchange, African governments 
were expected to hire and pay local workers, to acquire local building materials, to 
cover transport expenses for Soviet project materials from the port of entry to the local 
construction site and to underwrite various operating expenses associated with specific 
development projects.
During the same period, however, progressive views that advocated changing 
traditional approaches to economic cooperation gained considerable ground. In respect 
of trade, New Thinking strategists favoured cultivating economic ties with a wide 
variety of developing countries and a readiness to enter into trade relations with any 
country willing to cooperate on an equitable and mutually beneficial basis (Danilov 
1986:52-54). In line with the new approach, considerable importance was attached to 
forming strong trading links with Third World capitalist-oriented states (Albright 
1991:44-46; USSR 1990 and USSR 1991). The new policy guidelines, in effect, 
signalled an end to concessional trade exchanges that had formerly been justified on 
ideological grounds. Under the new system of mutually advantageous trade 
arrangements, Soviet officials were fully prepared to downgrade sales of goods and 
services deemed to be vital to ruling elites of socialist-oriented states if the costs 
became too high.
Similarly, New Thinking approaches undermined traditional policy frameworks 
for extending humanitarian and development aid to socialist-oriented states on the basis 
of common socialist affinities. In respect of humanitarian assistance, Gorbachev’s 
administration became increasingly concerned about the food problem in African states. 
In addition to charitable aid given to Ethiopia (estimated at around US$150 million) in 
the 1984/1985 famine, Lopatov (1987:153-161) claimed that the Soviet Union was 
providing additional assistance to combat famine in African states by improving water 
resource management and boosting agricultural production. Projects funded for this
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purpose included the building of dams and various irrigation systems, land 
developments and setting up state agricultural and animal farms. As regards 
development assistance, Lopatov (1987:160) maintained that that New Thinking 
objectives envisaged increasing the value of agro-industrial projects to 20 percent of 
Soviet Union’s total assistance to the region.
Soviet officials like Pyotr Koshelev (1987:33) pointed out that Gorbachev’s new 
approach was geared towards combating the cause of backwardness, rather than 
remedying its results. To this end, four priorities for African agricultural development 
were established, and he claimed that Moscow was providing assistance to the 
Ethiopian government in respect of each one. First, governments were encouraged to 
recognise the importance of inaugurating new farmland and obtaining the 
comprehensive use of water resources. Second, leaders were urged to recognise the 
positive benefits of mechanised agriculture and the importance of building maintenance 
and repair centres for farm machinery and equipment. Third, considerable emphasis 
was placed upon constructing adequate storage and processing facilities and improving 
sea fishing. Finally, leaders were encouraged to train African farm specialists.
Soviet criticisms of Moscow’s traditional approach to assisting non-capitalist 
states like Ethiopia had increased markedly by 1990. The change was clearly 
demonstrated in various assessments of the impact of Soviet assistance upon 
progressive internal economic development in the socialist-oriented states of sub- 
Saharan Africa. Analysts like Andrei Kolosov (1990:41) argued that countries which 
had relied primarily on Soviet co-operative economic links still remained unable to 
establish mechanisms for stable internal development, despite Moscow's assistance in 
setting up some major facilities and developing projects.
In an official report on foreign policy and diplomatic activity issued by the 
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990, shortcomings associated with Soviet 
assistance to African states under the umbrella of economic cooperation were 
identified. The 1990 report stated that New Thinking priorities included plans for
restructuring a whole range of trading, economic, technological and scientific ties with
20African states, as a consequence of past shortcomings and miscalculations. The
20 Officials reported that the Soviet Union had concluded agreements on economic and scientific 
cooperation and trade with 37 African countries. Under the umbrella o f these agreements, 348 major
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report acknowledged that traditional approaches to assisting African states had been 
superficial, links between African and capitalist economies had been underestimated, 
and the tenacity of traditional modes of production had been greatly under-rated (USSR 
1990:95).
Authors of the 1990 report also identified some important shortcomings in 
Soviet assistance policies. On the issue of suitability, analysts claimed that many of the 
projects had not been critically evaluated because they had been undertaken at the 
request of African leaders, eager for personal prestige. Since the economic bases of 
most recipient states were inadequately developed, many of the projects that had been 
implemented to facilitate African industrial and infrastructural development were of 
limited utility. Other shortcomings mentioned included the slow pace of construction, 
low technical standards and shortages of spare parts. As a consequence, Soviet officials 
argued that the economic effect of Soviet aid to sub-Saharan African was considerably 
less promising than originally envisaged (USSR 1990:96).
The declining importance attached to the provision of economic assistance to 
African states on ideological grounds was clearly demonstrated in the second official 
report on foreign policy and diplomatic activity issued by the USSR Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 1991. Soviet officials reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
abandoned the ‘ideologised and predominantly spendthrift character’ of assistance 
programmes in favour of a ‘model of mutually beneficial links’ (USSR 1991:130-131).
Under the new policy guidelines, the importance of development was eclipsed
by a new emphasis upon increasing political assistance for conflict resolution and
* 21 reducing the Soviet military presence in the region. Under the new guidelines for
economic cooperation, Soviet officials planned to jettison old structures of economic
cooperation and transplant trade and economic links with African states into a ‘new,
economically justified framework’ (USSR 1991:129-131).
projects had been completed and an additional 300 were in the process o f being built or designed (USSR 
1990: 96).
21 In the 1991 report, officials o f Gorbachev's administration confirmed that in 1990 the USSR had 
granted no further credits to sub-Saharan African countries for military assistance (USSR 1991:130-131).
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The de-ideologisation of inter-state relations.
Gorbachev's decision to de-ideologise inter-state relations undermined 
traditionalist notions that socialist-oriented states should cultivate preferential political 
links with the Soviet Union and other states in the world socialist system. His 
recognition that governments in sovereign states were responsible for their own 
domestic development reduced Soviet responsibilities for underwriting radical political 
regimes with militaristic policies that also implemented controversial development 
schemes.
Lev Entin (1988), for example, maintained that African state formation was an 
exceedingly complex and difficult process. He thought that sovereign states, 
encumbered with enormous official bureaucracies, were being built in Africa before 
nations had been created, and he believed that the persistence of traditional structures, 
institutions, notions and ideals would impede the creation of national states. Entin 
acknowledged that some African socialist-oriented states had attempted to reorganise 
state machinery and to extend citizen participation, but he maintained that the radical 
progressive reforms originally envisaged had never materialised. He concluded that 
most African states were governed by autocratic regimes under the leadership of one 
individual who retained a monopoly of power as head of state and party leader.
Specialists like Kolosov (1990:37) also criticised the actions of autocratic 
leaders in socialist-oriented states. He argued that leaders who were involved in 
regional conflict were not actively pursuing political settlement. He believed that in 
many cases, political elites were actually at war with their own people. Kolosov 
doubted that autocrats who had co-operated with Soviet leaders before Gorbachev 
could respond positively to the ideological restructuring of inter-state relations 
advocated under New Thinking.
The new emphasis on state sovereignty also undermined traditional arguments 
that Soviet assistance was necessary for progressive social transformation in socialist- 
oriented states. There was an increased awareness that indigenous factors affected the 
socialisation process and a growing concern about the potential utility of Soviet 
prescriptions for socialist development in African states.
Entin (1988) argued that selecting appropriate models of social development in 
African states was constrained by the elitist composition of the ruling coalitions. He
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argued that backwardness and rudimentary productive forces precluded the formation of 
diverse social strata. Consequently, ruling coalitions tended to be made up of political 
activists drawn from the intermediate (median) strata. He believed that the gaps 
between the political elites of the intermediate strata and peasants who accounted for 80 
to 90 percent of the population remained extremely wide.
Entin (1988:47) maintained that even after development models were selected, 
opportunities for restructuring social processes in African states would remain limited 
as a consequence of adverse internal factors: in particular, the limited availability of 
material and financial resources, the lack of skilled personnel, the presence of 
traditionalist-oriented populations, and the tendency of ruling elites to advocate 
unviable plans of development. He believed that the inability of ruling elites to fulfil 
the expectations of the population would eventually diminish their internal social 
support and that those in power would respond by repressing public discontent, thereby 
alienating the vast majority of the population even further.
Polyakov (1990:84) was sceptical about the viability of New Thinking 
development rhetoric with its emphasis upon agricultural progress obtained through the 
peasantry. He believed that what had been presented to the world as perestroika was 
essentially Stalinism with a new face. He argued that despite a liberalised rhetoric 
advocating new models, Moscow's old principle of ‘follow me’ had changed very little. 
He claimed, for example, that Gorbachev's new found enthusiasm for privatisation in 
Ethiopia was basically a restatement of previous recommendations made by the World 
Bank and other international institutions. As regards the practical viability of Moscow 
recommending substantial policy changes favouring Ethiopian peasants, he argued that 
Soviet ministries were ill equipped to undertake new policy based research and would 
probably find it very difficult to discard old principles in favour of more pragmatic 
ones. In respect of Gorbachev's new veneration for the peasant sector, Polyakov argued 
that the Soviet Union was pushing a strategy of development upon Ethiopia which it 
had yet to try out on itself.
Alexei Kiva (1991:30-33) openly acknowledged the failure of the Soviet model 
of socialist orientation. He maintained that even the most progressive regimes 
associated with the model had eventually turned into military and police dictatorships. 
Kiva also believed that the Soviet model of ‘barracks-type socialism’ which had been
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duplicated by many countries had actually bankrupted indigenous development efforts. 
He maintained that former Soviet leaders had been so enraptured with the myth of 
capitalism's limited utility for self-development and its certain replacement by 
communism that they had failed to notice the dead-end nature of the Soviet model. He 
attributed this oversight to ‘...ideology's dead letter distorting politics which, in its turn, 
distorted the economy and the nation's whole life’.
The prioritisation of universal human values.
Gorbachev's stress on universal humanitarian values and issues, in effect, 
challenged the wisdom of supporting ruling elites in socialist-oriented states like 
Ethiopia who continued to implement decisions that adversely affected segments of the 
population. Analysts like Andrei Zagorsky and Yuri Kashlev (1990:62-63) maintained 
that that advocates of New Thinking in the Soviet Union were becoming increasingly 
aware of the relationship that existed between a state's international prestige and the 
human rights policies practised by its ruling elite.
CONCLUSION
In the Brezhnev era, serious attempts were made to restructure traditional 
explanations about developing countries and Soviet priorities in Third World 
relationships. Innovative ideas like the theory of socialist-orientation were introduced in 
an effort to remedy past failures to develop an effective theory of socialist 
transformation, to design a viable model of socio-economic development and to secure 
permanent political commitment from revolutionary democrats for the Soviet Union 
and the world socialist system. For a time, Soviet appraisals of the global correlation of 
forces and the Soviet Union’s increased military capabilities enhanced ideological and 
strategic prospects for the successful implantation of socialist-orientation in African 
states like Ethiopia, where radical revolutionary leaders had expressed a desire to 
pursue non-capitalist paths of development.
Subsequently, a number of Soviet analysts sought to explain anomalies that had 
been identified in respect of internal developments in socialist-oriented states.
Although divergent viewpoints persisted, a general consensus gradually emerged in the 
analyses of the internal and external relations of non-capitalist states like Ethiopia. Of
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these, the acknowledgement of an internationalised world market, the recognition of 
economic differentiation among developing countries, and the acceptance of a global 
division of labour were especially important.
Well in advance of Perestroika, traditional perspectives about the importance of 
economic links between socialist-oriented states and the Soviet Union were changing, 
largely as a consequence of the recognition of a global economy, a growing awareness 
of the positive benefits associated with capitalist transactions and the realisation that 
backwardness in developing countries could no longer be blamed exclusively upon 
imperialist ventures undertaken by capitalist states. Consequently, the theoretical 
foundations were laid for a different prescription of development in socialist-oriented 
states that ultimately affected the conduct of Soviet relations with ruling elites like 
Mengistu in Ethiopia. Although not generally applied in the pre-Gorbachev period, the 
mixed economic model later resurfaced as a prototype recommended for progressive 
economic development in socialist-oriented states in accordance with the principles of 
perestroika.
Despite considerable theoretical and tactical innovation, however, the practical 
conduct of Soviet relations with socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia continued to be 
formulated in line with Marxist-Leninist notions of East-West rivalry and the ultimate 
triumph of the socialist world system. Prescriptions advocated for military, political, 
economic and social success continued to reflect the hostile, competitive nature of east- 
west relations. Consequently, throughout the Brezhev era, Moscow’s preferred 
strategies for conducting relations with socialist-oriented states remained focused upon 
giving tactical advice to ruling elites aimed at consolidating state power through the 
centralisation of administrative structures and strengthening political ties through the 
creation of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties, providing military assistance to 
revolutionary democratic governments, conducting trade in line with the principles of 
economic cooperation, and providing development assistance for large-scale, 
collaborative ventures aimed at socialist transformation.
In Gorbachev’s time, the radical restructuring of domestic and foreign policy 
under perestroika, glasnost and New Thinking had a decisive bearing on Soviet 
perspectives about developing countries and eventually provided the much-needed 
opportunity to downgrade the special involvement with socialist-oriented states like
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Ethiopia. Soviet Third World analysts, of course, continued to hold divergent views 
about Moscow’s involvement with the various categories of Third World states 
throughout the Gorbachev era, and the blending of traditional and progressive elements 
varied substantially. Nevertheless, approaches that advocated expanding the Soviet 
Union’s relations with a wide variety of capitalist-oriented states and contracting 
existing relations with socialist-oriented states gained considerable ground. More 
importantly, analysts like Brutents, Primakov and Yakovlev who were associated with 
the new views became politically active and occupied important positions in 
Gorbachev’s administration.
Ideas about global interdependence, the de-ideologisation of inter-state relations 
and the prioritisation of universal human values were particularly important in 
legitimising the changes. The recognition of global interdependence undermined the 
utility of supporting national liberation forces and socialist-oriented governments 
engaged in regional conflict and maintaining preferential economic links with socialist- 
oriented administrations. The de-ideologisation of inter-state relations removed 
traditional justifications for supporting radical political regimes that implemented 
controversial domestic programmes for socialist transformation. The prioritisation of 
universal human values eroded traditionalist beliefs that class conflict would initiate 
progressive social change and made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to support 
publicly the activities of ruling elites who implemented dubious policies in respect of 
the population.
In conclusion, Soviet analyses of domestic conditions and the conduct of 
relations with socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia changed markedly over time. 
Officials, as well as analysts, recognised the need to take domestic complexities into 
account and to assess the interests of radical leaders in socialist-oriented states more 
carefully. Nevertheless, a confusing mixture of old and new theories and practices 
prevailed. As we shall see in the following chapters, the shifting balance between old 
and new views and recommendations made the restructuring of Soviet relations with 
socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia inevitable.
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CHAPTER TWO 
ASYMMETRY, INTERESTS AND EXPLOITATION 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines ideas about asymmetry, interests and exploitation. It 
begins at a general level by considering three perspectives on the dynamics of 
asymmetric exchange operating between powerful and weak partners, with a view to 
establishing some general criteria for analysing the patterns of exchange between the 
Soviet Union and Ethiopia. Part two looks at regional factors prompting African ruling 
elites to alter experiments in Marxist-styled socialism. In part three, issues specific to 
the case study are examined. I look at some contrasting opinions regarding asymmetry 
and exploitation in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship.
PART ONE: PATTERNS OF ASYMMETRIC EXCHANGE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN 
POWERFUL AND WEAK STATES.
Three views on the dynamics of asymmetric exchange generally operating in 
special relationships between powerful and weak states are particularly useful in 
considering the relationship between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia: Johan Galtung's 
ideas about Center-Periphery relations, Claude Ake's analysis of relations between 
bourgeois and proletarian states and the views of Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett 
about the consequences of capital intensive militarisation.
In ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism' published just a few years before the 
formation of the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship, Johan Galtung (1971) attempted to 
explain the dynamics of asymmetric interaction in bilateral relationships made up of 
powerful (‘Center’) and weak (Periphery) states. He was particularly interested in how 
the Center state dominated such relationships, even in the absence of purposeful intent. 
He assumed that interactions between powerful and weak states had value and that they 
could be classified as symmetric or asymmetric on the basis of the costs/benefits 
assessments rendered for each state in the relationship. Symmetric or equal interactions 
existed when interactions were deemed to benefit both states about equally.
Asymmetric or unequal interactions applied when one state was deemed to benefit 
considerably more than the other.
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Galtung (1971:303; 1980:119-121) was especially concerned with the dynamics 
of asymmetric interaction in bilateral relationships between Center and Periphery states. 
To explain them, he developed a model comprised of Center and Periphery states, each 
having its own center and periphery. According to Galtung, the Center state was able to
penetrate the periphery state by establishing a bridgehead in the center of the
22Periphery. In order for the bridgehead to function, two conditions had to be met.
First, a harmony of interests had to exist between the centers of the Center state and the
23Periphery state, and the bridgehead had to be kept at a high standard of living.
Second, the gap between the living conditions of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in the 
Periphery state had to be greater than those in the Center state.24 Once established, the 
bridgehead was expected to play a crucial role in the process of imperialism and to 
facilitate the penetration of the Periphery state via the Center state’s ideology. Over 
time, the Periphery state would became dependent on the Center state, but the resulting 
dependency would be generated in accordance with the needs of the bridgehead. 
Consequently, the needs of the Periphery state would become synonymous with the 
needs of its ruling elite.
Galtung developed a system for classifying categories of imperialism based on 
his own ideas about the respective inputs provided by Center and Periphery states. He 
refused to assign priorities on the grounds that all categories of imperialism were 
equally important, any combination of categories could co-exist simultaneously and any 
single category could initiate the entire imperialist process. He identified six categories
25of imperialism: economic, political, military, communications, cultural and social.
Some of the views that Galtung (1971:309-311) held about political, military, economic 
and social imperialism are also useful for identifying the negative aspects of
22 Galtung (1971:304) thought that the center o f the Periphery state would disengage from its own 
periphery and align with the center of the Center state. As a result, the Periphery state would become 
progressively less cohesive.
23 Galtung (1980:119) maintained that a strong coupling between the centers of the Center and Periphery 
states was essential to the implementation of the penetration mechanism His analogy was that the 
arrangement between centers should be like that between a very harmoniously structured couple who went 
up together and down together, sharing good and bad days.
24 Galtung (1980:120) expected gaps between rich and poor to exist in both states, but he thought that the 
gap would be an abyss in a Periphery country.
25 Galtung (1971:309-312) identified the first five categories in 1971. The sixth category, that o f social 
imperialism, was discussed in his book, The True Worlds, 1980:127-131.
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asymmetric exchange in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship.
Under conditions of political imperialism Center states furnished decisions and 
models, while Periphery states supplied imitators and obedience. He believed that in the 
name of modernisation and development, the centers of Center states had persuaded the 
centers of Periphery states (i.e., bridgeheads) to adopt Center models on the pretext that 
they possessed superior structures and cultures. Consequently, the centers in Periphery 
states attempted to reproduce structures and decisions imported from the ‘motherland of 
liberalism’ (USA) or the ‘fatherland of socialism’ (USSR) with more regard for their 
Center origins than their suitability for the Periphery.
In the case of military imperialism, Center states provided protection and the 
means of destruction, while Periphery states furnished the discipline and traditional 
equipment. He maintained that only Center nations had the technology to develop and 
to provide sophisticated weaponry. By overpricing the military hardware that they sold 
to Periphery states, Center states would be able to recoup financial losses if the prices 
of raw materials imported from the Periphery increased, especially when the centers of 
Periphery states were severely threatened. The centers of Center states also provided 
officers and military advisors to assist the centers of Periphery states in armed conflict. 
In contrast, the centers of Periphery states supplied the raw fighting power (rank and 
file soldiers) and less technologically advanced weaponry.
Under conditions of economic imperialism, Center states provided processing 
and the means of production, while Periphery states supplied raw materials and 
markets. He thought that economic relations between Center and Periphery states were 
likely to demonstrate patterns of asymmetric exchange, particularly in respect of 
concentration on trade partners, commodity concentration and economic dependence of 
the Periphery state on the Center state. He envisaged that the Periphery state would 
conduct most of its trade with its Center partner and that high levels of import and 
export concentration would probably characterise trade exchanges from the Periphery 
state to the Center. The Center state would remain relatively free to extend trade in 
almost any direction, but the Periphery state would become dependent on the Center, as 
a result of trade partner and commodity concentration. He also argued that trade 
between a particular Periphery state and its Center partner would account for a much 
higher percentage of the GNP for the Periphery than for the Center. As a consequence, 
the Periphery would become much more vulnerable to economic fluctuations and
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demands than the Center.
In the case of social imperialism, Centers supplied model social structures, 
while Peripheries provided reinforcement through isomorphism. Galtung (1980:130) 
believed that time-lags between the prototypes constructed by model-makers and the
models selected for replication by model-users were likely to occur, especially in
26respect of the transmission of ideological symbols. He also thought that if social 
implantation actually took place, the end product fashioned by ruling elites in Periphery 
states would never replicate the original completely. The structures of the two systems 
would appear to be alike, but in reality, they would continue to function within two 
entirely different orders.
Galtung (1981:184-185) also argued that the Soviet Union's position of 
dominance and control over client countries constituted an example of 
imperialism. He maintained that imperialist relationships between the center of 
the Soviet Union and the centers of Periphery states could exhibit net flows of 
economic benefits directed away from the Center state as well as towards it and 
that such relationships could be economically impoverishing, as well as 
enriching, for Soviet ruling elites. He thought that Soviet officials might be 
willing to endure economic losses within an imperialist relationship in order to 
maintain military and political control. He also believed that social imperialism 
aptly described the Soviet Union's endorsement of its own socio-cultural pattern 
of development as a model for organising society in other states.
Three aspects of Galtung’s theory are particularly appealing as means for 
testing the hypothesis that asymmetric patterns of exchange persisted in the 
Soviet-Ethiopian relationship. First, his view that a bridgehead in the Periphery 
state is needed to hold an asymmetric relationship together is interesting. The 
idea that ideological penetration from the Center state is facilitated by the 
Bridgehead and the notion that dependency is formed in line with the needs of 
the bridgehead, rather than the rest of the population, are useful for analysing 
this particular the case study. Second, his discussions about the patterns of 
asymmetric exchange operating under conditions of political, military, 
economic and social imperialism raise some interesting questions about the
26 His illustration of the time-lag principle involved Brazilian tramworkers carrying banners supporting 
August Comte, one hundred years after the Center states had forgotten about him.
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Soviet-Ethiopian relationship. To what extent did Moscow influence Mengistu’s 
decision to introduce structures for political administration and a constitution 
that closely resembled those existing in the Soviet Union? Was Ethiopia really 
dependent upon Soviet military assistance? Did the economic exchanges really 
benefit the Ethiopians? Did Soviet officials unduly influence Mengistu’s
in ­decision to implement large-scale development efforts aimedjmodemising the
agricultural sector and the rural population? Finally, Galtung’s charge that the
Soviet Union assumed a dominant position over client countries raises an
interesting question. Was the Soviet Union imperialistic in its relationship with
Ethiopia, despite its non-imperialist philosophy?
Nevertheless, Galtung’s theory has some serious limitations. His ideas 
about what Centre states do are interesting, but the theory is seriously deficient 
when it comes to explaining why leaders take certain kinds of actions in 
Periphery states like Ethiopia. Connections between the Bridgehead and the 
Center, for example, are made in isolation, without regard for the complex 
pressures that influence elites in developing states to form alliances with 
stronger states. His thesis of model emulation is intriguing but fails to factor in 
the Bridgehead’s independent capability for selection and utilisation to achieve 
its own ends. The views expressed by Claude Ake (1978) and Wendt and 
Barnett (1993), provide some useful insights on these issues.
Claude Ake’s theory was published in 1978, the same year as the Soviet- 
Ethiopian Friendship Treaty was agreed. As he was concentrating on Africa at the time, 
it is very likely that some of the events happening in Ethiopia shaped his views about 
radical revolutionary administrations.
Ake (1978:9-25) argued that the global economy had separated countries into 
two camps: bourgeois states, which possessed the instruments of labour by virtue of the 
ownership of capital and technology, and proletarian states, which possessed the labour 
power. He maintained that these divisions applied, regardless of ideological affinities. 
Consequently, he considered the Soviet Union to be just as much a bourgeois state as 
any developed country in the West, due to its ownership of technology.
Ake (1978:20-32) also believed that primary contradictions in the global 
economy arising in connection with the bourgeois and proletarian states constituted the 
major source of revolutionary pressure in Africa. He thought that bourgeois and
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proletarian countries were engaged in a struggle of ever increasing intensity and that 
each camp utilised an ideology which reflected its own interests. Leaders of proletarian 
countries were preoccupied with exploitation, inequality and oppression. They viewed 
international relations in terms of imperialism, neo-colonialism and unequal exchange. 
In contrast, ruling elites in bourgeois countries stressed order, peaceful co-existence, 
peaceful change, stability, unity and the struggle between East and West. Their 
dominant ideology rested on the notion that that development had already been 
achieved in bourgeois countries. Consequently, proletarian states were encouraged to 
admire and to replicate the models provided by bourgeois countries, thereby reinforcing
27their secondary position in the global economic order. In the 1970s, for example, Ake
maintained that African ruling elites were being increasingly pressured to adopt foreign
28development ideologies.
Ake (1978:26-28) argued that the powers of ruling elites in proletarian states 
were much more limited than those exercised by leaders of bourgeois states. Although 
African ruling elites had acquired political power as a consequence of decolonisation, 
the ruling classes of bourgeois countries (patrons) had managed to retain economic 
power. Within the parameters of the patron-client relationship, African ruling elites 
were forced to function in dual roles as protectors of the interests of bourgeois countries 
and political governors of the African proletariat. Consequently, relations between 
patrons and clients reflected a curious mix of consensual and conflicting interests that 
exerted a negative impact on Africa's position in the global economy.
Ake (1978:71-76) also maintained that most African elites were under 
increasing pressure to adopt repressive policies, despite rhetorical commitments to
27 As a consequence of over reliance upon external models o f development, ruling elites neglected the 
development of indigenous strategies. This made them exceedingly vulnerable to changes in the international 
system, especially when radical changes in development prescriptions were recommended by officials in 
bourgeois states (Ake 1978:30-32).
28 Ake (1993:242) maintained that pressures to adopt foreign development ideologies still prevailed in 
Africa in the 1990s. He believed that post-Cold War recommendations for the democratisation of African 
states constituted yet another example of pressures exerted on weak states to emulate models recommended 
by powerful states. He thought that indigenous efforts at African democratisation would focus on social and 
economic rights, rather than on abstract legal and political rights and that economic adversities in most 
African states would mandate considerable state intervention in the economy. He maintained that efforts at 
democratisation along these lines would overtly conflict with the values and interests held by sponsors of 
Western democratisation and that they would oppose indigenous remedies on the grounds that they were 
socialist. He believed that it was very unlikely that the process of democratization in Africa would be 
allowed to go its own way.
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radical ideologies condemning exploitation and inequality. Initially, two strategies 
were favoured to improve economic performance: the direct use of coercive power for 
expropriation and economic centralisation. Over time, both strategies proved to be 
ineffective in containing growing pressures for revolution. The direct use of coercion 
failed to redress existing economic adversities because it generally alienated the rural 
population, exaggerated the importance of political power and ultimately retarded the 
development of the material base. Strategies for expropriation, where the state extracted 
tribute from the population via centralised state organs and government monopolies 
over the marketing of primary commodities, also failed to strengthen the material base, 
because they created a regressive form of capitalism.
Since economic expropriation had failed, Ake (1978:77-81) argued that African 
ruling elites in the late 1970s had only two options left for responding to increased 
revolutionary pressures on the continent: either meeting the political and social 
demands of the population or depolitisation. He thought that African elites would be 
disinclined to opt for strategies aimed at establishing social equality and well-being 
because their power would be dislodged, and, as a consequence of limited economic 
surplus and an underdeveloped material base, there could only be marginal 
improvements. He concluded that most African ruling elites would aim to depolitise 
domestic opposition. Under those conditions, revolutionary demands would be 
discouraged; political manifestations of domestic opposition would be prevented, and 
one party states or military regimes which behaved like one party states would reduce 
the active participation of the masses. Ake predicted that depolitisation would increase 
instability, internal violence, and underdevelopment in African states, because one party 
states or military regimes had no mechanism for dislodging rulers. Consequently, 
change could only be instituted by breaking the rules. Underdevelopment would 
intensify because of the tendency of military regimes to resort to booty capitalism that 
alienated the masses from ruling elites, precluded the mobilisation of the population 
and was not conducive to African development needs.
Ake’s ideas are particularly helpful in identifying certain policies likely to be 
implemented by African heads of state in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to 
external and internal pressures, regardless of capitalist or socialist alliances. In respect 
of development, for example, the notion that patron states, regardless of ideological 
persuasion, pressure client states to emulate approved strategies on the grounds of
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superiority is particularly interesting, given Ethiopia’s former relationship with the 
United States and Haile Selassie’s capitalistic ventures undertaken in that period. Ake’s 
description of the domestic policies likely to be implemented by African leaders in 
response to internal pressures are also important to consider. If his views are right, then 
policies aimed at economic centralisation, the augmentation of state power, the creation 
of one party states and the depolitisation of domestic opposition by military means 
constituted a normal response to internal crisis by African leaders in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, rather than strategies imposed externally by a Patron state like the Soviet 
Union.
Two main problems exist with Ake’s theory, however. In the first instance, like 
Galtung, he focuses on one side of the story at the expense of the other. The interests of 
ruling elites in Africa are carefully explained, but he ignores analysis of the dynamics 
operating in patron-client relationships. Second, Ake’s theory does not accommodate 
change very easily. His ideas about the impact of external and internal pressures upon 
African leaders are interesting but they do not provide us with a framework for 
understanding increased complexities and a changing world order in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett’s theory about asymmetry in 
capital-intensive militarisation provides a useful insight on this issue.
Two years after the demise of both Soviet and Ethiopian empires, Alexander 
Wendt and Michael Barnett examined the dynamics of military exchange between 
strong and weak states in the late twentieth century. Wendt and Barnett (1993:336-341) 
believed that a fundamentally asymmetrical global military culture existed which was 
shaping Third World military development in different ways than would be the case if it 
were absent. They argued that the modem army, characterised by professionalism and
29technologism, had become one of the most important symbols of the modem state. 
They also maintained that a global security culture had socialised third world elites to 
attach a high symbolic value to advanced weapons technology that could only be 
provided by powerful states in the international system.
Wendt and Barnett (1993:321-326) advanced the hypothesis that in the late 
20th century ruling elites in weak and powerful states alike wanted to acquire capital­
29 Professionalism concerned the actual military establishment, especially those parts that helped to keep 
ruling elites in place. Technologism referred to the symbolic valuation o f advanced technology over 
alternative technology.
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30intensive militarisation, rather than labour-intensive militarisation. However, they 
viewed threats to national security differently. In developed states, officials viewed 
national security threats as primarily external, while the leaders of most Third World 
states perceived national security threats to be internal. Consequently, the acquisition of 
capital-intensive militarisation exerted a decisive impact on the process of state 
formation in most developing countries because of its considerable potential for 
controlling domestic opposition.
In respect of state formation, Wendt and Barnett (1993:322) identified three 
structures of dominance shaping the national security interests of ruling elites in Third 
World states. First, dependence on a global economy tended to create weak regimes 
that viewed the bulk of the population as security threats, rather than assets. Second, 
dependence upon external security assistance tended to produce elites whose definitions 
of security reflected the concerns of their external patrons and ignored the needs of the 
resident population. Third, dependence upon a global military culture shaped Third 
World ruling elites’ ideas about what should constitute a modem army, despite the 
exorbitant costs incurred in the process of modernisation.
Wendt and Barnett (1993:334-336) also maintained that Great Power authority 
had penetrated third world states to a considerable extent through the formation of 
hierarchical structures of informal empire. Within informal empires, interactions 
between sovereign states were characterised by the dominant or powerful state having a 
significant degree of de facto political authority over the security policies of the weak 
state and by the availability of local actors willing to act on behalf of the powerful state. 
Dominant states created informal empires either to secure a political base for economic 
expansion or to block the penetration of rival powers in geo-politically sensitive areas. 
By virtue of ‘arms for influence’ trade-offs, particular local actors gained the military 
means to assert power over rival contenders. Informal empires also adversely affected 
the process of state formation in weak states because local elites relied upon external 
military support to keep indigenous opposition under control, rather than resolving 
differences through political accommodation. Moreover, dominant states typically
30 They defined capital-intensive militarisation (CIM) as the accumulation of capacity for organized 
violence (i.e., military build-up) through modem, advanced weapons systems and a small core of highly 
skilled soldiers. In contrast, labour-intensive militarisation (LIM) was defined as military build-up 
characterised by low levels o f sophisticated weaponry and large-scale deployment o f unskilled people's 
armies or militias.
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adopted a two-pronged strategy for providing military assistance to Third World ruling 
elites that encouraged military dependency of the latter, even though this particular 
outcome was not always intended. The first tactic was to limit clients' access to 
weapons that might actually enable them to defeat or to deter military intervention such 
as weapons capable of mass destruction. The second tactic was to provide access to 
technologies that would encourage Third World ruling elites to divert scarce domestic 
resources towards the acquisition of capital-intensive militarisation.
The strength of the theory of militarisation offered by Wendt and Barnett rests 
in its potential for explaining the security motivations of ruling elites in powerful and 
weak states and describing the dynamics of modem military asymmetry. Its strength, of 
course, is also its greatest weakness. That is to say, the theory is specialised and can 
only be used to analyse the security dimension of the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship.
These three views of Johan Galtung, Claude Ake. Alexander Wendt and 
Michael Barnett provide good starting points for the analysis of asymmetry and 
interests in relationships between strong and weak states generally, but they do not 
consider the consequences of ideological bonding and disengagement sufficiently.
These issues are addressed in part two.
PART TWO: CHANGING AFRICAN INTERESTS IN SOVIET-STYLE SOCIALISM.
It is vital to consider how the interests of elites in weak states change. The 
changing responses of African elites to Marxist ideology and Soviet-styled prescriptions 
for state governance, for example, serve as useful indicators for charting some of 
Mengistu’s responses in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship.
Ethiopia was not the only country in Africa to pursue and to abandon 
experiments in Soviet-styled socialism. Arnold Hughes (1992a:9-l 1) points out that in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, African ruling elites in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania 
and Zambia selectively applied Marxist-Leninist development strategies to facilitate 
modernisation and economic progress. These first-wave leaders in populist or African 
socialism, however, were selective in the Soviet-styled rhetoric and policy prescriptions 
that they adopted. They favoured centralised state structures, command economies, 
egalitarian social policies, anti-imperialist rhetoric and support for broad-based 
movements engaged in anti-colonial struggles, but ignored policies associated with 
scientific socialism, especially those that emphasised distinct class divisions, inter-class
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conflict and the formation of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties with explicit party 
programmes. First-wave experiments were largely unsuccessful. The Soviet-styled 
models that had been imported failed to increase productivity or to stimulate economic 
growth. Moreover, as a consequence of their populist affinities and the selective nature 
of their socialist experiments, proponents of African socialism received very limited 
support from the Soviet Union or China. As a result, most first-wave African socialist
31regimes had been swept away or retreated into isolation by the end of the 1960s.
Hughes (1992a: 10-11) maintains that African leaders in the 1970s attributed the 
failures of their experiments in Soviet-styled socialism to three shortcomings. First, 
they thought that too much importance had been attached to the idea of forming broad- 
based coalitions for socialist transformation. Second, they realised that opportunities 
for non-capitalist development had been severely constrained by a combination of 
domestic and external factors: in particular, high opportunism among leadership groups, 
low popular support for socialist ideas, weak state institutions and massive needs for 
Western economic assistance. Third, they recognised that that prospects for the 
successful implementation of African or populist socialism had been sharply reduced as 
a consequence of the very low levels of external assistance and support received from 
powerful socialist states like the Soviet Union and China.
Armed with this knowledge, Afro-Marxist regimes that appeared in the mid-
321970s decided that that scientific socialism, with its clear-cut models for political, 
economic and social organisation, held out real prospects for modernisation and 
progressive development on the continent and could offset the shortcomings associated 
with earlier failures. Consequently, they were willing to use Marxist-Leninist rhetoric 
that emphasised distinct class divisions and inter-class conflict to establish vanguard 
parties with explicit party programmes and to strengthen the power of the state through 
the importation of Soviet political and economic administrative structures. In this way, 
they hoped to bring about progressive development and social modernisation and to
31 Three prominent first wave socialist regimes were swept away within as many years: Bella in Algeria 
(1965), Nkrumah in Ghana (1966) and Keita in Mali (1968). Others like Guinea opted for isolation 
(Hughes 1992a:9-10).
32 Hughes (1992a: 9-11) maintained that two parallel routes towards a more orthodox Marxism emerged in 
Africa in the mid-1970s. The Afro-Marxist route was directly associated with military takeovers and 
revolutionary military regimes. The Afro Communist route was associated with indigenous movements that 
ultimately evolved along Marxist-Leninist paths. See also Simpson (1989) and Halliday (1983).
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avoid the failures associated with their first-wave socialist predecessors. More 
importantly, by demonstrating a firm commitment to the principles of scientific 
socialism, African officials in socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia hoped to acquire 
development assistance provided by the Soviet Union and other socialist states.
Hughes’s discussion of changing African interests provides an interesting 
account of the attempts made by leaders to alter Soviet-styled policies underpinned by 
Marxist ideology in ways that would secure their interests. It is equally vital, however, 
to consider why ruling elites in developing countries lost interest in Soviet prescriptions 
for progress. Here, Forrest Colburn's and Dessalegn Rahmato's analysis of the problems 
associated with implanting Soviet-styled socialism in Africa is particularly useful. Their 
discussion contributes substantially to the analysis of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, 
because it highlights some of the crucial structural constraints impeding Mengistu’s 
efforts to implement socialist transformation and helps us to understand some of the 
reasons underlying his decision to abandon Ethiopia’s experiment in scientific 
socialism in 1990.33
Colburn and Rahmato (1992) claimed that Marxist leaders were unable to 
realise their socialist objectives as a consequence of several problems. To begin with, 
they believed that the majority of Third World revolutions had been fought to dislodge 
the old order, rather than to introduce socialism. Consequently, post-revolutionary 
regimes had to persuade, to force or to entice their populations to accept the changes 
mandated for socialist development. Another issue was that most developing countries 
had a limited capacity for economic development, but socialist prescriptions for 
economic progress had dramatically increased the state's responsibilities. Consequently, 
the costs incurred by post-revolutionary regimes in centralising state control over 
economic activity generally exceeded the benefits, because leaders inevitably lost 
political support whenever domestic economic conditions deteriorated. A third issue 
rested in the fact that most post-revolutionary regimes remained dependent on the 
generation of export revenue to pay for imports. The poorer the country adopting 
socialism was, the more dependent it tended to become upon external economic 
transactions.
33 Colburn and Rahmato (1992:160) acknowledged that decision-making and leadership in revolutionary 
regimes were important, but their analysis centred on six structural propositions deemed to impede the 
successful inplantation o f scientific socialism in Third World states.
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Colburn and Rahmato (1992) believed that widening gaps between modem and 
traditional sectors constituted another serious problem for post revolutionary 
governments. Contradictions in revolutionary equality were inherent in developing 
countries, and revolutionary governments had to allocate resources disproportionately 
in order to initiate economic recovery. Consequently, Third World elites tended to 
commandeer resources and to redirect them to the modem sector where the potential for 
productivity was deemed to be greatest, at the expense of the traditional sector where 
they were most needed. Strategies of this sort intensified agrarian problems because 
revolutionary socialist regimes invariably alienated peasant populations by raising taxes 
and enforcing collectivisation. Moreover, pro-socialist post-revolutionary regimes 
tended to favour the industrial sector and to inflict costly changes upon the peasant 
population.
Excessive reliance upon military means to control the population constituted the 
final problem analysed by Colburn and Rahmato (1992). They concluded that Third 
World revolutionary regimes almost always had to escalate military expenditure to stay 
in power. Leaders had to contend with escalations in domestic opposition, as a 
consequence of rising, unfulfilled political and economic expectations. Consequently, 
most ruling elites had to harden post-revolutionary policies in order to stay in power.
The analyses provided by Hughes, Colburn and Dessalegn Rahmato provide 
useful insights about policy problems associated with ideological bonding and 
ideological disengagement. In the case of Ethiopia, they provide some useful guidelines 
for identifying the pressures Mengistu faced after the revolution that were exacerbated 
by his decision to adopt Soviet-styled ideologies, structures and prescriptions to secure 
Ethiopia’s modernisation.
PART THREE: ASYMMETRY IN THE SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONSHIP.
Part three examines the issue of asymmetric exchange or ‘who exploited whom’ 
in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship. In particular, it looks at the restructuring of 
political, military and economic relations and whether or not the Soviet Union was 
responsible for Ethiopian policies for internal development. Each side of the argument 
must be examined carefully in order to determine the balance of exploitation/ 
manipulation demonstrated in the Soviet-Ethiopian case.
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Soviet interests
One view commonly found in the literature is that the Soviet Union exploited 
Ethiopia in order to pursue its own competitive interests and that Soviet ruling elites 
disproportionately influenced and adversely affected Ethiopian strategies for 
modernisation and progressive development. The Ethiopian Unity Party (EUP), for 
example, levelled charges of imperialism against the Soviet Union in 1987 that were 
also voiced by some Western specialists in African politics.
In a radio broadcast made just one month before the official launch of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in September 1987, EUP 
spokesmen accused the Soviet government of committing a great violence to Ethiopia 
on a scale tantamount to invasion. They claimed that Moscow had turned Ethiopia into 
a colony. The Soviet Union was accused of overtly intervening in Ethiopian political, 
military, economic and development affairs and conspiring with the Derg to undermine 
the day-to-day progress of the people. On the political front, Ethiopian Unity claimed 
that Soviet officials were keeping an unpopular government in power and strengthening 
that regime's control over the Ethiopian population by allowing a carbon copy of the 
1977 Soviet constitution to become legally binding. In military matters, Moscow was 
accused of escalating regional conflict in the Horn, making Ethiopia a depot for the 
export of second-rate Soviet arms and military equipment, utilising Ethiopian territory 
for strategic purposes and determining Ethiopian military policies.34 Economically, 
Moscow was accused of expropriating raw materials to pay for arms transfers, 
providing unsuitable and unreliable equipment for Ethiopian farmlands, accepting 
famine relief donations (food and money) as payments for arms debts, and providing
35low levels of famine aid to populations at risk. In respect of development, the Soviets
34 EUP spokesmen claimed that high-ranking officials o f the Soviet army approved and controlled 
Ethiopian military and political policies. They also maintained that the Soviets had secured special strategic 
concessions in Ethiopia, especially on the Dahlak islands, situated off the Eritrean coast. Similar complaints 
about Soviet military participation in Ethiopian affairs were also launched by the EPLF in 1988. In contrast 
to the charges leveled by Ethiopian Unity regarding second rate Soviet arms, EPLF spokesmen claimed that 
Moscow had provided the Ethiopian military establishment with large numbers o f sophisticated weapons 
which had never been seen before in the region (BBC, SWB, 12 August 1987 and 13 May 1988).
35 EUP spokesmen also maintained that gold from the Adola mines in Sidamo had been used as payment 
or collateral for Soviet arms purchases and that Moscow had sold machinery to Ethiopians which was 
unsuitable, often incorrectly assembled, highly prone to breakdown, and could only be repaired with Soviet 
spare parts (BBC, SWB, 12 August 1987).
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were charged with destabilising Ethiopian society and destroying traditional Ethiopian 
cultural and religious values by the forcible implantation of Marxist-Leninist ideology 
(BBC, SWB, 12 August 1987).
These charges made by the spokesmen for Ethiopian Unity are particularly 
interesting because they reflected the views held by segments of Ethiopia’s population 
resolutely opposed to Mengistu’s administration. The criticisms seemed plausible, but 
to what extent were they valid? I shall be looking at the accusations in all four 
categories in more detail in the case study analysis that follows, but Western views 
about the exploitative nature of Soviet interests in political and military relations form 
the basis of discussion for the remainder of this section.
In respect of the political relationship between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, 
two particular issues should be examined in more detail. First, is it the case that Soviet 
officials provided Ethiopian ruling elites with prototypes for centralised structures of 
governance that consolidated the power of one particular group of radical, post 
revolutionary elites over others? Second, did Soviet officials intend to strengthen 
political ties between the two states in an asymmetric manner by pressurising the 
Ethiopians to create and to sustain a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party (MLVP) that 
would be linked to the CPSU?
In general, Western analysts' criticisms of Soviet opportunistic designs to 
acquire political influence in Ethiopia through the dissemination of Soviet-styled 
socialist administrative structures are fairly muted. This is probably because replication 
was involved, and that makes it difficult to assess Soviet intentions to influence the
36Ethiopians. Clapham (1988:230), however, maintained that Soviet officials attached 
particular importance to Ethiopia's emulation of Moscow's political model, because 
they expected Soviet-styled organisational structures to stabilise the regime and to 
facilitate its relationship with the Soviet Union.
In contrast, Western accusations that Soviet officials intended to moderate the 
activities of Ethiopian ruling elites by establishing a vanguard party linked to the CPSU 
are relatively common. Fukuyama (1987:24-35), for example, maintained that Soviet 
officials regarded the MLVP as a far more significant tactical innovation than any of the
36 Hughes (1992a: 11-12), for example, argued that African Marxist regimes had borrowed extensively 
from Soviet political language and institutional practices, but that Moscow had not physically imposed its 
form o f government upon any Afro-Marxist state.
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commonly noted policy instruments like proxy forces, a bluewater navy, tactical 
transport aviation and other military power projection capabilities that appeared in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. He believed that the potential for political organisation 
inherent in the creation of the MLVP was far more important to the Soviet Union than 
its ideological connections. In terms of political organisation, he claimed that Soviet 
officials viewed the vanguard party as a mechanism for stabilising revolutionary power 
and eventually establishing a pro-Soviet orientation in developing countries by virtue of 
its ability to provide the local regime with a firm organisational base. He also argued 
that Soviet pressures to form a vanguard party were most evident in Ethiopia. There 
ruling elites formed the Committee for Organising the Party of the Working People of 
Ethiopia (COPWE) in 1979, largely in response to Soviet demands for initiating party- 
building efforts aimed at establishing the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE).
Colin Legum and Robert Patman also support the proposition that Soviet efforts 
to influence the establishment of the WPE, Ethiopia's Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, 
were considerable.37 Legum (1987:240-243) maintained that Soviet officials regarded 
Ethiopia as the test case for MLVP strategies, designed to make the process towards 
socialist orientation irreversible through the creation of a vanguard party with strong 
Soviet connections. In support of this argument, he pointed out that the entire Soviet 
bloc provided extensive ideological training for Ethiopian officials and Marxist- 
Leninist cadres at home and abroad. Patman (1990:270) also claimed that Soviet elites 
considered the establishment of an MLVP necessary to ensure Ethiopia's continued 
progress towards socialism. To this end, the vanguard party was conceived as a 
political structure that would devolve Mengistu's power, enhance the role of Soviet 
trained cadres, and institutionalise the Soviet Union's position as Ethiopia's political 
patron.
In respect of the Soviet-Ethiopian military relationship, two issues are 
particularly important. First, did Soviet ruling elites increase the power of one 
particular group of Ethiopians after the revolution and subsequently ensure their tenure 
and their loyalty through the provision of substantial military assistance: in particular,
37 In theory, MLVPs fulfilled four functions. First, they provided a way o f forming revolutionary 
democratic alliances comprised of all classes. Second, they served as the focal point for organizational and 
ideological unity. Third, they facilitated the revolutionary transformation o f society through cadre 
instruction in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Finally, they provided links between developing countries and the 
world Communist movement (Albright 1983:217).
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technologically sophisticated weaponry, skilled Soviet military advisors and well- 
equipped surrogate troops? Second, did Soviet strategies for the management of 
regional conflict in the Horn of Africa also include plans to establish a Pax Sovietica 
made up of highly militarised, competitive powers in the region?
In respect of military assistance, Colin Legum (1987:241) believed that Ethiopia 
became the testing ground for Moscow's surrogate-intervention strategy. He pointed to 
the high risks willingly assumed by the Soviets in backing the Ethiopian revolution, and 
he maintained that the size of Moscow's military commitment there in the late 1970s 
was larger than any undertaking in the Third World, excluding Afghanistan.
As concerns Soviet aspirations for expanded spheres of influence, Patman 
(1990:190-203, 264-265) maintained that Moscow's commitment to Ethiopia in the pre- 
Gorbachev era, at least, was strongly conditioned by Soviet aspirations to establish a 
pro-Soviet confederation in the Horn that conformed in principle to the notion of a Pax
38Sovietica. Henze (1988:53-54) went a step further. He claimed that Soviet leaders 
wanted Africa to become a continent of states like Ethiopia or Angola. In this 
configuration, each state would form separate links to Moscow, and each would adopt a 
basic pro-Soviet orientation. After elites in African states had formed strong links with 
Moscow, lateral ties and international relations with other states and institutions would 
remain weak and would not infringe upon the links that had already been established 
with the Soviet Union. In respect of domestic conditions, Henze maintained that 
parallel structures of development would be implemented in African states. First 
peasants would be collectivised or employed on state farms, where they would be 
exploited as sources of wealth to sustain military and industrial expansion. Second, a 
growing urban proletariat would receive a larger share of scarce consumption goods as 
a consequence of fulfilling targets in five-year plans. Third, semi-permanent patterns of 
leadership would be established that would restrict change to narrow circles. Fourth, 
societies would operate for the benefit of a nomenklatura of bureaucrats, party officials 
and military officers. Finally, cultural and intellectual activity would be more rigidly 
circumscribed.
38 Many authors support the idea that Soviet ruling elites wanted to establish a Pax Sovietica over the 
Horn. See also discussions set out in Erlich (1988), Pascoe (1988) and Henze (1988 and 1991).
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Ethiopian priorities
The Ethiopian Unity Party may have powerful allies in its charges against the 
Soviet Union, but there are alternative views which support the hypothesis that Ethiopia 
entered into a relationship with the Soviet Union in pursuit of its own interests and 
subsequently exploited the Soviet Union in order to acquire military resources, 
blueprints for political organisation and mechanisms for dislodging feudal structures of 
economic production and social organisation. Explanations offered by Christopher 
Clapham, Marina Ottaway, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Colin Legum, Adele Jinadu, Herbert 
Block, Bonnie Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa demonstrate this.
In the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship, domestic considerations inside Ethiopia, in 
particular, had a direct bearing upon the processes of restructuring and asymmetric 
exchange. Christopher Clapham's analysis of Ethiopia’s experiment in Soviet-styled 
socialism generally supports this premise. Clapham (1992b: 106-111) maintained that 
Ethiopia's initial turn to Marxist-Leninist socialism and its subsequent abandonment 
was determined more by internal than external factors. Four factors prompting the turn 
to Soviet-style socialism were particularly important. First, Ethiopia and Russia had 
similar backgrounds in respect of empires and systems held in place by hereditary 
monarchs; consequently the solutions offered by Marxism looked promising initially 
because the problems seemed so similar. Second, Marxist-Leninist doctrine provided 
an approach to development that created new opportunities for sweeping out the old 
order. Third, Soviet-styled socialism offered the military regime a doctrine of multi­
ethnic nation building. Finally, scientific socialism offered Mengistu and his officers
39an ideology and a structure of control for strengthening the power of the state.
Clapham (1992b: 113-116) attributed Ethiopia's retreat from scientific socialism 
to the fact that all the attractions that Marxism/Leninism held out in the 1970s had 
either ceased to be relevant or had failed to work by the late 1980s. Ethiopia's 
centralised, socialist institutions had worked well enough in terms of their own internal 
structures, but they were unable to fulfil the objectives for which they had been created. 
Shortcomings were particularly apparent in respect of economic development --
39 In respect of external incentives, Clapham (1992b: 106-111) thought that two factors were particularly 
relevant. First, Ethiopian officials expected to access additional sources of international support. Second, 
they planned to increase the international and domestic prestige of the military government by interacting 
with other socialist states.
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especially agriculture ~  and in the methods advocated for achieving national unity. 
Clapham argued that the government's exploitative economic system had alienated the 
population and had increased levels of domestic opposition. As a consequence of 
economic failure, Mengistu turned to the West for economic assistance and acceded to 
capitalist-oriented demands to implement agricultural marketing reforms in 1987, in 
exchange for a comprehensive aid package aimed at improving peasant agriculture.
In looking at the political relationship from this perspective, it is important to 
examine the same two key issues relating to political structures and institutions 
identified previously in the argument about Soviet exploitation. In the case of Ethiopia, 
however, some analysts argue that Ethiopian officials took advantage of Soviet advice, 
interests, structures and institutions to obtain their own objectives. In other words, they 
replicated Soviet structures of political administration for the explicit purpose of 
strengthening the local state apparatus and formalising power,40 and they took 
advantage of Soviet-approved vanguard party models and used the end product to 
extend control over their own population.
Marina Ottaway (1987:37,40), for example, maintained that Mengistu's military 
regime was more interested in Marxist-Leninism as a blueprint for administrative 
structures than as an instrument of ideology. She argued that Soviet-styled socialism 
provided a model for the consolidation of state power that really did work under very 
difficult conditions. She also maintained that the PMAC was extremely successful in 
creating the political apparatus necessary to consolidate of central authority in a 
socialist state. Within a ten-year period, for example, Mengistu's military regime 
managed to construct organisational structures, establish parameters of authority, and 
implement policies for national economic reform.
In contrast to the views of Legum, Patman, and Fukuyama that emphasised the 
importance of Soviet influence over the creation of Ethiopia’s WPE, Ottaway (1987:32- 
36) advocated the thesis that party building was a indigenous strategy initiated by the 
Derg in conjunction with other policies designed to provide political organisation. She 
claimed that the party was formed out of local need, rather than ideological conviction 
or subservience to the Soviet Union and that the Derg had been attempting to establish 
a national party since 1975, because of its potential utility as an effective instrument of
40 See also Andargachew Tiruneh (1993:265-298) on the formalization of power enshrined in Ethiopia’s 
1987 constitution, modeled on the Soviet constitution of 1977.
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control.41 She attributed differences between Soviet leadership and the PMAC in 
respect of the speed of party formation to the fact that Mengistu's government was 
determined to proceed cautiously in the new enterprise, rather than to risk failure. 
Ottaway viewed the implementation of the Soviet-styled party model in Ethiopia in 
1984 as a successful move towards strengthening the centralised authority of Mengistu's 
regime, rather than a step taken to tighten links with the CPSU.42
Dawit Wolde (1989:57-61), a former high-ranking official in the Ethiopian 
government, also claimed that Ethiopian elites exercised control within the Soviet- 
styled system of political administration. He maintained that Mengistu used Stalinist 
techniques of force, intrigue and manipulation within the centralised state apparatus to 
stay in power. The vanguard party also provided Ethiopian officials with a useful means 
of control. Although the WPE controlled the Ethiopian population, Mengistu exercised 
full control over the party.
Ethiopian security interests in the military relationship must also be taken into 
account before any meaningful assessments of restructuring or asymmetry can be made. 
In respect of security interests in the Horn in general, Legum (1987:233) maintained 
that it would be a profound mistake to regard local actors as merely passive victims, 
clients or unsuspecting agents of the superpower blocs. He argued that African leaders 
were skilfully exploiting East-West rivalries to enhance their own interests and that all 
major powers had been compelled to adjust their policies and interests in the region in 
order to address the interests of African ruling elites. In a similar vein, Ottaway 
(1984:182-185) argued that great powers exerted minimal leverage upon conflicts in the 
Horn. She maintained that great power successes in the region were dependent upon 
the compatibility of their goals with the goals of the regional powers involved.
In relation to exploitation in the Soviet-Ethiopian military relationship, Dawit 
Wolde Giorgis (Freedom House 1990:26) claimed that Mengistu had intentionally
41 In her analysis o f Derg party building efforts from 1975 to 1984, Ottaway (1987:33-36) claims that two 
concerted attempts were made to form state parties out of indigenous political parties between 1975 and 
1979, and both failed abysmally. The first attempt sought to unify mainline, competing socialist opposition 
groups such as the EPRP, MEISON, and POMOA. The second consisted o f consolidation strategies 
designed to unite marginal, fragmentary socialist parties under the umbrella of the Union o f Marxist-Leninist 
Organization (1979). According to Ottaway, party-building via Moscow's Marxist-Leninist vanguard party 
model, was the third such effort.
42 Ottaway (1987:33) thought that the party fulfilled three essential functions for Ethiopia’s ruling elite: 
first, the country’s socialist image gained credibility; second, new possibilities were opened to control the 
population; third, officials acquired additional protection against radical civilian groups.
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fostered a relationship of dependence with the Soviet Union in order to acquire Soviet 
goods and services for the regime's security. In addition, Dawit (1989:61) maintained 
that models of Soviet military organisation had been deployed in the Ethiopian army to 
reduce the threat of military rebellion and that party members and cells existed at all 
levels of the military hierarchy.
The importance of economic transactions in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship 
has been generally underrated, particularly in respect of the patterns of asymmetric 
exchange they demonstrated. The reason why they are undervalued is that many 
analysts argue that Ethiopia continued to conduct the majority of its trade and aid 
dealings with capitalist states and institutions during the period under review. Clapham 
(1988:11), for example, maintained that post-revolutionary Ethiopia had undergone only a 
partial transformation, because existing Western-oriented trade links had been retained.
This may be true to some extent with regard to the sale of coffee, Ethiopia's 
major export. It is not the case, however, in respect of two categories of imports that 
Mengistu deemed to be crucial: namely, militarisation (the acquisition of modem 
weaponry and the provision of military advisors) and industrialisation (in particular, the 
provision of cmde petroleum and large-scale machinery for modernisation). As we shall 
see in Chapter five, Ethiopian officials relied heavily upon Soviet imports in these two 
categories for almost the entire period.
In relation to aid, many analysts point out that Soviet contributions were 
meagre, as compared to those provided by Western donors. But they forget that 
Ethiopian mling elites wanted support for large-scale projects aimed at modernisation: 
projects that Soviet officials were willing to underpin to a certain extent and that 
Western donors were exceedingly reluctant to finance throughout the Brezhnev and 
Gorbachev eras.
Adele Jinadu (1987) supports the thesis that Ethiopia's approach to economic 
relations with the Soviet Union remained opportunistic and in line with the strategies 
traditionally favoured by imperial regimes in the past for cultivating economic ties with 
powerful states. Her explanation focuses upon Ethiopian efforts to downgrade the 
importance of the economic relationship and to spread the risks more globally. Jinadu 
(1987:234-237) maintained that the Soviet-Ethiopian economic relationship was 
already showing signs of strain and stress in the early 1980s. She argued that Ethiopian 
concerns about the burden of heavy arms expenditures were further exacerbated by the
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paucity and inappropriateness of Soviet non-military assistance, in particular, 
development assistance and food aid. She claimed that as a consequence of the limited 
prospects for improving economic relations with the Soviet Union, the PMAC initiated 
overtures to Western donors and implemented a number of policies designed to 
improve Ethiopia’s creditability to prospective capitalist donor states and institutions in 
the early 1980s. First, Ethiopian ruling elites began to look for loans in Western capital 
markets. Second, the Ethiopian government took measures to restore its eligibility for 
loans and assistance from the World Bank. Finally, the strategic emphasis in Ethiopia's 
ten-year development plan drafted in July 1981 was nominally shifted away from 
collectivisation and nationalisation, and roles were outlined for Western bilateral and 
multilateral economic assistance in the plan's implementation.
The extent of Soviet influence over Ethiopian development strategies is a highly 
contentious issue. The problem is that the accumulation of hard evidence about the 
degree of influence one state exerts over another state's development policies remains 
elusive, chiefly as a consequence of three factors: replication, showcasing and 
interpretation.
To state the problem of replication briefly, the copying of one state's structures 
and systems by the ruling elite of another state does not constitute cloning. 
Consequently, the external and internal dimensions of the original and the replication 
will never be identical. This factor is particularly important in cases where ruling elites 
in a weak state like Ethiopia replicate structures of political, socio-economic and 
agricultural development that have been championed in the past by a powerful state like 
the Soviet Union. This helps to explain why gaps are most likely to develop between 
the interests of originators and replicators when the originator rejects the old model and 
supports a new development prototype. Block (1983:240), for example, argued that 
regimes that were politically and ideologically close to Moscow had their own motives 
for imitating Soviet patterns. In many cases leaders of such regimes would ‘out- 
Kremlin the Kremlin’ in their zeal to please their overlords. In such cases, Moscow 
would attempt to brake their enthusiasm, out of fear that they would have to be bailed
. 43out.
Showcasing presents a slightly different problem. In this instance, it refers to
43 See also Halliday (1989:106-107) regarding this phenomenon.
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the idea that ruling elites in weak states may carefully adapt their development rhetoric 
and formal project plans to conform with wishes of powerful donors in a bid to gain 
financial assistance, but such strategies are only facades used to mask their own policy 
agendas. Holcomb and Ibssa (1990:9-10), for example, argued that Ethiopia was a 
colonising state and that imperialistic Ethiopian ruling elites had traditionally fostered 
dependence upon a strong imperial power in order to obtain foreign technology and 
skilled advisors. They claimed that over time Ethiopian regimes had developed 
showcasing techniques to foster dependence in asymmetric relationships. Under 
conditions of showcasing, carefully designed programmes and policies were presented 
to powerful partners to win their approval and to facilitate existing relationships. 
Holcomb and Ibssa concluded that in real terms, showcasing strategies were only 
facades that masked the real policy intentions of Ethiopian officials.
The best way to demonstrate the importance of interpretation (perception) is to 
examine some views expressed by analysts in respect of Soviet influence over 
Ethiopian strategies for agricultural development: in particular, collectivisation and 
resettlement. Dawit Wolde (Freedom House 1990:27), for example, maintained that 
the Soviets did not pressure Mengistu to collectivise. As evidence, he pointed out that 
Soviet officials had issued a statement in 1984 against the Derg's collectivisation 
policy.44 He claimed that Mengistu was deploying Marxist-Leninist organisational 
strategies to increase his control over Ethiopian society. First, society was restructured 
into peasant associations, urban dwellers associations and collective farms. Second, 
party cells at multiple levels were introduced to control the Ethiopian population.
Divergent views about Resettlement expressed by Henze, Holcomb and Ibssa 
also demonstrate the proposition that the determination of influence in Ethiopian 
schemes resembling earlier Soviet projects hinges upon the particular interpretation. 
Henze (1989:31), for example, maintained that Mengistu's strategy for opening up new 
agricultural lands by massive resettlement schemes with the use of state-operated heavy 
equipment was modelled upon Soviet prototypes. He believed that Mengistu's colossal 
resettlement effort in the mid-1980s was essentially an imitation of Khrushchev's virgin 
lands programme of the 1950s. Henze (1985:94) skirted around the issue of Soviet
44 He maintained that Mengistu's strategies had been influenced by North Korean examples. In respect of 
Mengistu's tactics for controlling agrarian populations, he argued that Ethiopian villagisation schemes, like 
Tanzanian ‘ujamaa’ projects, were mandated by the government, built by the peasantry and sustained by the 
villagers' own efforts. Also see Crouch (1987:39-53) on ujamaa.
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influence, however, preferring instead to point out that Mengistu’s resettlement plans 
reflected actual Soviet practice only in respect of their bias towards the formation of 
state farms and collectives and the fact that the plans entailed the forcible movement of 
the population.
In contrast, Holcomb and Ibssa (1990:365-370) ignored links to earlier Soviet 
models altogether. They argued that Mengistu's strategy of resettlement represented a 
continuation of tactics traditionally employed by Ethiopian ruling elites like Menelik 
and Haile Selassie. As evidence, they pointed out that the settlement studies which had 
been carried out under Haile Selassie became available to the Derg after the take-over. 
They maintained that Mengistu viewed resettlement as an important mechanism for 
controlling Ethiopian land and labour. Control was expected to be implemented in two 
stages: first, the dependency of resettled populations on the Ethiopian state was to be 
fostered; second, land policy was to be liberalised and the land given to resettlers in 
order to minimise their opposition to the regime.
Finally, in considering ‘who exploited whom’ in the Soviet-Ethiopian 
relationship, it is important to consider the reluctance of Ethiopian ruling elites, in 
general, to relinquish sovereignty in relationships with powerful partners. Analysts 
Mulatu Wubneh, Johannes Abate, Bonnie Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa agree that 
Mengistu's motivations for cultivating alliances with powerful states like the Soviet 
Union and the United States differed little from the practices traditionally advocated by 
Ethiopian ruling elites. Wubneh and Abate (1988:163-164), in particular, maintained 
that finding a major power willing to provide ample military and economic aid had 
traditionally constituted the top priority for Ethiopian political elites, regardless of 
traditional or radical affinities.
Clapham, Erlich, Holcomb and Ibssa argue that Ethiopian ruling elites have 
traditionally demonstrated a reluctance to relinquish sovereignty in relationships with 
powerful states. Clapham (1988:222) pointed out that Ethiopia had demonstrated an 
inherent impenetrability throughout Haile Selassie’s relationship with the United States 
and Mengistu’s relationship with the Soviet Union. In 1992, he also argued that major 
Ethiopian opposition groups had used Marxist-Leninist ideology to gain their own 
objectives and that rises and falls in avowed commitment levels, plus the use of 
socialist organisational models by opposition groups over the years, indicated that
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internal priorities had shaped the level of Marxist commitment to a considerable degree 
in Ethiopian opposition forces, as well as among Ethiopian officials. The TPLF, for 
example, had downplayed Marxist affinities and reversed all of Mengistu's socialist 
policies immediately after take-over in order to gain internal support.45 Clapham's 
analysis implied that Ethiopian opposition groups, as well as Ethiopian ruling elites, 
had selectively applied ideologies originally generated in the Soviet Union to serve their 
own purposes and that both groups had demonstrated a readiness to abandon them 
when the political climate became too unfavourable.
According to Haggai Erlich (1988:130-139), Soviet leaders had been able to 
exercise very little control over Mengistu because they failed to understand Ethiopia’s 
impenetrability and the geopolitical history of Ethiopian relations with powerful states, 
as traditionally evidenced in the policies of'politica tigrina' —where outside agents 
recruited Ethiopian partners for purposes of internal subversion, as a consequence of 
Ethiopian fluid personal politics and the existence of many losers wanting to regain 
power — and ‘politica scioana’ —where foreign powers attempted to promote economic, 
cultural and political influence through Ethiopian emperors.
Holcomb and Ibssa (1990:363-365) argued that the Ethiopian superstructure had 
remained intact under the Derg and that Moscow's relationship with Ethiopia and 
Mengistu's rhetorical commitment to socialist orientation had not really changed 
anything. They thought that the Derg's implementation of so-called state socialism 
constituted little more than a return to the old maderia land model of Menelik, under 
which all land had belonged to the crown.46
Soviet and Ethiopian interests in combination.
As the preceding discussions have shown, any analysis of asymmetric exchange 
in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship must take the interests of ruling elites in both states
45 In his analysis o f the two major opposition groups, Clapham (1992b: 111-112,116-118) indicated that 
the TPLF-EPRDF and the EPLF also differed considerably in their objectives and that each group used 
Marxist propositions in different ways to attain them. See Alex DeWaal (1994:28-36) for another account of 
contending forces.
46 In contrast to Holcomb's and Ibssa's thesis o f imperial continuity, Andargachew Tiruneh (1993:289- 
298) argued that Mengistu's new autocracy had significantly changed the Ethiopian political culture. He 
claimed that a fundamental difference existed between Haile Selassie's paternalistic traditional aristocratic 
autocracy and Mengistu's 20th century totalitarian autocracy. He maintained that as a consequence of the 
1974 Ethiopian revolution, a 20th century totalitarian dictatorship had replaced a feudal autocratic system.
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firmly into account. Legum and Ottaway, for example, stressed the importance of 
considering the separate interests of ruling elites in each state. Legum (1984:10) argued 
that a proper perspective of the Soviet Union's encounters with Africa could only be 
formed if the individual objectives and interests of both Soviet and African parties were 
considered. He maintained that the best way to interpret Moscow's experience in Africa 
was to regard it as the dynamic interplay between converging and conflicting interests 
of both parties. Ottaway (1984:169) was particularly interested in security interests.
She maintained that relations based on a compatibility of separate interests strong 
enough to allow trade-offs between military aid and access to military facilities was the 
most that global superpowers could expect in relationships with regional powers in the 
Horn.
Clapham and North, on the other hand emphasised the complex coupling of the 
two states in the relationship. Clapham (1988:228) visualised the Soviet-Ethiopian 
relationship as based upon an interlocking set of mutual interests. North (Freedom 
House 1990:29) described the relationship between Soviet and Ethiopian ruling elites as 
a bad marriage from which neither partner could escape. He argued that Gorbachev 
was reluctant to withdraw from the relationship, even though he disapproved of 
Mengistu's economic policies, because the Soviet Union still derived prestige and 
strategic strength from its relationship with Ethiopia. As for Mengistu’s reluctance to 
abandon the partnership, North maintained that he was locked into the relationship 
because of his dependence on Soviet assistance.
CONCLUSION
All the perspectives outlined in this chapter are interesting in their own right. 
Their real importance to this thesis, however, rests in the questions they raise about the 
interests and dynamics of exchange actually operating within the Soviet-Ethiopian 
relationship and in their utility for locating patterns of asymmetric exchange particularly 
adverse for Ethiopia.
In respect of interests, analysts like Legum, Marina Ottaway, Clapham and 
North emphasise the importance of taking the separate interests and complex interplays 
of ruling elites firmly into account when analysing the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship. I 
share this view, and their methodology forms a vital aspect of analysis in the next four 
chapters.
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In respect of asymmetry, Galtung, Wendt and Barnet and Henze stress the 
notion that strong states guide the direction of exploitation. Proponents of this view 
would probably claim that the Soviet Union dominated the relationship and that 
Ethiopia became overly dependent upon the Soviet Union. In addition, Henze would 
claim that Soviet officials unduly influenced Ethiopian policies for socialist 
development and, by so doing, actually weakened prospects for Ethiopia’s self-reliance. 
On the other hand, Ake, Ottaway, Holcomb and Ibssa remind us that the analysis of 
asymmetric exchange in relationships between strong and weak states is never so 
straight-forward. Exploitation is not just a one-way process. Ruling elites in weak states 
frequently take advantage of strong states to secure their own interests.
The charge that the strong state set the pace of exploitation, however, is 
probably the best starting point in this particular analysis of the Soviet-Ethiopian 
relationship. The accuracy of such claims can be evaluated by examining facets of the 
relationship in the chapters that follow.
In respect of political relations, I shall investigate the claim that the Soviet 
Union took advantage of existing opportunities to expand its influence in Ethiopia. To 
achieve those ends Soviet officials had to strengthen the power of one particular group 
contending for recognition after the Ethiopian revolution. They were able to do this by 
implanting Soviet-styled administrative structures, introducing a Soviet-styled 
constitution and establishing a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, technically responsible 
to the CPSU.
In the discussion on military relations, I examine the accusations made by 
Ethiopian Unity spokesmen that the actions of Soviet officials actually escalated 
regional conflict in the Horn, made Ethiopia a depot for exports of Soviet military 
equipment, utilised Ethiopian territory for strategic purposes and heavily influenced the 
direction of Ethiopian military policies.
In the chapter on economic transations, I take a closer look at trade transactions 
to see whether or not available evidence would support the claim that the exchanges 
were asymmetrical and benefited the Soviet Union more than Ethiopia. In addition, 
evidence about aid and debt will be examined to see whether there is any merit in the 
charges that Soviet aid to Ethiopia was inadequate and that Ethiopian dependence upon 
the Soviet Union increased as a consequence of Moscow’s willingness to allow so 
much unpaid debt to accrue.
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The chapter on agricultural development examines the charges made by 
Ethiopian Unity spokesmen that Soviet development prescriptions for Ethiopia’s 
modernisation rooted in collectivisation, Marxist-Leninist ideology and the values of 
scientific socialism were devised to facilitate cultural penetration. These prescriptions 
undermined traditional Ethiopian cultural and religious values and destabilised 
Ethiopian society.
61
CHAPTER THREE
RESTRUCTURING 
POLITICAL RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the changes in Soviet-Ethiopian political relations from the mid- 
1970s to the early 1990s are examined. I start from the simple premise that officials in 
each state pursued their own separate interests and that political exchanges in the 
Brezhnev era were conducted on roughly equal levels, despite sharp differentials in the 
projection of global power. During Gorbachev’s time, however, three issues increased 
in importance: the extent of influence exerted by the strong state over its weaker 
partner; the effects of pressures exerted by the United States upon the relationship, and 
the impact of a radical change in leadership in the strong state upon the relationship at a 
given point in history.
In Part One, the issue of balance between Ethiopian interests and Soviet 
influence in Brezhnev’s time is addressed by looking at Mengistu’s ideological 
commitment to Soviet-styled socialism and his decision to create a socialist vanguard 
party. I argue that the strengthening of political relations in Brezhnev's time was 
prompted more by the needs of Ethiopia's revolutionary military administration to 
control domestic opposition than by the desires of Soviet officials to intervene and to 
dominate Ethiopian internal affairs.
The central focus of the chapter rests in Part Two. Here, Soviet-Ethiopian 
relations in the Gorbachev era are analysed with a view to explaining significant 
changes in the level of political compatibility over the six-year period. I argue that real 
events triggered gaps between the interests of Soviet and Ethiopian ruling elites which 
widened markedly between 1985 and 1991. The changes ultimately turned out to be 
more costly for Mengistu’s regime than they did for Gorbachev’s administration, 
because of the Ethiopian leader's marked reluctance to adjust to new times and to 
relinquish the perceived benefits associated with old-fashioned notions of ideological 
bonding.
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PART ONE: INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN BREZHNEV’S TIME.
Evidence about Soviet-Ethiopian political relations is inconclusive when it 
comes to assessing the balance between Ethiopian national interests and Soviet 
influence over Ethiopian ruling elites in Brezhnev's time. What can be ascertained is 
that the Derg's position in Ethiopia was weak after the revolution and officials needed 
external support to stay in power.
The take-over
In 1974, Ethiopia’s military establishment mounted an organised campaign 
against Haile Selassie's imperial regime. In June, the Military Coordinating Committee 
secured a mandate from the armed forces to create the Coordinating Committee of the 
Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army (the Derg). In September, the Derg 
stripped Emperor Haile Selassie of his powers and seized control of the Ethiopian 
government in the name of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC). 
In December, the PMAC introduced the ‘ten-point programme’ that incorporated 
nationalist, as well as socialist objectives (ETPMG 1974; Clapham 1988:45-46).
Initially, Ethiopia's new revolutionary administration raised some hopes for the 
rank and file of the population. Assisted by Marxist intellectuals eager to facilitate the 
building of a more progressive Ethiopian state, the Derg introduced some broad-based 
socialist reforms aimed at reducing the economic power base of Ethiopian aristocrats. 
In March 1975, peasant associations were created, and rural lands became government 
property under Proclamation 31/1975 (Mulugetta, et. al. 1978:159-172). In July, urban 
lands and extra houses were nationalised under Proclamation 47/1975 (Wubneh and 
Abate 1988:106-107). Kebelles (Urban dwellers’ associations) were established shortly 
thereafter (Clapham 1988:130-136).
During 1975, dissatisfaction with the Derg’s administration began to rise, 
largely in response to the PMAC's repressive tactics and the persistent refusal of 
officials to hold national elections. The Derg responded to public disapproval by 
intimidating organised resistance. To reduce the threat associated with mounting 
student unrest in urban areas at the end of 1974, Ethiopian officials sent some 50,000 
university and high school students into the country to indoctrinate the peasantry on the 
revolution under the National Development Through Cooperation Campaign or
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Zemacha (Clapham 1988:49-50). To prevent the emergence of an organised coalition 
of labour, government officials detained leaders of the Confederation of Ethiopian 
Labour Unions (CELU), banned strikes and, in December 1975, finally replaced the 
union with the All-Ethiopian Trade Union (AETU), their own institution (Wubneh and 
Abate 1988:53). To curtail prospects for a peasant uprising, the military government 
invested Ethiopian peasant associations with official powers to enforce rural land 
reform under the provisions of Proclamation 71 (Mulugetta, et. al. 1978:173-194).
In 1976, some of the more radical members within the Derg strengthened their 
positions, intensified their socialist rhetoric and introduced even tougher measures to 
protect their relatively weak status. On 20th April, shortly before Soviet officials 
indicated the first positive interest in providing assistance, the PMAC adopted the 
Programme of the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR), aimed at eradicating 
feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism and establishing a firm foundation 
for Ethiopia’s socialist transformation (Wubheh and Abate 1988:205-210). In July, 
criminal codes were tightened. In September, retaliatory attacks were undertaken with 
the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement or Mella Ethiopia Socialist Nekenake (MEISON) 
against the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP). In October, police powers 
were extended to include arbitrary rights of search and seizure, and, simultaneously, 
government security forces and the people’s militia intensified mopping up procedures 
in the provinces. In December, PMAC members consolidated their positions by 
restructuring the administrative bureaucracy along the lines advocated formally by 
Soviet officials. In line with the new recommendations, the PMAC was divided into 
three bodies: a Standing Committee of seventeen members; a Central Committee of 
forty members, and a Congress made up of all PMAC members. General Teferi Banti 
became the PMAC chairman, the official Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Ethiopian military establishment, and Colonels Mengistu and Atnafu assumed the 
positions of first and second vice-chairman, respectively (Wubneh and Abate 1988:59).
The introduction of Soviet-styled, centralised bureaucratic structures in 1977 
strengthened the PMAC's power over Ethiopian citizens in general, but administrative 
restructuring had the unintended effect of destabilising the internal hierarchy of the 
provisional government. Consequently, Mengistu re-established his authority over the 
PMAC by a surprise manoeuvre in February 1977 and confirmed his intention to 
engineer Ethiopia's socialist transformation in accordance with the principles of
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scientific socialism. At that time, he announced that the course of revolutionary 
reforms in Ethiopia would be altered from a defensive to an offensive direction 
(Izvestia, February 5,1977, in CDSP v 29, no 5:20).
The provisional powers of the PMAC acquired a more permanent character 
shortly thereafter. The Derg was incorporated into the General Congress; the 32 
member Central Committee was invested with specific economic and diplomatic 
powers, and the Standing Committee was accorded the authority to administer political, 
legal and diplomatic affairs (Legum and Lee 1977:53-54). Mengistu now exercised full 
power over the entire political apparatus, as Chairman of the PMAC, the de facto Head 
of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
Once in control, Mengistu extended the PMAC's potential reach by creating 
civilian policing groups and by strengthening centralised control over administrative 
structures at national, regional and local levels. In the cities, Kebelles and workers’ 
defence squads were recruited to serve as urban vigilantes. In rural areas citizens were 
recruited to serve in the peasant militia (estimated at 300,000). In addition, 
Revolutionary Administrative and Development Committees (RADC), introduced at 
national, regional, provincial and district levels, were subsequently empowered to raise 
money and materials for the elimination of internal and external enemies by any means 
available (Legum and Lee 1977:81; Wubneh and Abate 1988:66-67).
In 1977 and 1978, the PMAC's newly strengthened coercive powers were 
demonstrated in the Red Terror campaigns designed to reduce organised opposition in 
urban regions even further. This period was also characterised by high levels of 
compatibility in the Soviet-Ethiopian political relationship, as a consequence of the 
Ethiopian- Somali conflict.
Strengthening Soviet-Ethiopian relations
Reports from the Soviet media issued early in 1974 indicated that ruling elites 
and newspaper correspondents in the Soviet Union were monitoring indicators of 
political change in Ethiopia well in advance of the September revolution. Two articles
til tilin Pravda on 10 and 12 March by Vladimir Ozerov and Valentin Korovikov entitled 
‘Winds of Change over Ethiopia’ and ‘Working People's Victory’, respectively, 
examined the 10th March strikes. Both writers considered signs of Ethiopian political 
unrest to be progressive, and both applauded the Ethiopian proletariat for participating
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in the process of political change (CDSP v 26, no 10:21-22).
In 1975, Soviet news correspondents portrayed post revolutionary ideological 
and political developments in Ethiopia in a very favourable light. A. Nikanorov, for 
example, welcomed the socialist-oriented reforms that had been introduced in 
accordance with the political manifesto released on December 20 1974 and commented 
favourably on the Derg's avowal to seek a peaceful resolution of the Eritrean problem 
(Izvestia, 8 February 1975, in CDSP, v 27, no 6:19-20). V. Korovikov maintained that 
the Derg's nationalisation of rural and urban lands constituted the most important 
reform of the year. He also reported that the PMAC intended to create a national 
political party made up of workers, peasantry and the intelligentsia (Pravda, 16 August
1975, in CDSP v 27, no 33:16).
Soviet approval of the military government's revolutionary policies increased in
1976. In April, only a few days after the PMAC introduced the PNDR, Soviet officials 
applauded the revolutionary efforts of the Derg and referred to the status of true 
friendship which also implied a willingness to assist the PMAC in future endeavours 
(Legum 1987:241). In May, Korovikov reported that the new leaders of Ethiopia's 
National Democratic Revolution were actively drawing the masses into the reform and 
implementing a gradual transition from a military regime to a democratic system. The 
Derg, he claimed, had initiated efforts to create and strengthen mass organisations and 
political parties supportive of the National Democratic Revolutionary Programme 
(Pravda, 16 May 1976 in CDSP v 28, no 20:20). In July, high-ranking Soviet officials, 
including A. N. Kosygin (Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers), 
A. A. Gromyko (Politburo member and Minister of Foreign Affairs), B. N. Ponomarev 
(candidate member of Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU-CC), and I. V. Arkhipov 
(CPSU-CC member and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers) met an Ethiopian 
delegation in Moscow. Soviet and Ethiopian officials issued a joint communique 
promising to develop the relationship further. Brezhnev’s administration also offered to 
send experts to Ethiopia to explore areas suitable for mutually advantageous economic 
and technical cooperation and to expand training programmes for Ethiopian national 
cadres (.Pravda, July 14,1976, as cited in CDSP, v 28, no 28:15). Soviet specialists 
visited Ethiopia to assess military and economic needs in October, and, in December, 
officials in the Soviet Union concluded an arrangement with the PMAC to provide arms 
assistance (Patman 1990:196).
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Throughout 1977, Soviet news correspondents and officials supported 
Mengistu's more aggressive approach to socialist-oriented domestic reform. In May, 
Mengistu met Podgomy, Brezhnev and other officials in Moscow. During a dinner at 
the Kremlin Palace, Podgomy confirmed that the Soviets were pleased with the 
PMAC's decision to pursue a socialist-oriented path of development, and Mengistu 
reaffirmed his commitment to sweep away feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic 
capitalism in Ethiopia and to lay a solid foundation for the transition to socialism. At 
the end of the meeting, a Declaration of Friendship establishing friendly relations on a 
mutually advantageous basis was issued. (Pravda, 5-6 May 1977, in CDSP, v 29, no 
18:9-11).
Soviet mling elites strengthened political and ideological ties with the Mengistu 
administration on a more formal basis in 1978. In November, a Treaty of Friendship 
and Co-operation was concluded. Under the provisions of the 20 year Treaty, mling 
elites in both states agreed to strengthen friendly relations and to cooperate on political, 
economic, trade, scientific, technical, cultural and other matters, on the basis of equality 
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs {Pravda 21 Nov 1978, in CDSP, v 
30 no 46:11-12).
The formation of Ethiopia's Marxist-Leninist party.
The PMAC planned to create a national party capable of reinforcing government 
policy after the revolution. Ethiopian officials envisaged that the party should be strong 
enough to withstand political opposition and cohesive enough to oversee the 
implementation of official policy at local, regional and national levels. In this case, the 
Soviet-styled socialist features of Mengistu's national party were determined more by 
domestic political necessity than by the external pressures imposed by Soviet officials. 
The intense concern of the PMAC about the rise in popularity of indigenous socialist 
parties like the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), inaugurated in August 
1975, make this clear.
The EPRP was formally inaugurated as a proletarian party on 1st August 1975 
(Legum and Lee 1977:44). Its prescriptions for Ethiopia's modernisation threatened the 
Derg's authority because they advocated the restoration of civilian mle as a pre­
condition for the implementation of socialist reforms. To counter EPRP influence, 
PMAC officials initially backed a rival Marxist party, the All-Ethiopia Socialist
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Movement (Mella Ethiopia Socialist Nekenake or MEISON), led by Haile Fida.47 
Throughout 1975 and 1976, the Derg conducted extensive propaganda campaigns 
designed to discredit the allegedly Maoist intentions of the EPRP. In September 1976, 
MEISON officials launched a retaliatory campaign against EPRP leaders to eliminate 
the potential threat of a political take-over. During 1977 and 1978, the PMAC and 
MEISON jointly conducted Red Terror campaigns to counteract White Terror attacks 
attributed to the EPRP. In the campaigns, neighbourhood militias were recruited to root 
out EPRP members and supporters.
After the EPRP's powerbase was destroyed in Addis Ababa, the PMAC began to 
doubt MEISON's utility as a national political party for promoting official objectives.
As a result, Mengistu’s regime formed the Revolutionary Flame (Abiotawi Seded), a 
military-dominated socialist party that competed with MEISON for power. MEISON 
was eventually outlawed by Ethiopian officials, after an unsuccessful attempt to 
overthrow the PMAC (Wubneh and Abate 1988:57). In December 1979, Mengistu’s 
administration set about organising another national party. This time, a preparatory 
committee was convened: the Commission to Organize a Party of the Workers of 
Ethiopia (the COPWE). At the time, the COPWE happened to conform roughly to 
Soviet recommendations for organising a vanguard party.48
In theory the COPWE was supposed to lay the groundwork for establishing a 
Soviet-styled vanguard socialist party in Ethiopia. In practice, it provided an effective 
mechanism for consolidating Mengistu's control over the population. First, the 
COPWE, like the PMAC, was organised into executive and central committees and a 
congress, and Mengistu presided over each of the three main organs. Second, PMAC 
officials and military representatives dominated the membership of COPWE executive 
and central committees. The Central Committee, for example, included the entire 
PMAC Central Committee, all of the cabinet ministers in the Mengistu administration
47 Both parties advocated socialist transformation along Marxist lines, but there were important 
differences. MEISON recognized the right o f ethnic groups to self -determination, but only within the 
confines of a united Ethiopia. EPRD officials supported the idea o f grass roots revolution, and they 
acknowledged the right o f various nationalities to secure self-determination by secession (Wubneh and 
Abate 1988:55).
48 Six rival Marxist-oriented groups operated in the country before the COPWE was convened. Two 
parties, the EPRP and MEISON, were outlawed. The other four, including The Labour League (Wez Ader), 
the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organization (MALERID), the Ethiopian Oppressed Revolutionary 
Struggle (ECHAT) and the Revolutionary Flame (Abiotawi Seded), supported the PMAC and were 
eventually absorbed by the COPWE (Wubneh and Abate 1988:57).
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and around 70 representatives from the military (Wubneh and Abate 1988:60). Finally, 
the COPWE was legally empowered to exercise complete control over all political 
cadres, including the military (Clapham 1988:70-77).
In the early 1980s, the CPSU and the COPWE strengthened their links. In 
October 1982, Mengistu met with Brezhnev, A. A. Gromkyo, Chernenko and other 
officials in Moscow. Brezhnev and Mengistu signed an ‘agreement on cooperation’ 
between the CPSU and the COPWE (Pravda 17 October 1982, in CDSP, v 34, no 41:11- 
12). In March 1984, during a state dinner held in the Ethiopian leader's honour in 
Moscow, Chernenko, the new Soviet leader announced that the creation of an Ethiopian 
ruling vanguard party guided by the principles of scientific socialism was extremely 
important for the successful accomplishment of the urgent tasks of the revolution. 
Mengistu, in turn, recognised the importance of Soviet experience in party creation and 
claimed that existing ties and exchanges of experience between the COPWE and the 
CPSU were creating favourable conditions for the work of the future vanguard party 
(Pravda, Mar 30,1984, as cited in CDSP, v 36, no 13:14-15).
The Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), Ethiopia's official Marxist-Leninist 
Vanguard Party, was finally inaugurated during the 10th anniversary celebrations of the 
Ethiopian revolution in Addis in September 1984. In his speech to the newly formed 
Ethiopian party assembly, Soviet Politburo member G.V. Romanov emphasised the 
importance of the WPE as an instrument for consolidating the revolutionary 
administration and for establishing the foundations for a new socialist society. He also 
maintained that the guidance of a vanguard party guidance was essential to ensure 
Ethiopia's transition from backwardness to socialist orientation. Pravda and Tass 
correspondents reported at the time that the WPE would assume responsibility for 
working out the details of directives for the new system of State administration and the 
creation of a People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Pravda, 8 September 1984, in 
CDSP, v 36, no 36:9).
The WPE may have been duly approved as a socialist vanguard party by the 
Chernenko regime when it was established, but it is doubtful that Soviet officials had 
any influence over the selection of Ethiopian party officials. When one compares the 
membership of the COPWE and the WPE and the distribution of power within the 
framework of Soviet-styled structures, it is clear that future party decisions were much 
more likely to reflect Mengistu's personal political inclinations, than Soviet political
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preferences. To begin with, membership of the WPE at decision-making levels 
remained firmly under PMAC domination and closely approximated that of the 
COPWE. Ninety-two percent of the full Central Committee members appointed to the 
COPWE in June 1980, for example, were still serving in the WPE Central Committee 
in September 1984 (Clapham 1988:74). Second, while it may be fair to say that the 
administrative structures and functions of Ethiopia’s PMAC and the WPE overlapped 
in a manner similar to the Soviet system operating in Brezhnev's day,49 supreme 
political power in Ethiopia in 1984 continued to be wielded by one person, rather than 
by a party-driven, oligarchic system such as the one that prevailed in the Soviet Union 
after Stalin.
Soviet political support for socialist oriented reforms implemented in Ethiopia 
after the revolution actually helped to consolidate the power of Mengistu's military 
regime in the pre-Gorbachev era. By taking advantage of Brezhnev's heightened 
political and military interests in the Horn in the 1970s, Mengistu was able to 
strengthen his position of power when Ethiopia's relationship with the United States 
declined. In respect of political ideology, Marxist-Leninism, with its anti-imperialist 
slogans, optimistic views about rapid, progressive development and clear-cut 
prescriptions for socialist transformation, offered Ethiopia's revolutionary military 
administration a unique opportunity to introduce radical strategies aimed at dislodging 
the old imperial order and modernising the Ethiopian state. As regards political control, 
the establishment of an Ethiopian socialist party in the mid 1980s in line with Soviet 
recommendations to create a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party provided the military 
regime with an effective organisation for monitoring and enforcing national policies at 
regional and local levels.
As discussed in Chapter two, Fukuyama, Legum and Patman maintained that 
Soviet pressures for vanguard party formation had a significant bearing upon the 
development and organisation of Ethiopia’s Marxist-Leninist national party. However, 
Marina Ottaway’s claim that the Derg built and organised a national party in accordance 
with its own, indigenous priorities more closely captures reality. Clearly, in this case, 
Mengistu’s interests were served, more than those of Soviet officials.
49 Wubneh and Abate (1988:60,62) provide useful diagrams on the Ethiopian governmental and party 
structures.
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PART TWO: THE RESTRUCTURING OF POLITICAL RELATIONS AFTER 1985
Four stages in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship directly related to developments 
within Ethiopia can be used to illustrate the decline in political relations that occurred 
during Gorbachev’s time in power. In the first stage, from 1985-1987, a positive 
balance in compatibility levels was sustained between Soviet and Ethiopian officials, 
despite the adverse pressures exerted by American officials. The two sides had a 
common interest in transforming Mengistu’s military establishment into a civilian 
administration. In the second stage, in 1988, a precarious balance in compatibility was 
maintained. The relationship was not very much affected by Soviet involvement in the 
restoration of Ethiopian-Somali relations, but Mengistu's decision to expel international 
relief agencies from the northern regions of Ethiopia had a negative effect. During the 
third stage, in 1989-1990, the rapid pace of decline in political relations was triggered 
by events in Eritrea that substantially widened the gap between the interests of Soviet 
and Ethiopian elites. In the fourth stage in 1991, political relations were restructured 
and preferential exchanges removed, largely as a consequence of important domestic 
changes within Ethiopia: in particular, rising levels of organised opposition; the 
introduction of government reforms aimed at liberalising socialist structures; the 
decline in Mengistu’s own power base, and the emergence of a Ethiopian leader eager 
to distance himself from the policies and practices associated with the previous 
administration.
Stage 1: 1985-1987
Between 1985 and 1987, exchanges between Soviet and Ethiopian officials 
reflected more or less the same ideological affinities that had characterised political 
transactions in Brezhnev's day in substantial measure, because the new Soviet views 
took time to filter down and both parties wanted to restore civilian rule in Ethiopia. 
Nevertheless, signs of impending change were apparent. Gorbachev's new priorities for 
improving relations with the United States under New Thinking, coupled with Reagan's 
renewed interest in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, made the future restructuring of Soviet- 
Ethiopian political relations inevitable.
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Ethiopia’s transformation into a civilian administration.
In preparation for the transfer of power from a military regime into a civilian 
administration, the drafting of a constitution appropriate for Mengistu’s new order 
played a crucial part in legitimisation. Ideological directions and administrative 
structures enshrined in the 1987 Ethiopian constitution relied heavily upon the 1977 
Soviet constitution. Although Ethiopia’s new constitution may have served the interests 
of both parties in some respects, the end product provided Mengistu with an effective 
mechanism for consolidating and amplifying power, more than it facilitated 
opportunities for Soviet penetration.
The ideological aims advocated and the organisational structures recommended 
for political organisation in the two constitutions were remarkably similar, particularly 
in respect of the functions allocated to political entities, the roles and responsibilities 
assigned to official bodies, party intervention in governmental affairs, and the policies 
advocated for accommodating the interests of multiple nationalities. This can be 
illustrated by comparing the two constitutions. First, administrative organs in both 
countries were supposed to function according to the principles of democratic 
centralism (USSR, 1977:Chl A3; PDRE, 1987:Chl A4). Second, Ethiopia's National 
Shengo and the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet, the supreme organs of state power in 
the two states, were invested with roughly parallel powers, and the delegates to both 
bodies were elected to serve five year terms (USSR 1977:Chl2-15, A89-127; PDRE 
1987:Ch9,A62-80). Moreover, the Soviet Presidium and the Ethiopian Council of State 
exercised similar executive responsibilities in respect of overseeing the legal system 
and treaty ratification (USSR 1977:Chl5 A121-123; PDRE 1987:ChlO A82-83). In 
addition, Councils of Ministers in both states were officially recognised as the highest 
executive and administrative organs, and officials in both Councils were empowered to 
direct the activities of state ministries, to ensure the implementation of monetary and 
fiscal policy and to take legal measures deemed necessary for the welfare of resident 
populations (USSR 1977:Chl6, A128-136; PDRE 1987:Chl2, A89-A94). Third, in 
both constitutions, a high priority was placed upon party intervention in governmental 
affairs. In the Soviet case, the Communist Party was expected to form the nucleus of 
the political system. In Ethiopia, the Workers Party of Ethiopia was expected to 
become the guiding force of the State and the entire society (USSR 1977: Chi 
A6;PDRE 1988:Chl A6). Finally, both constitutions contained clauses advocating
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equal rights for all nationalities, regardless of ethnic origin. (USSR 1977:CH6 A36; 
PDRE 1987:Chl A2).
However, some important differences also existed in respect of the contents of 
the two documents. Three of these were particularly important for the future conduct of 
Soviet-Ethiopian political relations. In the first instance, Soviet and Ethiopian officials 
were committed to different stages in socialist development. In the Soviet Union, the 
principal goal of the socialist political system rested in extending socialist democracy. 
For the Ethiopians, completing the national democratic revolution and laying down 
socialist foundations constituted the chief aims of political development (USSR 
1977:Chl A9; PDRE 1987:Chl Al:3).
A second important difference rested in the distribution of power at top levels.
In the 1977 Soviet constitution, an oligarchic power structure was favoured via the 
Presidium, which was supposed to function on behalf of the Supreme Soviet. In the 
Ethiopian document, vast powers were delegated to the PDRE President who also 
presided over the Council of State (the Ethiopian equivalent of the Presidium), and 
served as Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces (USSR 1977:Chl5, A119-124; 
PDRE 1987:ChlO-ll, A81-88).
A third difference, which existed in theory, related to the different approaches 
taken with respect to managing the balance between central and regional control. In the 
Soviet constitution, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was defined as an integral, 
federal, multinational state formed on the principle of socialist federalism, as a result of 
the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR 1977:Ch8 A70). In theory, under the provisions of Article 
72, each Union Republic retained the right to secede from the Union.50 In the Ethiopian 
constitution, however, the notion of a voluntary association of regions was not 
recognised, even in theory. The Ethiopian state was defined as a unitary structure, 
comprised of administrative and autonomous regions (PDRE 1987:A59). Under the 
provisions of the Ethiopian document, there was no legal possibility for representatives 
from regions like Eritrea to enter into negotiations with the Mengistu administration 
with a view to securing real autonomy or independence.
50 In Article 75, however, the territory of the Soviet Union was defined as a single entity comprised of the 
various Republics, and the sovereignty of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was recognized over 
all o f its territory (USSR, 1977:Ch8 A75).
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While it is fair to say that the Ethiopian constitution of 1987 closely resembled 
the Soviet document fashioned in Brezhnev's time, it is important to note that the 
Ethiopian document institutionalised the existing powers of Mengistu's administration, 
as opposed to offering new prospects for a more equitable distribution of power within 
Ethiopia under civilian rule. The existing power structure of the provisional military 
administration was carried over virtually intact into the new civilian administration.
This remained the case, even after elections for representatives to the Ethiopian national 
assembly (Shengo) were held in Ethiopia during the summer of 1987. For example, all 
Politburo and Central Committee members formerly affiliated with the PMAC were 
elected to the Shengo (EIU 1987, CR , no 3:21-22).
As far as party organisation was concerned, essential organisational features of 
the CPSU were replicated in the administrative design of the WPE. This was especially 
so in respect of hierarchically designed administrative structures that facilitated the 
party’s and the government’s control over the population. First, both parties were 
organised into tightly controlled, hierarchically structured institutions on local, regional 
and national levels in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism.
Second, in theory, both held Party Congresses that convened every five years. In 
the case of the Soviet All Union Party Congress, delegations were supposed to reflect 
the interests of the populations in the various Republics having been elected in a series 
of complicated, upwardly tiered, hierarchical selections initiated at primary party 
organisational levels (Smith, G. 1992:110-111). In contrast, delegates to the Ethiopian 
Party Congress came from all regions and were supposed to represent the interests of 
the population at large ( Wubneh and Abatel988:61).
Third, at the middle level, Central Committees (CCs) in both parties were 
supposed to assume political responsibility in between Party Congresses. In practice, 
however, they were excluded from the highest levels of policy making. Both CCs 
functioned primarily as sounding boards for legitimating Politburo decisions. In the 
Ethiopian case, important party and government officials, influential civilians, and top 
military and police personnel formed the bulk of membership at the expense of workers 
and peasants (Wubneh and Abate 1988:61-64).
Finally, at the top level, Politburos in both parties represented Central 
Committee interests in theory but served as the principal decision-makers of party and 
state policy in practice. The internal workings of both Politburos remained secret.
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Nevertheless, Politburo decisions made in the USSR were probably more collectively 
determined than those made by the Politburo of the WPE, as a consequence of Soviet 
preferences for oligarchic control after Stalin, as opposed to Mengistu's autocratic 
control over the chief institutions of Ethiopian party and government power, including 
the Politburo.51
Mengistu's administration may have replicated Soviet structures of party 
organisation, but the replications benefited the interests of Ethiopia's ruling elite more 
than CPSU officials. First, Soviet-styled organisational structures helped to retain 
Mengistu's monopoly of power over the government during the transition from military 
to civilian rule. Second, the hierarchical structures and the unitary character of the 
WPE sharply reduced prospects for disrupting the existing power balance by curtailing 
possibilities for alternative party channels. Third, the wholesale accommodation of 
PMAC officials into the WPE ruling elite amplified the political powers of the military 
regime in the new civilian administration. Finally, the inclusion of representatives from 
the armed forces within the party structure provided the military means to enforce the 
political will of Mengistu’s administration.
Official party links between the CPSU and the WPE were actively encouraged 
by the Gorbachev and Mengistu administrations in preparation for the transformation to
thcivilian authority in September 1987. In a joint communique issued on 12 November
1985, Soviet and Ethiopian officials recognised the growing importance of close 
connections between the CPSU and the WPE and expressed a joint desire to develop 
and to strengthen party ties (Tzvestia, Nov 12,1985, in CDSP, v 37, no 45:15).
In the transformation to civilian rule, closer party ties particularly served the 
interests of Mengistu’s administration. First, Ethiopia's international position was 
strengthened as a consequence of affiliating with a far more powerful partner. In March
1986, for example, CPSU and WPE officials agreed to adopt a common approach on 
problems in the Middle East, southern Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and 
other regions, including the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In addition, WPE 
representatives supported Soviet peace initiatives advocated by Gorbachev in January 
1986 (TASS, 5 February 1986). Second, the access to CPSU networks offered
51 Politburo sizes in both parties were also similar. Throughout the 1980s, CPSU Politburo membership 
varied from 17 to around 24 (11-15 full and 6-8 non-voting member candidates). In comparison, die 
Politburo o f the WPE in 1984 consisted o f 17 members (11 full and 6 alternate members). (Smith, G. 
1992:114-115; Wubneh and Abate 1988:61).
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Ethiopian officials additional prospects for establishing long-term cooperation with 
other African socialist-oriented states. In May 1987, an agreement of cooperation 
between Frelimo and the WPE was signed in Maputo, Mozambique (BBC, SWB,19 
May 1987). Third, the WPE had little or no experience in devising strategies for 
socialist transformation. They needed advice and instruction that only the CPSU could 
provide. With this aim in mind, WPE representatives met a CPSU delegation in Addis 
in May 1987 to discuss participation in Marxist-Leninist ideological training and the 
prospective role of the mass media (BBC, SWB, 27 May 1987).
American proposals for Soviet-Ethiopian relations.
Gorbachev's new priorities for improving relations with the United States under 
New Thinking conflicted with Reagan's renewed interest in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s. 
His strategy for perestroika relied heavily upon the importation of current Western 
technological know-how, economic principles, business systems, and managerial 
strategies, which required an improvement in Soviet-American relations. Initially, 
however, efforts in this direction were seriously hampered by the Reagan 
administration’s view that an improvement in East-West relations should coincide with 
the demilitarisation of Soviet relations with Ethiopia.
In October 1985, during the 40th anniversary session of the United Nations 
(UN), President Reagan proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union jointly 
undertake regional peace efforts in Ethiopia and four other Soviet-backed countries 
described as ‘at war with their own people’. He outlined a three level strategy for 
Soviet-American cooperation in regional conflict resolution. First, regional talks were 
to be initiated at local levels by the warring factions. Second, after progress in these 
talks had been demonstrated, the United States and the Soviet Union would implement 
cooperative strategies aimed at enforcing lasting political solutions. All foreign military 
presence would be eliminated from the conflict zones and the flow of outside arms to 
warring parties would be restricted. Finally, the five countries would be welcomed
52back into the global economy, after signs of improvement became evident.
In 1985, Reagan's suggestions for involving Gorbachev’s administration in
52 The other countries were Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua (Associated Press, 24-25 
October 1985).
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regional conflict management were unfavourably received by Soviet and Ethiopian 
officials. On the Soviet side, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze failed to join in the 45 
second round of polite applause that followed. On the Ethiopian side, Foreign Minister 
Goshu Wolde condemned Reagan's ‘inaccurate and wholly unjustified reference to 
Ethiopia’ and confirmed that Mengistu remained totally opposed to the idea of Ethiopia 
becoming the subject of future discussions between Soviet and American officials 
(Associated Press, 24-25 October 1985).
Prominent Washington officials continued to criticise Gorbachev’s
53administration for its involvement in Ethiopian affairs. Shortly before the Geneva 
Summit, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker accused Soviet officials of 
exploiting internal divisions in the Horn and adversely affecting Ethiopian development 
in order to de-stabilise African governments in general. He claimed that Soviet 
influence had reduced Ethiopia to near vassalage and that Ethiopia had lost its chances 
for development and its internal stability under Soviet domination (Associated Press, 13 
November 1985).
Despite American complaints regarding Soviet relations with Ethiopian 
officials, talks between Reagan and Gorbachev at the Geneva Summit went ahead 
towards the end of November.54 Although issues related to Ethiopia and the Horn 
conflict were undoubtedly discussed, neither Soviet nor American ruling elites 
demonstrated the political will to formulate co-operative strategies for the management 
of Third World regional conflict. Nevertheless, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to 
exchange views about regional issues on a regular basis (Associated Press, 21 
November 1985).
During 1986, the year preceding PDRE formation, Soviet-American dialogue 
continued to improve, but no progress was made about managing the process of Third 
World conflict resolution. No substantive policy recommendations emerged from the 
Reykjavik meeting in October, although the same five Marxist-led countries identified 
by Reagan in 1985 formed the nucleus of discussion about Soviet-American
53 During 1985, Gorbachev concluded several agreements with Mengistu and treated him with high regard 
during the Ethiopian leader's ninth visit to Moscow from 31 October to 9 November. During the October 
Revolution parade, the Ethiopian leader was allowed to stand on the podium with members o f the Soviet 
Politburo (Pravda 2 November 1985, in CDSP v 37, no 45:14-15; Associated Press, 31 October and 9 
November 1985).
54 The Geneva Summit was the first meeting between Soviet and American leaders in six years.
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cooperation in this area. (Associated Press, 9 October 1986).
Despite a general warming in Soviet-American relations between 1985 and 
1987, the gains perceived by Soviet officials in respect of establishing a pro-Soviet 
civilian government in Ethiopia generally outweighed the temptation to agree to Soviet- 
American cooperation aimed at managing regional conflict in the Horn. Consequently, 
in 1987, at the risk of incurring American displeasure, Gorbachev officially confirmed 
his unwavering support for the just cause of the people of Ethiopia during talks with 
Mengistu held in Moscow in November and, one month later, sent a Soviet 
representative to Addis to brief Ethiopian officials on the results of the Washington 
Summit (TASS, 17 December 1987).
The joint decision to expand Soviet-American dialogue on regional conflict 
management in November 1985, however, directly affected the political behaviour of 
Ethiopian officials. Shortly thereafter, Mengistu stepped up efforts to improve relations 
with the Reagan administration. In December, he agreed to settle American 
compensation claims and to pay $7.5 mn over a five year period for the 30 companies 
nationalised during the revolution (EIU, QER 1986, no 1:21). Five months later, 
Mengistu officially confirmed that a rapprochement with Washington would be 
welcomed (Associated Press, 19 May 1986).
To be sure, differences in the political interests of Soviet and Ethiopian officials 
appeared prior to PDRE formation. Nevertheless, between 1985 and 1987, they were 
largely obscured by mutually compatible interests in transforming Mengistu’s military 
government into a civilian administration.
Stage two: 1988
In 1988, vestiges of the old relationship remained, but differences in the 
interests of Soviet and Ethiopian officials increased, as Gorbachev’s New Thinking 
assumed more practical dimensions. This precarious balance can be demonstrated by 
reference to two events: the resolution of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and Mengistu's 
expulsion of international relief agencies from Ethiopia in the spring of 1988.
Gorbachev's decision to improve relations with Somalia undoubtedly prompted 
Ethiopian and Somali officials to make some gestures towards reconciliation. 
Nevertheless, the impact of Soviet efforts to persuade ruling elites in the African Horn 
to resolve their differences remained marginal, in comparison to the pressures exerted
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upon the two leaders by rising levels of domestic opposition.
In 1986, Gorbachev’s administration initiated a concerted bid to improve 
relations with Somalia. Shortly before the Reykjavik Summit in October, Soviet 
officials announced the resumption of relations with Barre’s administration. In June
1987, news commentators in Moscow reported that some parts of the Soviet-Somali 
trade and education agreements had been reinstated (BBC, SWB 27 June 1987). 
Gorbachev’s enthusiasm for improving relations with Somalia and reducing conflict in 
the Horn region, however, was not shared by Mengistu’s administration. During 1986 
and 1987, Ethiopian and Somali officials demonstrated a mutual reluctance to resolve 
their dispute over the Ogaden territory, despite Soviet efforts to the contrary.55 In April
1988, however, the two leaders finally settled their grievances, largely as a consequence 
of rising domestic pressures. Diplomatic relations were re-established, borders were 
demilitarised, war prisoners were returned, and official support for subversive groups 
engaged in cross-border operations was withdrawn over a four month period (EIU, CR 
1988, no 2:17-18).
Soviet correspondents applauded the decision and used the case to argue the 
viability of Gorbachev’s new strategy. No deep political rifts developed between 
Soviet and Ethiopian officials over Soviet efforts to secure the peaceful resolution of 
the Ethiopian-Somali conflict between 1986 and 1988, because compatible interests 
were not fundamentally challenged. Indeed, the peaceful resolution of conflict actually 
accommodated the separate interests of Soviet, Ethiopian and Somali political elites 
alike. Nevertheless, some important shifts in priorities occurred, particularly on the 
Soviet side. As a consequence of restructuring relations with Somalia, Gorbachev was 
able to set up some guidelines for limiting further Soviet intervention in Horn affairs. 
First, he confirmed a policy of non-intervention in the Horn region. Second, he 
promised continued diplomatic support for the peaceful resolution of the Ethiopian- 
Somali dispute.
55 Grievances were rooted in traditional disputes over the Ogaden, a triangular-shaped region in Ethiopia 
that jutted into Somalia, which was inhabited largely by the Somali. Somalia's claim to the Ogaden was 
enshrined in that country's constitution, making negotiations virtually impossible. Ethiopia, on the other 
hand, refused to negotiate until existing state borders had been officially recognized by Barre’s 
administration. In January 1986, Mengistu and Siad Barre met for the first time since 1977 at a drought 
summit in Djibouti and agreed to set up a joint committee to improve bilateral relations. The committee 
met three times during 1986 and 1987, but negotiations were generally unsuccessful (Keesing's, 30 April 
1987).
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In April 1988, however, Soviet-Ethiopian political relations were strained by 
Mengistu's decision to shut down international relief operations after insurgent activity 
increased in the northern regions. On 6 April 1988, Mengistu ordered all foreign relief 
organisations except UNICEF to cease operations in Tigre and Eritrea, including the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which operated across government 
and rebel-controlled areas and accounted for half of the aid workers withdrawn 
(Associated Press, 14 April 1988). The ICRC refused to turn its relief supplies in Tigre 
and Eritrea over to the Ethiopian Red Cross, and consequently, in May, ICRC relief 
workers were expelled from Gondar and Wollo provinces, as well (Keesing's, 30 
November 1988). Mengistu’s decision evoked a hostile reaction from the Reagan 
administration. American officials believed that the government planned to mount a 
massive military offensive in the northern provinces. In an effort to prevent this,
Reagan proposed that Gorbachev should use his influence to persuade Ethiopian 
officials to resume relief operations (Associated Press, 21 April 1988).
To contain the adverse effects of co-operation between the Reagan and 
Gorbachev administrations, Mengistu attempted to cultivate the good will of both 
governments. In June, shortly before the Moscow Summit, he reaffirmed his 
commitment to an Ethiopian-Soviet relationship based on socialist solidarity and 
ideological unity, but he also stressed that Ethiopia's primary objective was to become 
self-reliant. In respect of Washington, Mengistu expressed the desire to restore 
Ethiopian-American relations, providing this could be accomplished on the basis of 
equality and mutual respect.56 His efforts to play both ends against the middle, 
however, were not very successful. In the summer of 1988, Soviet-American dialogue 
on Ethiopia's domestic problems intensified. The situation was discussed at the 
Moscow Summit in June (BBC, SWB, 4 June 1988). One week later, Mengistu agreed to 
allow major relief operations to be implemented in government-held areas in the 
northern regions (Keesing's, 30 November 1988). Further discussions between Soviet 
and American officials on African regional issues were held at the Geneva meeting in 
July (TASS, 1 August 1988). However, no public statements were issued, possibly in 
deference to Mengistu's earlier insistence that the Gorbachev and Reagan
56 Prospects for Ethiopian-American political relations inproved marginally in the fall o f 1988. This was 
due more to Ethiopia's election to the UN Security Council in October and George Bush's election to the 
American Presidency in November than to any conciliatory rhetoric voiced by the Mengistu administration 
(BBC, SWB, 7 June 1988).
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administrations refrain from public discussions about Ethiopian domestic affairs.
The difference between Soviet and Ethiopian political interests widened after 
Mengistu’s expulsion of relief agencies in April 1988. Changing attitudes to the 
relationship were particularly evident on the Soviet side. In May, Karen Brutents 
arrived in Asmara for talks with Mengistu on the Ethiopian-Eritrean situation, carrying 
a personal message from Gorbachev to the Ethiopian leader. The contents of the 
message were never publicly disclosed, but Soviet correspondents maintained that talks 
between Brutents and Mengistu had focused on conflict resolution, particularly the need 
to solve regional disputes by political means. They also reported that Brutents had 
briefed Mengistu on Gorbachev's current course of restructuring (BBC, SWB, 9 May
1988).
In July, Soviet officials informed Mengistu in Moscow that new thinking 
priorities had shifted (TASS, 26 July 1988). In the new order, universal human values 
would replace class-struggle as the basis of Soviet diplomacy (Woodby 1989:103-108). 
In addition, Gorbachev spelled out Moscow’s new political priorities in its conduct of 
relations with Mengistu’s administration. Although Soviet officials continued to 
support Ethiopian unity and territorial integrity in theory, considerable importance was 
attached to securing a just solution to the Eritrean problem (Pravda, 29 July 1988, in 
CDSP, v 40, no 30:26).
In December, a delegation from the Ethiopian Shengo was invited to Moscow to 
strengthen inter-state parliamentary ties and to receive instruction on the course of
57Gorbachev's new domestic political reforms. During the sessions, Shengo members 
were briefed on the measures being taken to enhance the role of the people's deputies in 
the Soviet system, the changes proposed for the new Soviet constitution and the 
forthcoming elections for the people's deputies. They were also told about Gorbachev's 
new stress on humanising international relations. Ethiopian and Soviet delegates agreed 
that peace should be established in the Horn, and they concluded that inter­
parliamentary contact would become an important new feature of Soviet-Ethiopian 
political relations (TASS, 28 December 1988). Soviet initiatives to improve relations 
with Ethiopian parliamentarians at the end of 1988 indicated that Gorbachev was losing 
patience with Mengistu’s decisions and planned to cultivate political contacts with a
57 The Shengo delegation, led by Debele Dinssa, WPE-CC member and PDRE Vice President visited 
Moscow, December 19-26 1988. Mengistu was absent from the proceedings (TASS, 26 December 1988).
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broader representation of Ethiopians. This new direction gained additional credibility 
because Mengistu was absent from the proceedings.
Stage three: 1989-1990
Mengistu’s failure to resolve the Eritrean conflict in 1989 and 1990 further 
diminished compatibility in the political relationship. Despite Gorbachev’s efforts to 
persuade him to focus upon political solutions, the Ethiopian leader demonstrated a 
firm resolve to handle the matter via military means. Three developments illustrate this: 
plans to partition Eritrea, reluctance to negotiate terms for peace with the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and refusal to share power with regional leaders. Let 
us examine these situations in more detail.
Partitioning Eritrea
As a consequence of Mengistu's radical proposal for partitioning Eritrea, the 
level of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict intensified markedly, despite Gorbachev's 
increased interest in securing a peaceful solution to the problem. Moreover, complaints 
against Moscow’s continued support for Mengistu’s political intransigence levelled by 
the Eritrean resistance leader at the end of 1988 challenged the credibility of 
Gorbachev’s New Thinking doctrine.
Prior to 1989, Ethiopian and EPLF officials refused to recognise any validity in 
their opposing claims, despite the fact that informal discussions between the two sides
58had taken place between 1982 and 1985. EPLF demands remained firmly based on 
the notion of Eritrea's right to self-determination, while Mengistu refused to deviate 
from the axiom set out in the constitution that Ethiopia must remain a unitary state.
In 1987, this adverse state of affairs was exacerbated by Mengistu's decision to 
change the territorial boundaries of Eritrea. Inspired by Soviet ideas about ethnic 
considerations in regional planning, the Ethiopian Institute of Nationalities (established 
in 1983) carried out extensive research on re-districting along ethnic lines in the mid- 
1980s. As a consequence of its findings, the Shengo approved a plan for regional
58 Ten informal meetings between Ethiopian and EPLF political elites reportedly took place between 
September 1982 and 1985. At the close of talks in September 1985, each side complained about the other. 
In the end, EPLF representatives maintained that further talks were contingent upon Mengistu's agreement to 
the presence o f a mediating third party and his public announcement that the peace process was underway 
(EIU ,QER  1985, no 4:16).
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restructuring in September 1987.59 Mengistu's proposed reform, in effect, dismembered 
Eritrea. First, the new region of Eritrea was to be divided into three zones: one catering 
for the Kunama inhabiting the southwest area; another accommodating the largely 
Christian, Tigrinya-speaking populations in the centre, and one situated in the North, 
encompassing a region of Tigre. Second, the Afar sections of Eritrea were supposed to 
become part of the new autonomous region of Assab (EIU, CR 1987, no 4:22). EPLF 
officials objected to the plan on grounds that the removal of Assab and the division of 
Eritrea along ethnic and nationality lines constituted an attempt to destroy Eritrean unity 
(Keesing's, 30 November 1988).
Between September 1988 and July 1989, Ethiopian officials intensified efforts 
to partition Eritrea. In September 1988, Mengistu announced that all new regional 
structures would be operational within the year (EIU, CR 1988, no 4:21). In December, 
he appointed former Derg officials to leadership positions in the new Eritrean region 
who were generally considered to be unsympathetic to the Eritrean cause, and he also 
discussed prospects for creating an autonomous Muslim region in Eritrea (EIU, CR 
1989, no 1:21-22). In January 1989, the WPE central committee duly approved 
Mengistu's proposal for a separate Muslim region in Eritrea, and the proposal was 
placed on the Shengo's June agenda for ratification.60
EPLF opposition to the plan, to the Ethiopian government and to Soviet support 
for Mengistu's activities increased markedly during 1988. During an interview in 
December, EPLF leader Isayas Afeworki complained that the new regional reforms had 
failed to address the crucial issue of separatism. He also criticised Gorbachev's policy 
on the grounds that continued Soviet support for Mengistu’s administration and a 
unitary Ethiopian state were contrary to basic Eritrean rights to opt for independence, 
federation, or regional autonomy (BBC, SWB, 3 January 1989).
Negotiations
Negotiations between Ethiopian and Eritrean officials in 1989 were not 
successful. This was due primarily to Mengistu's refusal to consider EPLF demands,
59 Under the new plan, the 14 existing regions were to be divided into 24 administrative regions and 5 
autonomous regions: Eritrea, Tigray, Assab, Dire Dawa and the Ogaden. In autonomous regions, assemblies 
were directly accountable to the national Shengo, to the Council o f State and to the President o f Ethiopia, as 
well (EIU, CR 1987, no 4:22 and 1988, no 4:21; Keesing's, 30 November 1988).
60 The proposal was approved during an extraordinary meeting of the WPE-CC, on grounds that the new 
Muslim region in Eritrea would constitute an expression o f basic democratic rights (EIU, CR 1989, no 1:22).
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despite considerable Soviet and American efforts to improve the quality of discussions. 
During the spring of 1989, officials in Gorbachev’s administration intensified efforts to 
persuade Mengistu to resume talks with the EPLF. In April, Soviet diplomats in 
Washington confirmed that Gorbachev had refused Mengistu's requests for increased 
military support and debt rescheduling because of the inordinately large military 
expenditures incurred in combating domestic insurrection (Washington Post, 21 April 
1989).
In the end, however, domestic necessity, rather than Soviet pressure, forced the 
Ethiopian leader to reconsider his position. Less than a month after an unsuccessful 
coup, Mengistu officially agreed to open unconditional negotiations with any party in 
Ethiopia.61 The Shengo went a step further in June 1989 and approved the Six Point 
Peace Plan for Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict resolution. Under the plan, talks would be 
held in public under the auspices of a mutually selected observer. In addition, 
negotiations between the government and opposition parties would embrace the notion 
that differences would be reconciled within a united Ethiopia (Associated Press, 5 June
1989).
Gorbachev’s administration responded very favourably to the Shengo's decision 
to introduce the Six Point Peace Plan (BBC, SWB, 15 June 1989). Shortly thereafter, 
Soviet officials intensified their efforts to influence both parties to begin negotiations.
In July, Y. Yukalov, the Director of the African Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, met EPLF head Issayas Afeworki to discuss the situation. As a concession to 
Afeworki, Soviet officials rejected Mengistu's proposal to create an autonomous 
Muslim region in Eritrea (EIU, CR 1989, no 4:21). When a WPE-CC delegation visited 
Moscow in August to discuss prospects for expanded cooperation, Soviet and Ethiopian
party representatives focused on the importance of improving dialogue on the Eritrean
• • 62 crisis.
61 Despite conciliatory rhetoric, Mengistu remained adamantly opposed to the idea of regional secession 
(BBC, SWB, 8 June 1989).
62 Simultaneously, American officials also intensified efforts to persuade die Ethiopians to open 
negotiations with the EPLF. In July, former President Jimmy Carter also met with Mengistu in Addis to 
discuss frameworks for negotiation. In August, Assistant Secretary o f State Herman Cohen, the first 
senior American official to visit Ethiopia since the 1974 revolution, informed the Ethiopian president that 
better relations with the U.S. were contingent upon improved human rights policies and an imminent 
reconciliation with Eritrean separatists and Tigrayan autonomists (BBC, SWB, 29 August 1989; 
Associated Press, 27 July and 4 August 1989).
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Gorbachev’s efforts to influence the course of Ethiopian domestic affairs in 
1989 in conjunction with American officials proved to be generally disappointing. In 
September 1989, the first round of official Ethiopian-EPLF negotiations was held in the 
Carter Presidential Center in Atlanta, Georgia. Marginal progress was made, but the 
talks concluded before consensus could be obtained on the agenda. A week later, 
Shevardnadze, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, and James Baker, the U.S. 
Secretary of State, discussed prospects for further negotiation at Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming (BBC, SWB, 25 September 1989). In November, the second round of 
Ethiopian-EPLF negotiations were held in Nairobi. In the course of the meeting 
international observers were selected, but prospects for success dimmed markedly, 
when EPLF leader Afeworki accused the Ethiopian government and Carter of delaying 
negotiations. Eventually, negotiations came to an end, despite considerable effort
63expended by Gorbachev’s administration.
Sharing power in Port Massawa
Gaps between the interests of Soviet and Ethiopian ruling elites widened even 
more in 1990, as a consequence of Mengistu's reluctance to share power with the EPLF 
in the distribution of famine relief out of Port Massawa and his decision to continue 
bombing raids on the Port. Once again, the joint efforts of Soviet and American 
officials to persuade Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders to cooperate remained largely 
unsuccessful.
At the beginning of 1990, famine prevailed again in northern Ethiopia.64 
Although international donors recognised that high levels of conflict existed in the 
northern areas of Ethiopia, they believed that Port Massawa would remain under 
Mengistu’s control and that it would continue to serve as the primary port for 
offloading emergency food aid in the northern regions. In February 1990, however, the 
EPLF defeated government troops at Port Massawa. Shortly thereafter, victorious 
EPLF officials offered to reopen the Port so that food supplies could be shipped into 
northern Eritrea. Mengistu rejected their offer at the time on the grounds that
63 Both parties approved the notion of United Nations participation, but the UN Secretary General refused 
to become involved in Ethiopian-EPLF negotiations, unless requested to do so by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly.
64 At the beginning of 1990, harvests in Eritrea were down to 20 percent of the norm Tigra/s harvests 
were reduced by half, from previous levels (EIU, CR 1990, no 1:31).
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recognition of EPLF control in the region would undermine prospects for Ethiopian 
unity.
In response to the crisis, unprecedented levels of American-Soviet cooperation 
developed in the spring and summer of 1990. At the beginning of June, officials in both 
states agreed to cooperate on joint food airlifts in northern Ethiopia, particularly in the 
area of Asmara.65 At the close of the June Summit, Bush and Gorbachev issued a joint 
statement confirming their intentions to cooperate and to pool Soviet and American 
resources to combat starvation. In addition, they also supported the idea of convening 
an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to settle conflicts 
in the Horn region (BBC, SWB, 6 June 1990).
Unfortunately, international relief agencies, as well as Soviet and American 
officials, underestimated the importance of accommodating the conflicting interests of 
Ethiopian and EPLF officials. In June, Mengistu tentatively agreed to allow Port 
Massawa to be used for unloading famine relief aid. In July, four technicians from the 
World Food Programme (WFP), acting on the assumption that the Ethiopian 
government’s approval still sufficed for port inspection, arrived from Djibouti in an 
empty boat. The gesture offended EPLF representatives who exercised de facto control 
over Massawa. Although Soviet and American political elites exerted considerable 
pressure on Ethiopian and EPLF officials to work out a plan for sharing port 
management, relief operations in the northern Ethiopian areas were severely hampered 
between February and December 1990, as a consequence of the closure of Port 
Massawa (EIU, CR 1990, no 3:29-30). In December 1990, however, Ethiopian and 
EPLF political elites finally agreed to allow imports of emergency food aid into 
Massawa. WFP and USAID representatives were credited with successful mediation, 
and the efforts of Soviet and American officials to persuade Mengistu and the EPLF to 
re-open the Port and to resolve their differences were scarcely mentioned.66
65 Under this proposal, US food would be transported on Soviet aircraft. The EPLF, however, opposed the 
idea of joint aid airlifts to Asmara (Associated Press, 3 June 1990; EIU, CR, 1990, no 3:26).
66 Under the terms of the agreement concluded in December 1990, cargoes arriving in the Port had to 
be inspected by both warring parties. Half o f the aid would be distributed by the Eritrean Relief 
Association, and the other half would be loaded on to trucks by the Ethiopians and shipped to Asmara 
(EIU, CR, 1991, no 1:26).
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Stage four: 1990-1991
In the final two years of Gorbachev’s and Mengistu’s administrations, 
compatibility in the political relationship dropped sharply. At one level, relations 
declined partly as a consequence of the overriding priorities of both leaders to maintain 
domestic control over disputed regions. At another level, the relationship was 
substantially eroded by the overriding priorities of Soviet and Ethiopian officials to 
improve their own individual relations with the United States.
Soviet-Ethiopian relations were particularly affected in 1990 and 1991 by four 
developments taking place within Ethiopia. First, in the late 1980s, organised, pro- 
Marxist, insurgent organisations began to co-ordinate efforts to rid the country of Soviet 
influence. Second, in March 1990, Mengistu formally rejected his experiment in 
scientific socialism and announced his intention to implement a more modem 
development programme. Third, in April 1991, the Shengo proposed recommendations 
for government restructuring that included power sharing. Finally, Mengistu's 
resignation and the transitional government's subsequent take over during May and June 
of 1991 provided unique opportunities for the mling elite in both states to normalise 
their relationship and to divest it of preferential ties.
As Soviet military support declined in the late 1980s, the level of organised 
resistance to Mengistu's administration in Ethiopia increased markedly. The most 
important factor in the new equation involved the coordination of efforts between the 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an umbrella group led by 
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (committed to Mengistu's removal from 
the government and greater autonomy within a united Ethiopia) and the EPLF
67(committed to Eritrean independence).
In 1989, the political threat to the Mengistu government posed by the EPRDF 
began to eclipse the long-term dangers associated with the Eritrean conflict. In March, 
the Third TPLF Congress resolved to remove Mengistu’s administration from power 
and to end Soviet intervention in Ethiopian affairs. In addition, TPLF spokesmen 
indicated a willingness to cooperate with the EPLF and to support Eritrean demands for
67 In April 1988, TPLF and EPLF officials agreed to restore relations and to coordinate active resistance 
campaigns against Mengistu’s government. Prospects for coordinated efforts were further increased when 
EPRDF representatives introduced their first official programme in December 1988 (Keesing's, 30 
November 1988; BBC, SWB, 1 August 1989).
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self-determination. In July, two months after an unsuccessful coup, Central Committee
members in the TPLF and EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement) also
agreed to co-ordinate their opposition efforts under the EPRDF umbrella. They urged
all anti-Derg and anti-Soviet forces to form a common front and encouraged the
68Ethiopian people to intensify the struggle. In December, the first EPRDF conference 
convened in Welo. In the course of negotiations, representatives from various parties 
approved a resolution to continue joint struggles against the Mengistu administration 
and against Soviet interventionists (BBC, SWB, 19 December 1989).
By the beginning of 1990, the rising level of militant, organised opposition to 
Mengistu’s administration was apparent to Soviet officials. Given the sharp decline in 
Mengistu's military and political power, as compared to rival insurgent contenders, 
Gorbachev’s administration could scarcely ignore increasing evidence that indigenous 
Marxist groups, eager to implement political reforms, were exceedingly anxious to oust 
Mengistu from office and to rid the country of Soviet influence.
In the late 1980s, Gorbachev’s administration had become more insistent that 
perestroika ought to be introduced in Ethiopia. In March 1990, Soviet officials finally 
got their way. Ethiopian political elites produced a reform package that embraced 
notions associated with perestroika, as well as Western prescriptions for change. The 
nucleus of Mengistu's reform strategy rested in the formal renunciation of Marxist- 
Leninist ideology and the abandonment of Ethiopia's experiment in scientific socialism. 
Under the new ideology, Ethiopian political life would be restructured to reflect the 
democratic unity of all classes, nationalities and creeds (WPE 1990:42-43). The WPE 
was stripped of its Marxist-Leninist features and transformed into a nationalist party, 
the Ethiopian Unity Party (EUP), which would function as a popular party that 
embraced all Ethiopians, regardless of religion, sex, ideology or class.
Initially, Mengistu’s administration attempted to establish a link between the 
reforms and Gorbachev's strategy for domestic recovery in the Soviet Union. In July 
1990, for example, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Dinka explained to reporters that the 
government was planning a future of perestroika, private enterprise, political 
competition and reconciliation. He also claimed that Gorbachev's reforms had
68 The Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), a splinter group o f the EPRP, operated 
primarily in Gondar and Wollo. Linguistically identified with the Amhara, the EPDM had supported TPLF 
activities for some time (BBC, SWB, 1 August 1989).
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influenced the direction of Mengistu's reform efforts (Associated Press, 27 July 1990).
Mengistu's rejection of Soviet-styled socialism in exchange for something more 
modem, however, had an unintended effect. It removed the cornerstone that had 
established the basis for special links of political cooperation between Soviet and 
Ethiopian elites. For this reason, subsequent efforts to regain the good will of 
Gorbachev’s administration by linking Ethiopian domestic reforms to perestroika 
remained largely unsuccessful. In fact, the level of Soviet-American co-operation 
intensified after Mengistu's rhetorical change in direction. In June 1990, American and 
Soviet officials confirmed their intentions to co-ordinate efforts more fully to secure 
peace in Ethiopia. They also declared that a new era of trust and cooperation had been 
initiated between the two superpowers (Associated Press, 3 June 1990).
As Soviet-American relations improved, constructive political dialogue between 
the Gorbachev and Mengistu administrations declined. Although overt hostility was 
avoided, relations between Gorbachev and Mengistu were characterised increasingly by 
political apathy on the Soviet side and growing antagonism on the Ethiopian side. In 
the Soviet Union, the magnitude of public dissatisfaction in Ethiopia with Mengistu's 
administration, coupled with mounting crises within the Soviet Union greatly reduced 
Gorbachev’s interest in improving dialogue.
In the early months of 1991, political exchanges between Soviet and Ethiopian 
political elites slumped dramatically. The rift in the relationship was particularly 
apparent on Mengistu's side. In his last speech to the Ethiopian State Council on 19th 
April, Mengistu accused Soviet officials of opposing Ethiopian foreign policy. He also 
emphasised the need to end all vindictive measures undertaken by the Soviet Union 
against Ethiopia (BBC, SWB, 23 April 1991).
As relations with Gorbachev deteriorated, Mengistu accelerated his attempts to 
improve relations with the Bush administration. In February, he agreed to American 
participation in Ethiopian-EPLF negotiations.69 In March, he tried to improve relations 
indirectly with Israel and the United States by agreeing to allow more of Ethiopia's 
Falasha population to emigrate to Israel (BBC, SWB, 20 March 1991). His efforts to 
exchange powerful partners, however, were ultimately undermined by political changes
69 Chaired by Herman Cohen, Ethiopian-EPLF peace talks took place on February 21-22 1991. It was the 
first time an American official had officially mediated in discussions between the two parties (Keesing's, 28 
February 1991).
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inside Ethiopia. The real locus of Ethiopian political power was changing. Resolution 
One of the Third Extraordinary Session of the Shengo resolved to set up a common 
peace forum with all opposition parties and unified forces with a view to forming a 
transitional system capable of negotiating a lasting peace and determining the future
70political situation in Ethiopia.
The Soviet Foreign Ministry extended full support to the Ethiopian Parliament's 
new initiative in April 1991. Gorbachev’s administration was willing to assist in 
promoting the creation of a broad and constructive political dialogue in Ethiopia. 
Foreign Ministry representatives also claimed that the Shengo Resolutions had opened 
up new possibilities for affecting the peaceful resolution of military conflicts in 
Ethiopia (TASS, 26 April 1991).
In May 1991, political ties between Gorbachev’s and Mengistu’s 
administrations were severed when Mengistu resigned and the EPRDF took power. In 
the first week of July, the newly formed Council of Representatives adopted the 
EPRDF charter for a two year transitional government, and Meles Zenawi was selected 
as the acting Head of State (BBC, SWB, 25 July 1991).
In the summer of 1991, a new pattern of Soviet conduct towards Ethiopian 
officials developed in response to the formation of a transitional government and to the
• 71demonstrations that had been staged against American involvement. First, Gorbachev 
strengthened cooperative links with Western European states that were also interested 
in establishing friendly relations with Zenawi’s administration. In May, for example, 
Soviet and Italian officials formally announced their joint commitment to extend 
concrete support for the formation of a broad-based Ethiopian transitional government 
(TASS, 31 May 1991). Second, Soviet political elites established parameters for the 
conduct of political relations with Ethiopia’s new ruling elite. In June, the Gorbachev
70 Section A o f the Shengo document contained proposals for altering the political status quo. Section B, 
however, stressed the importance of upgrading security measures in order to preserve the existing 
distribution o f power (BBC, SWB, 24 April 1991).
71 After Mengistu left the country, US official Henry Cohen interrupted a meeting in London between 
EPLF officials and members o f Mengistu’s administration to urge the EPRDF to enter Addis and to establish 
order there. At the end o f May, thousands o f Ethiopians protested Washington's involvement in the EPRDF 
government takeover. Many felt that the official Ethiopian government had been pushed aside in order to 
make way for new blood deemed to be more compatible with American national interests and Third World 
priorities (Associated Press, 28 and 29 May 1991).
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administration re-confirmed Soviet decisions to encourage constructive dialogue with 
all ‘politically active and influential forces in Ethiopia’ and to conduct relations with 
Ethiopia on the principles of mutual benefit (TASS, 3 June 1991).
The new Ethiopian government similarly re-adjusted priorities with a view to 
protecting the national interest. Although well known for his revolutionary, Albanian- 
styled Marxist views in Mengistu's time, Meles Zenawi adopted a more cosmopolitan 
approach in a bid to obtain more famine relief aid from capitalist donor states and 
international organisations and to secure additional economic resources for Ethiopia's 
future development. To that end, Ethiopian-American relations were re-emphasised, 
and experiments with Soviet prescriptions for Ethiopia's progressive development were 
finally abandoned.
CONCLUSION.
Before Gorbachev came to power Soviet-Ethiopian political relations 
flourished. Ruling elites in each state had different priorities, but political interests 
remained roughly compatible. Although there were differences in interests, they were 
confined to acceptable parameters, as a consequence of common ideological bonds 
formed in an era of Soviet-American rivalry.
Disparities in the power projections of the two states at international levels 
raised questions about the degree of domination exercised by the Soviet Union. In 
respect of political exchange, however, the strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian political 
relations in Brezhnev's time was prompted more by the needs of PMAC officials to 
control its domestic opposition than Soviet intentions to exercise domination over 
Ethiopia’s internal affairs. At a period of time characterised by the Derg’s declining 
relationship with American officials and higher levels of ideological competition 
between rival superpowers, prospects for improving political dialogue between Soviet 
and Ethiopian ruling elites were facilitated by Mengistu's decision to adopt a Marxist- 
Leninist ideological perspective, to import Soviet-style administrative structures for 
strengthening state control over the population and to create a socialist party that 
conformed in theory to Soviet recommendations for vanguard parties in socialist- 
oriented states. By taking advantage of superpower rivalry, Mengistu was able to 
protect his position as Ethiopia's de facto political leader and to consolidate the power 
of the provisional military government.
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During Gorbachev's time, however, the compatibility in the Soviet-Ethiopian 
political relationship declined sharply. The deterioration of political relations that 
occurred between 1985 and 1991 was triggered by real events that widened the gap 
between the interests of ruling elites in the two states. In this regard, it is imperative to 
note that changing levels of cooperation in the Soviet-American relationship directly 
influenced the pace of decline. Between 1985 and 1987, the level of political 
compatibility between Soviet and Ethiopian ruling elites remained relatively high, and 
their previous ideological links were retained. This was due primarily to the fact that it 
took time for New Thinking to filter into practice and the separate interests and aims of 
the Gorbachev and Mengistu administrations converged on the importance of creating a 
socialist Ethiopian state administered by a civilian government. To be sure, Soviet 
influence upon the Ethiopian political system was discernible, particularly in respect of 
the new constitution and WPE administrative structures. Nevertheless, there is clear 
evidence that the interests of Ethiopia’s ruling elite were served by replicating Soviet 
structures.
Between 1988 and 1991, the importance of cultivating a special political 
relationship declined progressively for ruling elites in both states, as a consequence of 
mounting domestic crises within each country and the conflicting priorities both leaders 
had to develop and to expand cooperative dialogue with the United States. In 1988, the 
year of transition, the picture remained mixed. On the one hand, Gorbachev's efforts to 
bring about the peaceful resolution of Ethiopian-Somali conflict posed no direct threat 
to Ethiopian sovereignty. In contrast, Mengistu's decision to expel international relief 
agencies from northern Ethiopia in April 1988 conflicted markedly with Gorbachev's 
commitment under new thinking to universal human values. During 1989, Mengistu’s 
persistent refusal to search for a political solution to resolve the Eritrean problem 
substantially widened existing gaps in the political relationship. The pace of decline 
gained momentum during 1990 and 1991, particularly as a consequence of domestic 
changes within Ethiopia. In March 1990, the Ethiopian leader officially renounced his 
commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology, terminated Ethiopia's experiment in Soviet- 
styled socialism, adopted a nationalist ideology and agreed to implement some 
Western-oriented political and economic reforms that also conformed in some respects 
to perestroika. In 1991, however, shifting power balances within Ethiopia facilitated 
opportunities for the normalisation of Soviet-Ethiopian political relations. In May,
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Mengistu resigned as President, the old government fell, and the EPRDF took control 
of Addis Ababa. When Meles Zenawi was elected as the new head of the transitional 
government, the Gorbachev administration extended full support and indicated a 
willingness to cooperate with the new administration.
In the case of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's desire to establish good relations 
with the United States and his willingness to cooperate with Washington in regional 
conflict resolution ultimately invalidated the old-fashioned patterns of preferential 
political exchange conducted on common ideological grounds under socialist 
orientation that had characterised Soviet relations with Mengistu in Brezhnev's time. In 
addition, the domestic crises within Ethiopia in the late 1980s effectively eliminated 
Soviet interests in cultivating political relationships with radical leaders like Mengistu, 
who opted for military, rather than political solutions. As regards Ethiopia, the special 
political alliance with the Soviet Union ultimately turned out to be more costly than 
beneficial for Mengistu’s administration. The inability of his administration to replace 
military techniques of crisis management underpinned by Soviet military assistance 
with political tools more in keeping with the Gorbachev’s new thinking and increased 
cooperation between Soviet and American officials, ultimately led to the general view 
that Mengistu's revolutionary military government with its past record of Soviet 
entanglements, like Selassie's imperial order with its past record of American 
entanglements, had become an anachronism.
After the new Ethiopian political elite gained power, both countries divested 
their relationship of any special political characteristics based upon ideological 
connections. Their bilateral relations were restructured in accordance with the 
principles of de-ideologisation and mutually advantageous political contact: the very 
same principles that Gorbachev had ranked so highly in his quest to implement 
progressive reform under New Political Thinking.
In respect of asymmetry and exploitation in the political relationship, available 
evidence does not support the claim that Soviet officials took advantage of crises in 
Ethiopia to exercise control over Ethiopian political affairs. A different, more 
complicated reality existed. Explanations by Ottaway, Dawit and Ake that emphasise 
the part played by Ethiopia’s ruling elite in the process are particularly relevant. First, 
Ottaway’s thesis that Ethiopian officials selected Soviet-styled centralised structures 
because they provided good blue prints for domestic political reorganisation in the
93
aftermath of domestic crisis provides some explanation about the instruments preferred 
by Ethiopian officials for crisis management after major political change. Second, the 
argument made by Ottaway and Dawit that internal pressures upon Ethiopian officials 
to create a national party were more important than external Soviet pressures draws 
attention to the importance of domestic priorities in shaping the conduct of Ethiopian 
officials. Finally, Ake’s idea that post revolutionary African elites were increasingly 
pressured to select policies aimed at augmenting state power and creating one party 
states in order to facilitate administration, to contain domestic opposition and to stay in 
power really does help to explain Mengistu’s initial attraction to Soviet-styled, 
centralised structures for political organisation and party administration in Brehnev’s 
time and his subsequent reluctance to jettison those strategies.
At deeper levels, however, these explanations fail to eliminate concerns arising 
from the charges made by spokesmen for Ethiopian Unity in 1987 that the Soviet Union 
had unduly intervened in Ethiopia’s political affairs and artificially prolonged 
Mengistu’s tenure in power by providing Soviet military arms and assistance. In this 
case, Galtung’s view that Centre states initially establish and subsequently maintain 
patterns of asymmetric exchange with Periphery states by forging links and establishing 
ideological connections with bridgeheads, may be simplistic, but his hypothesis has 
some merit. The claim that Soviet officials artificially prolonged the political life of 
one group of Ethiopian ruling elites through the provision of military support will, 
however, be discussed in more detail in the Chapter on military relations that follows.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP.
INTRODUCTION
Soviet-Ethiopian military ties strengthened markedly during Brezhnev’s tenure 
in power and, in time, became the linchpin of the relationship. This gave rise to 
accusations like the ones made by the Ethiopian Unity party that the Soviet Union had 
escalated regional conflict in the Horn region, made Ethiopia a depot for second rate 
arms and equipment, used Ethiopian territory for strategic purposes and wielded 
substantial influence over the military policies of Mengistu’s administration. These 
criticisms echoed Galtung’s, Wendt’s and Barrat’s general views that dominant states 
created informal empires by making elites in weak states dependent on the provision of 
modem sophisticated weaponry, but to what extent were the claims made by Ethiopian 
Unity really true? To assess the balance between Ethiopian interests and Soviet 
influence in this chapter, I shall examine the changes that took place in the Soviet 
Union’s military involvement with Ethiopia under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, make 
some comparisons about the weapons actually provided and see what use Mengistu 
actually made of Soviet arms provision.
During Gorbachev’s time prolonged Soviet involvement proved to be extremely 
expensive. Nevertheless, the costs incurred by Ethiopia turned out to be greater, as a 
consequence of Mengistu’s reliance upon Soviet military assistance to resolve domestic 
problems. Ultimately, military relations between the two states contributed to the 
process of Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation. In addition, opposition forces became 
increasingly reliant upon foreign arms to resolve internal differences.
PART ONE: MILITARY RELATIONS BEFORE GORBACHEV.
Before Gorbachev came to power, Ethiopia’s mling elite, in particular, benefited 
from the military relationship because they gained access to regular supplies of 
relatively sophisticated modem weaponry and technological expertise. New 
opportunities to upgrade and to restock existing arsenals were sorely needed when 
Ethiopian security arrangements with the United States fell through.
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Soviet military influence in Ethiopia
In this first section, I investigate Ethiopian Unity’s claim that the Soviet Union 
escalated regional conflict in the Horn and used Ethiopian territory for strategic 
purposes. Before this can be done, some information about their earlier relationships 
must be examined. Four important factors prompted the military connections between 
the Soviet Union and Ethiopia: Russian-Ethiopian connections before the Cold War, 
constraints imposed by superpower competition in the region, opportunities created by 
the Ethiopian revolution, and, finally, Soviet intervention in Ethiopia’s external and 
internal conflicts.
In the 19th century, Russian military officials demonstrated strategic interests 
in Ethiopia. In 1889, for example, a Russian Lieutenant named V.F. Mashkov proposed 
that Russia secure religious, military and economic control over Ethiopia in order to 
deter Egypt from bolstering the capabilities o f the Ottoman Empire. He also 
recommended that Russia acquire a port on the Ethiopian coast capable o f functioning 
as a base o f operations for closing the Red Sea to British shipping (Henze 1991:68). 
Russian ruling elites provided military advisors and modem conventional weaponry to 
Ethiopian officials. During 1885 and 1886, Captain Leontiev served on Menelik II's 
special security council and probably advised on tactical manoeuvres in the Italian 
campaign, as well. Following Ethiopia's victory over Italy at Adowa in March 
the Tsar o f Russia supplied Leontiev with rifles and ammunition destined for Menelik 
II's armed forces (Henze 1991:71).
In the aftermath of the Russian revolution, Soviet geo-strategic interests in 
Ethiopia declined, but some military interests in the country remained. In 1917 and 
1918, some Czarist officers found refuge in Ethiopia. In 1935, the Soviet government 
offered verbal support for the Ethiopian cause after the Italian invasion. In 1943, the 
Soviet Union opened an embassy in Addis Ababa, and, in 1946, Moscow selected 
Ethiopia for its first foreign aid project after the Second World War, a hospital along 
the lines o f the one built during Menelik's time (Henze 1991:65-89).
In the 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet efforts to re-establish security links with 
Ethiopian ruling elites were constrained by the development of good American- 
Ethiopian relations. In 1953, Haile Selassie concluded a twenty-five year mutual 
defence agreement with the United States. In exchange for the emperor’s loyalty and
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guaranteed access to Kagnew facilities for purposes of military intelligence, American 
officials agreed to expand Ethiopia’s existing military arsenal and to provide some 
economic aid for development.
In an unsuccessful bid to dilute Haile Selassie’s loyalty to Washington, Soviet
72officials offered a sizeable loan for development to the imperial government in 1959. 
However, the Soviet approach was thwarted in 1960 by the decision of American 
officials to increase arms shipments substantially. American-Ethiopian ties were 
strengthened even more in 1962, when officials in Washington denied Somalia’s 
petition for arms assistance. Apparently, this policy was implemented on the condition 
that Haile Selassie would refuse all future offers of assistance from the Soviet Union 
(Legum and Lee 1977:10).
As a consequence of limited prospects for improving relations with Ethiopia, 
Soviet efforts to increase influence in the Red Sea region in the 1960s and early 1970s 
were directed towards establishing friendly relations with Somalia. Geo-strategic 
interests were initially prompted by the desire to extend naval networks and to
73counteract America's well-established presence in the Red Sea region. Interests in 
Somalia and the region in general intensified, following Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet 
military advisors from Egypt in 1972.
Although PMAC officials requested Soviet military assistance shortly after the 
take-over, arms were not supplied in any great quantity until 1976. In July of that year, 
PMAC Committee Chairman Captain Moges Woldes Mikael visited Moscow to 
discuss Ethiopia’s security situation, and the first agreement on Soviet military supplies 
was signed (Halliday and Molyneux 1981:245; Pravda, 14 July, 1976, in CDSP, vol 38, 
no 28:15). In December, the Soviets agreed to supply the PMAC with $100 million for 
military equipment, including T-34 tanks and artillery. Apparently, the offer was 
conditional upon the severance of American-Ethiopian military ties (Henze 1983:169- 
170; Korn 1986:19).
72 In 1959, Soviet officials extended a R400 million loan (US$100 mn) to Haile Selassie for the 
installation o f an oil refinery in the Port of Assab and the construction o f a polytechnic institute in Bahir 
Dar (Wubneh and Abate 1988:181; Bach 1987:58).
73 In 1960 (the year o f Somali independence), Khrushchev’s administration extended $53 mn in aid to 
Somalia: the largest per capita credit extended to any foreign state in that year. Over the next 15 years, 
Soviet officials considered relations with Somalia important enough to provide well over half a billion 
dollars: an amount equivalent to everything the United States had spent in Ethiopia over a thirty year period 
(Legum and Lee 1977:11; Henze 1983:159).
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Soviet intentions to supply arms to the PMAC were confirmed in the Spring of 
1977. In March, the first Soviet cargo vessel carrying military supplies berthed at Assab 
(Legum 1987:241). In May, only twelve days after the closure of American military and 
information facilities in Ethiopia, Mengistu and Brezhnev signed a joint communique 
and agreed to issue a Declaration of Friendship. (Pravda, May 9 1977, in CDSP, v 29, 
no 18:10-11). Apparently, Mengistu also received assurances of full Soviet military 
support and an arms agreement worth $400 million (Legum 1987:241). In June, the first 
supplies of Soviet tanks arrived in Ethiopia (Halliday and Molyneux 1981:246). By 
July, ample supplies of Soviet military arms and equipment were being shipped to 
Ethiopia, as well as to Somalia.
Unfortunately, Soviet security objectives to establish a Pax Sovietica in the 
region failed to take into account the importance of accommodating the conflicting 
security priorities of Ethiopian and Somali officials. Brezhnev attempted to preserve a 
stake in both countries, even after Somali irredentist incursions into Ethiopia’s Ogaden 
region took place in July 1977.74 Soviet interests in retaining the status quo declined 
sharply, however, when Somali officials appealed to the United States for additional 
arms assistance. In October, Brezhnev refused to supply additional arms to Siad 
Barre’s administration, and, in November, the Somali leader responded by revoking the 
1974 Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty, terminating Moscow's access rights to Somali 
military facilities, severing diplomatic relations with Cuba and ordering all Soviet
75advisors out of the country.
Soviet strategies for assisting Mengistu in Ethiopia’s military conflict with 
Somalia in 1977 resembled the policies that had been advocated for Angola in 1975. 
Copious quantities of modem Soviet conventional weaponry and military equipment 
were provided, as well as a sizeable number of military advisors, and several thousand 
Cuban troops and professional personnel. On 26 November 1977, two weeks after the 
expulsion of Soviet military advisors and other personnel from Somalia, Soviet air-and 
sealifts of military supplies, combat troops and advisory personnel began pouring into
74 Somali troops invaded the Ogaden in July, and, by September, reportedly controlled 90% o f the area. In 
August, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Afro-Asian Countries issued a statement advocating the 
peaceful resolution o f conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia: the two "friends of the Soviet Union"
(Patman 1993:114; Pravda 7 August, 1977, in CDSP, vol 29, no 32:15).
75 An estimated 1678 Soviet advisers were expelled from Somalia in November 1978 (Patman 1993:114).
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76Ethiopia. Over a six-week period, about one billion dollars worth of Soviet arms and 
equipment, around 12,000 Cuban combat troops and 1500 Soviet military advisers were 
transported into the country.77
Soviet officials also provided Ethiopia’s ruling elite with experienced military 
advisors. The First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, General 
V.I. Petrov, was sent in to direct Ethiopia's military campaign (Patman 1993:114). In 
addition, some of the same Soviet advisors who had previously advised Somali troops 
must have provided tactical assistance to Ethiopia's armed forces. Largely as a 
consequence of Soviet expert military advice and extensive arms provision and Cuban 
troops, Mengistu's military forces were able to push Somali troops back across the 
border in the spring of 1978.78
Shortly after the successful campaign against Somali troops in the Ogaden, 
Mengistu requested additional Soviet military assistance to defeat the Eritrean
79liberation army that controlled most of the principal towns in Eritrea. The Soviet 
Union and Cuba agreed to back the PMAC at the time, even though officials in both 
states had previously supported the Eritrean National Liberation Movement. In July 
1978, hundreds of Soviet advisors and about 2000 Cuban troops accompanied more 
than 100,000 Ethiopian troops into Eritrea. In November, Mengistu re-established 
control over urban areas in Eritrea, but only as a direct consequence of Soviet and 
Cuban military intervention.
Conditions for the future conduct of military relations were set out in the 1978 
Friendship Treaty, officially approved in November 1978. Four aspects of the military 
provisions set out in Articles 10 and 11 were particularly revealing. First, only the 
designated ruling officials in each state were supposed to be privy to Soviet-Ethiopian
76 Halliday and Molyneux (1981:246) maintained that Moscow’s 1977-78 military airlift operation to 
Ethiopia was the largest venture of its kind ever attempted by the Soviet Union in the Third World until that 
time.
77 Estimates of the actual number o f Cuban troops engaged in the war effort vary. Patman (1993:114) 
claims that about 12,000 Cubans were shipped into Ethiopia. DeWaal (1991:76) puts the total number at 
16,000.
78 The first major Ethiopian-Cuban counter-offensive was launched in January 1978. Three months later, 
Somali troops returned to Somalia (Halliday and Molyneux 1981:246).
79 Eritrean history, including disputes with Ethiopia, are discussed in depth by Trevaskis (1960). See also 
Halliday’s and Molyneux's (1981) account of the Eritrean problem
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military transactions. Second, the heads of both states agreed to cooperate on military 
matters, but only on the condition that the defence capabilities of both parties were 
ensured. Third, Soviet and Ethiopian officials agreed not to enter into any alliance nor 
participate in any state groupings deemed detrimental to the other party. Finally, both 
Heads of State agreed that they would not engage in adverse actions nor become 
involved in measures directed against the other (Pravda 21 November 1978, in CDSP, 
v 30, no 46:11-12).
For the Soviet leadership in 1978, the gains from a more formalised military 
relationship with Ethiopia were considerable. First, Moscow's military airlift operations 
in the Ethiopian-Somali war served as a valuable experiment in the mobilisation of 
military resources on a global level. Second, in exchange for one port (Berbera) located 
in Somalia, Soviet officials acquired access to naval docking facilities in the Dahlak
Islands off Eritrea, limited access to the ports of Massawa and Assab situated in Eritrea,
80and prospects for some use of other Ethiopian air and land facilities. Third, increased 
influence in Ethiopia, as well as in the People's Democratic of Yemen, reduced Soviet 
security concerns about the American- British base of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean 
(Wubneh and Abate 1988:183). Fourth, by defending Ethiopia against Somali 
aggression, the Soviet Union gained the good will of the Organisation of African Unity, 
as well as many Third World countries.
As an added bonus, Soviet concerns about the prospects for American 
retaliation in response to Ethiopia's militarisation were minimised. First, Brezhnev’s 
decision to intervene was legitimated by the fact that Mengistu had requested Soviet 
military assistance. Second, Soviet military participation in Ethiopian affairs remained
restricted to the provision of advice and arms transfers. The actual fighting was left to
81Cuban combat troops and Ethiopian military personnel. Finally, Somalia's former 
status as a client state of the Soviet Union reduced American inclinations to support the 
unlawful invasion of Somali troops into Ethiopian territory.
In respect of Ethiopia, Soviet military assistance in the early 1980s helped the 
Derg to withstand the takeover bids initiated by regional rivals and domestic opposition
80 Apparently, Soviet military personnel had some access to air and land facilities at Makele in Tigray, 
Debre Zeit and Dire Dawa (Patman 1993:115).
81 Halliday and Molyneux (1981:248) note that some officers took part in the fighting in late 1978, but 
Soviet advisors generally refrained from active combat.
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groups. When 14,000 regular Somali troops invaded the Ogaden in August 1980, for 
example, Soviet-supplied Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships were instrumental in 
repelling the attack (Patman 1993:115). In 1982, Soviet officials supported government 
efforts to wipe out the EPLF in Mengistu's Red Star campaign. As a consequence of 
Moscow's timely intervention, Ethiopian troops were able to drive out militant 
opposition forces from most urban areas in Eritrea. The latter collaborative venture 
worked to further Soviet interests, as well, because it secured continued access to 
docking facilities in the Dahlak islands located in Eritrean waters.
While some evidence supports Ethiopian Unity’s charge that the Soviet Union 
escalated prospects for conflict in the Horn and used Ethiopian territory for strategic 
purposes, the reality is far more complex. Military intervention by Soviet officials 
escalated prospects for internal conflict within Ethiopia, but it actually prevented a 
long, costly war between Ethiopia and Somalia. Soviet officials may have secured 
access to some Ethiopian facilities, but the costs escalated dramatically because the 
installations were located in Eritrea and Tigray, the main centres of insurgent activity.
Soviet arms provisions and the modernisation of Ethiopia’s military 
arsenal.
This section examines whether there is any validity to the Ethiopian Unity’s 
claim discussed in Chapter two that Soviet officials exploited Ethiopia by turning the 
country into a depot for exports of second rate military equipment. I argue that 
Ethiopian ruling elites gained substantially from the weapons supplied by Moscow in 
Brezhnev’s time, because Soviet arms and equipment supplied at that time were 
modem and could actually be used to upgrade Ethiopia’s existing arsenal of military 
supplies. Although I shall briefly address the issue of costs, I shall concentrate
82particularly on the quality and quantity of the weapons and equipment provided.
It is virtually impossible to make realistic estimates of Soviet expenditures and 
Ethiopian debts incurred in arms transfer costs during Brezhnev’s time, despite the 
impressive appearance of quantitative assessments provided by organisations like the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The reason is that real 
production and labour costs in the Soviet Union's highly centralised economy did not
82 Mark Kramer (1989:67-109) provides a concise review o f Soviet arms transfers and military aid to 
Third World states.
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translate into equivalent evaluations based on similar weapons produced in the West. It 
is also the case that Soviet military assistance was almost never a totally separate affair. 
Military and economic assistance arrangements were often lumped together and 
virtually impossible to separate. In addition, the proportion of free, concessional and 
full rates on arms transfers tended to vary. We do know, however, that Moscow's 
military assistance was often in the form of tied aid and notoriously difficult to price. 
Under tied aid conditions, free weapons were sometimes provided, but Ethiopian 
officials were expected to pay for technical maintenance, as well as for additional spare 
parts. Moreover, Soviet arms deliveries linked to a particular agreement tended to take 
place over extended periods of time. Consequently, the estimates rendered by external 
monitors frequently contained double counting errors. Despite these difficulties, 
records kept by organisations such as the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) provided considerable insight into the patterns established in respect of 
Soviet arms transfers to Ethiopia.
Accurate details remained elusive about the kinds and quantities of Soviet 
military equipment exported into Ethiopia. Small arms like rifles must have been 
provided, but they were difficult to identify and probably less interesting for external 
sources to monitor. Nevertheless, substantial numbers of weapons in this category must 
have been shipped to Ethiopia, and Ethiopian officials must have incurred costs in the 
operation.
In respect of more sophisticated weaponry, however, more data were 
accumulated. The register of weapons imported into Ethiopia from the Soviet Union 
during 1977 and 1978 maintained by SIPRI provided a good idea about certain 
categories of armaments shipped into the country during the Ethiopian-Somali War. 
SIPRI collected arms trade information on five categories of major weapons: aircraft; 
armour and artillery; guidance and radar systems; missiles, and warships (SIPRI 1978, 
1979,1987: explanations on trade registers). The data indicate that some of the 
weapons delivered to the Mengistu administration at the time were quite 
technologically advanced for the period.
SIPRI estimated that Soviet officials delivered around 115 modem combat or 
combat-adaptable aircraft to the Mengistu administration during 1977 and 1978. One 
hundred of those were jet aircraft: 46 MiG-17s, 48 MiG-2 Is, and 6 MiG-23's. The 
remaining fifteen were Mi-8 helicopters (SIPRI 1978:261 and 1979:212). A comparison
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of the kinds of aircraft imported with SIPRI registers on aircraft output in the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s suggests that the Brezhnev administration supplied Mengistu’s 
administration with some relatively sophisticated and disproportionately expensive 
combat aircraft. In respect of jet aircraft, for example, various versions of the MiG-17 
and MiG-21 had been around since the 1950's, but the MiG-23 and K and L versions of
83the MiG-21 were products of the early 1970s. Transport helicopters like the Mi-8 had 
been produced since 1960, but, by 1977, advances in Soviet technology were creating 
new opportunities for the utilisation of Mi-8s for combat purposes. In addition, the 
Soviet jets imported by Mengistu's administration must have been substantially armed. 
After 1960, most supersonic aircraft were equipped with missiles and other attack 
features like cannons, machine-guns, bomb loads and napalm tanks. By the 1970s, to 
all intents and purposes, combat aircraft were more like weapons systems than weapons 
carriers (SIPRI 1978:239).
A comparison of the types of Soviet combat aircraft exported into Ethiopia with 
aircraft shipped to very important Third World clients like Syria in the 1960s and 1970s 
also supports the claim that the Brezhnev administration placed a high priority upon 
supplying Mengistu’s government with fairly modem aircraft. In the case of Syria, for 
example, MiG-15s and MiG-17s had been received since the late 1950s, but MiG-2 Is 
with Atoll air-to-air missiles were not delivered until around 1967. MiG-2 Is and MiG- 
238 were still being shipped to Syria in the 1970s:MiG-21 MFs in 1972, and MiG-23s 
in 1974 (SIPRI 1978:242).
Missiles shipped to Ethiopia from the Soviet Union in 1977-78 were generally 
of the anti-tank (AT) or surface-to-air variety (SAM). SIPRI estimated deliveries at 
2000 AT-3s (Saggers); 500 SA-3s (SAM mobiles) and 3000 SA-7s (SAM portables for 
infantry)(SIPRI 1979:212). All three types of missiles were relatively modem: AT-3 
Saggers entered production lines around 1965; SA-3s (SAMs) had been around since 
1960, but SA-7s (SAMs) were only produced in bulk after 1966. During the 1970s, all 
three types were extensively deployed in third-world conflicts. In the 1973 Middle-East 
war, for example, the Soviet S A-7 became extremely popular because it was highly 
effective and extremely portable. SA-7s were subsequently deployed by guerrillas in
83 The MiG-21s were being made in 1958, but versions K and L weren't added until around 1972. MiG-23 
Flogger prototype flights and production dates were estimated at 1967 and 1970, respectively (SIPRI 
1976:179).
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Angola and Mozambique, as well (SIPRI 1978:243).
Shipments of armoured vehicles included tanks (T) and some armoured 
personnel carriers (APC). In the 1970s armaments in this category reflected more 
conventional Soviet lines of arms production. SIPRI estimates of Soviet armoured 
vehicle delivered to Ethiopia in 1977-1978 included: 31 T-34s (light tanks); 200 T-54s; 
100 T-55s; 30 T-70s, and 40 BMP-40s (APC), plus an additional 150 M-47 tanks
84 *imported from Yugoslavia in 1977. Soviet armoured vehicles shipped to Ethiopia m 
1977-1978 demonstrated a judicious combination of old and new varieties. Main battle 
tanks like the T-54 and T-55 had been around since about 1949, while T-70s were 
relatively new, having entered production about 1971. Armoured personnel carriers like 
the BMP-1 and BMP-2 were mostly products of the mid-1960s (SIPRI 1976:195).
SIPRI registers of Soviet weapons imported into Ethiopia between 1979 and 
1984 also support the premise that Soviet officials in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
were supplying newer weaponry with higher unit values. This is particularly evident in 
the provision of upgraded combat aircraft supplied between 1980 and 1984, particularly 
the Mi-24 and Mi-14 military attack helicopters and the MiG-25 fighter-interceptors. In 
1980 ten Soviet Mi-24 helicopters were delivered (SIPRI 1981:221), while in 1984, two 
Mi-14 attack helicopters boosted Mengistu's existing helicopter arsenal 
(SIPRI: 1985:396). Both were products of the 1970s and represented a technological
85advancement over previous helicopters. During 1983/1984, Soviet officials
86reportedly delivered six MiG-25 fighter-interceptors to the Ethiopian government.
These fighter planes, also products of the 1970s, represented a significant technological 
advancement over earlier varieties of fighter combat aircraft like the MiG-17 and the 
MiG-21.87
84 Several countries were licensed by the Soviet Union to produce Soviet weaponry. In most cases, such 
countries required permission from the Soviet Union to export weapons covered under the licensing 
arrangement. T-62 main battle tanks, for example, were being produced under Soviet license in 
Czechoslovakia in 1977 (SIPRI 1978:201).
85 Although the prototype flight o f the Mi-24 was believed to have taken place in 1971, A and B versions 
were not in production until 1973/1974, and C and D models didn't come on the assembly line until 1975 
and 1976, respectively. Mi-14 helicopters were believed to be production in 1977 (SIPRI 1979:128- 
131).
86 SIPRI (1984:238 and 1985:396) reported the delivery o f six MiG-25’s in the 1984 yearbook, as well 
as in the 1985 edition. These two listings may have covered the same shipment.
87 Versions A and B o f the MiG-25 were certainly in production by 1970, but the MiG-25M didn't reach
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In contrast, Soviet exports of old fashioned conventional weaponry to Ethiopia 
appeared to be declining as an overall proportion of the costs incurred in expanding 
Mengistu’s military arsenal. To be sure, old-fashioned tanks like the T-55's were still 
being imported into Ethiopia, but Libya, not the Soviet Union was apparently supplying 
them (SIPRI 1985:396). The decline, in part, was caused by the fact that the PMAC 
already possessed considerable reserves of old-fashioned conventional weaponry. The 
International Institute of Strategic Studies (ESS), for example, estimated that the 
Ethiopian government already possessed at least 700 towed and self-propelled guns and 
howitzers, mortars and air defence guns of various sizes (ESS 1981/82:61 and 
1982/1983:66-67).
Ethiopian Unity’s charge that the Soviet Union made Ethiopia dumping ground 
for second rate arms and equipment is not wholly correct. Many of the weapons 
provided were technologically sophisticated and very expensive to purchase. In this 
case, Wendt and Barnett’s claim that ruling elites in developing countries would 
become dependent upon powerful arms suppliers because they wanted to modernise 
their arsenals seems to have more merit.
Mengistu’s use of Soviet military assistance
Does the Ethiopian Unity’s claim that Soviet officials heavily influenced the 
direction of Ethiopian military policies have any validity? It is probably fair to say that 
Soviet officials created the conditions that enabled Mengistu to rely unduly upon military 
solutions. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence to support the view that Mengistu 
retained control over Ethiopian military policy and the actual deployment of Soviet arms 
and equipment before Gorbachev assumed power.
American military assistance to the Ethiopian imperial government declined
88markedly on the eve of the Revolution. In May 1973, Haile Selassie requested $450 
million in military equipment from the Nixon administration. With the exception of a 
squadron of F-SE fighter-bomber aircraft, some M60 tanks and naval patrol boats
the assembly lines until about 1975 (SIPRI 1976:179 and 1979:30).
88 From 1953 to 1970, Ethiopia received around $150 mn in U.S. military aid. Over 2,500 members of 
Ethiopia's armed forces, including Mengistu Haile Mariam, were trained in the United States. In addition, 
the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) co-ordinated military aid and provided on site 
training for Ethiopia's armed forces (Wubneh and Abate 1988:175).
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supplied on a cash and credit basis, American officials denied his request on the basis 
that supplying such a massive military order would upset the fragile balance between 
Ethiopia and Somalia (Legum and Lee 1977:10; Patman: 1990:139). They also 
informed the Ethiopian leader that the Kagnew Communications Facility had been 
earmarked for closure.
The initial reaction of American officials to the Derg's creation was optimistic. 
Anticipating that a moderate, stable government aligned with Western interests would 
emerge, U.S. officials approved a new programme of credits and cash sales worth about
89$ 1 OOmn for the purchase of American military equipment in the summer of 1974. In
December, American attitudes to the Derg became increasingly negative after the 
execution of General Aman and fifty-seven other top figures of the Imperial regime and 
the military government’s refusal to provide compensation for confiscated American 
companies. Consequently, when the PMAC requested an American airlift of $30 
million in small arms and ammunition to combat increased hostilities in Eritrea in 
February 1975, U.S. officials in the State Department determined to limit arms transfers 
to the Derg to $7 million (Korn 1986:14).
In 1976, American dissatisfaction continued to grow, but the Ford 
administration was reluctant to withdraw all military support from Ethiopia. In the 
Spring, American officials approved Ethiopian requests for two squadrons of F-5E 
fighter bombers and agreed to consider the Derg's request for an additional $100 
million in military supplies (Korn 1986:16). In August, however, the Congressional 
Sub Committee on African Affairs concluded that the United States could pressure the 
PMAC to stop human rights violations because of its position as the sole arms supplier to 
Ethiopia. Subsequently, the Ford administration terminated military grants to Ethiopia, 
but sales of military hardware on credit were continued (Wubneh and Abate 1988:176). In 
December, however, American-Ethiopian military relations were severely strained by 
the Derg's announcement that Ethiopia’s new government was to be restructured along 
Marxist-Leninist lines.
Hostile exchanges between the U.S. government and the PMAC escalated 
markedly in 1977.90 In February, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced that
89 In Haile Selassie's time, American military assistance to Ethiopia had been capped at about $10 million 
per annum (Kom 1986:8).
90 Legum and Lee (1979:52-54) provide useful information on the progression o f hostilities.
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aid to Ethiopia would be substantially reduced because of human rights violations.91 In 
April, the American-Ethiopian alliance was officially downgraded, following a U.S.
92national security review. In retaliation, the Derg demanded the immediate closure of 
every American installation in Ethiopia except the Embassy and the AID office 
(Pravda, 26 April 1977, in CDSP, vol 29, no 17:22). In April, the Carter administration 
responded to the PMAC’s hostile action by suspending Ethiopia’s Military Sales Credit 
Programme. In turn, the Derg ordered a two-thirds reduction in American Embassy 
Staff and the resident Marine Corps. In July, a U.S. foreign military aid bill omitting all 
previous provisions for Ethiopia was passed by the House of Representatives and 
forwarded to the Senate. Shortly thereafter, American officials terminated military 
assistance to Ethiopia. The freeze also covered arms that had already been purchased by 
the PMAC (Wubneh and Abate 1988:176).
As a consequence of the revolutionary government's alienation from the 
American military alliance in 1977, the Derg’s position in Ethiopia was substantially 
weakened. Fortunately for Mengistu and his compatriots, the Soviet Union was willing 
to fill the vacuum.93
Between 1976 and 1978, the Derg struggled to consolidate its power over the 
Ethiopian state. Soviet military assistance undoubtedly facilitated Mengistu's 
acquisition of power, especially during the two-year period before the signing of the 
Friendship Treaty. One case in point concerned the Red Terror campaign conducted by 
the PMAC to eliminate domestic opposition in urban areas, which took place during the 
Somali-Ethiopian war.94 Soviet military assistance to combat Somalia's intrusion into 
the Ogaden helped Mengistu to mask the extent of domestic violence involved in the
91 Aid to Argentina and Uruguay was reduced on the same grounds (Legum and Lee 1977:69).
92 During Castro's visit to Addis Ababa in the spring o f 1977, the two leaders issued a joint communique 
that condemned imperialism and imperialist puppets in the Red Sea region and advocated the co-ordination 
o f progressive forces in anti-imperialist struggles. Shortly thereafter, U.S. officials intensified their efforts to 
disengage from Ethiopia (Izvestia, 16 April 1977, in CDSP, v 29, no 15:5; Legum and Lee 1977:92).
93 In an interview for the New York Times conducted eleven years later, Mengistu claimed that he had been 
forced to lean toward the Soviet Union because U.S. officials had been unwilling to supply the arms ordered 
in 1977 (BBC, SWB, 1 December 1988).
94 Dawit (1989) and DeWaal (1991) provide good accounts of the Red Terror campaign.
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Red Terror campaigns.95 In addition, Soviet assistance in repelling Somali troops 
helped to rally internal and external support for the PMAC in its fight against foreign 
invaders.
Mengistu's military resources were significantly expanded as a consequence of 
Soviet intervention in the Ethiopian-Somali war. After the war was over, his 
administration controlled all of the American military equipment received prior to 
Washington's withdrawal, plus substantial supplies of relatively new Soviet armaments 
and the added benefit of expert military advice provided by Soviet advisors. In addition, 
the number of Ethiopian military personnel was substantially increased, as a 
consequence of recruitment during the conflict.96 Ethiopia's vastly extended military 
capability meant that Mengistu’s administration was now able, as well as willing, to 
deploy substantial military resources in the battle to eliminate domestic opposition in 
rural as well as urban areas.
Mengistu also relied extensively upon Soviet-supplied weaponry and equipment 
to subdue domestic opposition in Northern Ethiopia in the pre-Gorbachev era. Evidence 
about the military campaigns conducted against the EPLF in Eritrea and the TPLF in 
Tigray between 1978 and 1984 demonstrate this.
To counter the threat of Eritrean insurgent groups claiming to control 90 percent 
of Eritrea, PMAC officials moved substantial numbers of Ethiopian military personnel 
previously deployed in the Ogaden into Eritrea (DeWaal 1991:113). Mengistu's strategy 
against the EPLF in general was two-pronged. First, enemy-held territory was 
subjected to sustained bombing by Soviet-supplied combat aircraft. Second, after 
substantial damage had been inflicted, Ethiopian foot soldiers, in combination with 
columns of armoured vehicles and modem conventional weaponry supplied by Soviet 
officials, were deployed against EPLF installations.
Between May 1978 and December 1979, the Ethiopian government launched 
four major military offensives against the EPLF in Eritrea. In each case, large 
quantities of sophisticated Soviet weaponry and large numbers of Cuban and Ethiopian 
troops were deployed The first military offensive was launched in May 1978, only three
95 Significantly, most o f the Red Terror executions were over by March 1978, when the war between 
Ethiopia and Somalia ended.
96 The regular Ethiopian army increased from 60,000 to 75,000, and troops in the people's militia doubled 
from 75,000 to 150,000 (DeWaal 1991:76).
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months after the Ethiopian-Somali war had ended. Operating from the government's 
newly built airfield in Makele (Tigray), the Ethiopian airforce began bombing ELF and 
EPLF occupied areas in Eritrea. In July, ground offensives were launched, as well. As 
a consequence of newly amassed superior military resources and abundant Soviet 
military advice, the PMAC recaptured all of the towns in Southern and central Eritrea 
within a matter of weeks. The second offensive began in November 1978. Mengistu's 
planned objective was to drive all Eritrean forces out of the vicinity of Massawa and to 
recapture Keren. Once again, chiefly as a consequence of access to superior military 
resources, the Ethiopian government was able to drive EPLF insurgents out of their 
remaining urban strongholds in Eritrea. In the third and fourth offensives, however, 
Mengistu failed to defeat EPLF opposition forces, despite the government’s 
disproportionately high allocation of scarce resources to complete the task.97 Both 
offensives were launched against Nacfa in the Sahel, where the retreating EPLF had 
retrenched. In February, Ethiopian armed forces sustained high casualties and were 
unable advance further into EPLF-held territory. In December, Mengistu's troops were 
routed by the EPLF and forced to retreat back to the government's military headquarters 
at Afabet. The Ethiopian military establishment suffered high casualties, and substantial
98amounts of Soviet weaponry and equipment were lost on the Eritrean battlefield.
In 1982, Mengistu launched the Red Star Campaign in Eritrea in a concerted 
effort to eradicate EPLF forces from Eritrea. To achieve this aim, he moved the national 
capital temporarily to Asmara so that he could control the campaign. Although military 
tactics resembled those used in Eritrea previously, the destructive potential of Soviet- 
supplied weaponry and Ethiopian troops was more fully exploited. In the 1982 
campaign, bombing raids took place day and night, and Soviet combat aircraft flown by 
Ethiopian pilots reportedly discharged cargoes of phosphorous and cluster bombs. More 
than 120,000 Ethiopian troops were also deployed in attacks on EPLF base areas: the
97 The third offensive took place during January and February 1979, and the fourth was initiated in the 
following December (DeWaal 1991:113-116).
98 During 1980 and 1981, no major military offensives were mounted by the Derg in Eritrea, but 
Government bombing raids continued in designated areas. Lack o f government interest in retaking lost 
ground in Eritrea in this period was probably due to renewed concerns about Somalia engendered by the 
invasion o f 14,000 regular Somali troops into the Ogaden in August o f 1980 (DeWaal 1991:115-116; 
Patman 1993:115).
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largest number ever deployed in Eritrea." Ultimately, the enterprise proved too costly 
to sustain. The Red Star campaign was unofficially abandoned in June 1982 (DeWaal 
1991:122). Mengistu’s national security objective to eliminate Eritrean opposition 
remained unfulfilled, despite access to costly supplies of Soviet weaponry and 
equipment, professional military advice, and abundant Ethiopian manpower.
Mengistu's strategies for eliminating TPLF insurgency in Tigray differed in 
certain respects from those deployed in Eritrea. TPLF successes relied heavily upon the 
ability of combatants to move around freely and to obtain access to supplies and 
support in rural areas. Consequently, the government aimed to dislodge the TPLF by 
destroying rural market networks and intimidating the population in TPLF-controlled 
areas. These strategies relied heavily on Soviet combat aircraft and modem 
conventional weaponry.
To that end, Mengistu diverted sizeable military resources from Eritrea to 
Tigray in 1980,100 and mounted two important campaigns between 1980 and 1983. The 
first campaign was launched in central Tigray between August 1980 and March 1981, 
the second between February and April 1983, not long after the failure of Red Star 
operations (DeWaal 1991:140). In both campaigns, Soviet fighter planes, helicopter 
gunships and ground weaponry, in conjunction with Ethiopian troops, were deployed 
against civilians, as well as armed insurgents.
Ethiopian government troops also conducted systematic bombing raids in Tigray 
after mid-1980. Reports issued at the time maintained that Soviet-supplied aeroplanes 
and helicopters inflicted high levels of damage upon the resident population. In several 
instances, phosphorous bombs were discharged on market places. Incendiary bombs 
were also dropped on fields and stores. Soviet helicopters and MiGs were also used to 
strafe populated market areas (DeWaal 1991:147-149).
By 1984, the mutual benefits envisaged in the Soviet-Ethiopian military alliance 
had decreased substantially for both sides. For the Soviet ruling elite, military provision 
to Ethiopia had become exceedingly costly. For Mengistu’s administration, hopes of
99 DeWaal (1991:117-118) claimed that nearly two-thirds of the Ethiopian army was stationed in Eritrea in 
1982. The sheer number o f soldiers in the area put severe pressures on local food resources. Consequently, 
the military regime had to airlift food to Asmara in order to feed the Ethiopian army.
100 In 1978 and 1979, the TPLF took advantage o f Mengistu's military engagements in the Ogaden and 
Eritrea to expand operations throughout rural Tigray. By 1980 spokesmen for the organisation claimed 
that the TPLF controlled 85 percent o f Tigray (DeWaal 1991:139).
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containing domestic opposition through reliance upon Soviet arms provision remained 
largely unfulfilled. In addition, Ethiopian debts had risen dramatically.
Before Gorbachev came to power, the evidence available supports the view that 
Mengistu used Soviet weapons and advisors, as well as Cuban troops to further his own 
interests, rather than yielding to Moscow’s influence. However, by providing so much 
military assistance, Soviet officials fostered the conditions for Mengistu’s 
administration to develop a preference for military, rather than political solutions.
PART TWO: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE 
GORBACHEV ERA.
Compatibility in the Soviet-Ethiopian military relationship dropped sharply in 
the Gorbachev era. National interests diverged, security priorities conflicted and the 
special arrangement ceased to function. Like the progression of political relations, the 
pace of decline was irregular and linked to the transformation of Mengistu’s military 
government into a civilian administration. The negative impact of declining relations 
was intensified by the fact that Soviet arms transfers to Ethiopia lost their technological 
edge, and the weapons that Ethiopian officials were able to purchase came mostly from 
surplus stocks of old-fashioned arms scheduled to be phased out of production in the 
Soviet Union. Despite marked declines in the quality and quantity of Soviet arms 
provision, however, Mengistu still persevered in his efforts to control domestic 
opposition by military might. As a consequence of his decisions, prospects were 
increased for Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation.
Gorbachev’s military disengagement from Ethiopia
Between 1985 and 1987, Soviet-Ethiopian military transactions carried on much 
as they had in Brezhnev's day. Gorbachev’s administration continued to supply 
advisors, weaponry and military equipment to Ethiopia, roughly in line with previous 
levels. One difference, however, was that the new Soviet leader also made a concerted 
effort to improve relations with Somalia.
Although empirical evidence remained sketchy, military concerns and arms 
transfer agreements still ranked high on the agenda in the early Gorbachev era. During
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Mengistu’s visit to Moscow in November 1985, several agreements were concluded, 
and they probably included provisions for military supplies.101 In return, Soviet access 
to Ethiopian facilities situated in Eritrean waters was assured for a while longer.
Although Soviet transfers of military arms and equipment to Ethiopia continued, 
events in 1987 indicated that security arrangements were changing in line with New 
Thinking priorities to downgrade the provision of military support. On 2 March 1987, 
USSR Minister of Defence S.L. Sokolov met with Ethiopian defence minister Lt- 
General Gebre-Kidan Tesfaye in Moscow. Details of the conversation were not
disclosed, but the number of high-ranking Soviet military officials in attendance
102indicated a growing concern about the situation in Ethiopia. In April, Gorbachev 
emphasised the importance of establishing peaceful co-existence in the Horn region 
(TASS 18 April 1987). In November, only two months after the PDRE's formal 
recognition, Soviet and Ethiopian officials concluded a new military agreement in 
Moscow. Although it was supposed to be worth about $2 billion, with deliveries to be 
spread over a three year period, the expiration date was set for December 1990, with no 
provision for renewal (Patman 1993:122).
In 1988, New Thinking recommendations for demilitarisation acquired more 
practical dimensions. Gorbachev was reluctant to maintain Mengistu’s military arsenal, 
chiefly as a consequence of military disengagement from Afghanistan and the heavy 
financial burdens incurred as a consequence of prolonged Soviet intervention in that 
particular civil war. In addition, developments within Ethiopia increased Soviet concerns 
about the wisdom of prolonging its military involvement. In March, EPLF and TPLF 
opposition forces defeated Ethiopian government troops on several occasions. At the 
battle of Afabet in Eritrea, the EPLF captured large quantities of Soviet weaponry 
supplied to the Ethiopian government under preferential conditions (EIU, CR, 1988, no 
2:15-16). In the same battle, three senior Soviet military advisors were captured by the 
EPLF and taken as prisoners of war (TASS, 22 March 1988). A week later, TPLF forces
101 Order information compiled by SIPRI on Soviet weapons imported into Ethiopia between 1985 and 
1990 supports this view. Apparently, orders for many Soviet weapons entering Ethiopia in this period 
originated in 1985 (SIPRI 1985-1992: trade registers).
102 In addition to Sokolov, four important Deputy Ministers of Defence also attended the meeting: the First 
Deputy, Army General P.G. Lushev; Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy; 
Commander in Chief o f the Air Force, A.N. Yefimov, and Commander o f the Armed Forces Rear Services, 
S.K. Kurkotkin (BBC, SWB, 10 March 1987).
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drove Ethiopian troops out of four important towns in Tigray, resulting in a further loss 
of Soviet arms and equipment.
In 1989, signs of Gorbachev's intention to disengage from Ethiopian military 
entanglements became increasingly visible. In January, Soviet officials announced 
substantial cuts in the production of conventional weaponry. This decision directly 
affected the categories of weaponry that had been typically earmarked for export to
103Ethiopia since the late 1970s. In April, unnamed Soviet officials in Washington 
reportedly claimed that Gorbachev had denied Mengistu's requests for increased military 
support, had refused his request for debt rescheduling and had restricted the flow of arms, 
spare parts, and the replacement of lost heavy equipment ( Washington Post, 21 April
1989). In May, two weeks after an unsuccessful coup in Ethiopia, Gorbachev informed 
the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies that military spending was likely to be 
substantially reduced in 1990-1991.104 In June, diplomatic sources reported that Soviet 
officials had already ordered the withdrawal of Soviet nationals from Northern Ethiopia 
(EIU, CR, 1989, no 2:25). In October, Youli Vorontsov, the Soviet deputy minister of 
foreign affairs, delivered a personal message from Gorbachev to Mengistu in Addis, 
which apparently confirmed that Soviet arms shipments would cease by the beginning of 
1991. During November and December, Soviet officials stepped up deliveries of 
weapons and equipment, but these new provisions apparently fulfilled the terms set out in 
earlier agreements.105
The pace of Soviet military disengagement from Ethiopia accelerated 
dramatically during 1990.106 Reasons for withdrawal were certainly linked to Mengistu’s 
reluctance to seek peaceful solutions to internal problems. In February, on the eve of the
103 Aeroplane output was scheduled to decline by 23 percent and the manufacture o f helicopters, by 60 
percent. Tank and munitions production was projected to drop by 52 percent and 20 percent, respectively 
(SIPRI 1991:299).
104 In 1989, Gorbachev disclosed that military spending in 1987-1988 had been frozen and that real 
military spending in 1989 would amount to R 77.3 bn (a figure four times higher than the officially stated 
defence budget of R 20.2 billion). He also announced that a proposal was under consideration for defence 
cuts o f a further R10 bn (14 percent), which could take place as early as 1990-1991. Prior to this time, 
realistic assessments o f defence spending by Soviet officials had always been kept secret for security reasons 
(SIPRI 1990:161-163).
105 Sources in Ethiopia reported at the time that the port o f Assab was clogged up with vessels unloading 
military hardware and munitions (EIU CR 1989, no 2:25 and 1990, no 1:29).
106 Substantial reductions in all Soviet military expenditures, including military assistance, were introduced 
in 1990 (SIPRI 1991:139).
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EPLF's take-over of Massawa, Soviet official G.I. Gerasimov announced the withdrawal 
of Soviet military specialists from Eritrea and all zones of military operation in northern 
Ethiopia. He explained that they had been assigned to Ethiopia for the express purpose 
of repelling external aggression, as opposed to participation in domestic conflict. 
Consequently, Soviet advisors would no longer be allowed to remain in potential combat 
zones (Izvestia, 8 February 1990, in CDSP, v 42, no 6:24).
In March 1990, adverse publicity on Ethiopia's indebtedness to the Soviet Union 
further undermined Gorbachev's motivations for continuing any existing lines of military
stexchange. On 1 March, Izvestia published figures about the USSR's foreign debtors. 
Ethiopia's total indebtedness to the Soviet Union, as of November 1989, was assessed at
107about 2.86 billion Roubles. The public revelation of Ethiopia’s position as a top Third 
World debtor to the economically ailing Soviet Union evoked criticisms from the Soviet 
media, particularly in respect of military debts incurred by Mengistu’s administration.
On 29th March, Isvestia correspondent G. Ustinov argued against sustaining 
current levels of Soviet military involvement in Ethiopian internal affairs. He claimed 
that details about the EPLF's capture of three Soviet military advisors in 1988 had been 
withheld from the public out of fear that the released information would constitute 
Gorbachev’s public admission that a Soviet military presence had been established in 
Ethiopia.108 Moreover, he argued that Moscow had incurred substantial costs in 
underwriting the Mengistu administration and that military expenditures had accounted 
for the lion's share of Ethiopia’s R2.86 billion debt. Although Soviet officials had 
originally agreed to provide emergency military assistance to Mengistu for the purpose of 
repelling external aggression, he pointed out that aid had continued long after Somali 
troops had left the Ogaden. He maintained that without Moscow's military resources, 
Mengistu's regime would be hard-pressed to defend itself against the EPLF and the 
TPLF. Finally, and very importantly, he stated that continued Soviet military assistance 
was prolonging the civil war in Eritrea and Northern Ethiopia, because Ethiopian troops
107 Ethiopia was listed as one of Moscow's top 10 Third World debtors. The others were Cuba, Mongolia, 
Vietnam, India, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria and North Korea {Izvestia, 1 March 1990, in CDSP 1990, 
v 42, no 9:9; BBC, SWB, 9 March 1990).
108 Ustinov stated that two Lieutenant Colonels, Y. I. Churayev and Y.P. Kalistratov, and one interpreter, 
A.V. Kuvaldin had been captured taken by the EPLF at Afabet in 1988. He claimed that 13 more Soviet 
advisors would have been taken prisoners if they had not been rescued by Soviet helicopter crews. He 
maintained that he, like other Soviets citizens working in Ethiopia in 1988, had been aware of the facts but 
had not been allowed to disclose them (Izvestia, March 29,1990, in CDSP, v 42, no 13:31).
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and opposition forces were using the same Soviet weaponry to destroy each other. 
Ustinov concluded that it made no sense to continue providing military aid that was 
wasteful and ineffective to developing countries like Ethiopia.109
In 1990, despite increased pressures for Soviet disengagement, Gorbachev’s 
administration continued to demonstrate conflicting priorities about supporting long­
standing allies whose power bases were being undermined by domestic rivals. On the 
one hand, Soviet officials showed a firm resolve to downgrade the military relationship. 
In March, for example, Soviet officials apparently refused to allow Antonov aircraft 
based in Ethiopia to be used to transport supplies to besieged Ethiopian troops in Asmara 
(EIU, CR, 1990, no 2:28). In April, Soviet military advisors began pulling out of Ethiopia, 
and the number dropped from about 1500 to around 600 (Patman 1993:124). On the 
other hand, Gorbachev’s administration demonstrated a reluctance to slow down 
deliveries of weapons. In May, more supplies of Soviet weapons, explosives and other 
military armaments were reportedly offloaded in the Port of Assab (BBC, SWB, 14 May
1990).
By December 1990, however, anomalies had apparently been resolved. The 
Gorbachev administration released financial data about Soviet arms assistance, identified 
the principal Third World recipients and confirmed plans to reduce arms production in 
the categories of traditional weaponry normally exported to Ethiopia.110
In 1991, Soviet disengagement from the military relationship with Ethiopia was 
completed. In January, concessional prices for Soviet arms supplies were eliminated as a 
consequence of Gorbachev's decision to conduct all foreign trade, including arms deals, 
in hard currency after 1st January 1991 (SIPRI 1991:213-214). In March, the three Soviet 
military advisors captured by the EPLF in 1988 were handed over unharmed to the Soviet 
ambassador in Khartoum (TASS, 27 March 1991). During the spring, military facilities
109 Ustinov claimed that the EPLF and TPLF had captured whole arsenals of arms and ammunition from 
Ethiopian troops in recent years. Izvestia, 29 March 1990, in CDSP, v 42, no 13:32).
110 In December, Soviet official I. S. Belousov publicly disclosed actual figures on Soviet arms exports for 
the first time. He reported that R56.7 bn worth of weapons and weapons technology had been exported 
during the last five years (R9.7 bn in 1990) and that R8.5 bn of the total amount had been exported free of 
charge. He also confirmed that Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, PDR Yemen, India, Vietnam, North Korea,
Algeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Cuba were the main Third World recipients o f Soviet arms 
transfers. Belousov also indicated that exports of weapons would decline markedly under the current 5 year 
plan: in particular, missiles by 64 percent; tanks and armoured personnel carriers by 25-30 percent; artillery 
by 48 percent; aircraft by 53 percent, and ships by 56 percent (BBC, SWB, 10 January 1991; SIPRI 
1991:212).
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on the Dahlak islands were evacuated, and most Soviet citizens were transported out of 
Ethiopia, following the EPLF's formal take-over of Eritrea and the surrounding territorial 
waters (TASS, 27 May and 3 June 1991). In May, Soviet officials disclosed the fact that 
seventy-five military advisors and specialists had been killed in Ethiopia (TASS, 21 May 
1991). Soviet television newscasters at the time also reported that Mengistu had received 
about $12 billion worth of Soviet military assistance over the years (BBC, SWB, 24 May
1991).
The level of compatibility in Soviet-Ethiopian military relations declined 
markedly while Gorbachev was in power. Efforts to disengage were particularly apparent 
on the Soviet side, and available evidence supports Patman’s (1990) claim that eroded 
motives, declining opportunities and the political impermeability of targeted societies 
initiated the process of Soviet Union’s disengagement from the Horn region.
The quality of Soviet arms provision under Gorbachev
Patterns of Soviet arms supply to the Mengistu administration changed markedly 
in Gorbachev’s time. At first, Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia carried on much as it 
had in the early 1980s, despite the demilitarisation rhetoric of New Thinking. Supplies of 
costly, technologically advanced weaponry to Ethiopia continued, but large quantities of 
conventional, less expensive weapons were shipped, as well. In 1985 and 1986, for 
example, 12 more Soviet MiG-23s were reportedly delivered to the Mengistu 
government. During the same period, forty scout cars (BDRM-l's) and 40 T-55 tanks 
were also imported into Ethiopia (SIPRI 1987:245).
According to SIPRI, the pattern of Soviet arms provision to Ethiopia began to 
change in line with Gorbachev’s aim to seek peaceful solutions to regional conflict in 
1988 (the first year of Mengistu’s civilian administration). Substantial amounts of 
Soviet weaponry were still being delivered, but the shipments consisted primarily of 
older conventional arms and equipment: in particular, artillery, armoured vehicles and 
tanks (SIPRI, 1989:249).
SIPRI records of Soviet arms delivered at the end of the 1980s increasingly 
resembled the weaponry that had been shipped to Ethiopia during 1977, with the 
noticeable absence of costly items like combat aircraft.111 For example, no further
111 In December 1989, Izvestia correspondents published a list o f military assets in the Soviet arsenal. The
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deliveries of fighter aeroplanes or military attack helicopters were reported after 1986.
A large number of missiles were provided, but only the 80 multiple rocket launchers 
delivered between 1984 and 1989 could be said to be very innovative, and they may 
well have made by the North Koreans. There were, to be sure, 320 more AT-3 Saggers 
delivered between 1986 and 1989 to augment the 2000 AT-3s received 12 years 
previously. Moreover, copious amounts of older armoured vehicles were supplied 
between 1985 and 1989: in particular, 152 ex-national volksarmee T-55 tanks shipped 
from East Germany (which were either produced in the Soviet Union or under license 
in another Warsaw Pact country), two hundred Soviet scout cars and 360 armoured 
personnel carriers. Two hundred pieces of artillery, comprised of towed howitzers and 
towed guns, provided by Soviet were also reportedly imported into Ethiopia between 
1985 and 1989 (SIPRI 1990:277).
To all intents and purposes, the Gorbachev regime ceased to provide new 
supplies of arms and military equipment by 1990. Perhaps the most notable arms cargo 
delivered to the Ethiopians in that year involved the final deliveries of the 380 T-55 
tanks supplied by Czechoslovakia between 1985 and 1990, which were the same model 
as the ones supplied by Soviet officials in 1977-78.112 In 1990, Mengistu ordered three 
sea-going vessels from the Soviet Union in anticipation of conducting future naval 
operations along the Eritrean coastline: one ocean minesweeper of the Natya class and 
two coastal minesweepers of the Sony Class. In 1991, however, SIPRI (1992:336 and 
1993:503) reported that arrangements had been completed, but the vessels had never 
been delivered.
The Ethiopian Unity’s claim that Soviet arms supplies imported into Ethiopia 
were second rate seems to have more merit in the Gorbachev period. Evidence collected 
by SDPRI indicates a real decline in respect of their technological edge, when compared 
against the weapons Mengistu obtained from the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev’s 
time in power.
estimates provided at that time indicated the existence of huge stocks of 1970s conventional weaponry like 
the weapons shipped to Ethiopia: as, for example, 63,900 tanks; 76,520 armoured personnel carriers and 
66,800 multiple rocket launchers (Izvestia, 16 December 1989, in SIPRI 1991:143).
112 Reports on Omnipol in October 1990 indicated that arms deals had secured up to half of 
Czechoslovakia's foreign currency profits. One such deal, concluded with Mengistu, also involved the 
provision of a munitions factory in Ethiopia for the production of infantry weapons (BBC, SWB, 4 October 
1990; SIPRI 1991:254).
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The effects of Mengistu’s reliance upon Soviet military assistance
In 1987, Ethiopian Unity accused the Gorbachev administration of determining 
Ethiopia’s military policy. Available evidence suggests that party spokesmen failed to 
take the priorities and interests of Mengistu’s administration sufficiently into account. 
Four important developments in Ethiopia were caused by Mengistu’s excessive reliance 
upon Soviet military assistance in Gorbachev’s time. First, the level of EPLF and TPLF 
resistance stiffened in response to Mengistu’s decision to impose military control over 
the Northern regions, in preparation for the transformation into a civilian administration. 
Second, Mengistu’s reluctance to abandon military campaigns in the Northern regions 
incurred prohibitively high costs for the newly created civilian administration. Third, his 
diminished access to Soviet military assistance reduced the survival prospects of his 
administration and created new opportunities for other military factions in Ethiopia to 
exercise power. Finally, his arsenal of Soviet-supplied weaponry ultimately facilitated 
the victories of his adversaries because they were able to capture so much of the 
government’s supplies.
Mengistu’s continued reliance upon Soviet arms provision to subdue internal 
opposition in the early Gorbachev era reduced prospects for the military government’s 
successful transformation to civilian rule in 1987. Dependence upon military means 
rather than political solutions actually stiffened levels of domestic resistance against the 
revolutionary administration. Campaigns mounted against the EPLF and TPLF in the 
mid-1980s demonstrate this.
In the case of the EPLF, Mengistu mounted the heaviest military campaigns in 
Eritrea since 1978, during the Ethiopian famine of 1984-1985. Despite a vastly expanded 
army and a substantial military arsenal,113 Ethiopian troops failed to eliminate Eritrean 
secessionist forces. Mengistu’s reluctance to abandon military solutions had the 
unintended effect of stiffening Eritrean resistance. Moreover, EPLF combatants 
continued to bolster their position because they captured large quantities of Soviet arms 
and equipment from Ethiopian military forces.
113 In October 1984, Ethiopian armed forces personnel were estimated at 60,000 new conscripts drafted 
and recently trained for combat, a regular army of 210,000 men and a militia army estimated at 170,000. In 
respect of weaponry, the Ethiopian army had at least 750 main battle banks and 130 combat aircraft on hand 
at that time (DeWaal 1991:182).
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In 1986 and 1987, the government’s campaigns on the ground in Eritrea tapered 
off, but bombing raids conducted by Soviet-supplied combat aircraft continued (DeWaal 
1991:184-186). In addition, the conflict acquired a new dimension. Emergency food 
relief convoys in Eritrea became targets and bargaining chips for EPLF and Ethiopian 
officials, alike.114 In December 1987, however, the EPLF finally broke through 
government troop installations around Nacfa in one of the largest battles of the twenty- 
six year-old civil war (Keesing’s, 30 November 1988).
In the case of the TPLF, Ethiopian troops also intensified their efforts to 
eliminate TPLF threats in Tigray between 1985 and 1987. Mengistu relied upon the 
combined deployment of Soviet-supplied combat aircraft and ground forces equipped 
with Soviet weaponry in central Tigray (where famine prevailed), as well as in western 
Tigray (where surplus harvests existed). In addition, government forces conducted 
strafing and bombing raids on market towns and villages (DeWaal 1991:197-198).
As a direct consequence of Mengistu’s aerial bombardment, TPLF resistance 
stiffened, and the tactics became more organised. Subsequently, guerrillas began to 
consolidate bases in Western Tigray and to establish control over the Ethiopian 
government’s access routes to Sudan (DeWaal 1991:209).
Mengistu’s reliance upon Soviet-supplied arms and equipment to resolve 
internal problems was not diminished by the restoration of civilian rule. In the late 
1980s, however, dependence upon military means turned out to be an exceedingly 
costly proposition for his administration, especially when Soviet officials determined to 
cut provisions for military support.
In 1988, the Ethiopian government attempted to re-assert its authority over the 
northern regions. In February, brigades from the 6th and 17th divisions in Tigray were 
moved into Eritrea to bolster existing defences. On 19th March, however, despite the 
substantial increase in Ethiopia’s military manpower, EPLF troops defeated Mengistu’s 
northern command at the base of Afabet, destroying the Nadew Command. Between
114 The Eritreans maintained that the Ethiopians were shipping military supplies to Eritrea in food relief 
convoys. On these grounds, the EPLF attacked a convoy o f 34 trucks south of Asmara (Keesing's reported 
23 trucks) on October 23,1987 and burned all o f the vehicles. EPLF representatives said that three of die 
trucks had carried arms destined for Ethiopian troops, but the allegations could not be verified. Later on, 
though, EPLF accusations that trucks in some relief convoys had actually transported government weapons 
were verified. (Keesing's, 30 November 1988; DeWaal 1991:188-189).
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10,000 and 20,000 Ethiopian troops were killed in the battle.115 As a consequence of 
heavy loss, all government troops were subsequently withdrawn from the vicinity of 
Keren, formerly Mengistu's key base in western Eritrea. Voice of the Broad Masses of 
Eritrea maintained that this was the first time the EPLF had captured such heavy 
weaponry (EIU, CR, 1988, no 2:15). Captured arms included BM-21 rocket-launchers; 
130-mm artillery, 122-mm howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, light weaponry and 50-60 T-55 
tanks (Patman 1990:300). In addition, EPLF forces also secured important ammunition 
and fuel depots (Andargachew Tiruneh 1993:367).
Mengistu’s questionable decision to move troops from Tigray to Eritrea in 
February 1988 provided the TPLF with new opportunities to extend its power base. On 
26-27 March 1988, it captured the key towns of Axum and Ende Selassie, and on 28 and 
31 March, Ethiopian government troops retreated from Adua and Adigrat. By the end of 
March 1988, Mengistu's only remaining stronghold in Tigray was Makele, the regional 
capital (Andargachew Tiruneh 1993:369-370; Patman 1990:300).
Despite the obvious loss of control over the northern regions, Mengistu 
persevered in his efforts to destroy EPLF and TPLF resistance. In May, he imposed a 
state of emergency in Eritrea and Tigray and established exclusion zones 10 miles wide 
on either side of the Eritrean border. Bombing raids were made on rebel-held towns, 
reportedly using napalm and cluster bombs in civilian areas (EIU CR, 1988, no 3:20). In 
June, government troops temporarily regained partial control of urban areas in Eritrea 
and Tigray, but only because they acquired additional supplies of Soviet weaponry 
(Washington Post, 24 June 1988). Nevertheless, Mengistu remained unable to dislodge 
EPLF or TPLF installations in rural areas.
Enormous costs were incurred by Ethiopia’s ruling elite in the 1988 campaigns 
to eradicate domestic opposition. Unit costs estimated by Eritrean broadcasters in 
September 1988 included the following ($1.00=Et Birr 2.07): one 130 mm mortar 
bomb priced at $1,441; one single artillery shell priced at $971; one Brenn gun priced at 
$237,850 and one raid by a single fighter-bomber jet priced at $9,667. In terms of total 
expenditure during 1988, Western diplomatic sources estimated that the Eritrean war was 
costing Ethiopian ruling elites around eight million dollars a day (EIU, CR, 1988, no
115 In 1988, about 120,000 Ethiopian troops out o f a total standing army o f 313,000 were estimated to be 
deployed in Eritrea (Keesing’s 30 November 1988, Washington Post, 1 April 1988; Andargachew 
Tiruneh 1993:367).
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4:25).
In a report to the WPE-CC in November 1988, Mengistu confirmed that military 
expenses were placing a heavy economic burden upon the country. He also admitted 
that military spending since 1974 had increased by about 19 percent per annum. In 
addition, he announced that military expenditures in 1988 would consume about 50 
percent of the annual budget ($1.2 mn). He also confirmed that his administration 
could no longer rely upon Socialist countries for the provision of large-scale assistance 
because these states were so busy restructuring their own economies (Associated Press, 
12 November 1988)
Mengistu’s decision to withdraw Ethiopian troops from Tigray in February 1989 
had important consequences for the future utility of his existing military arsenal.116 The 
Ethiopian army's only road access to Eritrea ran through Tigray. TPLF control over the 
region, in effect, split Mengistu's troops and his vast arsenal of Soviet weaponry in two. 
After the withdrawal of government troops, a considerable proportion of the Ethiopian 
army, together with copious supplies of Soviet military equipment were marooned in
117Entrea. To make matters worse, Ethiopian troops were now needed to replace 
departing Cuban military troops who had formerly patrolled the Ogaden borders. On 7th 
September 1989, the opening day of peace talks with the EPLF in Atlanta, Georgia, 
Mengistu announced the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Ethiopia. The evacuation 
of 3,000 Cuban military personnel began on the following day and was completed ten 
days later (EIU, CR, 1989, no 4:25).
In 1990-1991, obstacles impeding Mengistu’s military manoeuvrability were 
formidable. First, Soviet arms agreements guaranteeing access to fresh supplies of 
weaponry and equipment were due to expire at the end of 1990, with no possibility for 
renewal. Second, a sizeable proportion of Ethiopian troops and copious quantities of 
valuable Soviet weaponry and equipment had been left in Eritrea and were now 
effectively marooned there. Third, the level of opposition within the Ethiopian
116 On 27 February 1989, the TPLF captured Makele, the Tigrayan capital. Reports alleged that the town 
was taken without firing a shot. Apparently Ethiopian troops had pulled out, following the take-over o f Enda 
Selassie on the 19th of February (EIU, CR, 1989, no 2:25).
117 Thereafter, most supplies to Ethiopian forces in Eritrea had to be supplied by airlift (Andargachew 
Tiruneh 1993:370).
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118government's own military establishment were rising. Finally, lingering hopes that 
Soviet military personnel would intervene if the EPLF attacked Soviet support facilities 
situated in Eritrean waters, like the Dahlak Islands, were rapidly being extinguished by 
the harsh reality of Soviet military withdrawal from the region.
On 11 February 1990, the EPLF captured Massawa. At that time, large 
quantities of sophisticated Soviet weaponry were taken from the retreating Ethiopian 
armed forces. Ground arms seized by the EPLF in the encounter included technically 
sophisticated arms like multiple rocket launchers and anti-tank missiles, as well more 
conventional weapons like tanks and artillery (Patman 1993:123).
After the fall of Massawa, the Ethiopian government concentrated its efforts on 
other regions and increased attacks on territories taken over by the EPRDF. In March, 
rebel forces alleged that the Ethiopian government had used Soviet MiGs to drop Israeli 
cluster bombs on a grain stockpile in the Welo region (BBC, SWB, 5 April 1990). In 
May, on-site reports provided by Western journalist Neil Henry confirmed that 
Mengistu was still using Soviet MiGs to conduct frequent strafing raids and daytime 
bombings in Tigray. Henry also reported seeing scores of Soviet-made tanks and 
armoured carriers rusting in Tigrayan pasture lands, as well as spent artillery shells in 
village market squares (Washington Post, 16 May 1990).
In an effort to arrest the decline in military power, Ethiopian ruling elites 
attempted to secure military assistance from Israel, and, in 1990, Israeli officials 
confirmed that a few military advisors and some small weapons like rifles had been sent 
to Ethiopia.119 Although the precise scope of duties performed by Israeli military 
personnel was not detailed, some of the operations reported included the repair and 
maintenance of sophisticated Soviet machinery such as the MiG-21 and MiG-23 
fighter-ground attack planes and training Ethiopian armed forces personnel (Associated 
Press, 4 October 1990; Washington Post, 10 February 1990). On more than one 
occasion it was rumoured that the Israeli government had supplied cluster bombs to
118 The TPLF took advantage o f unrest in the Ethiopian army and formed two insurgent organisations for 
dissatisfied Ethiopian military personnel willing to operate under the EPRDF umbrella: the Oromo People's 
Democratic Organization (OPDO) set up in April 1990, and The Ethiopian Democratic Officers' 
Revolutionary Movement (EDORM), established in May 1990 (Andargachew Tiruneh 1993:371).
119 Patman estimated that about 125 military Israeli instructors were assisting the Ethiopian military 
establishment and that Israeli officials probably supplied about 100,000 recycled Kalashnikov rifles to the 
Ethiopians (Patman 1993:124-125; Associated Press, 30 March 1990).
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120Mengistu’s administration. However, Ethiopian hopes for substantial, long-term 
military assistance from Israel failed to materialise. Apparently, Israeli military
assistance in the 1990s, like Soviet military assistance in the 1980s, was contingent
121upon American tolerance and goodwill. By mid-1990, Israeli officials were officially
122downplaying military assistance to Ethiopia.
Despite the lingering presence of the Ethiopian armed forces in 1991, it was 
clear that the military balance in Eritrea and Ethiopia had shifted in favour of the EPLF 
and the EPRDF, under the direction of the TPLF. With the help of Soviet arms and 
equipment captured from the Ethiopians, the EPLF took over Eritrea. On 25 May, EPLF 
troops captured Assab and established control over Ethiopian port facilities and the oil 
refinery there (EIU, CR, 1991, no 3:30). Shortly thereafter, the Ethiopian garrison at 
Asmara, which had housed the 2nd Army Command, also surrendered to the EPLF 
(DeWaal, 1991:253). Consequently, under the leadership of Isayas Afewerki, new ruling 
elites in Eritrea gained access to a sizeable percentage of Mengistu’s existing military 
arsenal because so much Soviet weaponry remained on the Eritrean side of the border.
A similar situation developed in respect to the changing distribution of power in 
Ethiopia. In May 1991, Mengistu resigned and fled to his private villa in Zimbabwe. 
Shortly thereafter, TPLF leader Meles Zenawi became the new revolutionary leader 
technically in charge of managing all of Mengistu’s extant military resources, including 
the arms and equipment that had been provided by the Soviet Union, which still existed 
on the Ethiopian side of a newly fragmented state.
Mengistu’s vast arsenal of Soviet supplied weaponry ultimately facilitated the 
victory of his adversaries because they were able to take advantage of the government’s
120 In 1990, it was rumoured that that Israeli funds had been used to finance an order for cluster bombs 
placed by the Ethiopian government with Cardoen, a Chilean arms manufacturer. The newly elected Chilean 
government eventually stopped Cardoen from exporting all o f the 1,680 cluster bombs originally requested, 
but Cardoen later admitted that 25 percent o f the bombs had already been sent to Ethiopia (EIU, CR, 1990, 
no 4:23-24; BBC, SWB, 11 October 1990).
121 Officials in Bush’s administration were concerned by allegations that Israel had supplied cluster bombs 
to the Mengistu administration. In March 1990, U.S. State Department officials informed the Israeli 
government that they opposed any provision o f Israeli military aid to Ethiopia (Associated Press, 22 January 
1990 and 30 March 1990).
122 In June 1990, Reuven Merhav, director-general o f the Israeli Foreign Ministry, admitted that the 
emigration o f Ethiopian Falashas was important, but he said that this issue would not compel Israel to 
provide military aid to the Mengistu administration. Merhav also claimed that not one single Israeli military 
adviser had set foot inside Ethiopia since the official resumption of Ethiopian-Israeli relations (BBC, SWB,
8 June 1990).
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supplies. More importantly, the redistribution of Soviet weapons increased future 
prospects for Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation and instability.
CONCLUSION
Military transactions formed the linchpin of the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship. 
Relations between the ruling elite of these two states were sustained so long as their 
security interests remained compatible. During the Brezhnev period and immediately 
afterwards, Soviet officials still valued the theories of socialist orientation which 
predicted that military regimes and their armed forces would create opportunities for 
non-capitalist development. Moreover, trade-offs between military aid to Mengistu’s 
administration and access to docking facilities located in Eritrean waters remained 
tolerable, despite some mutual recognition of diminishing benefits. During this time, 
the Ethiopian ruling elite, in particular, benefited from the arrangement because they 
were able to modernise, as well as to restock their existing military arsenal, after 
security arrangements with American officials fell through.
In the Gorbachev era, Soviet theories that military regimes would be the catalyst 
for the process of socialist orientation were largely discredited by the reality that local 
political elites had generally failed to implement internal social transformation. 
Consequently, Soviet and Ethiopian security interests diverged, in response to serious 
domestic crises in both states and a radical change in the prescriptions recommended 
for regional conflict resolution introduced by Gorbachev’s administration. In the 
process, the precarious balance of benefits and costs that had been sustained in 
Brezhnev’s day was destabilised.
Efforts to disengage from the military relationship were most apparent on the 
Soviet side. Between 1985 and 1987, the pace of extrication from military 
commitments to Ethiopia was slow. Soviet weapons continued to be exported to 
Ethiopia; Soviet advisors remained actively involved, and Cuban troops continued to 
guard the Somali border. During 1988 and 1989, the Soviet leader strengthened his 
resolve to withdraw from the situation. Soviet military supplies declined in quality and 
quantity; many advisors were sent home, and Cuban troops left the country. In 1990- 
1991, Gorbachev decisively opted out of the military arrangement. Official arms 
assistance agreements were terminated; Soviet advisors were withdrawn, and naval 
equipment was removed from the Dahlak islands.
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The proposition that ruling elites in these two sovereign states ceased to have 
common interests is interesting, but it does not tell the whole story. The military 
relationship was appreciably more than the sum of the separate security interests of 
Soviet and Ethiopian ruling elites that were sometimes compatible but often conflicted. 
In respect of militarisation, an asymmetric relationship developed as a consequence of 
unequal access to significant military resources.
We have finally to evaluate the validity of the Ethiopian Unity’s accusation that 
the Soviet Union exploited Ethiopia in the military relationship. Did Soviet officials 
really create the conditions requisite for negative patterns of asymmetric exchange to 
develop by making Ethiopia a depot for exports of Soviet military equipment, utilising 
Ethiopian territory for strategic purposes, heavily influencing the direction of Ethiopian 
military policies, artificially prolonging the political life of one group of Ethiopian 
ruling elites through the provision of military support and escalating regional conflict in 
the Horn region?
Some evidence supports the charge that Ethiopia became a depot for Soviet 
military exports. Galtung (1971) and Wendt and Barnett (1993) take the position that 
only Center states have the technology to develop and to provide sophisticated military 
arms and equipment. This view helps to explain why Ethiopian officials (i.e., the 
Bridgehead) were so attracted to Soviet offers of military assistance when American 
security interests declined and why Mengistu’s administration ultimately became 
dependent upon Soviet arms provision to resolve internal problems. Wendt and 
Barnett’s ideas about capital intensive militarisation provide additional insight into the 
negative aspects associated with dependency: namely, dominant states provide access to 
military technology that encourage ruling elites in Third World states to divert scarce 
domestic resources from where they are most needed towards the modernisation of 
military arsenals.
With regard to Ethiopian Unity’s accusation that Soviet officials dominated the 
military relationship because they exploited Ethiopian territory for strategic purposes 
and exerted a significant influence upon the direction of Mengistu’s military policies, 
the evidence suggests that a very different reality existed. Ethiopian elites exercised 
considerable control over the policies they selected for territorial access and regional 
conflict resolution. In support of this view, the arguments offered by Colin Legum, 
Marina Ottaway and Dawit Wolde Giorgis are particularly relevant. Legum’s and
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Ottaway’s claim that leaders of powerful states exert a limited influence over the 
security affairs of their clients, unless their goals are compatible with those of local 
ruling elites, provides a plausible explanation for the repeated failures of Soviet and 
American officials to persuade Mengistu to abandon militarisation as a strategy for 
conflict resolution. Dawit’s claims that Mengistu intentionally fostered a relationship of 
dependence on the Soviet Union to obtain goods and services for his regime also have 
considerable explanatory merit.
The final two accusations levelled against the Soviet Union, however, deserve 
more serious consideration. The evidence does support the claim that the Soviet Union, 
regardless of intention, intervened in Ethiopian affairs by providing military support 
which artificially prolonged the political life of Mengistu’s administration and escalated 
prospects for conflict in the Horn region. In the process of modernising Mengistu’s 
military arsenal, the military and communications technology provided by the Soviet 
Union dramatically increased the potential for fragmentation and destruction within 
Ethiopia. Moreover, as a consequence of capturing so much Soviet weaponry, militant 
Eritrean and Ethiopian opposition forces became just as adept as Mengistu’s 
administration at using modem weaponry to control opposing segments of the 
population.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PROGRESSION OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
INTRODUCTION
The importance of economic relations in forming and maintaining the 
negative patterns of asymmetric exchange that developed between the Soviet 
Union and Ethiopia has been generally underrated. Evidence in the Soviet- 
Ethiopian case adds credibility to Galtung’s claim that economic relations 
between Centre and Periphery states are likely to impact adversely upon the 
weaker state. Despite the stated intentions of Soviet officials to improve 
Ethiopia’s prospects for self-reliance, the cumulative effect of their economic 
relationship increased Ethiopia’s dependence on the Soviet Union and exerted a 
negative impact upon its prospects for future development. However, 
responsibility for Ethiopia's economic deterioration and rising indebtedness in 
the 1990s must be attributed at least equally to Mengistu's preference for 
negotiating special economic arrangements with Moscow, rather than spreading 
the risks more globally. In this chapter I examine trade, aid and debt issues in 
the Brezhnev period and then under Gorbachev.
PART ONE: TRADE, AID AND DEBT IN THE BREZHNEV PERIOD.
Ethiopian dependence upon Soviet economic exchanges increased 
during the era of Brezhnev and his immediate successors, but the rate of 
progression was uneven. In the early years, Ethiopia’s risks were spread over a 
wider range of countries. In the four years immediately preceding Gorbachev's 
rise to power, however, economic dependence upon the Soviet Union increased 
markedly.
Trade relations.
In this section, I begin by comparing Ethiopian trade turnovers with the 
Soviet Union and major capitalist trading partners to determine percentage 
shares in value. Then some imbalances in trading patterns that developed
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between the two countries are identified. Finally, I look at the limitations in 
comparative advantage inherent in exchanging Ethiopian unprocessed 
agricultural commodities for Soviet oil, manufactured goods and machinery.
It has often been stated that the Ethiopian government conducted most of 
its trade with the Capitalist developed countries in the pre-Gorbachev era and 
that trade exchanges with the Soviet Union remained insignificant by 
comparison. At one level, the data obtained from Ethiopian statistical sources 
about the period between 1976 and 1984 and represented in Chart 1 supports 
this view.
C hart 1
Ethiopian trad e  tu rnove rs  w ith m ajor cap ita lis t 
and  so c ia lis t trad ing  p a rtn e rs  1976 -1984  
Birr 19.5 billion (US $9.42 billion)
Others
43%
Data Sources: National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), Annual Reports 1980-1984 and Quarterly 
Bulletins 1991/1992 to 1993/1994; Ethiopian Annual External Trade Statistics, 1981-1990.
As a percentage of the 19.5 bn Birr (BR) (US$ 9.42bn) total trade 
turnover reported for the nine year period, trade exchanges with United States 
(14%), the Federal Republic o f Germany (10%), Italy (10%) and Japan (9%) 
accounted for 43 percent o f the total. In comparison, the Soviet Union and the 
German Democratic Republic (the largest CMEA partner after the Soviet 
Union) accounted for only 11 percent and three percent o f the total respectively,
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between 1976 and 1984.
Within the nine-year period, however, Ethiopian trade turnovers with the 
Soviet Union in percentage terms increased significantly in the four years 
immediately preceding Gorbachev’s rise to power. This trend is demonstrated in 
Chart 2.
Chart 2
Trade turnover comparisons for the periods 
1976-1979, 1980-1983 and 1984
□  1976-1979 
■  1980-1983
□  1984
USA FRG Italy Ja p a n  U SSR GDR
Data sources: NBE Annual Reports 1980-1984 and Quarterly Bulletins 
1991/1992 to 1993/1994. Ethiopian Annual External Trade Statistics 1981-1990.
Between 1976 and 1979, Soviet shares o f the total remained low. Trade 
turnovers with major capitalist partners accounted for 46 percent o f the BR6.7bn 
(US$ 3.2bn) total, with a breakdown as follows: the United States (18%), FRG 
(9%), Italy (9%) and Japan (10%). For the same period, trade turnovers with the 
Soviet Union accounted for only one and one-half percent o f the total, while the 
GDR accounted for three percent. Between 1980 and 1984, however, the value 
o f Ethiopia’s trade conducted with the Soviet Union in percentage terms rose 
markedly. For the period 1980 to 1983, Ethiopian trade turnover values with all 
countries were reported as BR9.8bn (US$4.73bn). O f this amount, transactions 
with the Soviet Union accounted for 16 percent o f the total, as compared to the 
U.S. (11%), FRG (11%), Italy (11%), and Japan (8%). In 1984, the year o f the
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Ethiopian famine, trade turnover with the Soviet Union rose to 17 percent o f the 
BR2.8bn total (US$1.4bn), as compared to the U.S. (17%), FRG (13%), Italy 
(9%), and Japan (7%).
More importantly, a breakdown of statistical data on export and import 
values published by Ethiopian officials between 1976 and 1984 indicated that 
the direction of trade became unbalanced during Brezhnev’s time. This pattern 
is demonstrated in Chart 3.
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Data sources: NBE Annual Reports 1980-1984 and Quarterly Bulletins 1991/1992 to 
1993/1994. Ethiopian Annual External Trade Statistics 1981-1990.
Exports continued to be channelled towards main capitalist trading partners.
The United States (24%), West Germany (14%), Italy (7%) and Japan (7%), for 
example, accounted for 52 percent o f Ethiopia’s total export revenue earned 
over the period 1976 and 1984, estimated at BR7.2bn (US$ 3.5bn), as compared 
to the Soviet Union’s meagre share of three percent. In contrast, imports from 
the Soviet Union for the same period accounted for 17 percent o f the total value of 
11 billion Birr, as compared to the United States (9%); West Germany (11%),
Italy (13%) and Japan (11%).
The changing distribution o f Ethiopia’s imported goods in percentage 
shares within the nine-year period is particularly interesting. This trend is 
demonstrated in Chart 4.
Chart 3
Changing patterns in Ethiopia's balance of trade with 
the major capitalist partners and the Soviet Union 
1976-1984
□  Exports 1976-1984
a  Imports 1976-1984
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Chart 4
Ethiopian imports from the major capitalist trading 
partners and the Soviet Union, compared for the periods 
1976-1979 and 1980-1983
□  Imports 1976-1979 
■  Imports 1980-1983
USSR
Data sources: NBE Annual Reports 1980-1984 and Quarterly Bulletins 1991/1992 
to 1993/1994. Ethiopian Annual External Trade Statistics 1981-1990.
Over the period 1976-1979, imports from the Soviet Union still only accounted 
for a very small percentage o f the total: about two percent o f the BR2.6bn 
reported, as compared to the United States (15%), the FRG (15%), Italy (15%) 
and Japan (19%). For the period 1980-1983, however, Soviet percentage shares 
o f Ethiopia’s import market rose sharply to 22 percent of the total BR6.5bn 
reported, while percentage shares o f the United States (6%), FRG (10%), Italy 
(13%) and Japan (9%) declined markedly.
Statistical data about Soviet trade turnovers with Ethiopia from 1976 to 
1984 collected in Vneshnyaia Torgovlya certainly supports the view that the 
total value o f trade between the two countries increased sharply during the nine 
year period. In 1976, for example, turnover between the two countries 
amounted to a mere 4.3 million roubles (R). In 1984, trade exchanges peaked at
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a record R 221.9mn. Indeed, total trade values over the nine-year period 
apparently increased about 52 times, a rather impressive figure at first sight. The 
magnitude of increase in the trade turnover values reported, however, masked 
the facts that the value of goods exported from the Soviet Union into Ethiopia 
accounted for most o f the rise and that trade exchanges between the Soviet 
Union and Ethiopia became increasingly unbalanced after 1975, despite the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status enshrined in the 1978 Friendship Treaty. 
This progression, expressed in percentage terms, is demonstrated in chart 5.
Chart 5
Soviet trade turnovers with Ethiopia, compared for the 
periods 1967-1975 and 1976-1984
100
1967 -  1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
□  Exports to Ethiopia 
■  Imports from Ethiopia
Data sources: Vneshnyaia Torgovlya, trade statistics: 1967-1984.
When economic exchanges between the two countries were limited over 
the period 1967 to 1975, the balance between the value o f Soviet goods exported 
to Ethiopia and Ethiopian goods imported into the Soviet Union remained 
roughly equal, averaging about 45 percent for exports and 55 percent for 
imports per annum, respectively. That is to say, the Soviet Union, on average, 
actually spent slightly more on goods imported from Ethiopia over the nine-year 
period when economic ties were loose, than it earned from items exported to 
that country. For the period 1976-1984, the value o f goods exported from the 
Soviet Union into Ethiopia soared, while the value o f items imported from 
Ethiopia slumped dramatically. Expressed in percentage terms, Soviet exports to 
Ethiopia accounted for 87 percent o f the total trade turnover value reported, as 
compared to only 13 percent for Ethiopian goods imported into the Soviet
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Union.123
Significant rises in the value o f Soviet goods were particularly 
noticeable in 1977, 1978, 1982 and 1984. In 1972, the year that the Ethiopian- 
Somali war ended and Soviet-Ethiopian friendship was declared, the value o f 
Soviet exports climbed to R22.4mn, representing a substantial increase from the 
paltry R3.6mn recorded in 1976. In 1978, the year of the Friendship Treaty, 
Soviet exports nearly trebled in value over the previous year’s figure to 
R64.2mn. In 1982, the year that the CPSU and the COP WE concluded a 
cooperation agreement (CDSP 1982, v 34, no 41:11-12), Soviet exports were 
valued at R182.3mn, representing an increase o f R46mn over the 1981 figure. In 
1984, the year o f the WPE party's official launch, Soviet exports into Ethiopia 
reached a record high of R203.2mn (Vneshnyaia Torgovlya (1967-1984).
Disparities in the kinds of goods that officials in each country had to 
offer the other cast doubts on the viability of mutually beneficial Soviet- 
Ethiopian trade relations sustained through comparative advantage. In terms o f 
export and import exchanges, the unit values of Ethiopian coffee and other 
agrarian raw commodities simply could not offset the costs o f Soviet oil, 
machinery and manufactured goods. An analysis of Ethiopia’s Annual External 
Trade statistics (EAETS) based upon customs reports issued between 1981 and 
1984 illustrates this fact.
In terms o f Ethiopia’s comparative advantage, exports to Soviet buyers 
in the early 1980s consisted almost exclusively o f unprocessed agricultural 
goods. Chart 6 demonstrates this.
123 Widening gaps in the directional imbalance o f trade were reversed only in 1979, the year that the 
COPWEwas formed. In that year, Soviet imports o f Ethiopian goods accounted for 29 percent o f the total 
trade turnover (Chart 5).
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Chart 6
E thiopian  g o o d s  e x p o r te d  to  
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Data Source: Ethiopian External Trade Statistics, 1981-1984.
Ethiopian customs officials reported that the value o f goods exported to the 
Soviet Union for the period 1981-1984 was about BR52mn (US$ 25mn). O f this 
amount, five primary commodities accounted for 93 percent o f the total: coffee, 
the primary export, (61%);124 foodstuffs for animals (7%); oil seeds, oil nuts and 
kernels (10%); cotton (12%), and live animals (apes and monkeys only) (3%). 
Products like these were not in much demand on the Soviet domestic market, 
and Ethiopia was only one o f many potential suppliers.
In the early 1980s, Ethiopia constituted a market for the kind of 
industrially oriented goods and products that had been produced in the Soviet 
Union and exported in bulk since Stalin’s time. An analysis o f Ethiopian 
customs statistical data on Soviet imports from 1981 through 1984 compiled 
according to entry code and published in the EAETS demonstrates this.
124 According to Ethiopian customs reports, all o f the coffee exported to the Soviet Union during the four- 
year period had been shipped in 1984.
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Soviet goods imported by Mengistu’s administration over the period 
were valued at BR1.6bn (US$773mn), almost 31 times the value declared for 
Ethiopian exports destined to Moscow. As illustrated in Chart 7 below, three 
categories o f imports accounted for 99 percent of the total: code 3, mineral fuels 
and lubricants (81%); code 6, goods manufactured for industrial purposes (6%), 
and code 7, machinery and transportation, including goods and services (12%).
Chart 7
Soviet goods Imported into Ethiopia 
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Data Source: Ethiopian External Trade Statistics, 1981-1984
Crude petroleum imported under code 3 accounted for the bulk of 
Ethiopia’s imports from the Soviet Union for the period 1981-1984, with a 
reported value of BR1.3bn (US$628mn), or 81 percent o f the total value of 
Soviet imports reported over the period. With the exception o f 1981 when 13 
percent o f the crude oil was imported from Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union 
supplied 100 percent o f Ethiopia's reported crude petroleum imports. During the 
early 1980s, Ethiopian imports o f crude oil dropped in value as a percentage of 
the total Soviet imports, from 92 percent in 1981 to around 70 percent in 1984. 
The decline, however, was offset by sharp increases in the import values of 
Soviet machinery and transport goods (code 7), which jumped from five percent 
in 1981 to 23 percent in 1984.
Manufactured goods for industrial purposes imported from the Soviet
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Union under code 6 were valued at BR90mn (US$43.5mn) or six percent of the 
total for the four-year period (Chart 7). Most of the items were earmarked for 
construction and/or industrial production, rather than consumer goods likely to 
be purchased by Ethiopians in local markets. Typical items and their reported 
values included: rubber (BR4mn); lime, cement and fabricated building 
materials (BR42.5mn); iron and steel bars (BR3.7mn); tubes, pipes and fittings 
(BR14.8mn); iron and steel castings and forgings (BR1.6mn); finished structural 
parts and storage (BR6.5mn), and metal storage containers (BR4.7mn) (EAETS 
1981-1984).
Soviet goods and services imported under code 7, machinery and 
transportation, were valued at BR192mn (US$92.8mn) or 12 percent of the total 
(Chart 7). Of this amount, machinery accounted for about seven percent, while 
transportation accounted for the five percent remaining (EAETS 1981-1984). 
Goods in this category were expensive. Machinery imports, for example, 
included items like civil engineering and construction equipment (BR13.7mn), 
agricultural machinery (BR1.8mn), tractors (BR1.7mn), steam and vapour 
generating boilers (BRl.lmn), pumps for liquids (BR3.4mn), mechanical 
handling equipment & parts (BR4.5mn), machine tools for working metal 
(BR2.1 nm), and equipment for distributing electricity (BR1.5 mn). In addition, 
unspecified machinery valued at BR70.2mn was imported under the subcategory 
‘other machinery and equipment, including parts’. Transport goods included 
items like road motor vehicles (BR10.5mn), other motor vehicles (BR36mn), 
parts and accessories (BR14mn), trailers and other vehicles (BR3.3mn), and 
aircraft (BR9.7mn) (EAETS 1981-1984).
Changes in the distribution of percentage shares between the three main 
categories of Soviet imports recorded by Ethiopian customs officials for the 
years 1981 to 1984 are demonstrated in Chart 8.
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What all these charts and figures illustrate is that while it may be fair to 
say that Ethiopia’s trade with major Western capitalist partners remained 
substantial, trade with the Soviet Union became increasingly important in the 
years immediately preceding Gorbachev’s rise to power. Moreover, in the 
period under discussion, the direction o f Ethiopia’s trade became progressively 
unbalanced. Exports remained directed towards major capitalist partners, but 
import purchases increasingly reflected Mengistu’s dependence upon Soviet 
supplied goods. It can also be argued that the kinds o f goods exchanged were 
more conducive to establishing patterns of dependency than to establishing 
trading relations capable o f flourishing on the basis o f mutual gain. First, 
Ethiopia’s exclusive reliance upon Soviet imports o f crude petroleum 
encouraged dependency. In addition, Soviet goods exported to Ethiopia such as
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machinery and vehicles had high values; consequently, they tended to be used to 
facilitate government policies aimed at militarisation and modernisation rather 
than to benefit the population directly. Finally, raw commodities offered for 
exchange by the Ethiopians were not in great demand on the Soviet domestic
125market. Low unit value goods like Ethiopian coffee were unlikely to make 
significant inroads in the Soviet Union, given Russian preferences for tea and 
Soviet access to a number of other important coffee suppliers.
In respect of Soviet-Ethiopian trade relations before Gorbachev came to 
power, Galtung’s points about trading partners and commodity concentration 
increasing the economic dependency of states like Ethiopia have some merit, 
but his explanations are overly simplistic. The imbalance of trade sustained 
between the two countries is the most important factor to consider, rather than 
the closed, exclusive exchange of trade between them. Over time, Ethiopia 
became dependent upon the Soviet Union for imports that Mengistu’s 
administration deemed crucial to modernisation. Ethiopia’s chief exports, 
however, remained securely directed towards the West.
Soviet aid in the Brezhnev era
Soviet economic assistance to Ethiopia for humanitarian and 
development purposes remained rather limited in the era of Brezhnev and his
immediate successors, particularly when compared to the funding levels
126delivered by Western states and international organisations. Nevertheless, 
Soviet aid should be examined. Ethiopian Unity, for example, accused the Soviet 
Union of providing an inadequate level of humanitarian assistance. Another 
issue worth considering is the appropriateness of Soviet development assistance.
In the autumn of 1984, Chernenko’s administration became involved in 
international operations to provide emergency humanitarian assistance during
125 Bloch (1983:241-242) maintained that Soviet officials had not made enormous efforts to trade with sub- 
Saharan countries because such countries rarely had what the Soviet Union really wanted. The USSR 
purchased coffee from Ethiopia, but coffee was a luxury, not a primary marketable item.
12 6 About 90 percent of the one billion dollars supplied to Ethiopia for development purposes between 
1971 and 1981 came from Western sources and the UN agencies. Three donors, the United Nations, the 
European Community, and Sweden provided 75 percent o f that amount (Dessalegn Rahmato 1987:176).
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the Ethiopian famine. In October, Western donors complained that the Soviet 
Union was providing too much military assistance and too little food aid. In 
December, Chernenko promised to channel substantially more humanitarian aid 
to Mengistu’s administration (Associated Press, 12, 30-31 October and 17 
December 1984). In terms of consumable goods, Soviet contributions in 1984 
and early 1985 remained meagre. In November 1984, Soviet officials shipped
10,000 tons of rice to Ethiopia, believed to have originated in India, and, in the 
early months of 1985, they also provided medical supplies, tents and blankets 
(Associated Press, 2 January 1985; TASS, 29 December 1985).
In terms of logistic support, the Soviet Union’s contributions were more 
significant: a contribution generally undervalued in the West at the time. In 
October 1984, Chernenko agreed to provide 300 trucks and some Russian truck 
drivers to assist in the distribution of food supplies (Associated Press, 31 
October 1984; Pravda, 1 November 1984, in CDSP 1984, v 36, no 44:19). Soviet 
officials also supplied 12 Antonov-12s and 24 Mi-8 helicopters, complete with 
Russian crews to help transport food shipments piling up in the port of Assab 
(TASS 29-30 December 1985). In November, Soviet aircrews flying Mi-8 
helicopters transported substantial supplies of wheat donated by the United 
States to designated areas of the country (Associated Press, 20 November 1984). 
In addition, Soviet aircrews actively participated in cooperative ventures such as 
Operation Tesfa, an airdrop jointly mounted by Eastern and Western states to
127deliver wheat supplies to remote Ethiopian villages. In January 1985, 
officials in Chernenko’s administration claimed that 70 percent of the total food 
aid shipped to Ethiopia was being transported by Soviet air and ground transport 
(Associated Press, 17 January 1985).
When considering Soviet approaches to the provision of emergency 
humanitarian aid in Chernenko’s time, it is important to note that international 
exposure of the Ethiopian famine disaster by the Western media in 1984 must 
have prompted Soviet officials to rethink their traditional approaches to 
humanitarian aid, previously rarely given, and then only on a bilateral basis. At 
one level, it could be said that Soviet responses to the Ethiopian famine late in
127 Operation Tesfa included air crews and planes supplied by the Soviet Union, Poland, the United 
Kingdom, West Germany and Ethiopia (Associated Press, 14 February and 24 June 1985).
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1984 constituted the Soviet Union’s first experiment in mobilising resources to 
be used in a large-scale famine relief effort involving Western-oriented 
international institutions and powerful capitalist donor states. Whatever the 
case, it is fair to say that the logistical support provided by Soviet officials in 
Ethiopia’s 1984/1985 famine crisis provided a vital link in the distribution chain 
and partly offset the shortcomings associated with the insufficient provision of 
emergency food and medical aid.
Soviet officials seldom, if ever, gave free donations for development 
assistance to Mengistu’s administration. They preferred to assist Ethiopia under
the provisions of economic cooperation, because the transactions were supposed
128to benefit both parties. In order to understand how the arrangement worked 
and the problems associated with this development approach, one must examine 
the administrative structures created for project assistance, the difficulties 
inherent in assessing the grant content of Soviet aid packages and the kinds of 
projects supported by Soviet officials.
Bilateral agreements aimed at facilitating economic and technical 
cooperation formed the basis for Soviet development assistance. Activities were 
administered by the Soviet-Ethiopian Commission on Economic, Scientific, and 
Technical Cooperation and Trade, established in 1978, which remained under 
the supervision of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for
129Foreign Economic Links. Economic protocols and projects approved by the 
Soviet-Ethiopian Joint Commissions in the pre-Gorbachev era reflected 
traditional Soviet preferences for strengthening key sectors in the partner 
country: in particular, heavy industry and the public sector. Agreements also 
frequently included provisions for a relatively high training component. A 
crucial problem with projects concluded under economic cooperation, however, 
rested in the fact that substantial time delays often occurred between the
128 Quintin Bach (1985:269) maintained that all Soviet aid to developing countries, excluding fraternal 
assistance for disaster, came under the heading o f economic cooperation.
129 The agreement creating the commission was apparently signed in Addis in September 1978, during a visit 
paid by Soviet officials (Pravda 7 April and 21 September 1978, in CDSP 1978, v 30, no 14:16-17 and v 30, 
no 37:12, respectively; Filippov (1987).
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130approval and completion of Soviet assisted development projects.
Exactly how much economic aid did Ethiopia really receive for 
development from the Soviet Union in the era of Brezhnev and his immediate 
successors? The answer to this question remains elusive. First, Soviet officials 
rarely, if  ever, disclosed financial data on individual transactions with specific 
recipient states. Consequently, even data meticulously compiled by Western 
experts on various projects were prone to error, particularly in respect of 
differentiating commitments from disbursals. Second, wide variations existed in 
the actual grant levels of Soviet economic assistance approved for different 
transactions. Fluctuations in this respect impeded efforts to determine the
131percentage of grant level within a given project. Third, Soviet aid packages
normally included complicated provisions for the combination of goods and 
services, as well as conditions for barter or local currency repayments. Such 
complicated arrangements made it impossible to make accurate comparisons 
between the value of Soviet and Western aid provisions. Finally, levels of 
Soviet participation in jointly funded projects were not generally disclosed. 
Consequently, this made it difficult to rank Moscow’s aid contribution against 
other Comecon members.
From 1977 to 1984, Soviet aid for Ethiopia's economic development 
tended to be project-oriented, and the projects tended to reflect the 
preoccupation of both leaders with large-scale efforts aimed at modernisation. 
Many of the more ambitious development projects initiated by officials in the 
era of Brezhnev and his successors, however, were not actually completed until 
Gorbachev’s term in office (details in part two). First, to improve Ethiopia’s 
agricultural performance, Soviet officials helped to fund the acquisition of 
machinery and farming inputs. Projects like the Nazreth tractor assembly plant 
were deemed to be particularly important. Second, to provide domestic power 
sources for Ethiopia's industrial growth, Soviet specialists conducted oil and gas
130 Bach (1987:xix) maintained that the average time lag between agreements and disbursals of Soviet aid to 
all countries in the late 1960s was about four to five years.
13 1 The grant element in Soviet development assistance ventures tended to be lower than that provided 
by Western donors. Bach (1985:269) estimated grant elements in Soviet loans to be about 38%, as 
compared to 90% in Western counterparts.
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explorations in the Ogaden and helped to build hydroelectric plants like the one 
constructed at Melka Wakane. Third, to increase Ethiopia's domestic potential 
for processing imported oil and oil products, oil refineries in Assab were 
endorsed for expansion. Finally, to facilitate industrial development, Soviet 
officials provided partial assistance for the construction of industrial plants, like 
the Mugher cement factory in combination with other Comecon member states 
(TASS, 28-30 December 1985).
It is fair to say Soviet aid provisions in Brezhnev’s time were 
insufficient either to redress Ethiopia’s short-term crisis or to meet longer-term 
development needs. However, the Ethiopian Unity’s charge that Moscow’s 
humanitarian assistance was inadequate should be qualified. Although Soviet 
officials provided a low level of food aid to Ethiopia in the 1984/1985 famine 
crisis, they did contribute ample logistical support, a fact which was largely 
ignored by major capitalist donors at the time. In respect of development 
assistance, Mengistu’s reliance upon Moscow’s continued funding of large- 
scale, long-term projects did, in effect, reduce Ethiopia’s options for developing 
a more multifaceted approach to development. In December 1984, however, the 
extent of damage sustained in this respect was partially obscured by the famine 
crisis.
Ethiopia’s debt to the Soviet Union
Ethiopia’s indebtedness to the Soviet Union increased markedly in the 
years immediately preceding Gorbachev’s rise to power. A comparison of data 
published in the Annual Reports of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) 
between 1976 and 1984 demonstrates this. It is also interesting to note the high 
ratio of military debt to the whole.
In terms of Ethiopia's disclosed external debt, the Soviet Union occupied 
a relatively modest position in comparison to the most important multilateral 
and bilateral creditors acknowledged in the pre-Gorbachev era. However, that 
the position shifted upward markedly towards the end of the Brezhnev era. This 
trend is illustrated in Chart 9.
142
Chart 9
Ethiopia's outstanding debt to the major capitalist 
trading partners, the Soviet Union and the World Bank Group in 
percentage terms for the years 1976, 1980 and 1984
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Data source: NBE Annual Reports: 1981, Table 24:91; 1983, Annex D.2:76; 
1984, Annex 12:73.
According to NBE data, the Soviet Union occupied a fairly low position 
on the debt hierarchy for most o f the Brezhnev era, as compared to other major 
trading partners,. In 1976, Ethiopia's outstanding external debt stood at 
BR905.4mn ($437.39mn). Officially declared debts owed to the Soviet Union 
accounted for only about one percent o f the total, as compared to the U.S.(29%), 
the Federal Republic of Germany (8%), Italy (4%), Japan (2%) and the World 
Bank Group (44%). In 1980, outstanding debt increased to just under BR1.5bn 
(US$725bn). Debts owed to the Soviet Union, still made up just one percent of 
the total, as compared to the U.S. (19%), FRG (9%), Italy and Japan (each 2%), 
and the World Bank group (47%). In 1984, however, total indebtedness more
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than doubled to BR3.2bn (US$1.5 bn). In that year, the Soviet Union’ profile as 
an unpaid creditor changed markedly. Soviet shares increased to 10 percent of 
the total, as compared to the U.S.(14%), FRG (3%), Italy (2%), Japan (1%) and 
the World Bank Group (28%).
Another set o f data, represented in percentage terms in Chart 10, 
demonstrates that the Soviet Union’s share o f Ethiopia’s declared external debt 
increased markedly on an annual basis during the four years immediately 
preceding Gorbachev’s tenure in power.
Chart 10
Ethiopia's increasing indebtedness  
to the Soviet Union 
1976-1984
 Ethiopia's External Debt10
«ara
coo
o
Q.
19 7 8 19 8 0 1981 19 8 2 1 9 8 3 198 41 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 19 7 9
Data Source:
1976 NBE Annual Reports 1981:91, Table 24 
1977-1980 NBE Annual Report 1983:76, Annex D.2 
1981 -1984 NBE Annual Report 1984:73, Annex 12
Between 1976 and 1980, annual assessments of Soviet shares of 
Ethiopia’s declared debt remained at or below one percent. Between 1981 and 
1984, however, Soviet percentage shares increased on an annual basis, rising to 
four percent in 1981, edging up to five percent in 1982, climbing to seven 
percent in 1983 and gaining by an additional three percent in 1984.
Estimates o f Ethiopia’s total indebtedness to the Soviet Union are 
interesting, but what proportion o f the debt can be attributed directly to
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Mengistu’s military spending? This issue remains problematic because officials 
in both countries elected not to release official financial details on military
132transactions. To compensate for shortfalls in primary information, 
government bodies and private agencies situated in other countries became, in 
effect, the gatekeepers of statistical data. The U.S. Arms Control and
• 133Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was particularly active.
ACDA efforts to compile accurate data were substantial. Nevertheless, 
interpretations of the information collected tended to be based upon capitalist 
economic assumptions, while complexities inherent in Soviet-styled socialist 
exchanges were virtually ignored. Consequently, despite copious quantities of 
impressive statistical data, the validity of estimates on military debt rendered by 
agencies like the ACDA remained open to question.134 A variety of Arab 
sources, for example, provided data indicating that figures provided by 
American gatekeepers had been substantially underestimated by factors of 1.5 to
2.0 or more (Becker 1987:69). Western analysts compounded the problem 
because they relied so heavily upon ACDA findings. Paul Henze, for example, 
relied almost exclusively upon statistics provided by the ACDA to support his 
very detailed and interesting comparative analysis of the effect of militarisation 
upon Ethiopia and other countries situated in the African Horn in the early 
1990s (Henze 1991:93-132).
Jinadu’s account of Ethiopia’s military indebtedness to the Soviet Union 
in Brezhnev’s time, however, can be introduced to demonstrate the level of 
finance involved and Moscow’s concern over the arrears. In 1981, it was 
reported that Mengistu’s administration had incurred a two billion dollar arms
135debt to Soviet officials. Annual repayment interests on the debt were
132 The Soviet Union refused to provide any official information on Third World military transfers until 
1989, and annual accounts issued by the National Bank o f Ethiopia (NBE), the official state bank, did not 
include specific data on the actual expenditures incurred in the purchase of Soviet weapons.
133 Paul Henze (1991:93) maintained that the annual statistical handbooks issued by the ACDA were the 
most comprehensive sources on military developments in the Horn region.
134 Becker's (1987:67-74) concise account o f the numbers problem in respect o f data collected by various 
U.S. sources on Soviet arms transfers is particularly informative.
135 According to Jinadu (1987:234), Soviet officials were so worried about the size o f Ethiopia's unpaid 
military debt in December 1981 that they were only willing to provide Ethiopia with preferential prices for
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estimated at around $328 million.136 Moreover, additional military debt 
appeared likely, as a consequence of Mengistu’s financial commitments to 
maintain Cuban and Soviet troops stationed in the country.
Ethiopia’s overall indebtedness to the Soviet Union increased markedly 
during the four years immediately preceding Gorbachev's accession to power. 
Although the upward trend can be substantiated, assessments of the actual debt 
incurred and the relative values ascribed to the figures by elites in both states 
remain subjects for debate. Nevertheless, the evidence available suggests that 
the largest proportion of Ethiopia’s debt to the Soviet Union was probably 
incurred as a consequence of Mengistu’s excessive spending on Soviet military 
goods and services.
By the end of the Brezhnev era, disadvantages in the Soviet-Ethiopian 
economic relationship were becoming more obvious. Benefits had declined 
substantially for both parties, but the costs were more keenly felt in Ethiopia. In 
respect of trade, two features had emerged that were particularly undesirable. 
First, Ethiopia’s direction of trade had become increasingly unbalanced; exports 
remained directed towards capitalist states, but imports from the Soviet Union 
had increased markedly in value. Second, Mengistu’s administration had 
become heavily reliant upon Soviet supplies of crucial imports deemed vital for 
Ethiopia’s modernisation: in particular, crude petroleum, goods manufactured 
for industrial purposes, and machinery and transport items (including goods and 
services). As regards Soviet economic assistance, the limited amount of 
humanitarian and development aid, as compared to the prospects for support 
offered by capitalist donors, had been highlighted by Ethiopia’s 1984/1985 
famine. To make matters worse, most of the large-scale, ambitious ventures 
endorsed by Soviet officials during this time had yet to be finished. On the 
issue of debt, the Soviet share of Ethiopia's debt was growing larger, but 
Moscow was becoming less inclined to tolerate the growing pains of socialist-
fiiel imports on a short-term basis.
136 At that time, Ethiopian debt repayments to the Soviet Union were being made in cash instalments or 
through barter exchanges o f valuable commodities like coffee and hides and skins. Jinadu (1987:234) 
maintained that Mengistu’s difficulties in repaying the Soviet arms debt in the early 1980s were exacerbated 
by the downturn in world coffee prices and a lowered demand on the world market for hides and skins.
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oriented states, as a consequence of serious financial decline at home.
PART TWO: TRADE, AID AND DEBT IN GORBACHEV’S TIME.
In part two, priorities and practices of the two countries in respect of trade, 
aid and debt in the Gorbachev era are examined to see what changes, if any, 
took place under New Thinking. I argue that many of the patterns of economic 
exchange set up in Brezhnev’s time persisted well into the new thinking era. 
Moreover, Gorbachev’s strategies aimed at reshaping economic relations with 
all sovereign states on a de-ideologised, non-preferential basis and his 
subsequent encouragement of socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia to conduct 
economic relations in a similar manner had the unintended spin-off of 
worsening Ethiopia's economic position. However, responsibility for Ethiopia's 
adverse economic situation and rising indebtedness in the 1990s must be 
attributed at least equally to Mengistu’s reluctance to adjust to new times.
Trade relations
Statistical data about Soviet trade turnovers with Ethiopia between 1985 
and 1989 collected in Vneshnyaia Torgovlya and represented in percentage 
terms in Chart 11 support the generally accepted thesis that the total value of 
Soviet-Ethiopian trade exchanges declined markedly in Gorbachev’s time.
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Chart 11
Soviet trade turnovers with Ethiopia 
from 1985 to 1989, in comparison to 1980 
Roubles in millions
Soviet-Ethiopian Trade Turnovers
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Data Source: Vneshyaia Torgovlya, Trade Statistics: 1960-1989
In 1989, for example, the trade turnover values between the two countries 
plummeted 52 percent from 1985 levels to 150.8 million roubles, only about 3 
percent higher than the value declared in 1980. Nevertheless, the Soviet share 
o f Ethiopian trade turnovers remained competitive with the four main capitalist 
partners for most o f the period. An analysis o f statistical data published by the 
NBE and Ethiopian customs officials, represented in Chart 12 demonstrates 
this.137
137 Percentages in the following analyses are derived from statistical data published in the NBE’s 
Annual Reports, 1980-1984 and Quarterly Bulletins, 1991/1992 and 1993/1994; Ethiopian Annual 
External Trade Statistics (EAETS) 1985-1990.
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Chart 12
Ethiopian trade turnovers with the major 
capitalist trading partners and the Soviet Union 
for the period 1985-1991
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Data Sources: Ethiopian National Trade Statistics, 1985-1990;
NBE Quarterly Bulletins, 1991/1992 to 1993/1994.
For the period 1985-1991, the value o f Ethiopia's total trade turnover 
reported by Ethiopian officials rose to Birr 19.2 billion (US$9.3bn), 
representing an 18 percent increase over the total o f BR16.3bn ($7.9bn) reported 
for the period 1978-1984. O f this amount, the Soviet Union’s share o f the total 
turnover value at 10 percent, represented a three percent decline from the 
previous period, but the overall share still compared reasonably well against the 
four main capitalist partners. Its 10 percent share surpassed Japan (8%), but fell 
below the U.S.(11%), West Germany (14%) and Italy (13%). Percentage shares 
for the 1985-1991 period, however, mask the uneven progression of annual 
decline. This trend is illustrated in Chart 13.
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Chart 13
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Data Sources: Ethiopian Annual External Trade Statistics, 1985-1990; 
NBE Quarterly Bulletins 1991/1992 to 1993/1994.
In 1985, when Soviet-Ethiopian relations were generally cordial, the 
Soviet share, at 14 percent o f the total, was higher than FRG (12%) Italy (8%) and 
Japan (7%) and only marginally less than the U.S.(15%). In 1989, when stresses 
in the relationship were already apparent, the Soviet share at 12 percent of the 
total, was less than the FRG (15%), but equalled that recorded for Italy (12%) and 
exceeded the value shares recorded for the U.S. and Japan (each at 8%). In 1991, 
when relations between Gorbachev and Mengistu declined to their lowest ebb, 
Soviet turnover shares, valued at 11.4 million Birr (US$5.5 mn), plummeted to 
less than one percent of the total trade value reported by Ethiopian officials in 
that single year.
Asymmetries in the direction of trade persisted in the Gorbachev era, as
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compared to the major capitalist trading partners, but they narrowed slightly. 
This trend is illustrated in Chart 14.
Chart 14
Export-import comparisons in Ethiopia's balance 
of trade with the Soviet Union and the 
major capitalist trading partners 
for the period 1985-1991
□  Exports from Ethiopia
■  Imports into Ethiopia
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Data Sources: Ethiopian Annual External Trade Statistics, 1985-1990;
NBE Quarterly Bulletins 1991/1992 to 1993/1994.
Although the bulk o f Ethiopian exports continued to be directed towards 
capitalist trading partners, slightly higher shares o f export values were also 
recorded for the Soviet Union. The Soviet share of Ethiopia's total export value 
o f BR5.2 bn ($2,5mn) for the seven-year period 1985-1991 rose by two percent 
over the four percent recorded for 1978-1984. At six percent o f the total, the 
Soviet share o f Ethiopian export values for the Gorbachev period as a whole 
remained very low, as compared to the FRG (23%), the U.S.(13%) and Japan 
(11%), but equalled the share allocated to Italy (6%). In 1989, however, 
Ethiopian goods exported to the Soviet Union valued at BR 86.6 mn (US$ 41.8 
mn) accounted for nine percent o f Ethiopia’s total trade turnover value.
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It is important to note that the Soviet Union’s position as an import 
provider in Gorbachev’s time remained very competitive as compared to other 
important trading partners, even though the value share of Soviet goods and 
services imported into Ethiopia declined substantially. The Soviet Union’s share 
of Ethiopia’s seven-year import total of BR13.5 bn ($6.5 bn) declined to 12%, 
from 18% for the period 1978-1984. In comparison to the four major capitalist 
partners, however, its share was lower than Italy (15%), but higher than the 
percentage values reported for the U.S.(11%), FRG (10%) and Japan (7%). In 
1991, however, Soviet import values plummeted to BR9mn ($4.3mn), the 
lowest point since 1978. In that year, Soviet shares of Ethiopia's annual import 
value accounted for only one percent of the total, as compared to the United 
States (13%), FRG (11%), Italy (10%) and Japan (10%).
Trade imbalances between the two countries persisted during 
Gorbachev’s time in power. An analysis of trade statistics published in 
Vneshnayaia Torgovlya, indicates that although gaps in the percentage shares of 
exports to imports in Soviet-Ethiopian trade turnover values narrowed slightly 
between 1985 and 1989, the balance of turnover values remained decidedly
138asymmetric. This trend is demonstrated in Chart 15.
X3 8Percentages derived from statistical data published in Veshnayaia Torgovlya.
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Chart 15
Export-import comparisons in the Soviet Union's 
trade turnover with Ethiopia 
for the years 1985-1989
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For the five year period, the total value o f Soviet exports to Ethiopia 
declined to 85 percent o f the total R835.7 mn recorded, representing a modest 
four percent drop from the previous turnover share o f 89%, sustained for 1980- 
1984. In comparison, Ethiopia’s share o f the trade turnover only increased 
from 11 percent to 15 percent for the same two periods. To be sure, the 
distribution o f turnover shares changed in Gorbachev’s time, but only by four 
percent in respect o f each state moving towards a more mutually beneficial 
exchange. According to statistical data set out in Vneshnayaia Torgovlya, the 
balance o f trade from 1985 to 1989 still remained asymmetric and 
disproportionately directed in the Soviet Union’s favour.
Although some changes in the pattern o f trading relations emerged in 
Gorbachev’s time, conventional transactions favouring the exchange of 
Ethiopia’s raw commodities for the Soviet Union’s manufactured goods and 
fuels for industrial development persisted. As under Brezhnev, Ethiopia’s 
agricultural commodities like coffee, with their low unit values, still remained 
the dominant goods exchanged for higher unit value items like Soviet oil, 
industrial goods, machinery and transport vehicles. An analysis o f statistical 
data on the goods exchanged published by EAETS customs officials between
□  Imports Into Bhiopia 
■  Exports from Bhiopia
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1985 and 1990 demonstrates this.
Ethiopia’s exports to the Soviet Union for the period 1985-1990 were 
valued at BR305mn ($147.3mn). O f that amount, four commodities accounted 
for 89 percent o f the total: coffee at 71 percent (valued at BR216mn or 
US$104.3mn; fresh and frozen vegetables at eight percent (valued at BR24mn 
or US$11.6mn; oilseeds at six percent (valued atBR19 mn or US$9.2mn, and 
petroleum products at four percent (valued at BR13mn or US$6.2mn). This 
breakdown is illustrated in Chart 16.
Chart 16
Ethiopian exports to the Soviet Union 
for the period 1985-1990
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Ethiopian trade statistics indicate that Mengistu’s administration 
exported more coffee to the Soviet Union in Gorbachev’s day than in prior 
times. Valued at BR153mn ($73.9mn), exports of this particular commodity for 
the period 1985-1988 increased five fold over the total value o f BR32mn 
($15.5mn) reported for the period 1981-1984. For the first four years of 
Gorbachev's administration, coffee accounted for 78% percent o f the total value 
o f all Ethiopian exports shipped to the Soviet Union. In 1989, the value of 
Ethiopian coffee shipped to Gorbachev’s administration peaked at BR63mn 
($30.4mn), an amount equivalent to 21% of the total value o f all Ethiopian
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exports shipped to the Soviet Union reported for the period 1985 to 1990.139 In 
1990, however, no coffee shipments destined for Moscow were reported by 
Ethiopian customs officials.
Under Gorbachev’s administration, substantial values were also reported 
for new categories of Ethiopian exports shipped to the Soviet Union. Between 
1985 and 1988, petroleum products from Ethiopia valued at BR13.2mn 
($6.4mn) were imported by Soviet officials.140 Between 1988 and 1990, 
Gorbachev’s administration imported fresh vegetables from Ethiopia valued at 
BR24.1mn ($11.6mn). In 1990 alone, fresh vegetables accounted for BR13mn 
($6.3mn) or 59 percent of the total value of Ethiopian exports earmarked for 
Soviet consumption. In the same year, manmade woven textile fabrics and cotton 
fabric and alcoholic beverages, each valued at BR2mn ($966,184), accounted for 
an additional 27 percent of the value of Ethiopian goods exported to the Soviet 
Union (EAETS 1985-1990).
For the period 1985-1990, Ethiopian imports of petroleum products 
(70%), goods manufactured for industrial purposes (7%) and machinery and 
transportation 18%) accounted for 95 percent of the value of goods imported 
from the Soviet Union, recorded at BR 1.73 bn (US$836 mn)(EAETS 1985- 
1990). This breakdown is illustrated in Chart 17.
139 1989 was also the year when a world coffee glut prevailed, world coffee prices plummeted, and member 
states o f the International Coffee Organization (ICO) failed to negotiate a new coffee agreement. ICO 
quotas were suspended, and, for several years thereafter, members were free to sell existing stocks wherever 
they could.
140 Ethiopian customs officials reported no petroleum-related exports for the period 1989-1990.
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Chart 17
Soviet goods Im ported into Ethiopia  
fo r the period 1985-1990
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Data Source: Ethiopian Annual External Trade Statistics, 1985-1990.
In percentage terms, petroleum shares in the total value o f Soviet goods 
imported into Ethiopia declined substantially in the Gorbachev era. For the 
period 1985-1988, for example, petroleum imports declined to 68 percent o f the 
total value o f Soviet imports, as compared to 81 percent recorded for the period 
1981-1984 (EAETS 1981-1989).
Between 1985 and 1990, however, annual percentage shares o f Soviet 
petroleum import values fluctuated in a rather unexpected way. This fluctuation 
is demonstrated in Chart 18.
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Chart 18
Fluctuations in the value of Soviet 
petroleum products imported into Ethiopia 
1985-1990
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Data Sources: Ethiopian Annual External Trade Statistics, 1985-1990.
In 1986, when world oil prices dropped, the percentage share of Soviet 
petroleum imported by Ethiopian officials plummeted to 52 percent. In 1990, 
when the two countries were finalising past economic commitments and 
downgrading trade activities, the percentage share of petroleum imports jumped 
to 81 percent.
Although oil imports declined, Ethiopia remained reliant upon the Soviet 
Union for petroleum imports in the Gorbachev era. For five o f the six years 
between 1985 and 1990, 100 percent o f Ethiopia's recorded petroleum imports 
came from the Soviet Union.141
Ethiopia provided a market for Soviet goods manufactured for industrial 
purposes in Brezhnev’s time and continued to do so in Gorbachev’s day. As 
illustrated in Chart 17, the percentage share o f those goods imported into 
Ethiopia for the period 1985-1990 under code 6 accounted for a respectable 
seven percent of the total value o f Soviet imports. Within the period, import 
value shares were higher in the early years o f New Thinking and declined 
substantially in the latter part o f Gorbachev era. Percentage comparisons o f the 
principle goods imported in both periods are set out in Chart 19.
141 In 1988, the Soviet Union provided 95 percent o f Ethiopia’s oil imports, and Kuwait supplied the
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For the three-year period 1985 to 1987, Ethiopian imports o f goods 
under code 6 accounted for nine percent of the value of Soviet goods imported. 
Five sub-categories accounted for two thirds of the nine percent total share value 
of goods in this category: rubber articles, including tyres at two percent; lime, 
cement and fabricated building materials at one percent; iron & steel bars, rods, 
angles and shapes at two percent; tubes, pipes and fittings at one percent, and 
finished structural parts and storage at two percent (EAETS 1985-1987).
In 1986, the year in which the percentage share o f petroleum values 
dropped sharply and Ethiopian resettlement activities intensified, the value of 
manufactured goods imported into Ethiopia rose to 15 percent o f the annual 
total. In that year unusually high imports were reported in two categories: (1) iron 
and steel bars, rods, angles and shapes and (2) finished structural parts and 
storage. Imports from these categories alone accounted for eight percent of the 
total value of Soviet imports recorded in that year (EAETS 1986).
As seen in Chart 19, over the three-year period 1988-1990, the 
percentage share o f manufactured goods in the total Soviet import values
0 1  985-1867 worth 9% 
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remaining five percent (EAETS 1988).
158
dropped to five percent. Imports of finished structural parts and storage dropped 
substantially, but the value shares of the other four main categories dominating 
exchanges for the period 1985-1987 remained constant, accounting for four-fifths 
of code 6 values.
In 1990, Soviet goods imported into Ethiopia under code 6 reached their 
lowest level for the six-year period. O f the four percent share recorded for 
manufactured goods in that year, rubber articles, including tyres at 7/10 o f one 
percent and tubes, pipes and fittings at two percent accounted for almost three 
quarters o f the total (EAETS 1990).
For the period 1985-1990, Soviet machinery and transport items 
imported under code 7 accounted for 17 percent o f the total. Import values 
attained particularly high levels in the early years o f Gorbachev’s 
administration, but declined noticeably towards the end o f the era. Percentage 
comparisons o f the major goods imported are illustrated in Chart 20.
Chart 20
Comparisons in the values of Soviet machinery 
and transport goods imported into Ethiopia 
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For the period 1985-1987, the share value of machinery and transport 
items accounted for 21 percent of all Soviet goods imported into Ethiopia, as 
compared to 15% for the period 1988-1990. In the earlier period, five categories 
accounted for about two-thirds of the total values reported: tractors at three 
percent; civil engineering and contractors’ equipment at two percent; ‘other’ 
electrical apparatus for making electricity at two percent; motor vehicles at four 
percent, and parts and accessories (for transport vehicles) at two percent. In the 
later period, only three of the five top categories recorded for 1985-1987 still 
retained their earlier percentage share values: civil engineering & contractors' 
equipment, motor vehicles, and parts and accessories (for transport vehicles). 
Value shares for these three categories accounted for over half of the total share 
value of Soviet machinery and transport items reported.
For the period 1988-1990, the drop in percentage share recorded for 
Soviet goods imported under code 7 applied primarily to machinery. The value 
share of transport items remained relatively stable. Machine imports for the 
period 1988-1990, for example declined to six percent of the total, from 13 
percent recorded for the period 1985-1987. In comparison, the value share of 
transport items for the two three year periods remained about the same, 
increasing slightly from eight percent (1985-1987) to nine percent (1988- 
1990)(EAETS 1985-1990).
Some very important features of trade relations that had been established 
in Brezhnev’s time persisted for most of Gorbachev’s time in office. Three of 
these were particularly important. First, the Soviet Union’s share of Ethiopia’s 
total trade turnover values in percentage terms remained substantial and 
compared favourably with the levels sustained with major capitalist trading 
partners. Second, imbalances in trade directions, identified before Gorbachev 
assumed power, still persisted for most of the New Thinking era. Ethiopia’s 
export trade still remained oriented towards capitalist partners, and imports from 
the Soviet Union still accounted for a disproportionate value of the trade 
turnover sustained between these two states. Third, the major categories of 
goods exchanged in Brezhnev’s day continued to dominate the structure of trade 
in Gorbachev’s time. Coffee, with its relatively low market value continued to 
provide the dominant commodity traded for Soviet oil and higher value goods,
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and Ethiopia continued to provide a market for the disbursal of excess supplies 
of Soviet semi processed manufactured goods, as well as machinery and 
transport goods and services.
Humanitarian and development aid.
Two points are important to consider when discussing Soviet provisions 
of humanitarian assistance in the New Thinking era. First, it took a while to 
change tactics after Gorbachev assumed power. Second, important Western 
donor states and institutions influenced the type of change ultimately 
introduced. These observations can be illustrated by examining Soviet 
approaches to the provision of humanitarian aid to Ethiopia in the early years of 
Gorbachev’s administration and comparing them to the strategies advocated in 
1988, three years later.
Initially, Gorbachev's programme of famine relief to Ethiopia continued 
along the path advocated by Chernenko, his immediate predecessor. Relief 
assistance remained focused on the provision of logistical support, at the 
expense of large-scale shipments of food supplies and other emergency relief 
items. Soviet motor vehicles, aircraft and personnel continued to be provided 
through the 1984/1985 famine. In addition, the Gorbachev administration 
supplied copious amounts of fuel for air and ground transport operations.142
Western states and international institutions continued to undervalue 
the importance of logistical support in emergency aid after Gorbachev assumed 
power. Consequently, his decision evoked negative responses from Western 
donors. To begin with, Soviet officials were accused of subordinating 
humanitarian concerns to military assistance.143 To make matters worse, many 
donors complained about the Soviet Union’s low level of food provision and 
objected seriously to the government’s plan to allow Soviet aircraft and land
142 In September 1985, Soviet reporters maintained that the Soviet Union had shouldered the entire cost o f  
supplying air and ground transport with fuel (Izvestia, 6 September 1985, in CDSP 1985, v 37, no 36:24).
143 In January 1985, for example, eyewitnesses reported that the Soviet ship ‘Captain Modest Ivanov’ had 
been allowed to unload military supplies in Port Assab. The ‘Baltic Skau’, however, carrying 16,000 tons of 
Australian wheat, had been left standing off the port waiting for permission to discharge its cargo of free 
food aid (Associated Press, 24 January 1985).
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vehicles originally intended for food delivery to be used to transport settlers to 
resettlement areas.
At the end of 1985, Soviet officials attempted to counteract criticisms 
levied by Western donors. They claimed that emergency food and relief supplies 
worth over $120 million had been sent to Ethiopia in the 1984/1985 famine 
crisis. In addition, TASS reporters pointed out that Soviet donations to 
Ethiopian famine relief had included a mobile hospital situated at Asosa for the 
benefit of resettlers, baby food, medicines, blankets and tents, and well drilling 
equipment (TASS, 29 and 30 December 1985; Izvestia, 6 September 1985, in 
COSP 1985, v 37, no 36:24).
Gorbachev’s approach to humanitarian assistance changed markedly in 
Ethiopia’s 1988 famine crisis. This time, high priority was assigned to the 
provision of large-scale emergency food aid. In January, Soviet officials 
confirmed their intentions to donate 250,000 metric tonnes of wheat to the 
Ethiopians and to send 200 tents to store the grain (Associated Press, 28 January 
1988). In addition to the large food gift, the Soviets promised to airlift 15 tons of 
medicines, 10 tonnes of food concentrates and a ton of children's formula to 
Ethiopia (The Washington Post, 16 February 1988). For a short time, the Soviet 
Union became Ethiopia’s largest food donor.
Two features of Gorbachev's food donation in 1988 differed markedly 
from the relief assistance provided by Moscow three years earlier. First, the 
food gift was relatively expensive. Soviet officials were already purchasing 
wheat from the United States for their own domestic consumption, as a 
consequence of a major crop shortfall. Consequently, the wheat earmarked for 
Ethiopia had to be purchased at considerable expense on the open market.144
Second, Gorbachev’s food gift in 1988, like the food gifts of many 
Western donors in the 1984/1985 crisis, was shipped to Ethiopian ports without 
any guarantee of logistical support. This action shed a new light on the relative 
importance of past Soviet efforts in this direction that had previously been so
144 The precise source o f the wheat was not clear. Patman (1990:296) maintains that it was reportedly 
purchased on the open market in Turkey at a price o f $80mn. Other writers thought that it could have come 
from Soviet domestic stocks or from Argentina. Some also believed that the wheat could have been part of a 
300,000 tonne shipment that Soviet officials had recently purchased from Saudi Arabia (The Washington 
Post, 16 February 1988).
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undervalued. Western diplomats stationed in Addis at the time estimated that it 
would cost an additional 25 million dollars to transport the 250,000 tonnes of 
grain to famine-stricken areas.145
Gorbachev’s food pledge of 250,000 tonnes in January 1988 was an 
extraordinarily large single contribution for one sovereign state to make,146 but 
Soviet officials could neither meet all Ethiopia's famine needs, nor compete 
effectively with important Western donors in respect of the quantity and quality 
of the famine relief provided. Limitations were clearly demonstrated in two 
ways. First, although Gorbachev’s strategy for providing emergency assistance 
more closely approximated the policies advocated by capitalist institutions and 
Western donors, the benefits of considerable logistical support that had been so 
freely provided three years earlier were dropped out of Ethiopia’s assistance 
provision. Second, despite its size, the Soviet food gift was soon dwarfed by the 
pledges given by Western donors shortly thereafter. In February, for example, 
the United States pledged to provide 247,438 tons of food and to underwrite the 
total transport costs. In addition, another US$ 6.6 million was promised to 
cover other transportation needs. Other Western nations also followed suit and 
promised to deliver an additional 441,454 tonnes of food (Washington Post, 16 
February 1988).
Soviet assistance for several large-scale development projects that had 
been started before Gorbachev assumed power continued well into the New 
Thinking era, and this aid incurred costs as well as benefits. As New Thinking 
policies gained ground in the late 1980s, new Soviet projects became smaller in 
scale, and the level of funding declined accordingly. Analyses of twelve 
important development projects approved for funding (wholly or partly) by the 
Gorbachev administration demonstrate this. Discussion of the first six projects, 
which were large-scale industrial ventures, illustrate some of the difficulties 
associated with Soviet-assisted projects and support Robert Patman's (1993:127)
145 Mikhail Botchamikov, a Counsellor in the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa at the time o f the Soviet 
pledge, confirmed that Gorbachev’s administration had made no specific provisions for internal 
transportation o f this particular grain shipment. The wheat donated by the Soviets in January was finally 
unloaded 6 months later in the port o f Assab (Associated Press, 28 January 1988; TASS, 25 June 1988).
146 The Soviet donation amounted to about 25% o f the 1.05 million tonnes of grain that Mengistu had 
requested for 1988 (Associated Press, 28 January 1988).
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view that Gorbachev’s administration continued to underwrite economic aid 
packages that had been framed in the Brezhnev era. The last six projects reinforce 
the premise that most new endeavours for Ethiopia’s development assistance in 
Gorbachev’s time were considerably less ambitious than their earlier 
counterparts and therefore less advantageous for Mengistu’s regime, as 
compared to the project assistance offered by Western donors.
Development assistance provided by the Soviet Union had its 
advantages and disadvantages. Because the projects often took so long to 
complete, it was not always possible to assess the balance. Soviet efforts to 
locate energy resources in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region demonstrate this. 
Explorations began in 1977 and carried on into the early 1990s. On the basis of 
output from the first well sunk in the Ogaden in 1975 (Calub 1), Soviet 
engineers estimated that a natural gas deposit of 1.3 trillion cubic feet existed in 
the region. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984, oil explorations funded by a 
Soviet-Ethiopian technical assistance agreement were conducted over 10,000 
square kilometres in the Ogaden desert. In 1984, the first of the four wells 
covered by the agreement was completed and subsequently closed off as a gas 
well. In 1986 anew contract was negotiated, and, in 1987, Soviet prospectors 
found a commercially exploitable natural gas deposit estimated at 25 billion 
cubic meters in Haraghe, situated in the south- eastern section of the Ogaden.
As a direct consequence of Soviet assistance, the Ethiopian government was 
able to expand the scale of oil and gas exploratory activities substantially in the 
mid-1980s. Leading Western oil companies were also invited to take up leases 
along side Soviet officials and to engage in prospecting activities on selected 
lots in the region.147
Soviet assistance in respect of locating energy reserves in Ethiopia had 
positive and negative implications. On the positive side, Soviets provided the 
skilled personnel and technology necessary for extensive oil explorations under 
concessional arrangements. Ethiopians received specialist training and actively
147 In 1986, for example, twenty-five blocks or 349,500 square kilometres were opened for exploration by 
Western states: 15 blocks in the Ogaden; nine blocks in the Red Sea and one block in Gambela. Details 
about Soviet efforts to discover fuel reserves in Ethiopia are reported in the following sources: World 
Bank 1984, vol 2:44-45; EIU,QER, 1986, no 1:21, CR, 1986, no 2:26 and CP 1986-87, 1986:17; EIU, CR, 
1987, no 1:28-29; EIU, CP 1989/90,1989:18.
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148participated in project-related activities. Moreover, Soviet activities in this 
direction probably raised the interests of Western oil companies in the venture. 
On the negative side, Ethiopian officials incurred considerable costs in the 
venture. They were expected to cover the local expenses incurred by Soviet 
engineers in prospecting activities. Under the protocol concluded in 1979, for 
example, Soviet goods were supplied for sale in the local markets in Ethiopia in 
order to cover the local costs incurred in oil and prospecting (Bach 1987:58). In 
addition, Gorbachev’s administration apparently also wanted to preserve a stake 
in the action. When the Ethiopians determined to expand oil-related activities 
and to open various lots for bidding to Western interests in 1986, it was reported 
that at least one of the most valuable gas deposits had been cordoned off by 
Soviet officials and withdrawn from the lots originally offered to potential 
Western bidders (EIU CR, 1987, no 1:28-29).
Large-scale projects supported by the Soviet Union took a long time to 
complete. The Melka Wakane hydroelectric plant and the Nazret Tractor factor 
demonstrate this. Soviet officials agreed to provide assistance for the 
construction of the Melka Wakane hydropower station on the Wabe Shebele 
River in the Bale region in 1983. In 1985 Correspondent Z. Kadymbekov 
reported that the plant was the largest hydroelectric station under construction in 
Ethiopia and considered it to be one of the most important construction projects 
currently underway. He estimated that the 153,000 kilowatt station, scheduled 
for completion in December 1987, would double Ethiopia's electricity supply 
(Izvestia, 6 September, in CDSP 1985, v 37 no 36:25). The dam was expected to 
be 1.8 kilometres long, 40 metres high and capable of accommodating a 
reservoir of 700 million cubic metres of water (EIU, QER, 1986, no 1:22). The 
Melka Wakane dam was officially opened in April 1988, some five years after 
Soviet approval had been secured for funding. Estimated at $302mn, the total 
costs were shared between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (EIU, CR, 
1988, no 3: 27).
148 In December 1985, TASS correspondents reported that the Soviets had trained 25 Ethiopians to perform 
tasks on drilling machines. The newly trained personnel were assigned to perform duties on the Soviet 
seismic team, who were prospecting for oil and gas in the Ogaden (TASS, 28 December 1985).
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The Nazret Tractor factory also took a long time to complete and to 
modernise. Plans to build a plant for the assembly and production of tractors 
were originally agreed under a Soviet-Ethiopian protocol concluded in 
September 1979. The Nazret Tractor Factory commenced operations in 1984. 
Shortly thereafter, Soviet officials agreed to expand the tractor factory and to 
give the Ethiopians a low interest loan of BR50mn ($25mn) for that purpose 
(Associated Press, 26 December 1984). In 1987, some eight years after original 
plans had been formalised, World Bank analysts reported that the total plant 
investment amounted to Birr 17.3 mn, 150 workers were employed, and plant 
production capacity had been increased to 1000 tractors per annum (World Bank 
1987:190).
Soviet development aid was also frequently extended in conjunction 
with aid provided by other CMEA countries, and reliable breakdowns of aid 
contributions remained elusive. Two examples demonstrate this: the Melka 
Wakane hydropower plant and the Mugher cement factory. As previously 
mentioned, the Melka Wakane hydropower plant was a collaborative assistance 
venture involving Soviet and Czechoslovakian personnel. About 400 Soviet 
and 100 Czechoslovakian experts were employed on the project. Soviet 
engineers undertook the site survey and supervised construction operations, 
while Czechoslovak technicians installed the generators (EIU, CR, 1988, no 
3:27). Apparently, most of the equipment for the power station, however, had 
been provided by Czechoslovakia under a cooperative agreement concluded at the 
sixth session of the Ethiopia/USSR joint commission for economic, scientific and 
technical cooperation held in October 1985 (EIU QER, 1986, no 1:22). Precise 
details about the breakdown of funding, however, remained undisclosed.
The Mugher cement factory was also collaborative venture, but this 
time, Soviet and East German officials were involved. In 1980, Soviet officials 
agreed to provide economic assistance in the region of $77 million (Bach 
1987:58) to construct a cement works at Mugher capable of producing 300,000 
tonnes of cement per annum. East Germans collaborated in the project, and the 
Ethiopians reportedly put up 75% of the investment capital. The factory was 
completed in 1985, but in May 1986, Mengistu’s administration signed an 
agreement with the Skel Export-Import Organisation of East Germany to double
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factory output. In 1987, about 500 persons were employed, and investment costs 
of the original project were valued at Birr 226 million.149 As in the case of the 
Melka Wakene Dam, however, precise information on levels of Soviet 
assistance in the venture as a whole or in part was not forthcoming.
Some projects funded by Gorbachev’s administration raised concerns 
about suitability and reliability. This was the case with the Assab Refinery, the 
Mugher Cement factory and the Nazret Tractor Factory. TASS reported in 1985 
that the Soviet Union was in the process of modernising the Port Assab oil 
refinery, originally constructed with Soviet funds in 1959. In 1986 reports were 
received that Soviet specialists were completing expansion plans and that the 
existing production capacity of the Assab oil refinery would be boosted from 
production levels averaging 664,000 tonnes in 1981-1983 to 900,000 tonnes 
(EIU, CP 1986-87, 1986:17). In 1988, World Bank analysts questioned the 
wisdom of expanding production capability so significantly on the grounds that 
refining raw petroleum imports locally was unlikely to improve prospects for 
economic growth (World Bank 1988:36). Western analysts also argued that 
demand for processed petroleum products and the need for such a large refinery 
would probably diminish significantly if natural gas deposits in the Ogaden 
were fully developed (EIU, CP 1989-90, 1989:18).
In the same year, World Bank officials also expressed concern over the 
suitability of Mengistu’s proposal to double the capacity of the Mugher factory 
in the Three-Year Development Plan (TYDP) project portfolio. They objected 
on grounds that expansion costs, estimated at around 120 million Birr, were 
excessive. They maintained that the cement industry was losing ground and that 
prospects for added profits from the venture were constrained by limited local 
demand. Analysts also complained about the fact that the Mugher expansion 
project, like many of the other Ethiopian projects, had not been accompanied by 
estimates of financial or economic profitability and that the stages of initial
149 EIU agents (1991) reported that the new plant at the Mugher cement works had finally been completed. 
Apparently, very little, if  any support for new plant construction was provided by Gorbachev’s 
administration. According to reports, East Germany financed around 60% o f the project, with the balance 
of funding provided by the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank. The $70mn extension expanded 
plant capacity by an additional 250,000 metric tonnes per year and created jobs for around 200 people (EIU, 
CR, 1986, no 3:25-26; TASS 29-30 December 85; Clapham 1988:148-149; World Bank 1987:190).
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preparation and appraisal had been bypassed, as well (World Bank 1988:28). 
Although the criticisms made by World Bank officials apply more to East 
German than to Soviet officials in this case, two issues about suitability are 
particularly relevant to the Soviet Union. First, some question exists as to the 
part Ethiopian locals actually played in prompting Brezhnev’s initial support for 
this project in 1980. Second, in the 1988 report, World Bank officials provided 
no evidence to support the claim that Gorbachev’s administration actually 
opposed East German plans to expand Mugher plant facilities.
Criticisms of suitability and reliability were also levelled against the 
Nazret Tractor Factory. In addition to production problems reported at the plant 
proper in 1987, Nazret tractors shipped to resettlement sites demonstrated a 
marked tendency to break down and were difficult to repair due to the lack of 
spare parts.
The final observation is that the level of Soviet contributions to CMEA 
ventures remained uncertain. Plans to develop a rail link connecting Addis 
Ababa to Port Assab illustrate this. In 1987, Soviet officials and representatives 
of other Comecon member states agreed in principle to provide assistance for 
the construction of an 850 kilometre rail link from Addis to port Assab during a 
session of the joint Ethiopian/Comecon Commission on Cooperation. Under 
the provisions, Comecon agreed to underwrite the construction of about 600 
kilometres of track, install railway coaches and provide other equipment (EIU, 
CR, 1987, no 4:28). Before the project started, Mengistu solicited funds for 
undertaking an engineering study contract. Key Western donors, including the 
World Bank, opposed both the project and the feasibility study on grounds that 
building a road link and laying down a pipeline between the two points would 
be more sensible. Rail India eventually conducted the feasibility study, 
however, and concluded that the link would cost $1.4 billion to construct. 
Although the track was only 850 kilometres long, 600 bridges, 30 tunnels and 
24 viaducts would be required for completion.150 In 1989 Comecon countries 
shelved the project on grounds that costs in relation to gains were prohibitively 
expensive (EIU, CR, 1989, no 1:29-30). Although the extent of Soviet
150 World Bank analysts (1988:33) also criticised Mengistu's willingness to spend 14.5 million Birr on
securing an engineering design study (EIU, CR, 1986, no 2:26-27 and 1987, no 2:27-28).
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involvement in the project agreement remained unknown, the decision made by 
Comecon members to withdraw funding for the railway link must have cast 
doubt on future prospects for Soviet involvement in grandiose schemes aimed at 
modernising Ethiopia’s transport infrastructure.
By 1988, changes in the provisions and funding levels of project support 
were clearly apparent. Six agricultural projects partly funded by the Gorbachev 
administration and described in the World Bank’s review of Ethiopia’s TYDP 
project portfolio issued in 1988 demonstrate the changes. Details of these 
projects are set out in the following table.
TABLE
ETHIOPIAN AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS 
PARTLY FUNDED BY THE SOVIET UNION.
Project
Description
Project
Life
(Years)
Total 
Cost 
($ mn)
Soviet
Share
%
Ethiopian
Share
%
Project
Status
The Dira Dawa 
Horticultural Cold Store 
project
3 2.4 44 56 Funding firm 
Ongoing
The Nekempte Central 
Workshop project
3 5.4 55 45 Funding firm 
Ongoing
The Bale Central 
Workshop
3 5.5 39 61 Funding firm 
New
The Bahr Dar Central 
Workshop
3 3.4 0 100 Funding
likely
New
The Alwero Irrigated 
Farm
5 21.2 1 99 Funding firm 
Design stage
The Jijiga Ethiopia- 
Soviet Ranch
5 30.3 100 0 Funding
likely
New
Source of data: Ethiopia’s TYDP project Portfolio, as cited in World Bank 1988:60-61.
First, smaller-scale projects, aimed at improving light manufacturing and 
increasing agricultural storage, replaced earlier, highly ambitious, large-scaled
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schemes designed to facilitate modernisation. As demonstrated in the table on 
the preceding page, four out of the six Soviet projects identified by World Bank 
officials in 1988 aimed to create additional cold store or workshop facilities, and 
none of the four was projected to cost more than six million dollars.
Second, the completion times estimated for the newer projects funded by 
Gorbachev’s administration tended to be shorter than for the ones that had been 
initiated in Brezhnev’s day. As specified in the table on page 168, four of the 
six projects were supposed to be completed within three years. The other two 
projects had five-year project lives, but both were still in the initial stages of 
planning.
Third, financial arrangements for some new projects in the late 1980s 
implied that Ethiopian officials might be paying a larger share of the initial, 
outright project costs than they had in the Brezhnev era.151 In four of the six 
projects under discussion, Ethiopia’s share of the costs accounted for more than 
50 percent of the total. In the Alwero irrigated project, Mengistu’s share of the 
operation was assessed at 99 percent.
Despite trends away from large-scale projects, Soviet assistance for 
Ethiopia's agricultural modernisation in Gorbachev’s time continued to favour 
the state farm sector. In the World Bank’s 1988 review of Mengistu’s Three-Year 
Development Plan (TYDP) project portfolio, the Soviet Union was not credited 
with assisting any projects aimed at developing peasant fanning (World Bank 
1988:56-59). In respect of state farm development, however, the situation was 
different. Total Soviet assistance accounted for 20 percent of the total project 
aid for state farm agricultural development anticipated from all foreign donors, 
if  one included the large Jijiga project worth $30.3mn, which in 1988 had not 
yet received firm funding. Without the Jijiga project, however, firm Soviet 
project assistance for Ethiopian state farm agriculture in 1988 accounted for
152only three percent of the total.
151 In real costs, the differences may not have been so great. In Brezhnev’s time, for example, Ethiopian 
officials would probably have been expected to pay the local expenses incurred by Soviet technicians and 
engineers, in addition to putting up a share o f the investment.
152 Under the Ethiopian TYDP project portfolio, the total value o f projects designated for state farm 
agricultural development amounted to BR977.6mn ($472.3mn). Of that amount, foreign donors were 
expected to contribute BR386.5mn ($186.7mn) (World Bank 1988:60-61).
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In conclusion, while it seems fair to say that patterns of Soviet assistance 
for Ethiopia’s progressive development changed to some extent in the 
Gorbachev era, some of the old-fashioned approaches to project aid persisted 
well into the late 1980s. Reluctance to change directions, however, was 
probably due more to the fact that many of the highly ambitious schemes 
initiated in Brezhnev’s day were not completed until Gorbachev’s time.
Mengistu’s legacy of debt to the Soviet Union.
The first precise reckoning of Ethiopian indebtedness disclosed by the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry was published in the Soviet newspaper Chas Pik on 
February 26 1990: just a few days before Mengistu officially confirmed his 
decision to introduce market reforms and to end Ethiopia's failed experiment in 
Soviet-styled socialism. As set out in the article, Ethiopia's total indebtedness to
153the Soviet Union on November 1 1989 amounted to 2.86 billion roubles. As 
a percentage of the total debt owed to the Soviet Union in 1989 (estimated at 
R85.8bn), Ethiopian arrears at one percent of the overall total were not very 
important. As a percentage of the outstanding debt owed to the Soviet Union by 
developing countries at the time (R42bn), however, Ethiopia's debt, valued at 
eight percent was substantial.
Russian officials produced a second important assessment of debt 
outstanding incurred by Mengistu’s administration in April 1992. Lev Mironov, 
Russia’s Ambassador to Ethiopia announced that Ethiopia’s indebtedness to the 
former Soviet Union, now scheduled to be collected by Russia, amounted to 
nine billion dollars. Of this amount, around $800 million was owed for 
commercial and economic goods and services and about 10 times that amount in 
military debt. During the news briefing, Mironov also confirmed that discussions 
about repayment had yet to be scheduled between officials of the new Ethiopian 
government and the Russian Federation (Associated Press, 29 April 1992).
The importance of Ethiopia's indebtedness to the Soviet Union should
153 Of this amount, R2.85bn was the principal; R51.7mn was written off, and R854.9mn was deferred for the 
period 1986-1989 (Izvestia, March 1 1990, in CDSP 1990, vol 42, no 9:9).
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not be underrated, regardless of the fact that Mengistu’s administration actually 
accumulated more debt in transactions with Western states and international 
institutions than in exchanges undertaken with the Soviet Union. There are 
three important considerations.
In the first instance, Ethiopia's rising debt to the Soviet Union limited 
Mengistu’s prospects for establishing political authority through the acquisition 
and deployment of military arms. In respect of military debt, the cumulative 
costs of acquiring Soviet military goods and services over time eventually 
overwhelmed his administration. As preferential elements in the costing of 
Soviet goods dropped out under New Thinking, Ethiopians ruling elites became 
increasingly hard pressed to afford even the most conventional weaponry.
Second, increased indebtedness to the Soviet Union reduced Mengistu’s 
prospects for implementing large-scale, grandiose development schemes aimed 
at modernising Ethiopia’s agricultural and industrial sectors. As the debts 
mounted and economic assistance dropped out of the arrangement, Ethiopian 
access to Soviet technical expertise, supplies of spare parts and other goods 
deemed vital for project completion, maintenance and rejuvenation became 
increasingly limited.
Finally, Mengistu's legacy of debt to the Soviet Union survived the fall 
of both governments in 1991 to become an issue for concern for future 
generations. In December 1992, Alemayehu Dhaba, the Ethiopian Minister of 
Finance, confirmed that Ethiopia's debt to the Soviet Union, now payable to 
Russia, amounted to 3.2 billion roubles, including interest. Of this amount, 
Minister Alemayehu claimed that 2.8 billion roubles had been spent on arms 
and 400 million roubles had been applied towards Ethiopian development. 
Under the new terms, payment on the reduced debt, plus interest, was expected 
to commence after a six-year grace period and to continue for a further 25
154years.
Minister Alemayehu’s disclosure of the debt and its adverse implications 
for Ethiopia’s economic recovery in 1992 also evoked considerable hostility 
from Ethiopia’s new entrepreneurial class. In June 1993 correspondent Tesgaye
154 It seems that a portion o f Ethiopia's debt to the former Soviet Union originally due for repayment in 
1989 had been cancelled (BBC, SWB, 5 January 1993).
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Tadesse reported that Ethiopian businessmen were objecting to the idea that the 
present regime should be held accountable to Yeltsin’s government in Russia 
for debts that had been incurred by Mengistu’s administration to the former 
Soviet Union, particularly in respect of the military debt, which the Russians 
had estimated at seven billion roubles. According to Tadesse, Ethiopia’s 
Minister of External Economic Cooperation, Abdulemejid Hussein, indicated 
that $750 million was still owed to the Soviets for pure economic aid.155
CONCLUSION
This chapter concentrated on three facets of the Soviet-Ethiopian 
economic relationship: trade, aid (including emergency and development 
assistance) and debt. The argument made here is that although trade, aid and 
debt incurred costs for both parties, Ethiopia’s prospects for economic self- 
reliance, in particular, were adversely affected. This trend was set in motion in 
Brezhnev’s time, but it persisted for most of the Gorbachev era.
In respect of trade, exchanges became progressively asymmetric and 
more costly, especially for Ethiopia, In Brezhnev’s time, Mengistu developed an 
undue reliance upon Soviet imports deemed vital for Ethiopia’s modernisation: 
in particular, oil, goods manufactured for industrial purposes, and machinery 
and transport items (including goods and services). This trend deepened in the 
early 1980s and persisted well into Gorbachev’s time, remaining visible, even 
after the trade turnover value of the goods exchanged declined. When 
Gorbachev finally determined to cut costs and increase profits, the price of vital 
goods once supplied to Mengistu’s administration at preferential rates became 
prohibitively expensive. In some ways, the evidence collected supports 
Galtung’s idea that the Bridgehead’s reliance on powerful trading partners and 
commodity concentration would create the conditions required to initiate 
dependence and to sustain asymmetric exchange. Other important factors must 
be considered, however: particularly, the presence of persistently unbalanced 
trade turnovers in relationships like the one between the Soviet Union and
155 Ethiopian businessmen were pressuring the government not to repay the military debt on grounds
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Ethiopia.
The limitations inherent in Soviet provisions of humanitarian and 
development assistance demonstrated in the era of Brezhnev and his immediate 
successors became even more apparent in Gorbachev’s day, especially when 
compared to the contributions made by capitalist donors and international 
organisations. Soviet officials provided considerable logistical support in the 
1984-1985 famine, but Western donors severely criticised both Chernenko’s and 
Gorbachev’s administrations for meagre emergency food provisions. When 
Gorbachev provided humanitarian assistance that conformed more closely to the 
criteria set by capitalist donors three years later, his large food gift was soon 
dwarfed by the combined food and transport offerings made by Western donors. 
Soviet assistance for Ethiopia’s progressive development also demonstrated 
some serious shortcomings. Under New Thinking, levels of Soviet project 
funding diminished, and problems of complexity, appropriateness and utility 
increased in scale. A sizeable share of available funding was still tied up in the 
construction of large-scaled, highly ambitious projects that had been started in 
Brezhnev’s time. Consequently, limited resources were available to repair and 
upgrade existing projects or to sponsor new ones. Moreover, the benefits of 
complex arrangements that had sometimes worked to Ethiopia’s advantage 
under the umbrella of economic cooperation largely disappeared after 
Gorbachev came to power.
As concerns debt, prospects for Ethiopia’s economic self reliance were 
further undermined as a direct consequence of increased indebtedness to the 
Soviet Union. In this particular equation, however, some part of the blame must 
be attributed to Soviet officials, because they continued to supply arms that 
escalated Mengistu’s military expenditures. In time, Mengistu’s excessive 
spending on military goods and large-scale development schemes combined 
with sharp trade revenue declines and multiple famine disasters precluded debt 
repayments in regular instalments, thereby allowing totals and outstanding 
interest to accrue to the Soviet Union.
The point must be stressed once again that the importance of economic 
relations in creating and maintaining the conditions for asymmetric exchange in
that the Soviet Union had intervened in the civil war with Eritrea (Reuters, 9 June 1993).
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the Soviet-Ethiopian case has been generally underrated. The cumulative effect 
of Soviet economic relations with Mengistu’s administration increased 
Ethiopia’s dependence upon the Soviet Union and exerted a negative impact 
upon that state’s prospects for economic self-reliance. This trend was initiated 
in the Brezhnev era and continued in Gorbachev’s time. However, blame for 
this negative end result must be shared by Mengistu’s administration for relying 
too much upon Soviet officials to provide the expensive arms and equipment 
deemed vital for Ethiopia’s security and modernisation.
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CHAPTER SIX
SOVIET INFLUENCE UPON ETHIOPIAN PLANS FOR 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
In the name of Ethiopia Tikdem, the PM AC introduced broad-based, socialist- 
oriented agrarian reforms after the revolution. Later, Soviet-Ethiopian relations 
improved, and the appearance of Ethiopian socialism began to change. The new 
approach increasingly adopted infrastructures and control mechanisms generally 
associated with Soviet-styled strategies for agricultural development. Over time, 
however, Mengistu’s efforts to modernise along these lines adversely affected 
agricultural output and the well being of Ethiopia’s population.
In this chapter, I examine Ethiopian strategies for agricultural development to 
see if evidence supports the claim made by Galtung and Ake (Chapter two) that 
officials in Centre states like the Soviet Union reduce prospects for self reliance in 
weak states like Ethiopia because they have the power to persuade leaders to emulate 
foreign development models that are costly and inappropriate. The actual degree of 
intentional influence exerted by Moscow over Mengistu's development policies remains 
a matter for debate, but it appears that old-fashioned Soviet-styled socialist prototypes 
offered Ethiopian officials good opportunities for importing packaged strategies for 
development planning in Brezhnev’s time.156 However, Ethiopian elites exercised 
considerable power over the selection and adaptation of the development policies 
actually emulated, and they incurred considerable costs in the undertaking. During the 
Gorbachev era, Soviet prescriptions for Ethiopia’s agricultural progress became 
progressively less easy to recognise, as similarities increased between the rhetoric of 
perestroika and capitalist development. Ethiopian elites were finally driven by severe 
domestic crises and the need to secure massive external resources to introduce
156 The term ‘packaged strategies for development planning’ refers to the simultaneous implementation 
o f several strategies aimed at large-scale social and economic transformation. Programmes like 
resettlement and villagisation, for example, included strategies for centralising control, tactics for 
initiating social change via vanguard party cadres, schemes for modernisation based upon large-scale 
mechanised farming, strategies for turning peasant farmers into agricultural labourers and plans for 
developing new agricultural regions.
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157showcase reforms advocated by powerful, Western lending institutions like the 
World Bank. The crises, however, had been partly engendered by Mengistu’s decision 
to channel existing resources towards large-scale, collectivist agrarian ventures that 
resembled earlier attempts to increase agricultural production and to modernise rural 
society in the Soviet Union.
PART ONE: SOVIET INFLUENCE UPON ETHIOPIAN DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES UNDER BREZHNEV.
Moscow's prescriptions for socialist agrarian progress directly influenced the 
formation of Ethiopian agricultural development policy in the first decade after the 
revolution. Nevertheless, Ethiopian ruling elites wielded considerable power over the 
selection and adaptation of the strategies and structures that they emulated. First, some 
background details are provided about a few well-known socialist strategies and 
structures implemented by particular Soviet leaders for agricultural development in the 
Soviet Union before the Ethiopian revolution. Then, I examine some policies and 
practices implemented by Ethiopian officials that have features resembling these earlier 
Soviet efforts.
Soviet agricultural strategies after the Russian revolution.
For socialist-oriented states like Ethiopia, Soviet-styled approaches to the 
socialist transformation of agriculture offered blueprints for centralised administrative 
structures and strategies for controlling production that could be emulated and 
implemented at relatively short notice. In addition, some of them also had considerable 
potential for introducing rapid change and dislodging feudal peasant structures. As we 
shall see in the discussion that follows, these attributes were exceedingly attractive to 
Ethiopia’s PMAC in the aftermath of their own revolution fifty years later, particularly 
in respect of five areas: land reform as a mechanism for controlling peasants; state 
farms as a means of modernising agricultural production; cooperative farms for
157 Showcase reforms refer to development plans designed specifically to impress potential investors or 
lenders. Holcomb and Ibssa (1990:9-10), for example, claimed that that Ethiopia’s dependence upon 
strong imperial powers in the past had caused officials to develop a systematic policy o f showcasing. 
Under conditions o f showcasing, carefully designed programmes and policies were formulated, which 
looked promising on paper but, in reality, were only facades.
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restructuring rural production relations; centralised structures for administration and 
planning, and large-scale comprehensive schemes designed to expand output by 
modernising the basis of production and restructuring the social fabric of Ethiopia’s 
rural population. The first four categories figured prominently in Ethiopian strategies 
for agricultural development between 1976 and 1984. Schemes in the fifth category 
were not emulated by Mengistu’s administration to any significant degree until the end 
of 1984, shortly before Gorbachev assumed power.
Land reform
In the aftermath of the Russian revolution, land reform was vital to Bolshevik
1 5Rschemes for restructuring economic and social conditions. At that time, peasant 
support was sorely needed, because the Bolsheviks were still very weak. Consequently, 
local peasants and village committees were allowed to implement the initial stages of 
Russia's land reform programme (Nove 1982:48-49). By allowing rich peasants as well 
as poor ones to participate in the initial redistribution process, Lenin's revolutionary 
government was able to contain threats of peasant opposition during the most 
vulnerable period of its existence.
Bolshevik decisions to alter this state of affairs were prompted by food 
shortages in 1918 and the government’s inability to purchase sufficient grain supplies 
from the rural inhabitants to sustain the urban population. In response to impending 
crisis, the government expanded the powers of the Supply Commissariat (Narkomprod) 
to obtain and to distribute food. Thereafter, the regime began a systematic campaign to 
requisition grain from peasants forcibly, assisted by local divisions of the Narkomprod, 
workers' detachments and agents of the secret police (Nove 1982:59).
For the first ten years after the revolution, Bolshevik aspirations for the socialist 
transformation of Soviet agriculture were largely confined to rhetoric. Desires to 
institute a socialist framework for agricultural development were continually thwarted 
by the practical necessities of restoring order and stabilising agricultural production. 
Consequently, a decade after the revolution Soviet agricultural production still 
remained dominated by individual peasant farmers who tilled 98.3 percent of the
158 Under the terms o f the land decree issued on 8 November 1917 and enacted into law in February 1918, 
all land in Russia was nationalised and user-rights conferred upon the peasant tillers (Nove 1982:48).
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cultivated land (Nove 1982:105-106). This state of affairs, however, was soon to 
change, given the low levels of production and the reluctance of peasant farmers to 
concede to government demands for urban food supplies.
State farms
After the revolution, state farms were highly favoured because they could be 
centrally controlled like Soviet industrial enterprises. During Stalin's time, however, 
they came to be regarded as too costly and inefficient, because wages and losses on 
state farms had to be absorbed by the government (Nove 1982:183-184).
After Stalin, state farms regained their former importance. Khrushchev 
determined that state farms constituted the ideal production infrastructure for 
cultivating new areas in his virgin lands scheme. He decided that collective farms 
everywhere were generally ineffective and substantially reduced the number in
• 159operation. Brezhnev and his immediate successors, as well as Gorbachev, who was a 
member of the Politburo and the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
responsible for agriculture when Brezhnev was General Secretary of the CPSU, also 
continued to regard large, heavily mechanised state farms as the way forward. By 1985, 
state farms accounted for 387.7 million hectares of the total area under cultivation, as 
compared to 173.9 million hectares for collective farms (Medvedev 1987:364).
Cooperative farms
During Stalin's time, Soviet peasant farmers were collectivised on a massive 
scale in a very short period of time. In December 1926, the fifteenth congress approved 
the spread of collectivisation. In March 1927, officials decreed in favour of the TOZ 
(Association for the Joint Cultivation of Land), a very loose form of collectivism, 
wherein members were expected to own their own farm implements, most of their own 
livestock and to exercise substantial control over the land they tilled. Towards the end 
of 1928, Stalin's interests in collectivisation intensified, chiefly as a consequence of the 
government’s prolonged inability to procure adequate grain supplies for feeding the
1 5 9
Between 1955-1960, the number of collective farms (kolkhozy) dropped from 87,000 to 44,600, 
while the number o f state farms (sovkhozy) rose from 5,134 to over 10,000. (Medvedev 1987:155, 161- 
202)
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urban population. From 1929 to 1934, Stalin launched intensive campaigns to 
collectivise Soviet agriculture. By 1935, 94.1 percent of the crop area and 83.6 percent 
of peasant households had been collectivised (Nove 1982:149-152; 160-187).
Collectivisation campaigns and the establishment of producer cooperatives, two 
strategies associated with Stalin’s collectivisation drive in the 1930s, were particularly 
attractive to Ethiopian officials forty years later. Stalin's tactics focused upon recruiting 
urban cadres to supervise operations in rural areas and using poor peasants to 
implement the collectivisation process. Cadres and poor peasants collected livestock 
and goods owned by private peasants and participated in enforcing the imposition of 
high mandatory grain quotas upon peasant farmers. They also helped to eliminate 
threats of organised rural opposition to the government by systematically undermining 
the credibility of more solvent, stable farmers (kulaks).
The essential features of producer cooperatives (kolkhozy) were established in 
Stalin's day, and most of them remained in existence in Gorbachev's time. Four 
features were particularly appealing for revolutionary administrations like Ethiopia’s 
PMAC who needed to gain more control over agricultural production and 
independently minded peasant farmers. First, collective farms were officially regarded 
as voluntary endeavours. This strategy reduced government spending because individual 
members were required to pool their separate means of production and to contribute 
significantly to the Soviet Union's overall agricultural output with a minimum of state 
assistance (Nove 1982:241). Second, as a consequence of collectivisation, state and 
party officials gained more control over crop production and procurement on 
cooperative farms. Third, officials were able to restructure traditional patterns of labour. 
Members of cooperative farms were organised into clearly defined team units called 
zvenos160, for example, and all kolkhoz workers were paid alike, in accordance with the 
workday unit or ‘trudoden’161 fixed by the administrators. Finally, Soviet officials were
160 In the 1930s and 1940s, the party favoured the link system or 'zveno' comprised o f six to eight 
persons. In the 1950s the brigade consisting of up to 100 persons became the approved unit o f  
organisation, but zvenos continued to exist within the brigade structure. In 1975-1976, Gorbachev 
introduced the autonomous link system, or 'Beznaryadnoe zveno' (wherein work was contracted and paid for 
on a start-to finish basis) in Stavropol (Nove 1982:305-306; Hosking 1985:394-395; Sakwa 1990:4; 
Medvedev 1987:353-357).
161 When the 'trudoden' was established, the party also determined that payment should be calculated on 
the basis o f work done, not on the number o f mouths to be fed in each household (Nove 1982:181,242; 
Medvedev 1987:183).
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able to reduce substantially the costs and responsibilities associated with feeding 
collective farmers and state farm agricultural labourers. This was done by conferring 
user rights on the heads of households on collective and state farms to cultivate their
own small private plots (between .25 and .50 hectare) and to exercise control over the
162disposal of surplus production.
Centralised administration and pianning
In Stalin's time, centralised economic structures and command strategies for 
development planning worked fairly well for achieving short-term growth targets in 
industry, but persistently fell short of the mark in agriculture. Shortcomings in this 
respect, however, were partially masked by the intensity of Stalin’s radical campaigns 
aimed at collectivisation in the 1930s and production losses sustained as a consequence 
of wartime adversities in the 1940s. Consequently, when Stalin died in the early fifties, 
it was impossible to assess whether or not the command model really could work if 
implemented in a more viable way because the structure was so closely associated with 
the crisis strategies that had been implemented by one particular individual.
Khrushchev’s strategies for agricultural recovery aimed to increase output and 
to regulate procurement by decentralising power in long-established bureaucracies and 
setting up new centralised chains of command to function in their place. In 1958, for 
example, he dismantled Machine Tractor Stations (MTS), and mandated that individual 
collective farms purchase and maintain their own farming equipment (Medvedev 
1987:176-180). In 1961-1962, he decentralised the authority of oblast party committees 
and set up the Territorial Production Administration, comprised of 1,000 units, to 
supervise agricultural production and procurement activities throughout the country 
(Medvedev 1987:188,190). Unfortunately, Khrushchev's efforts to exchange old 
existing chains of command for new ones ended in chaos. His attempts at agrarian 
reform had the unintended effect of reducing the level of agricultural production.
Under Brezhnev, restructuring the agricultural sector became a top priority. 
Between 1978 and 1982 (also important years for Ethiopia’s ruling elite in terms of
162 In 1980, private plots only made up 1/500 of the area cultivated, but they accounted for 49% of potatoes, 
15% of the vegetables, 14% of the meat, 6% o f the milk and 6% of the eggs actually produced in the Soviet 
Union (Lane 1985:13).
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setting up agricultural policy), Soviet organisational structures became more centralised
163and bureaucratic, and they demonstrated some extremely complex relationships. In 
1981, for example, the Commission of the Council of Ministers on Matters of the Agro- 
Industrial Complex (Agroprom) was given the responsibility for controlling all state 
and party activities relating to agriculture at the highest level. In addition, CPSU 
officials mandated that representatives of different ministries would be united into agro­
industrial units at district (RAPOs), regional and republican levels (APOs).164 
Unfortunately, Brezhnev's efforts to reorganise administrative structures also failed to 
increase agricultural production significantly. In this case, reorganisation and further 
centralisation vastly complicated the whole system of agricultural administration.
Large-scale programmes for agricultural expansion and modernisation
Soviet officials also experimented with large-scale plans aimed at modernising 
the agrarian sector, increasing agricultural output and re-socialising the rural 
population. Although it is impossible to prove that their strategies directly shaped 
Mengistu’s policies for resettlement and villagisation, evidence discussed later in this 
chapter suggests that Ethiopian officials were influenced to some degree by earlier 
Soviet experiments: in particular, the Virgin Lands and the Village Consolidation 
schemes introduced in Khrushchev’s time.
Khrushchev introduced the 'Virgin Lands' scheme in 1954.165 Under the initial 
scheme, 13 million hectares of virgin and fallow land located in northern Kazakhstan, 
southern parts of Siberia and southeastern sections of European Russia were opened for 
cultivation and planted in wheat. Later, land expansion targets were increased to 
around 28-30 million hectares (Nove 1982:332-333).
The principle aim of the Virgin Lands scheme was to bring more land into
163 In November 1978, Gorbachev became the CPSU Central Committee secretary responsible for 
agriculture, and the Soviet-Ethiopian Friendship Treaty was concluded (Sakwa 1990:5; Medvedev 1987: 
326-331).
164 Medvedev (1987:328-329) claimed that the Commission o f Agroprom was, in effect, a separate 
agricultural government with limited powers, which united all the ministries and state committees that had 
anything to do with agrarian matters.
165 Khrushchev’s virgin lands programme also helped to launch Brezhnev's political career. After his 
appointment as leader of the Kazakhstan programme (1954-1956), Brezhnev became a member of 
Khrushchev's exclusive circle o f political acquaintances (Medvedev 1987:167-175).
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agricultural production. Food supplies were to be increased by shifting the centre of 
wheat production from the Ukraine to more marginal farming areas located on the 
fringes of adequate rainfall belts. In turn, Ukrainian farmers were supposed to grow 
maize so that more livestock could be raised in central parts of the country. By 
restructuring the basis of regional agricultural production, Khrushchev hoped to increase 
supplies of meat and milk to feed the urban population (Hosking 1985:356).
The scope and pace of Khrushchev's virgin lands campaign was enormous. 
Between 1953 and 1956, the total amount of cultivated land in the Soviet Union was 
increased by 35.9 million acres: an area roughly equivalent in size to all the cultivated 
land in Canada (Nove 1982:333). Full-fledged campaign efforts were initiated in the 
spring and summer of 1954, and the Young Communist Organisation (Komsomol) 
recruited around 300,000 volunteers to work on projects and to harvest crops.
Hundreds of new state farms covering tens of thousands of hectares were established, 
and vast quantities of tractors, combine harvesters and other farming machinery were 
transported to the new sites (Medvedev 1987:171). In addition, extensive construction 
projects for building homes, schools, shops and service facilities and transport networks 
were undertaken. An estimated 300,000 persons permanently resettled on designated 
sites in the newly cultivated areas (Nove 1982:333).
Initially, the programme flourished. Prospects for long-term increases in Soviet 
agricultural output and the eventual realisation of Moscow's procurement targets 
seemed excellent. In Kazakhstan alone, an estimated 20 million tons of grain were 
produced in 1956. As an added bonus, government procurement rates improved 
substantially, as a consequence of comparatively low population density in the virgin 
land areas. In Kazakhstan, for example, Soviet officials were able to purchase 80 
percent of the 1956 harvest (Medvedev 1987:173).
Inspired by short-term successes, Khrushchev channelled valuable resources 
towards developing the virgin land schemes at the expense of other farming areas. 
Encouraged by initial results and prompted by the desire to increase production even 
more in the shortest time possible, Khrushchev ignored the sound advice of experts to 
mandate crop rotation and fertiliser application. Consequently, between 1960-1965, 
massive wind storms and substantial soil erosion damaged at least half of the virgin
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lands in Kazakhstan (Hosking 1985:357). Moreover, his decision to channel 
preferential resource allocations to the virgin lands programme generated a severe 
agricultural crisis in the Soviet Union. In order to feed the population, Soviet officials 
had to sell gold supplies to buy grain on the international market. (Medvedev 1987:192- 
196).
Khrushchev's virgin lands strategy for increasing agricultural production in the 
Soviet Union in the 1950s turned out to be prohibitively costly and ultimately 
contributed to his undoing. Nevertheless, the part played by natural disaster in this 
endeavour probably allowed some Soviet analysts to overlook four important 
shortcomings in his scheme. First, Khrushchev underestimated the problems inherent in 
resettling people on a large scale and establishing effective logistical systems. Second, 
by concentrating valuable resources on grandiose schemes, he reduced prospects for 
improving output in other regions of the country. Third, by relying upon a single 
strategy for increasing agricultural output, he increased the potential for a major food 
crisis. Finally, as a consequence of overspending on the virgin lands programme, a 
substantial economic strain was imposed upon the Soviet Union’s already overburdened 
economy.
Khrushchev also planned to resettle the rural population into large villages with 
urban amenities (agrogorad) so that rural inhabitants would be less inclined to migrate 
to urban areas. Although the full programme was never accepted, a scaled-down 
version known as the ‘village consolidation policy’ was eventually put into effect in 
some parts of the country (Pallot 1990:658-659).
Under village consolidation, Soviet officials envisaged that the rural population 
would be concentrated progressively into key settlements. The premise was that certain 
villages would be made large enough to be cost-effective, while small, remote and 
difficult-to service places would be left to die out. With that end in mind, many rural 
villages in the Soviet Union were officially evaluated and subsequently classified as 
viable or non-viable units (Pallot 1990:659). Viable villages were supposed to become 
a cross between towns and villages. They were also expected to provide a full range of 
urban services to collectivised agricultural workers situated in a rural setting. The 
optimal size of the new villages was set at between 1,000-2,000 inhabitants (Pallot 
1990:658-659). They could also be settled quite quickly. In one area of the Ukraine, for
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example, 1,700 villages were merged in a single three year period by shifting peasants' 
homes on sledges during the winter from old to new sites (Pallot 1990:659).
Three particular difficulties with Soviet village consolidation eventually resulted 
in the programme's fall from grace. First, relocation and new accommodation costs 
proved to be prohibitively expensive. Second, as a combined consequence of the 
mandatory withdrawal of state support from villages designated as unviable and the 
high level of inactivity associated with implementation, villages that survived after 
being adversely labelled were forced to function on very low means. Third, the very act 
of classifying certain villages as non-viable exacerbated the migration of youth to urban 
areas, thereby defeating the original purpose of the exercise (Pallot 1990:659-660).
Ethiopia’s selective utilisation of Soviet strategies and structures.
What evidence is there to support the proposition that Ethiopian officials 
emulated earlier Soviet structures and strategies recommended for agricultural 
development in the Brezhnev era? First, let us examine the strategies advocated for 
land reform as a means for dealing with internal crisis after the revolution. Second, we 
should look at the Soviet-styled strategies and administrative structures introduced into 
Ethiopia after the strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian ties: in particular, establishing a 
dominant state farm sector, creating a foundation for collectivised agriculture through 
the formation of producer and service cooperatives, strengthening state controls and 
centralised planning, and establishing state control over procurement, pricing, 
purchasing and marketing activities.
Land reform campaigns and peasant associations.
In the immediate aftermath of revolution, the strategies advocated by the Derg 
centred upon establishing indigenous socialism, achieved through self-reliance. 
Structures were less centralised, and peasants were freer. Nevertheless, the strategies 
aimed at land reform and controlling the rural population in Ethiopia bore a marked 
resemblance to the tactics advocated by Lenin’s weak government after the Russian 
revolution. Similarities were particularly apparent in the Derg’s agricultural campaigns 
and the creation of peasant associations.
In January 1975, Ethiopia’s provisional military government (ETPMG)
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launched the ‘Development Through Cooperation: Work and Enlightenment 
Campaign’. Its purpose was to promote cooperation for the common good by disbursing 
campaign participants (Zemaches) throughout Ethiopia to organise and to politicise the 
population.166 In March, land reform procedures aimed at fundamentally altering land 
ownership patterns and the structure of peasant production relations were initiated. In 
April, Proclamation no 31, ‘Public Ownership of Rural Lands’ became law. Rural land 
was nationalised; peasant associations were created, and individual peasants were 
allowed to farm up to 10 hectares of land (Mulugetta Bezzabeh, et.al., 1978:159-172.).
In August 1975, the ETPMG issued a progress report on the Campaign's 
activities. The report indicated that a high priority was accorded to implementing land 
reform and organising peasants into cooperative units, even before the formation of 
strong Soviet ties. As had been the case in the Soviet Union during Lenin’s time, 
Ethiopian campaigners were instructed to inform and to explain the land reform 
proclamation to the public (especially people living in rural areas). They were also 
assigned responsibilities for organising and strengthening peasant associations at all 
levels, collecting information on land use, and carrying out land surveys. In addition, 
campaigners were expected to undertake studies on the organisational set-up of peasant 
associations and cooperatives, with a view to learning how they could become self- 
reliant and self-sustaining units of Ethiopian society. Campaigners also issued 
directives for the formation of farmers' associations and cooperatives (ETPMG 
1975b:13-17,43).
The regime's campaign to generate Ethiopia's socialist transformation by 
indigenous means in 1975 was a costly venture. The National Development Campaign 
cost the ETPMG an estimated 50 million Birr, despite heavy reliance upon voluntary 
and conscripted labour (Muguletta Bezzabeh, et.al. 1978:64).
Peasant Associations (PAs) were also established under Proclamation 31 issued 
in April 1975. In effect, the PA became the new local government and was legally 
authorised to re-allocate land and evict tenants, to administer public property in the 
area, to establish judicial tribunals for land disputes, to establish marketing and credit
166 Between January 1975 and June 1976, 51,657 university and high-school students, over 1280 military 
personnel and hundreds o f  civilian volunteers were despatched to the 437 campaign posts located in 
every administrative region in the country. During the campaign some o f the most remote villages in 
Ethiopia were penetrated for the first time (Mulugetta Bezzabeh, et. al. 1978:67).
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* •  1 f \ 7co-operatives and to undertake villagisation programmes. PA powers were 
strengthened under Proclamation 71 in December 1975, when they acquired legal 
personalities and were officially invested with additional powers to implement the land 
reform proclamation: in particular, the right to form cooperative societies, women's 
associations, peasant defence squads and any other associations deemed necessary for 
the fulfilment of any particular PA's needs (Mulugetta Bezzabeh, et.al. 1978:173-194).
PAs remained an essential feature of the Derg's strategies for agricultural 
development after close ties were formed with the Soviet Union. Official statistics on 
PAs supplied by the Mengistu regime in 1982 demonstrated the importance still 
attached to PAs as mechanisms for regulating the behaviour of individual peasants. At 
the end of the Brezhnev era, 23,497 PAs with a total membership of 7,247,209 
households were reportedly operating in rural Ethiopia (Hay and Griffin 1992:25).
The state farm sector.
Large, mechanised commercial farms were well established in Ethiopia before 
the 1974 revolution. The changes introduced by the Derg after Haile Selassie’s demise, 
however, resembled the strategies that had been advocated for state farm development 
earlier in the Soviet Union.
During Haile Selassie’s time, the commercial farm sector formed the linchpin of 
the imperial government's strategy for agricultural development. Large-scale, 
commercial farms were generally run as capitalist ventures, and a sizeable percentage 
of the commercial farming sector was owned and managed by foreign nationals or 
multinational corporations. Output tended to be high because these ventures were 
situated on prime land and received preferential resource allocations (Mulugetta 
Bezzebah, et.al. 1978:90).
After the revolution, Ethiopian officials, like their earlier Russian counterparts, 
faced serious problems in managing the agricultural crisis, feeding the urban population 
and the armed forces, and providing work for displaced agricultural peasants and
167 In 1975, 15,941 peasant associations, with a membership estimated at 3,334,550, already existed in 
Ethiopia. PA controls also extended beyond local levels. PAs at Woreda levels, for example, coordinated 
the functions o f local PAs, while Awraja PAs, supervised the activities o f Woreda PAs (ETPMG 
1975a: 164-166; ETPMG 1975b:16-17).
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labourers. Consequently, their decision to nationalise the commercial farms and bring 
them under state control came as no great surprise. In May 1977, about the time 
officials signed the Soviet-Ethiopian Friendship Declaration, the ETPMG established 
the State Farms Development Authority to operate the existing commercial farms on 
new lines and to set up similar farms suitable for large-scale mechanised farming in 
other areas of the country. By 1978, more than ten state farm development corporations 
were already producing coffee, cotton, wheat, maize, teft, sorghum and pepper 
(Mulugetta Bezzebah, et.al. 1978:91-93; ETPMG 1984:3).
Ethiopia's state farm sector was heavily centralised and hierarchical. The 
system roughly resembled the Soviet-styled organisational structure advocated by
Brezhnev’s administration to increase agricultural productivity and efficiency in the
168Soviet Union. The ETPMG created a four-tier, hierarchical structure. At the top 
level was the Ministry of State Farms Development (established in 1982), the chief 
policy making body. The second and third tiers were comprised of Corporations and 
Enterprises, respectively. On the fourth tier, at the bottom of the authority chain, was 
the individual State Farm.169
Given reasonable access to Soviet technical advice and farm machinery and the 
positive performance records of large capitalist-run commercial farms in Ethiopia in the 
past, the ETPMG believed that Ethiopia's agricultural output would be substantially 
increased by expanding the state farm sector. To this end, Ethiopian ruling elites 
allocated an increasingly disproportionate amount of resources to state farm 
development in the pre-Gorbachev era. In 1978-79, for example, 56.2 percent of 
Ethiopia’s total agricultural budget was allocated to State Farms. In 1982-1983, the 
allocation increased to 60.5 percent. In 1983, state farms received 95 percent of the
168 Heavily centralised administrative structures also characterised Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector. In 1979 
the Ministry o f Industry was created to oversee Public Enterprises. Under the Ministry, twelve Corporations 
were established. Each Corporation was assigned responsibility for administering several Public Enterprises. 
In 1984, 180 Public Enterprises provided 95 percent of the output in large-scale manufacturing and 
accounted for more than 60 percent of the total manufactured output (Mulatu Wubneh 1990:210; World 
Bank 1984, v 2:2).
169 Within the state farm sector, coffee state farms were organised separately. Under the management o f the 
Coffee Plantation Development Corporation, the eight state coffee farms were grouped into four enterprises: 
Limmu, Bebeka, Tepi and Arabagugu. Six o f the eight farms were situated in Kefa (a resettlement area in 
the mid-1980s). Although coffee state farms encompassed an area o f 12,000-15,000 hectares (ha), coffee 
was only being produced on 8541 ha of the area under State farm control in the early 1980s (ICO 1976- 
1991; Hay 1992:84).
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regime’s total allocation of improved seed, 76 percent of the fertiliser and 81 percent of 
the credit facilities (Dessalegn Ramato 1987:169; Mulatu Wubneh 1990:206).
Despite these subsidies and the benefits of Soviet technical advice, state farms 
failed to increase Ethiopia's agricultural output significantly. Between 1980 and 1985, 
output from state farms accounted for only about four to five percent of Ethiopia's total 
agricultural production (EIU, CP 1989/1990,1989: 14).
Producer and service cooperatives.
The objectives, powers and duties of producer and service cooperatives were 
established under Proclamation no 71 (December 1975). Producer cooperatives (PCs) 
were expected to raise agricultural production and to improve the instruments of
170production. As legal entities, PCs were responsible for controlling the members' 
main instruments of production, organising the members into collective working groups 
and paying members on the basis of the quality and quantity of the work rendered. PCs 
were intended to give priority to the interests of poor and middle peasants and to ensure 
that cooperative leaders came from these groups. They were also supposed to engage in 
continuous political education so that the political consciousness of the members would 
be enhanced (ETPMG 1975c: 177). In contrast, Service cooperatives (SCs) were 
expected to provide their members with improved farming implements, to market their 
produce at fair prices and to supply consumer goods to cooperative members according 
to need. They were also responsible for instructing their members in socialist 
philosophy and instilling the virtues of cooperative work. SCs were supposed to 
function as important agents in the socialist transformation of agriculture. They were 
expected to pave the way for the successful establishment of agricultural PCs through 
the formation, promotion and consolidation of mutual aid teams (ETPMG 1975c: 176).
ETPMG guidelines for the development of producer cooperatives were set out 
in June 1979, and they were implemented soon thereafter. Given the disappointing 
performance of state farms immediately after the revolution, producer cooperatives 
offered new opportunities for launching socialist agricultural development at a 
relatively low cost to the government. Ethiopian officials viewed the PC infrastructure
170 Under Proclamation 71, an agricultural producers' cooperative society was deemed to be a society that 
had been established voluntarily by peasant associations (ETPMG 1975c: 177).
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as a mechanism for laying the foundation of socialist production in rural areas, a means 
for introducing modem farming technology and a preparatory device for the transition 
to large-scale agriculture.
Under the 1979 guidelines, PCs were supposed to operate on three tiers. On the 
bottom tier were the primary cooperatives (malba), where individual members were still 
allowed to own their own livestock and farming implements and to cultivate small, 
individual garden plots, measuring from quarter to a half a hectare. On the second tier 
were the secondary cooperatives (welba), where individual members were expected to 
hand over all of their privately owned livestock and farming implements to the 
cooperative, which, in turn, would own and administer almost everything, except the 
member’s small garden plot. At the highest level were the completely collectivised 
cooperatives (weland), which Dessalegn Rahmato (1990:102) maintained roughly 
resembled the scheme of the Russian kolkhozy in the 1930s. Weland could only be 
formed, however, if two or more welba were joined together.
The ETPMG tried to promote collectivism and to increase output on 
cooperative farms by providing incentives to PC members and discriminating against 
independent peasants. PC members, for example, gained access to modem inputs such 
as fertiliser and pesticides at subsidised rates. They also benefited from government 
extension programmes, lower bank interest rates, and tax reductions. Members of large 
cooperatives acquired access to special credit privileges and the right to enter into 
contractual agreements with state enterprises. PCs had to be officially registered,
171however, before special benefits could be obtained.
Despite government benefits, Ethiopia’s cooperative membership figures 
remained low. Small-scale ventures failed to produce significantly more marketable 
surplus per capita than individual farmers. In both cases, farmers marketed only about 
20 percent of their harvests. The rest was consumed at home (Dessalegn Rahmato 
1990:104-105).
171 ETPMG requirements for cooperative formation at lower levels were quite broad. Any three people 
living in die same peasant association could form a simple cooperative. In contrast, official requirements 
for registered cooperatives were fairly rigid. Thirty members were required before cooperatives could 
legally be registered. After submitting the registration forms, members o f larger cooperatives usually had 
to wait one or two years before they were legally entitled to claim any special benefits (Dessalegn 
Ramato 1990:102).
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In the early 1980s Mengistu's efforts to increase peasant participation in 
collectivist institutions like producer and service cooperatives were only marginally 
successful. In 1982, 837 producer co-operatives, with a total membership of only 
54,423 households cultivated 313,688 hectares of land. Of the 837 cooperatives in 
existence in April of that year, only 57 were officially registered. Service cooperatives 
fared slightly better. In 1982, 3679 service cooperatives, comprised of 16,680 peasant 
associations, registered a total membership of 5,054,892 households (Hay and Griffin 
1992:26; Agit Ghose 1992:74).
Strengthening state controls and centralised planning
Although the 1975 Nationalisation Acts in Ethiopia provided a basis for 
socialist development by sweeping away the old imperial order, blueprints for long­
term economic development were not included. In contrast to Haile Selassie's State- 
dominated economy, the Derg set about creating a framework for state centralisation
172along socialist lines. Although significant differences existed between the Soviet 
Union and Ethiopia in respect of the actual powers of the ruling elite to control all 
resources, strong arguments can be made to support Dessalegn Rahmato’s idea that 
Mengistu's structure of economic management amounted to a command economy,
173despite the existence of a private sector.
The Derg's moves to consolidate State control over the planning of agricultural 
development gained momentum after 1975, as Soviet interests in Ethiopia's socialist
t til •orientation intensified. On the 20 April 1976, just two days before Soviet officials 
issued their first positive public commendation of the ETPMG, the military regime 
launched the Programme of the Ethiopian National Democratic Revolution. Objectives 
in the new programme demonstrated a much closer affinity with Marxist-Leninist 
development rhetoric. Emphasis was given to building a new people's Ethiopia, laying a
172 Dessalegn Rahmato (1987:165) maintained that a critical distinction existed between development 
strategies advocated by the Imperial government and the PMAC. The first advocated an open economy 
wherein the state assumed a disproportionately large role. The second focused on inplanting a state-centred 
economy.
173 Dessalegn (1987:164-165) offered two arguments. First, in industry, the State controlled virtually all 
medium and large-scale manufacturing, all large-scale trade and service enterprises, and all financial 
institutions. Second, in agriculture, state-agencies controlled the marketing and distribution of most 
agricultural products, and state farms received most o f the resources requisite for improving agrarian output.
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firm foundation for the transition to socialism and establishing a people's democratic 
republic (Wubneh and Abate 1988:205-210). In 1977, the year of the Friendship 
Declaration, the Central Planning Commission was established under Proclamation 
128. In 1978, the year of the Friendship Treaty, the Central Planning Supreme Council 
(CPSC) replaced the Commission. Shortly thereafter the ETPMG launched the 
National Revolutionary Development Campaign to increase agricultural and industrial 
production. In 1984, the year that Ethiopia’s vanguard party was formed, the National 
Commission for Central Planning (NCCP) replaced the Council (Proclamation 262). In 
conjunction with three autonomous agencies (the Central Statistical Office, the 
Development Projects Study Agency and the Mapping Agency), the NCCP assumed 
responsibility for economic development planning (Mulatu Wubneh 1990:201-202).
In respect of agricultural planning, decision-making powers remained 
concentrated at the top-most levels of the administrative structure. Decisions were 
made in the National Committee chaired by Mengistu, handed down to the Executive 
Committee, and forwarded to Territorial Planning Agencies, situated at regional, 
provincial, awraja (district) and woreda (sub district) levels. In theory, of course, the 
Territorial Planning Agencies also had the power to initiate development proposals, 
conduct comprehensive economic and social studies and supervise project 
implementation (Mulatu Wubneh 1990:201). In practice, however, the powers of 
territorial agencies were severely limited, as a consequence of the State's virtual 
monopoly over the allocation of significant resources.
State control over procurement and marketing activities
Mengistu’s administration also introduced centralised structures that resembled 
Soviet-styled command entities to strengthen state control over procurement and 
marketing activities associated with domestic food supplies and primary exports. The 
Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) and the Ethiopian Coffee Marketing 
Corporation (ECMC) were particularly important.
The AMC was set up in 1976 and reflected Mengistu's preference for centralised 
and command-styled organisational structures. Initially, AMC operations were modest, 
and price controls were imposed rather arbitrarily. In 1979-1980, however, the powers 
of the Corporation were greatly extended in line with the ETPMG's growing need to
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procure more food for urban dweller associations (kebeles), state enterprises and the 
army. Under the new arrangement, the AMC acquired the powers to implement a 
planned purchase and quota delivery system, to fix producer prices, to establish control 
over the private grain trade and to strengthen State controls over market-related 
activities in the public sector. In addition, the AMC also exercised control over the 
distribution and pricing of fertiliser. (Pickett 1991:119-121)
The AMC's system of setting fixed procurement prices for mandatory quota 
purchases also reflected the ETPMG's preference for centralised planning. A 
committee drawn from important Ethiopian ministries set prices. Once determined, they 
were applied uniformly across the country, without regard to differences in crop quality. 
Prices also tended to remain static. Farmgate prices set in 1980-1981, for example, 
were still the same in 1985, despite the rising costs of inputs.174
The AMC aimed to strengthen the government’s control over agricultural 
production. First, the AMC, in effect, controlled supply, because state farms and 
producer cooperatives were required to deliver all of their output to the AMC, and 
peasant farmers were subjected to high compulsory quotas (Eshetu Chole 1990:94). 
Second, the AMC set prices and operated two-tier pricing systems that discouraged
175private initiative. In respect of cereals, for example, AMC officials paid personnel
on state farms 20 to 50 percent more per unit value than peasant farmers. Third, the 
AMC controlled distribution (Pickett 1991:136). Regional movement of grain, for 
example, was severely restricted.
Centralisation policies were also well demonstrated in the ECMC’s control over 
the procurement, marketing and export of coffee, Ethiopia's leading source of foreign 
trade revenue. Formed in 1978, the ECMC functioned as the State agency responsible 
for the procurement, processing and exporting of coffee. The ECMC, like the AMC, 
exercised exclusive purchase rights over coffee produced on state farms and coffee 
collected by service cooperatives. The ECMC also exercised a monopoly over all
174 This situation remained virtually unchanged until 1988 (Pickett 1991:120).
175 Private traders were allowed to engage in the grain trade on a limited basis but had to be licensed. 
They could purchase above-quota production directly from farmers, but, after sales transactions had been 
completed, they had to sell fifty percent of their purchases back to the AMC at fixed prices (Pickett 
1991:120).
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176purchases and exports of ‘washed coffee’. In 1983-1984, the Corporation handled 
about 70 percent of Ethiopia’s total coffee export, or about 1.58mn (60 kg bags), valued 
at BR1.3bn ($628mn). In theory, the remaining 30 percent were allocated to 14 private 
traders for export. In practice, opportunities for private entrepreneurship in coffee 
trading were severely limited, as a consequence of the ECMC's strict export controls, 
auction regulations, and the stiff purchase and sales restrictions levied upon quality 
coffee (ICO 1976-1991).
The ECMC also exercised considerable control over the internal marketing, 
processing and storage of coffee on all levels. Fifty-one purchasing stations under the 
ECMC's jurisdiction were established in coffee producing areas to buy coffee from 
growers, cooperatives and traders. Thirteen purchasing centres were set up to control 
the activities of the 51 stations. In turn, four ECMC regional offices supervised 
activities of the 13 centres. In addition, the ECMC controlled over 110 processing 
plants and 120 warehouses (ICO 1976-1991).
In the mid 1980s, the ETPMG exercised considerable control over production 
and marketing activities of all producers and private traders in Ethiopia. Centralised 
agencies like the AMC and the ECMC demonstrated Mentistu’s intention to strengthen 
state control over agricultural production, domestic marketing and the export of key 
crops. His policy remained in line with the heavily centralised adminstrative structures 
for managing the agrarian sector that had previously been adopted by Soviet officials in 
response to agricultural crises in the Soviet Union.
Ethiopia's Ten-Year Development Plan.
On the eve of Gorbachev’s rise to power, Mengistu formally reaffirmed his 
intention to implement the socialist transformation of agriculture. His commitment was 
embodied in the final draft of the Ten Year Development Plan (10YDP), introduced in 
September 1984 to cover the period 1984/1985-1993/1994 (Dejene Aredo 1990:49-55). 
Adoption of the plan signalled the ETPMG's intention to abandon campaign-style
177socialist development strategies in favour of longer-term centralised planning. The
176 Most coffee beans in Ethiopia were only sun dried. Washed coffee was generally considered premium 
coffee and fetched the highest economic return (ICO 1976-1991).
177 Prior to the implementation o f the 10YDP, the provisional government had implemented six annual plans 
(Getahun Tafesse 1992:8).
194
new 10YDP was to serve as the main instrument in the management and guidance of 
Ethiopia's socio-economic transformation. The broad goals of the plan were to 
transform the economy by developing Ethiopia's productive forces and raising the 
living standards of the population. As set out in the 10YDP, socialist agriculture was 
intended to become the dominant sector in Ethiopia by 1994 (Getahun Tafesse 1992: 9; 
Mulatu Wubneh 1990:203).
Ethiopia's 10YDP for the socialist transformation of agriculture favoured the 
implementation of large-scale, costly undertakings. In respect of 10YDP targets for 
state farm expansion, the land area set aside for state farms was projected to increase 
from 2.8 percent of the total cultivated area (175,000 hectares) in 1984/85 to 6.4 
percent (468,000 hectares) in 1994, despite the fact that existing levels of preferential 
resource allocations were barely sufficient to keep existing state farms minimally 
operational (Mulatu Wubneh 1990:206).
The 10YDP goals for enlarging the cooperative sector were even more 
ambitious. Under the 10YDP, cooperatives were supposed to increase from 1,147 in 
1983/1984 to 15,344 in 1993/94. Correspondingly, the total number of members in 
cooperatives was projected to jump from 83,150 to 4.1 million over the same period. 
Expressed as a percentage of the total rural population, Mengistu's 10YDP targets for 
cooperative membership (estimated at only 1.2 percent of the population in 1983/1984) 
aimed to transform 52.7 percent of the rural population into cooperative farmers by 
1993/94 (Getahun Tafesse 1992:20; Dessalegn Rahmato 1990:101-102).
The 10YDP also advocated the implementation of large-scale, comprehensive 
programmes such as resettlement and villagisation for expanding agricultural 
production and the socialist transformation of the rural population. Resettlement offered 
new opportunities for expanding the land area under cultivation and good prospects for 
establishing the socialist mode of production. As a justification, the 10YDP 
emphasised the need to reduce population pressures in the Northern highlands, where 
an estimated 78 percent of the population eked out a living on farmed-out land, by 
resettling citizens in sparsely inhabited, under-utilised areas situated in the lowlands 
and south-western parts of the country. Under the 10YDP, about 854,000 persons 
(194,000 families) were supposed to be resettled during the decade covered by the
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10YDP. As regards villagisation, the 10YDP embraced the notion that Ethiopia's rural 
population would be better off if farmers living in scattered settlements were moved 
into designated villages in order to facilitate the provision of various social and 
economic services (Getahun Tafesse 1992:16).
The 10YDP advocated four general directions for Ethiopia's future agricultural 
development at the beginning of 1985. First, the socialist transformation of rural areas 
was to be accelerated. Second, smallholder farming was to be discouraged. Third, 
individual farmers were to be organised into producer cooperatives. Fourth, large-scale 
farming and mechanised agricultural production were to be gradually introduced 
(Dejene Aredo 1990:51). In respect of all these, Mengistu’s administration was prepared 
to distribute scarce domestic resources preferentially in line with traditional, Soviet- 
styled recommendations for socialist agricultural development, despite 
recommendations made by capitalist donors to the contrary.
PART TWO: EMULATION IN ETHIOPIA’S AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
AFTER 1985.
Resemblances between Ethiopian agrarian policies and the agricultural 
strategies advocated by Soviet officials became less apparent in the New Thinking era, 
as similarities increased between Gorbachev’s plans for agrarian progress and the 
capitalist reforms advocated by World Bank officials. However, Mengistu 
demonstrated a marked reluctance to abandon the high-cost structures recommended for 
socialist agricultural development that had been in vogue in Brezhnev’s day. First, I 
look at the changes in Soviet support for Ethiopian agricultural policies that occurred 
while Gorbachev was in power. Then some of the strategies advocated by Mengistu’s 
administration are examined.
Soviet support for Mengistu’s agricultural policies.
The changing level of Soviet support for Ethiopia’s socialist transformation 
under Gorbachev can be demonstrated by looking at the Soviet Gosplan report on 
Ethiopian agriculture and Moscow's continuing support for resettlement. The support 
offered in the early years can then be compared to the pressures for reform exerted by 
officials and media representatives in the Soviet Union later on in the Gorbachev era.
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The Gosplan report.
Soviet officials were reluctant to abandon support for collectivisation and State- 
controlled agriculture in Ethiopia in the early Gorbachev era. Their criticisms focused 
more upon the pace and the method of implementation than upon the models emulated 
and the end goals envisaged.
In August 1985, Soviet advisers attached to Ethiopia’s NCCP completed a 
critical review of agricultural development strategies for Mengistu’s administration. 
The authors of the Gosplan report criticised the government's continued reliance on 
heavily centralised socialist agricultural policies but approved of Mengistu’s long-term 
goal to collectivise. On one level, Gosplan recommendations seemed to constitute a 
significant departure from the Brezhnev’s policies and to herald new directions in
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Soviet advice for improving Ethiopian agriculture. At a deeper level, however, their 
continued approval for Mengistu’s long-term collectivisation goals cast doubt upon the 
degree of change actually recommended.
This dualistic approach was particularly well demonstrated in the suggestions 
made for remodelling existing agricultural schemes. To begin with, Gosplan officials 
identified Ethiopia's main task in the mid-1980s as solving the problem of food supply. 
They maintained that this task could only be accomplished by boosting agricultural 
production. To this end, Ethiopian officials were advised to focus their efforts upon 
improving the output of individual peasants for the next three to five years, while 
simultaneously improving production rates on state farms and in peasant producers’ 
cooperatives. Progressive strategies advocated by Gosplan analysts stressed the 
importance of providing production incentives for peasant farmers: in particular, 
subsidising inputs, such as fertiliser and establishing more flexible pricing policies for 
farm produce. Authors of the report even suggested that output might increase if formal 
legislation stating the rights and duties of individual farms were introduced (Gosplan 
1985:A8-A.9).
178 Paul Henze (1989:19-20) believed that the Gosplan report was conceived to serve three purposes: first, 
to persuade the Derg to abandon unrealistic goals and to slow down the pace o f socialisation, without 
compromising the long-term objectives of establishing a Soviet-styled economic system; second, to absolve 
Moscow o f the blame associated with the failures o f past Soviet advice and previous Ethiopian economic 
policies; third, to distance the Soviet Union from any future decisions made by Mengistu regime likely to 
worsen Ethiopia's present economic predicament.
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As a justification for Ethiopia's temporary enhancement of the private sector, the 
writers of the report drew upon Lenin's approach to a similar problem in the Soviet Union 
after the Civil War. They pointed out that Mengistu's official support for independent, 
small farmers might improve economic conditions in the same way that Lenin's strategies 
for assisting peasants and developing small-scale private industry had done under the 
New Economic policy. In line with Lenin's earlier thoughts on the matter, Gosplan 
analysts maintained that Ethiopia's capitalist development should be directed towards 
state capitalism, rather than be forbidden or arrested during periods of social transition. 
They argued that state capitalism could eventually be transformed into state socialism 
(Gosplanl 985: A.8-A.9,A.50).
Gosplan’s recommendations still reflected the ongoing support extended by 
Soviet officials for the socialist transformation of Ethiopia’s agricultural sector. In 
respect of collectivisation, producer cooperatives and state farms were still deemed to 
be vital to Ethiopia's future agrarian progress. As regards, mechanisation, modem 
farming technology continued to be regarded as a vital strategy for improving 
agricultural output in all agricultural sectors, especially in the newly developed farming 
regions. To this end Soviet advisors stressed the importance of tractors and 
recommended that the Mengistu regime begin training programmes for machine
. 179operators.
Resettlement
In the early Gorbachev period, Soviet officials still officially supported
Mengistu's plan for expanding socialised agriculture through the implementation of
180resettlement and villagisation schemes. Introduced as part of Mengistu's Drought 
Action plan in November 1984, both programmes resembled old-fashioned, prescriptions
17 9 Along similar lines, authors of the report advocated the eventual amalgamation o f small-scale private 
industries into producers' cooperative organisations, in keeping with policies deemed acceptable for 
‘...creating the fundamentals of [a] socialist society’ (Gosplan 1985:A.26, A.10, A.21, A.51).
180 Initiated by Haile Selassie, Ethiopian resettlement programmes were endorsed by World Bank 
officials in a report issued in 1973. The Derg continued to carry out small-scale resettlement programmes 
until 1979, when they were suspended on grounds that the results had been unsatisfactory. Mengistu 
revived resettlement programmes in 1984 (Briine 1990:26).
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• * 1 R1for Soviet-styled collectivised agriculture, especially when used in combination.
Soviet support for resettlement was especially apparent between November 
1984 and January 1986. Although help in other areas was also provided, Soviet efforts 
to assist in Ethiopian resettlement schemes centred upon the provision of logistical 
support. Officials in Gorbachev’s administration continued to supply aircraft, aircrews, 
trucks and drivers for the transportation of settlers from famine-stricken areas in the 
north to resettlement areas situated in the west and south-western regions of the country 
and, aside from East Germany, was virtually the only government do so at that 
particular time. In December 1985, TASS correspondents claimed that Soviet pilots 
had evacuated at least 120,000 people from famine-stricken areas (TASS, 29 December 
1985).
Soviet officials also transported food and provided medical assistance to the 
settlers living on new settlement sites. Soviet trucks ferried food from the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Agriculture's stores to resettlement areas. Kurt Jansson (1987:37), head of 
the UN relief program in Ethiopia in 1985, maintained that 300 Soviet trucks and 700 
drivers had been specifically involved in this effort. In respect of medical assistance in 
resettlement areas, TASS reporters in December 1985 also stated that some 100,000 
patients had been treated at the Soviet mobile hospital in the Asosa resettlement area 
(TASS, 29 December 1985).
Officially, Soviet approval for Ethiopian strategies to implement collectivised 
agriculture on a massive scale in resettled areas continued well into the Gorbachev era. 
In 1988, for example, Soviet radio newscasters criticised Western objections to 
Ethiopia resettlement schemes on grounds that the West’s adverse responses to 
Mengistu’s plans were aimed at changing Ethiopia's political direction and frustrating 
collective work projects. They argued that Mengistu's resettlement programme was not 
an ideological choice but an important task for development and saving lives. Radio 
Moscow newscasters then commended the Ethiopian government for saving thousands 
of lives in the northern famine zones, developing over 123,000 hectares of land 
between 1985 and 1987 and providing the opportunity for 600,000 people resettled in
Henze (1989:31) claimed that Mengistu's resettlement policies and the provision of state-operated 
heavy equipment for opening up new agricultural lands in the mid-1980s were essentially imitations of the 
strategies previously deployed in Khrushchev's virgin lands programme.
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the western regions to become self-sufficient in food production (BBC, SWB, 3 and 16 
March 1988).
This positive view of Mengistu’s massive resettlement venture was reinforced at 
about the same time in a broadcast of an article written by Pravda correspondent Igor 
Tarutin. Tarutin considered resettlement and villagisation programmes to be the two 
central programmes for restructuring rural areas. He maintained that Ethiopian farmers 
were being provided with the necessary incentives to collectivise themselves into 
villages and to establish co-operative farms. Tarutin also believed that the success of 
resettlement and villagisation schemes would signal a bright future for Ethiopia (BBC, 
SWB, 16 March 1988).
Pressures for reform after 1987.
As perestroika developed in the Soviet Union, Soviet officials attempted to 
persuade Ethiopian officials to initiate some level of agricultural reform. These efforts 
were particularly apparent following Mengistu’s decisions to remove aid workers from 
the north in May 1988. In July, Gorbachev discussed approaches to development with 
Mengistu in Moscow, and the two leaders agreed to initiate joint efforts to devise new 
and more effective forms of Soviet-Ethiopian co-operation that could take into account 
the long-term development plans of both countries. Three days later, Politburo member 
Nikolay Ryzhkov, then Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, briefed Mengistu 
on the current progress of perestroika in the Soviet Union. Ryzhkov advised Mengistu 
that the Soviet economy could only be put right if command administrative methods 
were rejected and replaced by new forms of economic management. He also 
emphasised the importance of finding an optimal blend between personal and public 
interests and giving scope to personal initiative in order to benefit socialism (BBC, 
SWB, 29 July 1988).
Accounts in the Soviet media accounts in August and September reinforced the 
view that Soviet officials were becoming dissatisfied with Mengistu’s development 
strategies. In August, Aleksandr Krylov, a Soviet agricultural expert of the Far Eastern 
Scientific Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences, talked about the problems of 
Ethiopian agriculture in an interview broadcast on Moscow radio. Krylov maintained 
that Mengistu’s practice of setting very low agricultural prices had adversely affected
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Ethiopian farmers and had created an imbalance in the goods exchanged between rural 
and urban sectors. He also stated that the regime's monopoly over the purchase of 
agricultural produce had created a bottleneck for food supplies destined for urban areas. 
Krylov concluded that Mengistu's decision in December 1987 to raise producer prices, 
to legalise private trade in staples and to issue licenses to traders to buy directly from 
farmers would increase Ethiopia's agricultural production (BBC, SWB, 17 August 1988). 
In September, during a report on Ethiopian Revolution Day carried live on Soviet 
television, correspondent A. Kraminov criticised the Ethiopian government for failing 
to create an ‘effectively functioning economic mechanism’ and warned about the 
dangers inherent in too much centralisation and bureaucratisation (BBC, SWB, 16 
September 1988).
In March 1990, Soviet hopes that that Ethiopian officials would restructure 
Ethiopian agricultural policies more in keeping with Gorbachev’s perestroika were 
realised. Mengistu officially jettisoned Ethiopia's experiment in old-fashioned, Soviet- 
styled socialism in favour of a New Economic Policy (NEP), which vaguely resembled 
Lenin’s programme of the same name. In an article printed in Pravda about two weeks 
after the announcement, Soviet news correspondent Demidov reported that cooperatives 
were to be provided with new incentives. He pointed out that the Ethiopian State 
would continue to function as primary regulator of production, however, rather than 
leaving matters to the blind interplay of market forces. Demidov provided no 
assessments of the Mengistu's new development programme in the article, but he 
stressed the fact that Ethiopia's economic improvement was dependent upon concluding 
the civil war {Pravda, 23 March 1990: 6, in CDSP 1990, v 42, no 12: 27).
When Mengistu’s administration finally collapsed in May 1991, Soviet news 
correspondents were quick to equate the shortcomings of the ousted Government's 
policies with Mengistu’s predilection for earlier Marxist/Leninist socialist policies and 
to ignore the Perestroika aspects of the defunct administration's NEP. Correspondent L. 
Borovoi noted that the creation of a dominant State sector had failed to bring about 
economic and social well being for the majority of the population. He also observed 
that forced collectivisation had failed to reverse the negative decline in Ethiopia’s 
annual agrarian output. As proof of Ethiopia's lagging agricultural performance, he 
pointed out that in 1991 Ethiopians still remained reliant upon imports for daily food
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supplies (Izvestia, May 23, 1991:5, in CDSP 1991, v 43, no 21:21).
Mengistu’s strategies for agricultural progress.
During Gorbachev’s time in power, Mengistu’s official reform rhetoric 
embraced recommendations made by the World Bank as well as those advocated under 
perestroika.Whatever Soviet influences might have been, however, Ethiopia’s ruling 
elite had the ultimate say in determining agricultural policy. In this case, Mengistu 
demonstrated a marked reluctance to abandon former intentions to centralise and to 
collective Ethiopia’s agricultural sector in line with the tactics that had been advocated 
by earlier Soviet leaders. First, I discuss Mengistu’s collectivisation efforts in the 
resettlement and villagisation programmes. Then World Bank recommendations for 
agricultural reform in Ethiopia are reviewed, and certain similarities to some of 
Gorbachev’s strategies for agrarian reform in the Soviet Union are noted. Finally, the 
1990 agricultural reforms are examined to see whether there is any justification for 
Holcomb’s and Ibssa’s claim (see Chapter two) that Ethiopian leaders used 
‘showcasing’tactics to gain external funding for development which had little bearing 
upon their own intentions and policies for internal development.
Resettlement and villagisation
Used in combination, resettlement and villagisation programmes offered
Mengistu’s administration unique opportunities for collectivising agriculture and
182controlling the rural population. Resettlement offered opportunities to introduce 
Soviet-styled modes of socialist production with their emphasis on mechanised, large- 
scale farming in new settlement areas. Villagisation provided a means for sustaining 
socialist transformation, because the rural population could be concentrated into clearly 
defined areas.
After a five-year lapse, resettlement was re-introduced in November 1984, in 
conjunction with Mengistu’s Drought Action Plan. In addition to saving starving 
peasants, resettlement was viewed as a long-term strategy for the socialist
18 2 In theory, resettlement presupposed a movement of the population that would require detailed 
planning and control, while villagisation technically referred to population regrouping within a particular 
area (Pankhurst 1992:10).
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transformation of agriculture that could address the root causes of famine and end 
Ethiopia's dependency on external donors. The strategy also had some other uses: in 
particular, reshuffling the population, so that people who had already accepted the 
revolution could be placed along sensitive parts of the border; integrating various tribes 
and nationalities; developing new farming areas for producing food surpluses; removing 
unemployed and other economically unwanted persons from urban centres; containing the 
influence of political undesirables within a given geographical location, and depopulating 
rebel areas so that insurgents would lose their support lines (Dawit Wolde 1989:289).
Although in theory resettlement offered some prospects for agricultural 
development, Mengistu's undue reliance upon some of the strategies previously 
deployed in the Soviet Union alienated powerful external donors and greatly reduced 
prospects for the programme's eventual success. Criticisms in three areas particularly 
evoked memories of similar complaints that had been levelled against Soviet leaders in 
the past: the scale and pace of implementation, party control over the operation and the 
excessive costs engendered by resettlement ventures.
The scale and pace of Mengistu's resettlement operations in the mid-1980s were 
unprecedented in modem Ethiopian history. Initially, Ethiopian officials set targets to 
resettle 1.5 million people (300,000 families) from Tigray and Wollo to Southwestern 
Ethiopia within a nine-month period.183 In the first stage, 50,000 family heads 
(representing an estimated 250,000 people) were supposed to be moved from Welo and 
Tigray and resettled in the regions in the south and south-west, where they would be 
assimilated into existing peasant associations. In the second stage, 250,000 family 
heads (representing an estimated 1.25 million people) were to be transported to 
undeveloped areas (Pankhurst, 1992:55).
The speed of implementation was every bit as ambitious as the scope of the 
undertaking. From the programme's inception in October 1984 to January 1986 (when 
the government temporarily suspended resettlement programmes for consolidation 
purposes), an estimated 600,000 Ethiopians were moved from their homelands in the 
North and resettled in other parts of Ethiopia (Pankhurst 1992:56). Resettlement was 
briefly re-activated in November 1987 in response to poor harvests and impending
183 In comparison, between 1974 and 1984 only about 46,000 households (150,000 people) were resettled 
on 88 settlement sites in 11 regions (Pankhurst, 1990:121; Dawit Wolde 1989:289).
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famine, but at the end of May 1988, only 10,000 more people had been resettled. The 
programme was abandoned a month later, and no further mass movements of settlers 
from the north to new settlement areas in the West and Southwest were undertaken by 
Mengistu’s administration (Pankhurst 1992:76).
The WPE was assigned primary responsibility for organising the resettlement 
scheme and implementing the transformation to a socialist agricultural system. Party 
officials viewed the management of resettlement as a very important party task because 
it offered opportunities for putting Marxist/Leninist doctrines into practice and testing 
WPE cadre loyalties. To that end, the party sent out no less than 2,259 cadres to work 
on settlement sites during the first year of the programme (Pankhurst 1992:55).
On the resettlement sites, cadres introduced patterns of societal organisation and 
interaction in ways that resembled the methods previously used by CPSU officials in 
the Soviet Union. Recruited from all parts of Ethiopia, cadres were sent on campaigns 
to resettlement sites during the first phase of the programme, where they actively 
assisted in the process of social restructuring. Those selected were expected to serve as 
vanguard campaigners who would lead the people. Their most important duty was ‘to 
foster collective spirit and to instil values of cooperative work’. Organised into units 
called Zerfs, cadres also functioned as the most important intermediaries between the 
state and the settlers. They also had authority over other administrative officials and 
workers, including the selection and disposal of leaders of local peasant associations 
and members of the local militia (Pankhurst 1992:149-155).
Finally, WPE officials and resettlement administrators working together were 
supposed to facilitate the transformation of independent farmers into waged agricultural 
labourers. All lands situated on resettlement sites were farmed collectively except for 
small, private garden plots of one/tenth hectare allocated to each household. WPE 
officials and Ministry of Education workers supervised work arrangements in 
conventional resettlement sites. Settlers were organised into teams called Budin, and 
four Budin comprised a brigade. Settlers worked for resettlement administrators. Pay 
was determined on a points or Netib system, and remuneration was contingent upon
184official assessments of the work points that agricultural workers had accumulated.
184 In the conventional settlement site of Queto, for example, each man received one point for every hour 
worked (Pankhurst 1992:163).
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Insufficient internal resources eventually undermined the viability of Mengistu’s 
resettlement venture. Despite Soviet rhetorical and logistical support for resettlement 
endeavours, the Ethiopian leader’s preference for rapid implementation, his refusal to 
scale down targets and his decision to collectivise new settlement areas at all costs 
overburdened the country's already declining economy and alienated powerful capitalist
185 •donors. Preliminary survey reports were made too quickly, and valuable resources 
were often squandered upon sites that had to be abandoned because they were 
uninhabitable. Moreover, the ventures envisaged were overly ambitious and 
prohibitively costly. New areas were planned as a number of closely linked villages 
located within a radius of 100 km designed to accommodate between 10,000 and 
20,000 households (family heads). Each village in the complex was planned to house 
about 500 households (Pankhurst 1990:125). New complexes, in turn, were supposed 
to serve as excellent locations for introducing villagisation, as a consequence of 
organised grid-like layouts within each settlement area. However, settlers were 
frequently moved into resettlement areas before the land had been cleared for planting 
and dwellings had been completed. Consequently, the need to construct shelter 
frequently obstructed vital cultivation activities. Finally, attempts at successful 
production were thwarted by government's failure to provide adequate supplies of vital 
inputs like fertiliser and good seed (Pankhurst 1992:127-130).
The overly ambitious targets set for mechanised farming on new resettlement 
sites also undermined the utility of resettlement as a strategy for modernising 
agricultural production. Although tractors and other farm machinery, mostly provided 
by the Soviet Union, were delivered to the newly opened farming areas, their utility was 
limited, because they frequently broke down in the rough terrain and no one had the 
expertise or the parts to fix them (Pankhurst 1992:128,159-160).
The costs of the resettlement programme far exceeded the original estimates. 
Initially, only a quarter of Ethiopia’s Drought Action Plan's 531.92 million birr budget 
was supposed to be spent on it. Before the programme was finally scuttled, government 
expenditures were estimated to be in the region of 600 million Birr, a figure
185 Initially, only The Soviet Union, East Germany, Italy and Canada, plus a few independent aid 
agencies and religious groups agreed to help. The United States, West Germany and Britain remained 
resolutely opposed to the project (Pankhurst 1992:75,79).
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considerably in excess of Mengistu's entire action plan budget (Pankhurst1992:74-75). 
After resettlement was suspended, internal resources earmarked for existing sites 
dwindled at an alarming rate. Donors and principal aid agencies in the West, however, 
continued to withhold financial assistance on grounds that it was an inappropriate 
strategy for Ethiopia's agricultural development. Although this view was not officially 
voiced by Gorbachev’s administration, Soviet interests in providing continued logistical 
and rhetorical support for Mengistu’s large-scale, controversial collectivist ventures 
declined markedly.
Mengistu's large-scale experiment in villagisation in the mid-1980s also offered
opportunities for controlling the rural population and restructuring the traditional basis of
186agrarian society. In this case, while Soviet village consolidation policies in the 
Khrushchev era probably influenced Mengistu's ideas about villagisation to some extent, 
other prototypes also existed in relatively close proximity to Ethiopia: in particular,
187ujaama, Tanzania's massive experiment m villagisation. Whatever the influences upon 
villagisation, it is important to discuss its implications for collectivisation in Ethiopia.
Villagisation programmes were introduced in Hararghe in December 1984 as 
part of the government’s Drought Action Plan, and about one million rural households 
were moved into new villages over a six-month period. In July 1985, encouraged by 
earlier successes in Bale in the 1970s and recent experiences in Hararghe, Ethiopian 
officials extended the villagisation programme to eight of the 12 remaining 
administrative regions (Alemayehu Lirenso 1990:136).
Subsequently, the programme was scheduled for implementation in two phases. 
In the first phase, which lasted from December 1985 to March 1986, about 4.67 
million people (12% of the rural population) residing in small farming communities in 
Shewa, Arsi, and Hararghe were relocated into about 4,500 villages. In Phase two, 
national controls were introduced, and the pace of villagisation was intensified. In June 
1986, the administration established a national Villagisation Coordinating Committee 
to oversee operations. In January 1987, the Ministry of Agriculture issued
18 6 Villagisation programmes were introduced initially in the Bale region during 1977-1978 Somali war as 
countermeasures to security threats. The scale of these operations, however, was substantially less than 
Mengistu’s mid-1980s venture (Alemayehu Lirenso 1990:136).
187
See Susan Crouch (1987:68-73) on ujaama.
2 0 6
‘Villagisation Guidelines’ for implementing bodies. Under the programme 10 million 
people were supposed to be relocated into 9,438 villages by the end of 1987. In July, 
Ethiopian officials reported that eight million people had been villagised and that more 
than 180,000 dwelling units had been constructed. In October 1987, shortly after the 
military government’s formal transformation into a civilian administration, Mengistu 
announced plans to villagise a further three million people. In mid-1988, it was 
estimated that 12 million rural inhabitants (or one-third of the rural population) had
been relocated under the villagisation programme and were living in newly built
188villages or on officially designated sites.
Mengistu claimed that villagisation would effectively promote rational land-use 
patterns, conserve resources, provide peasants with essential social services and 
strengthen security. As set out in the Villagisation Guidelines issued in 1985 by 
Ethiopia’s Ministry of Agriculture, peasants living in small, remote farming 
communities would be relocated in larger village clusters situated somewhere in the 
vicinity of their peasant smallholdings. Within village clusters, each village would 
accommodate about 200 to 300 households (1000-2000) persons, and each household 
would occupy 1000 square meter compounds (Mulatu Wubneh 1990:207).
There were practical shortcomings in the plan to alter traditional ways of rural 
life through the introduction of collectivist strategies embodied in villagisation. First, 
peasants were often forced to move house before new accommodation had been built. 
In some cases, like earlier efforts in the Soviet Union, existing structures were actually 
hauled to designated sites. Second, new village complexes tended to be located further 
away from cultivated areas than the old, remote farming communities. Consequently 
many peasants had to walk long distances before they could even begin the day's 
farming activities. Third, smaller compound allocations in the new villages actually 
decreased prospects for self-sufficiency. Reductions in plot size limited prospects for 
growing garden crops, raising small animals and performing various activities to 
increase income and to meet domestic consumption requirements (Alemayehu Lirenso 
1990:135-136).
188 Estimates o f the numbers actually villagised between 1984 and 1987, as well as details about the pace 
of reforms and the contents o f official villagisation directives vary. Compare, for example, the estimates 
made by Alemayehu Lirenso 1990:139,136 with those in Mulatu Wubneh 1990:207and Brune 1990:26.
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Over time, miscalculations made by Mengistu’s administration in respect of 
particular programmes added substantially to the enormous costs incurred by 
villagisation. As a consequence of the Guidelines set out in 1987, some of the newly 
constructed villages, and village clusters failed to meet the required specifications. They 
had to be abandoned and subsequently rebuilt on more appropriate sites. Others had to be 
moved back some 400-500 metres because they were situated too close to the road 
(Alemayehu Lirenso 1990:139).
Although collectivist policies associated with Ethiopian resettlement and 
villagisation projects in the mid-1980s resembled earlier Soviet strategies, the style and 
pace of implementation were products of Mengistu’s own choosing. Nevertheless, 
Gorbachev’s rhetorical and logistical support for resettlement projects, in particular, 
encouraged Mengistu’s administration to divert scarce resources from other areas where 
they were badly needed.
Reforms advocated by the World Bank and Soviet officials.
Over time, the prospects envisaged by Ethiopian officials for substantially 
increasing agricultural output through resettlement and villagisation failed to 
materialise. The programmes were simply too large in scale to be financed by the 
Ethiopian government. In the absence of external support, Mengistu had no alternative 
but to consider policy options for agricultural development recommended by the World 
Bank. These recommendations also bore a marked similarity to Gorbachev’s strategies 
for agricultural reform in the Soviet Union.
World Bank proposals
World Bank officials issued two reports in 1987 and 1988 relating directly to
189Mengistu’s plans for the socialist transformation of Ethiopian agriculture. Authors
189 World Bank officials had issued earlier reports on Ethiopia in 1980, 1981 and 1984. Descriptions o f  
the government’s socialist administrative structures and policies contained in the 1984 report are 
particularly informative. Critiques and recommendations set out in that particular two-volume report are 
interesting as well. The 1987 report was based upon the recommendations of a field mission undertaken 
in March/April 1985 and discussions with Mengistu’s administration conducted in November 1986. The 
1988 report was based upon the findings o f a public investment review mission sent to Ethiopia in 
February/March 1987 and consultations with Ethiopia’s newly transformed civilian regime undertaken in
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of the 1987 report attributed part of Ethiopia's lagging economic performance to the 
difficulties encountered in putting an effective system of development planning into 
place. They concluded that even within a socialist framework the Ethiopian 
government should allocate internal resources more efficiently and should take 
advantage of market forces in order to stimulate peasant farmers and individual 
entrepreneurs.
To accomplish these aims, World Bank analysts made several important 
recommendations. First, the Ethiopian government was urged to establish an export 
action programme that would improve marketing and credit facilities, readjust 
exchange rates and reform domestic pricing. Then analysts encouraged Ethiopian 
officials to restore an open grain market by removing inter-regional barriers, 
eliminating taxes on the movement of grain by private grain traders and restricting the 
operations of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation. An increase in farmgate 
procurement prices for peasant smallholders was also recommended. Finally, World 
Bank officials advised Mengistu to raise the existing level of external development 
funding substantially. To achieve this aim, they encouraged Ethiopian officials to 
amend existing policy frameworks in order to attract potential donors. Improved 
mechanisms for aid-coordination, planning and the promotion of foreign investment 
were deemed to be particularly important (World Bank 1987:33,48-50,11,72-73).
In the 1988 report, World Bank officials intensified their efforts to persuade 
Ethiopian officials to abandon the Soviet-styled strategies that had been used to 
restructure the agricultural sector after the revolution. They were prompted by their 
reviews of the Ethiopian government’s Public Investment Programme (PIP) and their 
assessments of the viability of strategies advocated to attain the Three-Year Plan 
(3YDP 1986-1989) objectives.190 With regard to agriculture, they paid particular 
attention to the government’s preferential allocation of resources to state farms at the 
expense of peasant farmers and Mengistu’s continued reliance upon collectivist 
strategies as mechanisms for output expansion.
On the issue of resources, World Bank analysts reminded Ethiopian officials
October 1987 (World Bank 1987:unnumbered; 1988: preface).
1 9 0 As originally envisaged, Mengistu’s 10 YDP was to be conducted in three stages: a 2-year plan 
(1984-1986); a 3-year plan (1986-1989) and a 5-year plan (1989-1994) (World Bank 1988:1-3).
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that allocations under the current PIP continued to benefit state farms, despite 
Mengistu’s officially stated objective to improve peasant agriculture. State farms were 
still receiving 63 percent of the total expenditure in agriculture, even though they 
accounted for only four percent of the cultivated area. In contrast, peasants, who 
accounted for 91 percent of the area cultivated, were only receiving an allocation of 37 
percent. Consequently, World Bank analysts concluded that the current distribution 
policies represented a serious misallocation of resources. They recommended that the 
state farm share of PIP be reduced to 28 percent and that allocations to the peasant 
sector be increased to 72 percent of the total agricultural PIP (World Bank 1988 v, 2: 23, 
46-51).
The authors of the 1988 report also criticised the government’s plans to increase 
agricultural output by promoting schemes like resettlement and collectivisation. In 
respect of resettlement, World Bank analysts questioned the viability of Mengistu’s 
objectives to increase the total land area under cultivation by 930,000 hectares. At a 
conservative estimate of BRIO,000 ($4,831) per hectare, they claimed that bringing even 
half of the proposed 930,000 hectares into cultivation through resettlement would involve 
an additional expense of BR4.6 billion ($2.2bn): an outlay large enough to swallow over 
55 percent of the resources allocated to Ethiopia's entire three-year PIP. Consequently, 
they maintained that the target was far too ambitious, given the country’s limited 
resources. In addition, World Bank officials advised Mengistu’s administration to give 
substantial attention to problems associated with soil fertility, food supplies, 
communication infrastructures and health in resettlement areas (World Bank 
1988:46,42).
On the issue of collectivisation, World Bank officials expressed concern over 
the ETGVT's original 10YDP commitments to increase the share of producer 
cooperatives to 52 percent of the total land-use by 1994. They were especially 
concerned about 10YDP targets because 3YDP objectives advocated an increase of 
only six percent in the number of cooperatives by 1988-1989. Analysts were afraid that 
if the government implemented drastic measures of the kind needed to fulfil the 
ambitious 10YDP targets for collectivisation in so short a time, agricultural output 
would deteriorate dramatically (World Bank 1988:46-47).
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World Bank analysts also criticised Mengistu’s decision to promote and to 
strengthen socialist production relations. They claimed that initial efforts in this 
direction had been implemented too quickly and that restrictions on private enterprise 
remained too extensive. They argued that unless efforts at socialist transformation were 
implemented on a voluntary basis, food production would decline even further. They 
maintained that the Ethiopian government needed to learn from other centrally planned 
economies like the Soviet Union that had already legalised some aspects of private 
economic activity (World Bank 1988:85).
Within Ethiopia's existing socialist framework, the authors of the 1988 report 
urged Mengistu’s administration to assign a stronger and more dynamic role to the 
private sector. They recommended that the government introduce a joint venture code 
which would guarantee private entrepreneurs access to foreign exchange and domestic 
credit and relax existing limits upon private investment. Ethiopian officials were also 
urged to guarantee security of tenure to independent farmers and to provide assurances 
against the involuntary movement or forced membership of peasants into cooperatives 
(World Bank 1988:86-87). World Bank officials advised the government to adopt a 
three-pronged approach to reform that would focus on the producer pricing and 
marketing incentives, exchange rates devaluation, and the promotion of individual and 
group entrepreneurship in the private sector.191
Gorbachev’s reforms
Gorbachev's concerted efforts to resuscitate Soviet agricultural development by 
promoting and legalising individual initiatives did not really gain full momentum until 
1989. His strategies for domestic revitalisation stressed the importance of individual 
incentives and wage differentiation, as opposed to egalitarianism and collectivism.
They also resembled strategies that had been advocated for Ethiopia by the World 
Bank.
Gorbachev’s new strategies for agricultural progress emphasised the importance
1 9 1 During discussions in October 1987, Ethiopian officials objected to the World Bank's packaged 
approach to development policy recommendations on grounds that it made one policy change hostage to 
another. Subsequently, Mengistu agreed to act upon the first and third recommendations, but elected to 
ignore analysts' advice about changing the exchange rates (World Bank 1988:106).
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of individual peasants and agricultural workers in Soviet economic development. In 
April 1989, an agricultural reform program was introduced that aimed to make rural life 
more attractive by reducing differences between urban and rural living conditions and
192improving the overall quality of the rural work force. In August, legislation was 
implemented to provide economic incentives to producers and production units for 
increased agricultural output. Under the new provisions, farms were offered payments 
in hard currency for wheat produced above quota, and farms that agreed to lease areas 
for additional cultivation had their debts cancelled. In November, a leasing law was 
passed that officially authorised individuals or small groups to lease land from state
193farms or collectives in exchange for rent. Under the new arrangement, leases became 
valid for 50 years and could be inherited. Although wages for individuals on leased 
property were not guaranteed, leaseholders received profit-related income. In May 
1990, two months after Mengistu introduced his new economic policy, Gorbachev’s 
administration finally raised procurement prices for several kinds of grain (Tolz 
1992:263).
Nevertheless, agricultural policy in the Soviet Union during Gorbachev's time 
still remained rooted in the notion that highly mechanised state and collective farms 
would continue to function as the primary units of agricultural production. To be sure, 
individual peasants and rural workers became more prominent in development rhetoric, 
but large-scale, state and collective farms still remained the basic units of production in 
the Soviet Union, and farm managers remained accountable to centralised authorities 
for the bulk of production-related activities.
Mengistu’s response to World Bank and Soviet recommendations.
We turn now to Mengistu’s response to criticism, and the balance sustained 
between the rhetoric and implementation of reform in Ethiopia’s New Economic 
Policy. Available evidence does support the claim made by Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) 
in Chapter two that Ethiopian elites adopted ‘showcasing’ strategies to gain the support
192 See Judith Pallot (1990:655-674) on Gorbachev’s efforts to revitalise rural society through the 
implementation o f Green Ticket schemes.
193 Although the leasing law was not formally implemented until on 23 November 1989, Gorbachev 
attempted to introduce leasing arrangements in mid-1987 (Wegren 1992:14).
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of influential donors that masked their true policy intentions. Despite rhetoric to the 
contrary, Mengistu demonstrated a marked reluctance to abandon the Soviet-styled 
strategies and structures that he had previously advocated for agricultural progress.
Mengistu’s initial efforts in 1987 to incorporate capitalist-inspired strategies 
into his existing plans for socialist agricultural development were limited in scope. 
Nevertheless, his decision to advocate liberalisation dramatically increased Ethiopia's 
future prospect of receiving development aid from Western donors. Following the 
announcement of reforms in December 1987, Ethiopian officials expected to receive a 
loan from the International Development Agency (IDA) worth $150,000,000, which 
had been frozen since 1986, and about $200,000,000 from the European Community 
(EC), which had provisionally been allocated under the Third Lome Convention. 
Disbursal of these funds, however, remained contingent upon the ability of Ethiopian 
officials to secure the formal approval of World Bank and European Community 
officials for their new reform measures.194
In 1989, Mengistu’s reform rhetoric intensified. In May, a journalist, Julian 
Ozanne, reported that the Ethiopian government was thinking about implementing the 
development prescriptions advocated by Gorbachev’s administration, as well as World 
Bank analysts: in particular, leasing land for periods of up to 25 years; encouraging 
private commercial farming; hiring workers; devoting less resources to state farms; 
establishing rural small scale and cottage private industries; and introducing more 
liberal pricing and marketing policies (Financial Times, 12 May 1989). In July, capital 
ceilings were raised for Ethiopians wishing to invest in small-scale industries,195 and 
the government introduced a new joint venture code, which sanctioned the formation of 
joint ventures between the Ethiopian state, state enterprises, financial agencies, 
cooperatives or private capital on the one hand and foreign states, state enterprises, 
financial agencies or private capital, jointly or severally on the other.196 In October, the
194 EC officials, for example, made the release o f $78 million earmarked for Ethiopia contingent upon the 
government's introduction of free-market incentives (The Washington Post, 7 February 1988; Keesing’s, 30 
November 1988).
195 The capital ceilings for individual entrepreneurs and cooperatives/business organisations were raised to 
two million and four million birr, respectively. The total capital invested was limited to four million birr and 
eight million birr, respectively (ETGVT 1989a: 183).
196 The new law incorporated incentives such as the right o f foreign investors to remit any dividends
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Ethiopian government was reported to be in the process of abolishing common
197
farms. Reports obtained from field mission analysts at the time indicated that 
common farms were being divided up and distributed to the growers who worked on 
them and that producers were at liberty to dispose of their shares as they wished.198
Despite the new rhetoric, Mengistu’s administration was reluctant to abandon 
the schemes it had previously advocated for agricultural development. In December 
1987, Ethiopian officials announced plans to change pricing and marketing policies in 
line with the strategies advocated by the World Bank (The Washington Post, 7 February 
1988). Although the government raised some procurement prices (the first rise since 
1980), producers benefited only if they happened to be cultivating one of eleven 
designated crops. Similarly, new directives to restore a free grain market that allowed 
private traders to move grain between regions, reduced mandatory purchase quotas and 
permitted farmers to sell surplus grain on the open market lacked power because the 
AMC still retained a virtual monopoly over the grain market (Associated Press, 28 
January 1988). Although Mengistu announced in November 1988 that restrictions 
would be lifted on private sector investment in all economic sectors and that domestic 
entrepreneurs would be allowed to participate in joint ventures involving foreign 
capitalists, he maintained that the government remained committed to socialist 
principles (Associated Press, 12 November 1988). In 1989, despite the adverse 
criticisms of World Bank officials, Adela Sonesa, President of the Central Council of 
the Ethiopian Peasants’ Association, announced that another 2.7 million people would 
be moved from isolated farms and resettled in new villages. He confirmed that that 
plans for collectivisation were going ahead and that efforts were still being made to 
increase productivity by using the socialist mode of production (Keesing’s, 31 
December, 1989).
received from the activities o f a joint venture, preferential exemptions from certain customs duties and 
income tax exemptions for a five year period (ETGVT 1989b).
1 97 During a field mission to Ethiopia undertaken in January 1990, ICO official Dr Owuzu Akoto was 
informed by Government agents that a decision had been taken in October 1989 to abolish common farms. 
The term ‘common farms’ remained unclarified and could have referred to state farms, cooperatives, or 
large, collective farms situated in resettlement areas (Akoto 1990).
198 In March 1990, President Mengistu (1990:27) confirmed that some cooperatives had been dissolved 
during 1988 and 1989.
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In March 1990, Mengistu’s administration officially abandoned Ethiopia's 
experiment in socialism and replaced it with a mixed economic development package, 
appropriately named the New Economic Policy (NEP). In his March report to the 11th 
plenum of the WPE's Central Committee, Mengistu acknowledged that a model of 
development appropriate for one country could not be replicated in another. He 
explained that socialist prescriptions for Ethiopia’s development had initially seemed 
attractive because both the Soviet Union and China had managed to overcome 
economic backwardness in a very short period of time. As a rationale for change, 
Mengistu explained that trends in the world economic situation over the last 15 years 
had rendered the old-fashioned Soviet-styled strategies of socialist development 
unsuitable for the modem era.199
Mengistu’s new development rhetoric also embraced the notion that state, private 
and cooperative sectors would complement each other and function together 
harmoniously. The main domestic thrust of the new strategy for agricultural 
development was to enable producers to attain higher levels of production in 
accordance with their own choices. To that end the government promised to extend full 
support and encouragement to the private sector.
In theory, Mengistu's NEP incorporated many of the major policy changes 
previously recommended by the World Bank that also happened to resemble the 
strategies advocated by Gorbachev under perestroika. In respect of land-use, peasants 
were accorded security of tenure and acquired ownership rights over crops, plants and 
trees on tenured holdings. Independent farmers also became legally entitled to hire 
labour and to transfer tillage rights to their legal heirs. As regards marketing controls, 
agricultural trade was liberalised, and the Agricultural Marketing Corporation was 
stripped of its special privileges.200 As regards state-owned enterprises - and, by 
inference, all state farms because they were administered as enterprises- management
1 9 9 Mengistu’s justification for the NEP markedly resembled Gorbachev’s earlier rationale for undertaking 
Perestroika and New Thinking. The similarities may have been coincidental, but the care taken by Ethiopian 
officials to discuss the new plan with Soviet officials in Moscow less than a week after the announcement 
clearly indicated Ethiopian intentions not to damage relations with the Soviet Union. (Mengistu 
Hailemariam 1990:47,20,23-24; BBC, SWB, 13 March 1990).
200 Under the NEP, the AMC was supposed to operate on a ffee-market basis. In keeping with the new 
arrangement, grain quotas and movement control posts were to be abolished (Mengistu Hailemariam 
1990:33; WPE 1990:52-53).
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controls were liberalised, and overall performance indicators shifted towards
201assessment based upon profitability. With respect to collectivisation, the voluntary 
aspects of producer cooperative formation and maintenance were stressed. If members 
found their own cooperatives to be unproductive, they could dissolve them by 
agreement and then elect to pursue their trade individually (ETGVT 1990a; Mengistu 
Hailemariam 1990:34-36; WPE 1990:53).
In July 1990, four months after Mengistu’s official announcement of the NEP, 
Ethiopian officials linked the March 1990 reform package to Gorbachev's Perestroika. 
During an interview in the U.S., Ethiopian Cabinet Minister Tesfaye Dinka claimed that 
Mengistu's statements about Ethiopia's socialist transformation had described the 
intentions and the directions Ethiopian elites were going, rather than the actual 
situation. He confirmed that Ethiopian officials were planning a future of private 
enterprise, political competition and reconciliation based upon perestroika. The 
Minister also claimed that Gorbachev's policy of perestroika had helped to influence the 
switch in Ethiopia and that Ethiopian relations with Moscow still remained on good 
terms (Associated Press, July 26-27 1990).
At deeper levels, however, vestiges of the previous agricultural policies were 
carried over into the NEP. This was particularly evident in the retention of extensive 
state control over agricultural matters and the administration's continued interest in 
backing cooperatives as the preferred mechanism for raising agricultural output.
Official prerogatives to intervene actively in the agrarian sector were not fundamentally 
challenged by Mengistu’s reform rhetoric. To begin with, the state still retained sole 
ownership of Ethiopian land, even though independent farmers acquired new tenure 
rights. Second, the state was still expected to play a constructive role in production and 
services, even though greater participation of the private sector was encouraged.
Third, Ethiopian officials reaffirmed their commitment to encourage the establishment 
of large-scale commercial farms by providing government concessions to such 
ventures, even though the NEP emphasised efforts to improve the lot of smallholders.
20 1 Under the NEP, profitability was supposed to become the key ingredient for enterprise survival. 
Unprofitable state-owned enterprises could be leased or sold to private companies, entrepreneurs or 
eventually closed down. The new strategy posed some practical difficulties for unprofitable state farms, 
however, because substantial quantities of the maize grown there were actually used to feed the urban 
population and the Ethiopian army.
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Finally, Mengistu’s administration retained the right to provide support and incentives 
wherever deemed appropriate to the private sector and to cooperatives (ETGVT 1990a; 
Mengistu Hailemariam 1990:33; WPE 1990:52).
Mengistu was also reluctant to abandon the notion that producer cooperatives 
constituted a superior framework for increasing Ethiopia's agrarian output. In 
justification of this position, he argued that producer cooperatives were part of 
Ethiopian tradition and that they had not been copied from socialist models.202 
Mengistu claimed that if  cooperatives were properly organised and efficiently managed, 
they would provide effective solutions for the positive transformation of Ethiopian 
agriculture. Under the NEP, cooperatives were expected to become more democratic 
and grow stronger, but government powers to assist in resolving cooperative-related 
problems were retained (Mengistu Hailemariam 1990:27,34-36; WPE 1990:53).
In concluding this discussion on Mengistu’s preoccupation with collectivisation, 
it is interesting to note that his March 1990 reform package made no provision for the 
fate of the villagisation programme. Consequently, in October 1990, the fate of the 
large numbers of villages already built and the inhabitants living in them, and the 
cultivated areas situated nearby still remained in question. In theory NEP reforms 
advocated the right of villagised peasants to abandon the new villages and return to 
their old farming communities immediately. In practice, the government's promise to 
give peasants secured land-tenure, private ownership of crops and trees and ffee-market 
access only applied to land-holdings as they existed at the time of the March 1990 
proclamation. No provisions were made for peasants to reclaim tillage rights over land 
farmed in the past or to rebuild the old farming villages pulled down in Mengistu's 
villagisation effort. This dilemma caused many peasants to remain in the villages after 
the NEP was introduced. In October 1990, for example, it was reported that most 
people relocated to the new villages were still living in them. In general, residents were 
adopting a wait and see attitude and trying to strengthen their relative positions in 
anticipation of the eventual dissolution of the villagisation programme (Alemayehu
202 The sharp decline in number o f producer cooperatives after the March 1990 reform proclamation, cast 
considerable doubt upon Mengistu's (1990:34-35) claim that producer cooperatives were indigenous. 
Mulugetta Bezzebah (1992:149) estimated that about 250,000 households belonged to about 3,500 producer 
cooperatives at the time of the March proclamation, but only 170 producer cooperatives survived thereafter.
Lirenso 1990:142-143).
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CONCLUSION
In respect of the strategies and structures implemented for agricultural 
development, it is vital to remember that Ethiopia’s ruling elite were borrowers, rather 
than the victims of Soviet officials. Mengistu actually wielded considerable control 
over the way Soviet-styled strategies were implemented and over the structures actually 
selected for emulation.
After the Ethiopian revolution, tactics and policies for agrarian development 
previously utilised by Soviet leaders offered Ethiopia’s military government methods 
for restructuring Haile Selassie’s agricultural sector and changing the social 
stratification of rural society. Centralised structures for administration and planning, 
strategies for product control, clear-cut models of organisation and strategies for 
engineering fast-paced social change were particularly appealing, given the depth of 
agricultural crisis. For these reasons, in particular, Soviet approaches to agricultural 
development influenced the formation of Ethiopian agrarian policy considerably in the 
first decade after the revolution.
To be sure, Ethiopian officials adopted a more conciliatory rhetoric in respect of 
Western development recommendations as agricultural output declined and prospects 
for famine intensified in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, ideas about progressive 
development through centralisation and socialist transformation remained deep-seated. 
Consequently, on the eve of Gorbachev’s rise to power, Mengistu still demonstrated a 
firm resolve to continue the process of socialist transformation in line with the Soviet- 
styled socialist objectives outlined in Ethiopia’s Ten Year Development Plan.
Between 1985 and 1990, Mengistu’s administration may have utilised strategies 
and programmes that resembled old and new schemes advocated by Soviet officials, but 
the selection and implementation of such tactics served the purpose of Ethiopia’s ruling 
elite, rather more than the interests of Gorbachev’s administration. Nevertheless, 
prolonged Soviet rhetorical and logistical support for some of Mengistu’s grandiose 
agricultural schemes prompted Ethiopian officials to divert even more resources to 
dubious farming ventures than they had while Brezhnev was in power.
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Over time, conflicts of interest developed between Soviet and Ethiopian 
officials, as a consequence of Mengistu’s reluctance to jettison all of the strategies for 
socialist development that Gorbachev considered to be outmoded. These difficulties, 
however, were superficially smoothed over when Mengistu officially jettisoned 
Ethiopia’s experiment in socialism in 1990 in favour of liberalisation. In this case, 
however, Ethiopia’s New Economic Policy contained reforms proposed by the World 
Bank that also bore a decided resemblance to the strategies advocated by Gorbachev for 
agricultural reform in the Soviet Union under perestroika.
We have finally to determine the validity of Galtung’s and Ake’s accusation 
that Centre states reduce prospects for self reliance in weak states because of their 
power to persuade bridgeheads to emulate costly and inappropriate foreign 
development models. Did the Soviet Union really reduce Ethiopia’s prospects for 
agrarian development by championing its own development models and persuading 
Mengistu to implement the socialist transformation of the agricultural sector? If 
‘intention’ is crucial to Galtung’s and Ake’s indictment, then available evidence fails to 
support their accusation. Block’s, Holcomb’s and Ibssa’s views that Mengistu’s 
administration was opportunistic and used Soviet models of development to attain its 
own aims are much more realistic. Given the scale of domestic crisis after the 
revolution, for example, Ethiopian officials really did benefit from importing foreign 
development models that could help them to centralise control over the agrarian sector, 
to modernise and to expand agricultural production and to restructure social relations in 
rural areas. At a deeper level, however, Galtung’s and Ake’s accusation still has merit. 
By supporting Mengistu’s efforts to implement costly large-scale, Soviet-styled 
agricultural ventures, Soviet leaders provided the incentive for Ethiopian officials to 
concentrate scarce resources upon large, ambitious agricultural projects, to ignore the 
productive potential of peasant farmers and to disrupt the traditional patterns of social 
relations in rural areas. The adverse impact of this collaboration upon Ethiopia’s 
agricultural development began during Brezhnev’s term of office, persisted for most of 
the Gorbachev era and lingered on after relations between the two sovereign states had 
been divested of any special ties.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC EXCHANGE
INTRODUCTION
During the Brezhnev and Gorbachev periods, Soviet officials continued to 
defend the earlier claim that the Soviet Union’s relationship with Third World 
sovereign states was not imperialistic. Given the powerful status of this huge sovereign 
state in comparison to developing countries at the time, can this claim be valid? One 
can argue, of course, that asymmetric exchange between powerful and weak states 
constitutes the norm in modem times, but is there a point where the unequal balance 
adversely impacts upon the weak state’s long-term prospects for development?
This chapter begins with a brief review of the important arguments presented in 
the preceding chapters about the dynamics of asymmetric exchange demonstrated in the 
Soviet-Ethiopian relationship during the Brezhnev period and then looks at what 
happened after Gorbachev assumed power. I shall then see whether any conclusions 
drawn from the Soviet-Ethiopian case can also be used to explain the Soviet Union’s 
relationships with other non-capitalist states. Finally, I will consider whether or not 
these conclusions can be generalised and used to analyse negative patterns of 
asymmetric exchange in other relationships between strong and weak states.
PART ONE: THE SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONSHIP
In the preceding chapters, some important political, military, economic and 
development concerns about the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship were discussed in order 
to explain the changes that transpired over the fifteen year period. I also wanted to 
determine if the patterns of asymmetric exchange in this particular relationship were 
ultimately more disadvantageous for Ethiopia than they were for the Soviet Union. In 
respect of change, evidence supported my claim that the prevailing interests of ruling 
elites drove the relationship and that major shifts in leadership aims and objectives 
were tolerated only so long as the special relationship remained useful to both parties.
In this particular case, however, the priorities of Ethiopia’s ruling elite played a 
considerable part in shaping the adverse patterns of asymmetry that developed.
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While Brezhnev was in power, the interests of Ethiopia’s ruling elite were 
particularly well served. In an era of intense Soviet-American ideological competition, 
the interests of Soviet and Ethiopian officials remained roughly compatible, and elites 
in both states were able to smooth over quite large differences. The revolutionary 
government was able to take advantage of superpower rivalry to strengthen its control 
over Ethiopian domestic affairs. Politically, the importation of Soviet-styled 
administrative structures and guidelines for Marxist-Leninist vanguard party formation 
facilitated Mengistu’s administrative control over the population more than it provided 
Soviet officials with opportunities to expand political influence in the region. Militarily, 
despite some benefits that accrued to the Soviet Union through the acquisition of 
docking facilities in Eritrean waters, Soviet military advice and arms provision helped 
Ethiopia’s ruling elite to consolidate power over domestic opposition and to establish a 
strong position in the region more than it fulfilled Soviet security objectives in the area. 
Economically, preferential access to key imports and aid for large-scale projects 
deemed essential to Ethiopia’s modernisation initially helped Mengistu to benefit from 
the economic relationship at the expense of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev’s provisions of 
oil and machinery and assistance for building power generation stations were vital to 
the Ethiopians after relations with the United States became hostile. In respect of 
development, centralised structures and strategies for managing agricultural production 
imported from the Soviet Union initially pleased Ethiopian officials because of their 
perceived potential for expanding agricultural production and restructuring the 
production and social bases of rural society.
During Gorbachev’s term in office, ideological competition declined, and 
relations warmed between the Soviet Union and the United States. As a direct 
consequence, the precarious balance of compatibility that had been previously 
sustained in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship shifted. Mengistu’s power to bargain 
declined, and his administration lost its competitive advantage with the Soviet Union. 
Eventually, Soviet and Ethiopian priorities shifted, and national interests came into 
sharp conflict. In this case, a final rupture was avoided, because new ruling elites 
emerged in Ethiopia, and Soviet officials were able to establish relations with the new 
administration on a non-partial basis.
In respect of asymmetric exchange, negative patterns were set in motion during 
Brezhnev’s tenure in power that adversely affected prospects for Ethiopia’s long-term 
development. These persisted in the Gorbachev era, despite serious efforts made by
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Soviet officials under New Thinking to restructure relations with Mengistu’s 
administration on a de-ideologised basis.
In respect of political relations (Chapter Three), the question of Soviet influence 
over Ethiopian affairs is complex and not nearly so straight-forward as Galtung’s 
analysis of Center-Periphery relations would have us believe. After the revolution, 
Ethiopian elites were particularly anxious to form close political ties with the Soviet 
Union, because relations with the United States were deteriorating rapidly. Soviet 
interests in Ethiopia, on the other hand, only intensified after Ethiopian officials agreed 
to adopt scientific socialism as the way forward. During the Brezhnev era, political 
relations improved significantly between the two countries. This was due in 
considerable part to Mengistu’s decision to restructure the Ethiopian government by 
introducing Soviet-styled, centralised administrative structures aimed at strengthening 
state control over the population. His choice to establish a national party in Ethiopia 
that structurally conformed to the CPSU’s guideline for Marxist-Leninist vanguard 
parties also increased the level of official Soviet support for his military regime. In the 
Soviet-Ethiopian case, however, Mengistu’s reliance upon Soviet-styled organisational 
structures did not facilitate prospects for cultural penetration by the Soviet Union. 
Instead, the political interests of Ethiopian officials (the bridgehead in this instance) 
were secured by strengthening the government’s control over the population.
At the beginning of Gorbachev’s administration, Soviet-Ethiopian political 
relations strengthened, chiefly as a consequence of Mengistu’s decision to transform 
the military government into a civilian administration and to turn Ethiopia into an 
official socialist-oriented state. In the two years preceding the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia’s (PDRE) official inauguration, the argument for Soviet 
intervention gained considerable ground. The Soviet constitution of 1977 served as the 
model for Ethiopia’s 1987 constitution, similarities increased between Soviet and 
Ethiopian government and party structures, and CPSU officials gave considerable 
importance to the strengthening of party ties with the WPE.
The level of political compatibility between Soviet and Ethiopian officials 
declined markedly, however, after Mengistu’s official inauguration as president of the 
PDRE in September 1987. Soviet and Ethiopian interests diverged, as New Thinking 
deepened and Soviet-American relations improved. Nevertheless, two particularly 
important asymmetries associated with the Soviet Union that had been set in place in 
the Brezhnev era still persisted. First, Gorbachev’s endorsement of Mengistu’s efforts
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to incorporate Soviet-styled political and party structures in the PDRE in 1987 
subsequently reduced Ethiopian prospects for establishing . a more liberal civilian 
administration capable of accommodating the interests of ethnically and religiously 
diverse citizens. Second, Gorbachev’s decision to continue official political backing for 
Mengistu’s administration until the Ethiopian president’s resignation, despite certain 
knowledge of his repressive domestic policies, helped to prolong the political power of 
one group of Ethiopian elites at the expense of others. In June 1991, however, 
Gorbachev remedied this particular defect, by agreeing to encourage constmctive 
dialogue with all politically active and influential forces in Ethiopia.
Although more apparent in some respects, asymmetry in the Soviet-Ethiopian 
military relationship (Chapter Four) demonstrates considerable complexity as well. 
Without the assistance of Soviet advisors, arms and equipment and Cuban troops, 
Ethiopian officials could not have prevented Somali incursions over the border into the 
Ogaden in 1977. The Soviet Union, however, continued to provide substantial military 
assistance to Mengistu’s administration for many years thereafter, even though the 
cross-border problem had been resolved. Does this mean that arms provision benefited 
officials in the Soviet Union more than the ruling elite in Ethiopia? In 1987, Ethiopian 
Unity claimed that Ethiopia had become a dumping ground for second rate Soviet 
weapons, but this was not always the case. The reality was more in line with Wendt’s 
and Barrett’s prediction (Chapter Two) that ruling elites in Third World States would 
want to acquire more modem, technologically advanced weaponry for their arsenal and 
that heads of state would willingly divert scarce resources from where they were 
needed in order to modernise the military establishment. In this case, the Soviet Union, 
as the main arms provider, was willing to comply with Mengistu’s request for a time. 
Eventually, however, the costs of supply became too high for Gorbachev’s 
administration.
Another factor to consider when assessing asymmetry in the military 
relationship is whether there is any merit to the Ethiopian Unity’s claim that Soviet 
officials were able to direct the course of Mengistu’s military policy because of their 
power to supply arms and equipment. Evidence fails to support this charge. Mengistu 
continued to use Soviet arms to defeat Eritrean and Tigrean opposition forces, for 
example, despite Gorbachev’s severe disapproval of the Ethiopian’s government’s 
military operations. In the Soviet-Ethiopian case, reality is much closer to Marina 
Ottaway’s prediction (Chapter Two) that leaders of powerful states would exert a
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limited influence over security affairs in the Horn region unless their goals happened to 
be compatible with the aims of local ruling elites.
Two patterns of asymmetric exchange demonstrated in the military relationship 
are important to consider, however, because they negatively affected prospects for 
Ethiopia’s future development. Evidence collected does support the claim that the 
Soviet Union, regardless of intention, intervened unduly in Ethiopian affairs by 
providing military support that artificially prolonged the political life of one group of 
Ethiopian ruling elites and facilitated prospects for internal fragmentation and wanton 
destruction within Ethiopia. Moreover, the capture of weapons and military equipment 
provided by the Soviet Union allowed militant Eritrean and Ethiopian opposition 
forces, as well as Ethiopia’s ruling elite, to develop an undue reliance upon military 
solutions to resolve regional and local problems.
The adverse impact of asymmetric exchange demonstrated in the Soviet- 
Ethiopian economic relationship (Chapter Five) has generally been underrated, and it 
has turned out to be a great deal more complex than writers like Galtung and Ake 
predicted. To begin with, negative patterns in trade relations were partially obscured 
by the fact that the bulk of Ethiopia’s export trade always remained oriented towards 
the West. Most of the goods deemed to be essential for Ethiopia’s industrial 
modernisation and military independence, however, were imported from the Soviet 
Union. Evidence indicates that Mengistu became reliant upon Soviet imports of oil, 
industrial products, machinery and transport goods while Brezhnev was still in power, 
because preferential arrangements existed at that time in respect of pricing and supply. 
The Ethiopian leader’s dependence upon Soviet imports persisted throughout most of 
the New Thinking era, however, even after Gorbachev eliminated preferential trade 
benefits in an effort to cut economic losses in foreign trade sustained by the Soviet 
Union.
Complexities also prevail, when one tries to assess the extent that the Soviet 
Union’s rather low provision of humanitarian and development assistance to 
Mengistu’s administration adversely affected the Ethiopian population. Although the 
evidence does vindicate Ethiopian Unity’s claim that the Soviet Union provided very 
little food relief in the 1984/1985 famine, Soviet officials actually provided a 
substantial amount of logistical support for food aid distribution, even though this 
method of assistance was greatly underrated by Western donors at the time. Its value 
was only recognised three years later, when Gorbachev’s large food gift arrived in
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Ethiopia without any logistical provisions. Accusations were also made that Soviet 
officials funded large-scale projects in Ethiopia that were inappropriate and hindered 
the country’s prospects for economic development in Gorbachev’s time, as well as in 
Brezhnev’s day. Evidence provided by World Bank officials, however, suggested that 
Ethiopian officials exercised substantial control over the selection of project funded by 
the Soviet Union.
The adverse impact of asymmetric exchange becomes clearer when the effect of 
Mengistu’s indebtedness to the Soviet Union is considered. In this case, however, the 
decisions made by Ethiopia’s ruling elite played a vital part in creating the negative 
conditions of asymmetry that developed, particularly in respect of excessive military 
spending. During most of Brezhnev’s time in power, Ethiopia’s debt to the Soviet 
Union remained relatively modest, as compared to the money owed to the most 
important western multilateral and bilateral creditors. In the years immediately 
preceding Gorbachev’s rise to power, Ethiopia’s indebtedness to Soviet officials 
increased markedly, largely as a consequence of Mengistu’s substantial military 
campaigns against Eritrean and Tigrayan resistance groups. This trend persisted 
throughout the New Thinking era. In 1990, for example, Soviet officials claimed that 
Mengistu’s administration owed almost three billion roubles, or eight percent of the 
outstanding debt owed to the Soviet Union by developing countries. Two years later, 
Russian officials estimated that Ethiopia’s new government owed nine million dollars 
to the Russian Federation. Of that amount, Mengistu’s debts for military spending 
accounted for about 90% of the total.
As a consequence of Mengistu’s excessive indebtedness, the Soviet Union 
limited Ethiopian expenditures in certain key areas. This adversely impacted upon 
Ethiopia’s domestic environment in three ways. First, as Mengistu’s debts increased, 
Soviet officials reduced assistance for large-scale development projects aimed at 
modernising Ethiopia’s industrial and agricultural sectors, and Ethiopians lost the 
benefit of Soviet technological expertise, spare parts and other goods needed for project 
completion and repair. Second, the cumulative debts accrued in purchasing Soviet 
military goods and services eventually overwhelmed Mengistu’s government and 
increased prospects for domestic instability. As military provisions dried up, his 
administration was no longer able to prevent various militant opposition forces from 
taking over the country. Finally, Mengistu’s debt to the Soviet Union survived the fall 
of both governments in 1991 to become an issue of future concern for the Ethiopian
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population, because Russian officials confirmed that they still expected Ethiopians to 
repay the Mengistu’s debts to the Soviet Union.
In Chapter Six, the issue of Soviet influence over Ethiopian strategies for 
agricultural development was examined. The main aim here was to determine whether 
Galtung’s and Ake’s claims that powerful states adversely affected prospects for 
progress in weak states by virtue of their power to shape the course of development 
had any merit in the Soviet-Ethiopian case. I argued in Chapter Two that positive 
evidence of Soviet influence over Ethiopian strategies for agricultural development 
would be obscured by replication, showcasing and interpretation. Evidence 
subsequently collected confirmed that this was so. In the case of replication, which 
embraced Galtung’s idea of isomorphism, agricultural systems in the Soviet Union and 
Ethiopia may have demonstrated some similarities, but they really were different in 
respect of time, geography and social order. This makes it difficult to assess the degree 
to which Soviet officials actually influenced Ethiopian policies. Showcasing, which 
embraced Holcomb’s and Ibssa’s idea that Ethiopian leaders had traditionally produced 
carefully designed programmes on paper aimed at securing the good will and support of 
powerful allies that were only facades used to mask their own policy intentions, also 
complicated the issue, given Mengistu’s decision in 1990 to opt for reform and the 
close resemblance between World Bank prescriptions for agricultural progress and 
Gorbachev’s plans for agrarian reform in the Soviet Union. Interpretation complicated 
assessments even further. On the one hand, analysts like Henze and Dessalegn 
Rahmato acknowledged that links existed between Soviet and Ethiopian agricultural 
policies, even though they remained unwilling to accuse the Soviet Union of direct 
intervention in policy formation. On the other hand, Holcomb and Ibssa ignored Soviet 
connections altogether. They maintained that Mengistu’s strategies for resettlement 
represented a continuation of tactics that had been used by Ethiopian leaders in the past 
to control land and labour.
Assessments of the actual degree of influence exercised by Soviet officials over 
Mengistu’s agricultural policy may be difficult to render, but the evidence does support 
the claim that Ethiopia’s ruling elite were borrowers, rather than the victims of Soviet 
officials. Mengistu wielded considerable control over the selection and adaptation of 
the models that he emulated. In Brezhnev’s time, Ethiopian officials introduced 
centralised structures for administration and planning, strategies for product control, 
models of farming organisation and collectivisation that resembled some of the tactics
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and strategies used by Soviet leaders in the past, because they wanted to strengthen the 
government’s control over the agrarian sector and to sweep away the old hierarchical, 
rural social order. They also envisaged that the new socialist reforms would modernise 
the agrarian sector and expand agricultural production.
Ethiopian efforts to incorporate some Soviet-styled strategies and structures into 
their own plans for agricultural reorganisation were marginally successful in managing 
crisis, but fell short in long-term development planning. Tactics for sweeping away 
powerful landholders that had been used by Soviet leaders after the Russian revolution 
helped to reduce the same problem in Ethiopia. Strategies aimed at strengthening the 
government’s control over the production, distribution and export of essential 
commodities like grain and coffee also facilitated the development of centralised 
agricultural policies. Despite successes in these two areas, however, Soviet-styled 
strategies for agriculture reform failed to expand agricultural production in Ethiopia in 
the first decade after the revolution.
Mengistu continued to pursue agricultural policies along socialist lines after 
Gorbachev assumed power, and, apart from the occasional disapproval of some of his 
tactics, Soviet officials continued to support his efforts in this direction. In the late 
1980s, however, Ethiopia’s ruling elite finally succumbed to financial pressures and 
introduced reforms advocated by the World Bank that also resembled the strategies 
advocated by Gorbachev under perestroika. Although Mengistu officially relinquished 
ambitions to create a socialist agricultural sector in 1990, he demonstrated considerable 
reluctance to jettison entirely the Soviet-styled strategies and structures for agricultural 
development that he had used to reorganise Ethiopia’s agricultural sector after the 
revolution.
Discussions about Soviet influence over Ethiopian strategies for agricultural 
development thus far have focused upon problems inherent in assessment and upon the 
important part Ethiopian elites played in model selection and adaptation. Can there still 
be merit in the accusation that Soviet influence upon Ethiopia’s agricultural reform 
efforts adversely affected Ethiopia’s long-term prospects for development? The 
evidence indicates that the answer is yes. In this particular case, Moscow’s support for 
large-scale agricultural projects in Ethiopia provided Mengistu’s administration with a 
justification for overspending and diverting scarce resources away from where they 
were most needed.
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The analyses of interests and assessments of asymmetric exchange presented 
thus far have worked tolerably well in respect of explaining Soviet-Ethiopian relations. 
In the following section, I shall argue that they can also be used to explain asymmetric 
exchange in the Soviet Union’s relationship with other friendly, non-capitalist Third 
World countries.
PART TWO: SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER NON-CAPITALIST STATES
In the next few pages, political, military, economic and development issues 
arising in respect of the Soviet Union’s relationship with Angola, Mozambique and 
Cuba are examined. Angola and Mozambique provide a basis for comparing Soviet 
relationships with other socialist-oriented states in Africa, and, although the 
backgrounds of these two countries differ appreciably from Ethiopia in respect of their 
long historical pasts as Portuguese colonies, their relationship with the Soviet Union 
demonstrates some similarities. Cuba must also be considered because it was rated 
highly as a socialist developing country, granted CMEA full status and represented the 
best of what socialist-oriented states could hope to gain from their relationships with 
the Soviet Union. Cuba is particularly interesting because Fidel Castro experienced 
first hand the benefits and costs associated with maintaining very close ties with Soviet 
party and government officials.
Political Relations.
Did the Soviet Union unduly influence political developments in non-capitalist 
states other than Ethiopia by virtue of its power to provide full political support and 
artificially prolong the life of one particular coalition in power? Evidence suggests that 
although situations varied, Soviet officials often seemed to exercise some power in this 
respect, primarily because of their willingness to provide certain local elites with 
military support. This was so particularly before Gorbachev assumed power. During the 
New Thinking era, however, local elites who had maintained power in this way became 
extremely vulnerable to threats posed by rival contenders for power, especially after 
Gorbachev decided to downgrade military support.
Angola was engaged in a civil war, even before its independence from Portugal 
in 1975. The Marxist-oriented People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
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(MPLA) had received Soviet aid since 1961 and aimed to secure control of the country 
by defeating the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In 1976, the MPLA, led by 
Agostinho Neto, became the legal government of Angola, but only after the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Western European states had accorded 
recognition. In October 1976, Soviet and Angolan leaders signed the Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, and a cooperative agreement between the MPLA and the 
CPSU was concluded. Subsequently the MPLA became the MPLA Party of Labour 
(MPLA-PL), and called itself a vanguard party. After Gorbachev assumed power, the 
Soviet Union continued to support the MPLA-PL politically and to condemn the 
activities of UNIT A (supported by the United States) and South African forces, despite 
the complex positions of local rivals and the violent scale of the conflict. In 1987, 
Soviet officials still maintained that the MPLA should not attempt to compromise 
politically with UNITA.
In the late 1980s, however, Gorbachev’s position on the resolution of internal 
conflict in Angola changed, as it did in Ethiopia. In December 1988, with the help of 
Soviet and American officials, Angolan, Cuban and South African leaders agreed to 
withdraw Cuban troops from Angola and to grant Namibia independence. In June 1989, 
largely as a consequence of Soviet efforts, MPLA and the UNITA officials also signed 
a cease-fire agreement. In December 1990, Shevardnadze met with UNITA leader 
Jonas Savimbi for the first time to discuss further prospects for reconcilliation (Tolz 
1992:778). In that same month, eight months after Mengistu had launched his political 
reform, the MPLA CC embraced the concept of a multi-party system and adopted a 
programme aimed at political liberalisation. In the summer of 1991, in response to a 
complex combination of mounting internal and external pressures, MPLA officials 
finally abandoned adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles (Webber 1992:133).
In Angola, as in Ethiopia, it is difficult to assess the political power or influence 
that Soviet officials really had over keeping one particular set of local ruling elites in 
power. As in Ethiopia, however, the power of Soviet officials to prolong artificially the 
political life of one group of ruling elites over others in Angola seems to have been 
linked directly to the rise and decline of Moscow’s willingness to supply military 
assistance to one particular group in power.
Formed in 1962, the National Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
(Frelimo) fought for independence from Portugal. Party efforts were supported both by
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Chinese and Soviet officials for a time, but Chinese support dropped out, as Sino- 
Soviet relations declined. Under the leadership of Samora Machel, Frelimo assumed 
legal political control after Mozambique became a sovereign state in 1975. In March 
1977, party officials concluded a 20 year Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, and 
declared Frelimo a vanguard party. By 1980, Mozambique seemed to be moving into 
the Soviet orbit (Hall and Young 1997:140).
Although Frelimo continued to advocate Marxist-Leninist strategies from 
independence to the late 1980s, Mozambique’s ruling elite, like Angolan and Ethiopian 
officials, had their own priorities and agendas. In particular, modernisation along 
socialist lines ranked high on the domestic front, and helping insurgent groups in the 
fight to end white supremacy in Rhodesia was an especially important regional 
objective. In Mozambique, as in Ethiopia and Angola, however, government efforts to 
realise key priorities were impeded by the growth in the power of internal resistance. In 
particular, The Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) gained 
substantial political ground in the 1980s.
Unlike the situation in Ethiopia, however, a change of political leadership in 
Mozambique during the early early Gorbachev years also facilitated a shift in Frelimo’s 
position on the viability of long-term military conflict with Renamo. Although 
Joaquim Chissano’s more conciliatory approach may have been more in keeping with 
Gorbachev’s recommendations for the peaceful resolution of differences, evidence does 
not support the claim that the Soviet Union was largely responsible for Chissano’s 
decision to conclude a peace settlement with Renamo. In July 1989, about the same 
time talks were taking place between Eritrean and Ethiopian officials, President 
Chissano announced plans to open negotiations with Renamo. Although conflicts 
between the two parties continued until October 1992, the two leaders finally signed a 
peace agreement, largely due to the mediation efforts of the Catholic Church and the 
governments of Italy, Zimbabwe and Kenya.
Ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba go back much further. Nevertheless, 
the reasons behind the start of their close political relationship were in some ways 
similar to Ethiopia. Before the 1959 revolution, relations between Cuba and the United 
States were cordial, and the Cuban economy thrived. Castro’s nationalisation of 
foreign industries evoked considerable American hostility, and his subsequent decision 
to embrace Marxist-Leninist ideology effectively severed economic relations between 
the two countries. Because Cuba had become too economically dependent upon the
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United States, Castro could only preserve his new order if he established close ties with 
a powerful Cold War competitor like the Soviet Union. By improving relations with 
Cuba, Soviet officials gained new opportunities for expanding socialism in an area 
heavily dominated by American military and economic interests. Although Soviet and 
Cuban officials shared some mutual interests, their differences sometimes led to 
friction. Castro, for example, who maintained an aggressive stance in the non-aligned 
movement for many years, professed more interest in reducing North-South differences 
than in redressing negative socialist balances in the East-West correlation of forces. 
Unlike Soviet officials, he also believed in exporting revolution.
Cuba remained politically important to the Soviet Union and was considered to 
be the model Third World socialist state for a number of years. This was probably due 
in large part to Castro’s ability to retain sufficient political support in his own country 
in the face of considerable American opposition. During Gorbachev’s tenure in power, 
however, compatibility levels in the political relationship declined. Castro retained his 
conservative socialist perspectives and refused to endorse the new reform efforts taking 
place in the Soviet Union. In 1989, however, Gorbachev and Castro signed a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation that made no provision for mutual security and stipulated 
that regional conflicts should be resolved through political means, without military 
force (Shearman 1993:181). Differences may have increased between Soviet and 
Cuban officials, but diplomatic ties remained intact until the Soviet Union’s formal 
dissolution.
In this case, more evidence is needed to support the accusation that the Soviet 
Union artificially prolonged the political life of one group of ruling elites through the 
provision of military support. Although one could argue that the Soviet Union probably 
helped to secure Castro’s position and to prevent an American invasion of Cuban 
territory in the Cold War era, his very long tenure in office indicates that he also 
retained some credibility at home.
Military Relations.
Did the provision of Soviet military assistance to friendly, non-capitalist states 
other than Ethiopia actually increase prospects for conflict and fragmentation by 
allowing government and opposition officials to develop an undue reliance upon 
military solutions? Evidence about Soviet military relations with Angola, Mozambique
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and Cuba in the Brezhnev and Gorbachev periods indicate that this accusation is true 
and completely warranted, regardless of what Soviet officials may have intended.
In 1975, Soviet-Angolan military relations were strengthened when South 
African troops invaded Angola in support of an FNLA-UNITA offensive. As a direct 
consequence of Brezhnev’s arms provision and over 11,000 Cuban troops, the MPLA 
was able to defeat the FNLA and UNITA and to drive South African troops back to the 
Namibian border in March 1976, just six months before party officials signed the 
Soviet-Angolan Friendship Treaty. Thereafter, the Soviet Union became Angola’s chief 
arms supplier, providing weapons similar in character to the arms provided to Ethiopia 
after November 1977, including MiG-23 Floggers and Mi-25 Hind Gunship 
Helicopters and the whole range of Soviet surface-to-air missiles (from SA-2 to SA-13) 
with integrated early-warning radar systems (Alexiev 1988: 151). Training provisions 
for the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola were provided as well.
The value of Soviet arms provided to the MPLA before Gorbachev assumed power 
remains a matter for debate, but one estimate made of shipments in 1984-1985 was 
about two billion dollars (Alexiev 1988:151).
In 1985, shortly after Gorbachev’s assumed power, the MPLA forces were 
assisted by Soviet officials in an unsuccessful bid to defeat UNITA. This, in turn, in 
1986, caused American officials to extend $15 million in covert military support to 
UNITA officials (Alexiev 1988:152). As a direct consequence of foreign military 
support, MPLA and UNITA leaders resorted increasingly to military means. The level 
of Soviet military assistance declined under New Thinking, but Soviet arms provision 
to the Angolan government continued, despite Gorbachev’s increasing emphasis on the 
political resolution of MPLA-PL and UNITA differences. Over the period 1975-1990, 
for example, the Soviet Union provided 90 percent of Angolan arms imports, with an 
estimated value of one billion dollars per year. In addition, between 1980-1987, 20,000 
to 30,000 Cuban troops assisted MPLA forces in their unsuccessful efforts to destroy 
UNITA (Webber 1992:137-138). Over time, however, both MPLA and UNITA forces 
developed an undue reliance upon military solutions, as a consequence of foreign arms 
provision, and the devastating struggle between local elites for national power carried 
on.
Soviet officials also provided Mozambique’s Frelimo government with a 
substantial level of costly military assistance to help them fight against Renamo’s 
attempt to take over the country. In the mid-1980s, Soviet arms shipment costs, which
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included expensive arms like assault helicopters and jet fighters, were estimated at 
about one billion dollars (Henriksen 1988:172). Before the decade was over, military 
assistance provided by the Soviet Union and South Africa to facilitate the competing 
security interests of Frelimo and Renamo officials had facilitated the deaths of 600,000-
700,000 Mozambicans (Duncan 1990:181). In 1989, however, Gorbachev announced 
plans to withdraw all Soviet military advisors from Mozambique by the end of 1990, 
and Cuban military advisors (estimated at 400-600 in 1987) left the country (Duncan 
1990:181). Thereafter, the level of Soviet arms provision declined. In the case of 
Mozambique, Soviet arms provision facilitated Frelimo’s undue reliance upon military 
solutions for the resolution of internal differences, which, in turn, fostered Renamo’s 
dependence upon South African military provision, thereby increasing prospects for 
destruction and fragmentation within Mozambique that spread throughout the region.
In terms of Soviet-Cuban military relations, collaborative ventures undertaken 
in Angola and Ethiopia between 1975 and 1990, as well as Soviet arms provision to 
Castro’s administration have a direct bearing on the accusation currently under 
examination. In the 1970s, Castro still believed that national liberation movements 
seeking independence should receive military support. To achieve these ends, he sent 
many Cuban troops and military advisors to serve in Angola, Mozambique and 
Ethiopia in the 1970s and early 1980s. To assist him in these endeavours, Soviet 
officials guaranteed Castro’s access to abundant quantities of free military supplies. His 
interventions into other countries were particularly successful in Brezhnev’s time, 
because he gained the support of local elites and Soviet officials. During Gorbachev’s 
tenure in office, local elites in Africa that had been previously supported by Castro’s 
military establishment became increasingly vulnerable to armed attack launched by 
insurgent groups. This had serious implications for military relations between the 
Soviet Union and Cuba, because insurgents could also claim to be waging wars of 
national liberation. As Soviet-American relations warmed, Soviet-Cuban military 
collaboration declined. Although some MiG-29s were shipped to Cuba in 1988-1989, 
Gorbachev reduced military provisions substantially during the final years of his 
administration (Shearman 1993:186).
For a long period of time, Castro was able to upgrade his existing military 
arsenal as a consequence of access to the latest Soviet military weaponry. He became 
unduly reliant upon one supplier, however, and security concerns about the prospects of 
American intervention once again resurfaced when these provisions dried up. In some
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respects, the accusation that Soviet military assistance increased prospects for internal 
conflict and fragmentation did not seem to be particularly applicable to Cuba. Castro 
survived the demise of the Soviet Union, and information about Cuban opposition 
groups in the ten years that have elapsed since then has remained elusive. In the Cuban 
case, however, the accusation must be expanded to take into account the damages that 
were sustained internally by countries such as Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, as a 
consequence of Castro’s direct military intervention. He could not have implemented 
his strategy, however, without access to the modem weaponry provided by the Soviet 
Union. Consequently, there is no doubt that whatever the intention, Soviet and Cuban 
military support facilitated prospects for internal conflict and fragmentation within 
Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique.
Economic Relations.
Did Soviet economic relations with other friendly, non-capitalist states 
disadvantage their long-term prospects for economic progress and prosperity? Evidence 
about Soviet economic relations with Angola, Mozambique and Cuba in the Brezhnev 
and Gorbachev periods indicate that this accusation has some validity, particularly in 
respect of trade and debt, regardless of what Soviet officials may have intended. On 
the other hand, claims that the Soviet Union adversely affected economic development 
in Third World states because mling elites were forced to adopt Soviet-styled strategies 
and structures aimed at economic centralisation are not so convincing. Local mling 
elites in these three sovereign states also exercised considerable control over the 
selection, adaptation, implementation and rejection of the models that they emulated.
Soviet economic relations with Angola, like Ethiopia, were relatively 
insignificant, compared to the trade relations established with the West. However, the 
patterns of trade that ultimately formed substantially increased prospects for the 
MPLA’s substantial indebtedness to the Soviet Union. During the special relationship, 
wide gaps developed between the value of Soviet goods imported into Angola (which 
undoubtedly included military provisions) and Angolan goods exported to the Soviet 
Union, just as they had in Ethiopia. Over time, this differential resulted in a serious 
debt problem for Angola. In 1977, for example, Soviet imports to Angola accounted 
for 69.2 million roubles or about 86 percent of the trade turnover figure. By 1983, the 
total trade turnover figure recorded between the two countries had risen sharply to
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173.1 million roubles. Of this amount, Angolan imports of Soviet goods increased to 
98 percent of the total trade figure (Light 1993:197, table 8.2). Although trade between 
the two countries declined during Gorbachev’s tenure in power, the unbalanced pattern 
of trade distribution remained. In 1986 and 1987, for example Soviet goods accounted 
for 98% of the 158.2 and 115.9 million roubles recorded for each period. In 1990, 
Soviet imports still accounted for 96% of the 59.6 million roubles trade turnover (Light 
1993:205, table 8.5).
In contrast to Ethiopia, Mozambique and Cuba, Angola did not have to rely 
upon Soviet petroleum provisions because of its considerable oil reserves. However, a 
substantial percentage of the profits accrued in petroleum sales to Western buyers was 
evidently used to repay debts owed to the Soviet Union. For example, in 1987, Angolan 
officials were informed that their debt to the Soviet Union had reached 4.5 billion 
roubles and that the amount owed was increasing by about 23 percent each 
year.(Belikov 1993:74) By January 1990, however, Gorbachev’s administration listed 
Angola’s official outstanding debt at only 2.029 billion roubles (Belikov 1993:74), 
considerably less than the 2.8 billion roubles debt reported for Ethiopia in November 
1989.
In respect of economic planning, Angolan officials also introduced 
nationalisation and other socialist measures during the Brezhnev era, and their efforts to 
increase government control over economic planning, production and distribution 
persisted well into the Gorbachev period. In 1976, the MPLA introduced policies aimed 
at full-scale nationalisation. By 1980 the Angolan government controlled 71 percent of 
all companies and 83 percent of the workforce (Alexiev 1988:149). During the 1980s, 
domestic economic conditions declined dramatically, as a consequence of continuous 
civil war and the poor economic performance associated with the centralised structures. 
In 1988, the MPLA introduced an economic recovery programme known as 
Saneamento Economico e Financiero (SEF), which aimed to regenerate the private 
sector. In September 1990, a more radical reform programme known as the Plan of 
Action was enacted that advocated the privatisation of all non-strategic state industries 
(Webber 1992:135-136). Although Angolan officials, like Ethiopian ruling elites, 
subsequently acknowledged that a resemblance existed between their new reform 
programmes and Gorbachev’s perestroika, their rationale for selection in the 1990s was 
driven more by the necessity to redress domestic economic adversities and to reduce
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foreign indebtedness than by Soviet pressures to restructure Angola’s economic 
policies in accordance with the strategies advocated under perestroika.
Economic relations with the Soviet Union also adversely affected 
Mozambique’s prospects for prosperity. Mozambique, like Ethiopia, incurred a heavy 
debt as a consequence of military overspending and remained totally dependent upon 
the Soviet Union for all of its liquid fuel requirements. In 1984, Frelimo and South 
African officials signed the Nkomati Accords, under which both sets of ruling elite 
agreed not to sponsor further cross border insurgency (Henriksen 1988:174). Although 
Western countries welcomed this action and prospects for trade looked promising, 
Frelimo actually strengthened economic ties with the Soviet Union during the first 
months of Gorbachev’s administration. In May 1985, for example, Soviet officials 
agreed to provide $11.7 million in consumer goods in exchange for Mozambican 
agricultural products to assist in developing the Moatise coal deposit mining 
infrastructure, to develop rail lines to the port of Beira, to supply fishing equipment 
and to repair machinery for merchant ships (Henriksen 1988:175). In addition, Frelimo 
officials concluded a cooperation agreement with the CMEA. Despite this positive 
beginning, the costs incurred in Soviet military, trading and development provisions 
continued to mount during the New Thinking era. In November 1989, Mozambique’s 
total debt to the Soviet Union was estimated at 808.6 million roubles (Izvestiya, 1 
March 1990).
In respect of economic planning, the Mozambican government also introduced 
Soviet-styled socialist measures aimed at centralising economic strategies and 
structures during the Brezhnev era. Frelimo aimed to make heavy industry a high 
priority, and the manufacture of tractors was deemed to be particularly important. As in 
Angola and Ethiopia, however, the targets envisaged by Mozambique’s ruling elite 
were overly ambitious. To begin with, Frelimo’s firm commitment to end white 
supremacy in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and to harbour insurgent groups exerted an 
additional strain upon the fragile economy that could not really be blamed upon Soviet 
officials. Between 1976 and 1980, for example, Frelimo lost $600 million in hard 
currency from applying United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia, plus an additional $20 
million in remittances from Mozambicans working there (Henriksen 1988:173). In 
addition, by allowing Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) to 
establish sanctuary camps for attacking Rhodesia, Mozambique’s economic 
infrastructure became a primary target for Rhodesian retaliation. Finally,
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Mozambicans, like Ethiopians, had to cope with major famines in 1982-84 and 1986- 
87.
Chissano introduced the Programme of Economic Reabilitation (PER) in 1987. 
That programme contained proposals for the decentralisation of economic management 
which resembled the reforms introduced by Mengistu in November of the same year. 
The PRE subsequently formed the basis for Frelimo negogiations with the IMF and the 
World Bank, and, in March 1987, the IMF released a structural adjustment facility 
worth $51 million and the World Bank extended a package worth $106 mn (Hall and 
Young 1997:197). Given Mozambique’s massive need for external assistance, Frelimo 
really had no alternative in 1989 but to renounce formally Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
and to restructure political and economic policies along the lines recommended by 
powerful capitalist donors.
Although a different pattern emerged in respect of Soviet-Cuban economic 
relations, a negative impact on Cuba’s economic prosperity over time was still 
sustained, as a consequence of Castro’s economic dependence upon the Soviet Union. 
Cuba’s trade depended heavily upon trade with the United States in the decades before 
the 1959 revolution (69% of the total), and in the mid-1970s, a similar dependency on 
trade developed in respect of the Soviet Union (also 69% of the total) (Shearman 
1993:173). During Brezhnev’s term in office, Cuba benefited substantially from its 
economic relationship with the Soviet Union. In 1972, Cuba became the first state 
outside of the Soviet Union’s direct orbit to be admitted to the CMEA, and, as an initial 
sign of good will, Soviet and Cuban officials concluded some very important new 
economic bilateral agreements. First, Soviet officials refinanced Cuba’s debt and 
deferred repayments until 1986, with interest-free credit for twenty-five years. Second, 
Soviet officials raised the purchase prices of Cuban sugar and nickel. Finally, Castro 
received a further 300 million roubles in credit to develop Cuban industry. Of this 
amount, 81 million roubles were earmarked for the textile industry, 52 million for 
electricity and 35 million for railway transportation (Shearman 1993:172-173). In 
addition to all of these benefits, the Soviet Union provided Castro with 98 percent of its 
oil imports at preferential prices. After Brezhnev’s death, Cuban dependence upon 
trade with socialist countries continued to rise, accounting for about 86.8% of the total 
trade in 1982. This same proportion persisted through the early years of Gorbachev’s 
administration, reaching a high of 88.3 percent of the total in 1987 (Duncan 1990:203).
I l l
In the New Thinking period, the Cuban economy was adversely affected by 
Gorbachev’s new emphasis on cost effectiveness. In 1986, Soviet officials lowered 
Cuba’s sugar subsidy from 45 cents per pound (1985) to 38 cents. In 1987, Soviet oil 
deliveries to Cuba declined from seven million tons (1986) to 6.7 million tons, and oil 
rationing had to be introduced. To make matters worse, Cuban officials also had to pay 
higher prices for the oil they obtained because the agreements had been concluded 
before the world market price dropped (Duncan 1990:203). In 1989, Gorbachev 
became increasingly dissatisfied with Castro’s economic policies and his use of Soviet 
development funds, and, in 1990, estimates that Cuba still owed over 15 billion roubles 
(Izvestia 1 March 1990) or 80% of the total Third World debt still owed to the Soviet 
Union alienated Gorbachev’s administration even further. In the same year, Cuban 
trading activities in the CMEA came to an end, and Soviet officials cut oil supplies by 
20 percent (Tolz 1992:704). In 1991, Cuba suffered even more after Soviet-Cuban 
trade switched to a hard currency basis. In the new equation Soviet oil and Cuban sugar 
were to be valued and traded at world market prices. Over time, Cuba’s economic 
dependence upon the Soviet Union adversely affected the population’s prospects for 
prosperity and self-reliance.
Under the CMEA Charter, Castro was obligated to co-ordinate his domestic 
economic plans with the centralised systems in place in other CMEA member states in 
the 1970s. This he did, and more or less the same economic structures remained in 
place throughout the Gorbachev era. Castro remained hostile to Gorbachev’s strategies 
for domestic economic reform, preferring to remain closely tied to the traditional Soviet 
prescriptions for socialist economic progress. Although trade with European companies 
and investors has been encouraged, Castro remains committed to centralised economic 
structures that he initially implemented, despite evidence of growing economic and 
social privation in Cuba.
Soviet influence over agricultural development.
Ruling elites in developing socialist and socialist-oriented states did replicate 
strategies and models for agrarian reform that had been advocated by leaders in the 
Soviet Union earlier in the century, but it is impossible to verify the claim that Soviet 
leaders forced them to implement particular socialist development policies. As in 
Ethiopia, evidence indicates that leaders in Angola, Mozambique and Cuba had their
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own priorities and agendas and exercised considerable control over the selection, 
adaptation and implementation of the models which they emulated. A more substantive 
accusation is that Soviet leaders adversely affected prospects for agricultural 
development because they supported the efforts of Third World ruling elites to engineer 
the processes of modernisation by undertaking costly, large-scale projects, which they 
could ill afford. On this account, regardless of intent, Moscow’s endorsement of Soviet 
models as the preferred patterns for agricultural transformation and agrarian 
modernisation encouraged officials in weak states to divert scarce resources 
disproportionately towards large, state-controlled ventures. In addition, Soviet support 
for costly experiments in modernising production relations and social engineering like 
collectivisation, resettlement and villagisation had a devastating impact upon 
agricultural production, because they confused, destabilised and alienated the rural 
population. By the time Gorbachev finally urged ruling elites in Third World states to 
discard collectivist strategies and centralised structures and to emulate capitalist 
prescriptions for agrarian improvement, the damage had already been done.
In the mid-1970s, the MPLA introduced a system of state and cooperative farms 
in Angola that were patterned upon Soviet sovkhoz and kolkhoz enterprises 
(Alexievl988:149). They also set state prices for goods and established specific 
regulations for procurements and deliveries. For a time, Angolan officials accorded top 
priority to the new system and channelled most of the scarce funds earmarked for 
agricultural development to the state sector. This strategy seriously impeded farming 
efforts by smallholders and had severe ramifications for Angola’s predominantly 
peasant population. By the time Gorbachev assumed power, the MPLA’s strategies 
aimed at socialist transformation had already adversely affected Angolan agricultural 
production, and the loss had been further exacerbated by civil war. Angola, like 
Ethiopia, faced severe famine threats in 1984 and 1987, and the government had to 
appeal to Western donors for emergency food provisions. In 1988, the MPLA finally 
introduced some policy changes aimed at increasing incentives in the private sector. By 
that time, however, Angola’s ruling elite were importing 90 percent of Angola’s food 
supply, as compared to 1974, when Angola had been classed as a net food exporter 
(Alexiev 1988:149).
Ruling elites in Mozambique also replicated Soviet-styled strategies and 
structures for agricultural development with Moscow’s approval that ultimately 
damaged prospects for agrarian improvement. After independence in 1975, Frelimo
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militants used Party cadres in the liberated zones of isolated farming areas to prepare 
society for the construction of socialism. Scarce resources were used to set up and to 
maintain Soviet-style systems of state farms and cooperative agricultural villages aimed 
at increasing food and cash crop production, controlling the rural population and 
reducing the exodus of poor peasant farmers to urban areas. In 1980, Frelimo’s 
third party congress approved the Plano Prospectivo Indicativo (PPI), which advocated 
a two track agricultural strategy, wherein the government planned to create large state- 
owned farms and to villagise and to collectivise peasant farmers. In the National Plan 
for 1980-1990, for example, communal villages for five million people were supposed 
to be built by 1990 (Hall and Young 1997:90-101).
Frelimo used coercive means to implement socialist transformation, however, 
and their attempts to enforce collectivisation alienated large segments of the rural 
population (Henriksen 1988:165-168). Moreover, the government’s socialist agrarian 
policies confused peasant farmers, who, in 1983, accounted for about 90 percent of the 
total work force (Levey 1983:569), and caused many of them to join insurgent groups 
actively fighting for Frelimo’s removal. Despite calls for reform in 1983 advocated in 
Frelimo’s fourth party congress, the situation worsened markedly during the 1980s. As 
a consequence of low production levels, cash crop revenues declined and famine threats 
intensified after severe droughts hit the country in 1982-1984 and 1986-1987. In 1989, 
Frelimo formally renounced Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the Soviet-styled 
strategies that had earlier been advocated for agricultural progress. Shortly thereafter, 
Mozambican officials agreed to emulate the liberalisation models advocated by the 
World Bank that also resembled the strategies advocated by Gorbachev’s 
administration under perestroika. As in Ethiopia and Angola, however, the adverse 
impact caused by Frelimo’s decision to divert scarce resources into state controlled 
Soviet-styled, large-scaled agrarian ventures for over a decade lingered on.
In respect of Cuba, the case to be made for the Soviet Union’s negative impact 
upon agricultural development is slightly different. The charge here is that Soviet 
support for Castro’s decision to retain a sugar monoculture after the revolution 
adversely affected Cuba’s long-term prospects for agricultural progress. In 1964, 
Moscow and Havana concluded a sugar agreement, and, thereafter, Soviet officials 
agreed to pay subsidised prices for imports of Cuban sugar (Brun and Hersh 1990:174- 
175). This arrangement worked to Cuba’s advantage for many years, but in 
Gorbachev’s time, preferential prices dropped out of trading arrangements. When
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world market prices began to dominate Soviet-Cuban sugar transactions, the purchase 
power of Castro’s sugar-dominated economy declined sharply.
Prolonged Soviet support for Castro’s costly socialist agricultural policies also 
increased prospects for Cuba’s future agricultural decline. After the revolution, 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev endorsed his efforts to nationalise American businesses, 
sugar cane plantations and coffee farms and to implement Soviet-styled strategies 
aimed at the socialist transformation of the agricultural sector. The Soviet Union and 
other CMEA member countries continued to support Castro’s endeavours in this 
direction for many years, even after New Thinking became popular. In 1989, however, 
Gorbachev urged Castro to adopt a more liberal approach to economic and agricultural 
management, but the Cuban leader declined, preferring to continue along the lines 
established in the early years after the revolution. Dependency on sugar export revenue 
obtained from the Soviet Union, plus Castro’s unwillingness to reform the ailing, 
socialist agricultural sector greatly increased Cuba’s socio-economic vulnerability.
The preceding analysis of Soviet relations with Angola, Mozambique and Cuba 
indicates that certain negative patterns of asymmetric exchange identified in the Soviet- 
Ethiopian relationship were also present in the Soviet Union’s relationships with other 
Third World states embarking on the socialist path of development. In theory, given the 
anti-imperialist ideology of Soviet officials, the adverse impacts of asymmetric 
exchange in Cuba should have been less than in Ethiopia, Angola or Mozambique 
because of that sovereign state’s close, preferential ties with Moscow, its privileged 
position as a member of the socialist camp and its active participation in the CMEA. In 
practice, however, Cuba was even more adversely affected by the negative patterns of 
asymmetric exchange that developed during its long relationship with the Soviet Union.
PART THREE: ASYMMETRY IN OTHER RELATIONSHIPS
Research findings in this thesis about the Soviet Union’s relationship with Third 
World friends like Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Cuba raise two interesting 
questions. First, to what extent are the findings about the negative aspects of 
asymmetric exchange unique to the Soviet Union and its relations with friendly Third 
World states? Second, if  it can be demonstrated that the findings have a wider 
application, can the research offer any useful insights on the adverse impacts of uneven 
exchange outside of the Cold War period? To answer these questions, I shall begin
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with an examination of American-Cuban relations before the Cold War and follow 
developments until Fidel Castro took power. After that I shall take a very brief look at 
some negative patterns of asymmetric exchange similar to those formerly associated 
with inter-state relations that are becoming increasingly visible inside of prominent 
international organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).
American-Cuban Relations.
American-Cuban relations provide a useful illustration of asymmetric exchange 
prior to the Cold War period. From the beginning of the 20th century to the late 1950s, 
American officials and businessmen were extremely interested in Cuba, and Cuban 
living conditions were among the highest in Latin America. Within a brief space of 
only ih^flyears, Cuba lost access to the benefits of American trade, and Fidel Castro 
cast his lot with the Soviet Union. To the present day, American-Cuban relations 
remain hostile.
Colonised by the Spanish in 1511, Cuba, along with the Philippine Islands, 
Guam and Puerto Rico, was ceded to the United States for $20 million dollars in 1898, 
following the Spanish American war. In January 1901, with the recommendation of the 
American President McKinley, 31 delegates from six Cuban provinces framed a new 
constitution based upon the U.S. model. In May, however, in accordance with Article 3 
of the Platt Amendment (U.S.), American officials gained the right to intervene in 
Cuban affairs for the preservation of good government, and this right was also 
incorporated into the Cuban constitution. For the next thirty years, with the approval 
of American officials, various authoritarian leaders such as Gerardo Machedo (1925- 
1933) ruled over Cuba. In 1933, however, Franklin Roosevelt repealed the Plat 
Amendment, and Machedo’s government was overturned by a group of non­
commissioned officers and students that included Sergant Fulgencio Battista. Battista 
served as President from 1940-1944 and established a dictatorship in Cuba in 1952. 
With Washington’s support, he remained in power for six more years, until Castro’s 
takeover on 1st January 1959. (Calvocoressi 2001:782-783; Aguilar 1993:39).
From 1901 until 1959, political relations between the United States and Cuba 
were mostly compatible. Dictators like Battista were supported, while political 
revolutionaries like Castro, who had considerable support from segments of the
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population, were regarded with great suspicion. Regardless of intention, the United 
States adversely affected prospects for the development of a liberal political 
environment in Cuba by continuing to underwrite a succession of dictatorial regimes, 
despite clear evidence of repressive policies and the knowledge of the lack of Cuban 
popular support for such administrations. In so doing, American officials artificially 
prolonged the political lives of certain ruling elites at the expense of others and helped 
to create the conditions for Castro’s revolution and his controversial attempts to restore 
order thereafter. American hostilities to Castro’s administration led to Cuba’s increased 
isolation and vulnerability in the Western hemisphere. This strategy adversely affected 
prospects for Cuban citizens to form a government capable of accommodating political 
differences and helped to create the conditions for similar negative patterns of 
asymmetric exchange to develop in Cuba’s political relationship with the Soviet Union.
The United States also adversely affected prospects for security in Cuba, even 
before the Cold War period. Unlike the Soviet-Ethiopian case, however, American 
officials directly intervened in Cuba’s domestic political development, and established 
a military presence there to assist local ruling elites in power. Sanctioned by the Platt 
Amendment, for example, U.S. troops intervened in 1906-1909, 1912-1913,1917 and 
1933 to provide military assistance for corrupt and ailing Cuban administrations. In 
1941, however, American and Cuban officials concluded a lend-lease agreement, under 
which Cuban officials gained arms shipments in exchange for Washington’s use of 
Cuban military facilities (Perez 1993:78-79), and shortly thereafter, U.S. officials 
constructed a naval base at Guantanamo (Palmer 1992:108).
American military assistance to bolster the position of unpopular government 
officials in Cuba directly increased prospects for conflict and dissent among the 
population. Moreover, as a consequence of the precedent established in keeping 
particular sets of ruling elites in power in Cuba, U.S. troops subsequently intervened 
directly in the domestic policies of several other Caribbean and Central American 
countries, including the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti. By so doing, they 
greatly increased long-term prospects for fragmentation and conflict in the region of the 
Caribbean and in Central America.
Although economic relations with the United States benefited Cuba’s short-term 
prospects for economic prosperity, the United States adversely affected prospects for 
Cuba’s long-term economic growth by encouraging leaders to rely too heavily upon 
sugar exports revenue and to allow U.S. foreign investors too much control over the
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domestic economy. The bulk of the damage was inflicted before the 1930s depression, 
but the adverse impact was augmented by increased American-Soviet hostility and 
competitiveness in the early Cold War period.
In 1903, under provisions of an American-Cuban economic treaty, Cuban 
officials agreed to reduce duties on American imports and to encourage further 
American investment in the country, in exchange for gaining preferential access to 
U.S. sugar markets (Aguilar 1993:40). Guaranteed market access may have generated 
prospects for economic growth, but it also stimulated a vast increase in Cuban sugar 
production and an over reliance upon sugar exports for economic prosperity. By 1920, 
despite ups and downs over the years in the sugar market, Cuba’s sugar-based economy 
was thriving, and U.S. investments in the country were growing. Between 1911 and 
1924, for example, U.S. investments in Cuba rose from $205 million to $1.2 billion, 
and Cuba’s dependence on U.S. imports increased in a similar vein, rising, for example, 
from 51 percent in 1914 to 83 percent in 1915 (Aguilar 1993:47-48).
In 1929, however, the U.S. stock market collapsed, Cuba’s economic prosperity 
dropped, and Cuban dependence on U.S. trade relations declined in a manner that 
adversely affected American interests. In 1933, for example, U.S. imports accounted 
for only about 53.5 percent of Cuba’s total imports, as compared to 74.3 percent during 
World War I, and U.S. exports of manufactured goods and raw materials (excluding 
foodstuffs) to Cuba amounted to only $18 million, as compared to $133 million in 1924 
(Perez 1993:63). This adverse situation was remedied in 1934, when American and 
Cuban officials concluded a new treaty that guaranteed Cuba’s access to American 
markets for agricultural exports and reduced tariffs on a wide variety of goods. 
However, the Americans, in particular, benefited from the new arrangement. In 
exchange for reducing the tariffs on 35 Cuban goods, Washington acquired tariff 
reductions on 400 American articles destined for Cuban importation (Perez 1993:75- 
76).
Although Cuba’s economy experienced some independent growth in the years 
of World War II when the European sugar beet economy was adversely affected, 
American investments in the country continued to rise sharply. By 1955, U.S. investors 
controlled 90 percent of Cuba’s telephone and electricity services, 50 percent of the 
railroads and 40 percent of sugar production. In addition, twenty-five percent of all 
Cuban bank deposits were held in Cuban branches of U.S. banks. In 1958, American 
investments in Cuba amounted to one billion dollars, including $386 million in
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services, $270 million in petroleum and mining, $265 million in agriculture and $80 
million in manufacturing (Perez 1993:87-88).
In 1959, revolutionaries gained power, re-established Cuban control over 
economic transactions and nationalised American assets in the country. As a 
consequence of Cold War ideological rivalry, Castro’s socialist rhetoric and policies 
alienated American officials even more than they might have done at another time and 
resulted in a trade blockade that worked to Cuba’s great disadvantage. More 
importantly, in the absence of any western partners willing to go against American 
wishes, Castro really had no option other than to form economic ties with the Soviet 
Union and to establish patterns of asymmetric exchange similar to the ones that had 
characterised Cuba’s economic relationship with the United States before the 
revolution.
In the case of Cuba, as in Ethiopia, complexities are inherent in the accusation 
that the United States adversely affected prospects for agricultural development by 
imposing its own strategies and structures for agricultural control upon Cuban officials. 
Spanish colonists, for example, created much of Cuba’s agricultural infrastructure, and, 
after liberation in 1898, American officials largely accepted the systems already in 
place. Nevertheless, U.S. political and financial support for re-developing a monocrop 
culture in sugar encouraged Cuban officials to divert scarce resources towards large, 
expensive agricultural projects and away from small farmers who made up the bulk of 
the population. As a consequence, Cuba’s prospects for crop diversification and long­
term agricultural success were diminished, and the rural inhabitants in the poorer strata 
became further detached from the general population.
Before 1750, Cuba’s sugar plantations were relatively small in size and number. 
One hundred small plantations, each averaging about 300 acres and cultivated by about 
12 slaves, produced a total of 5,000 tons of sugar and exported about a tenth of that 
amount annually (Thomas 1993:2,7). By 1800, largely as a consequence of growing 
demand in Spanish and American markets, more Spanish and Cuban entrepreneurial 
landlords, and more slaves imported into Cuba, sugar had become the mainstay of the 
Cuban economy. In the 1790s, for example, sugar exports produced on 500 plantations, 
each averaging about 700 acres and each cultivated by 100 slaves, rose to 30,000 tons 
per annum. By 1860, Cuba’s sugar output at 450,000 tons, accounted for a quarter of 
the world’s sugar production (Thomas 1993:7,15).
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When the American Military Government assumed power in Cuba (1899-1902), 
Cuba’s agricultural sector was in chaos as a consequence of political, military and 
social unrest that had culminated in the Spanish-American War. Sugar production had 
been particularly affected, and four-fifths of the sugar estates were estimated to be in 
ruins (Aguilar 1993: 36-37). This would have been an opportune time for American 
officials to restructure the agrarian sector, to diversify crop production and to help 
Cubans end their dependence upon sugar export revenue. Instead, American officials 
concluded a treaty with Cuban officials in 1903 that secured Cuba’s preferential access 
to the U.S. sugar market. In response, Cuban sugar production rose sharply from 
283,651 tons in 1900 to 1,183,347 tons in 1905 (Aguilar 1993:40). Cubans generally 
continued to profit from sugar for the first two decades of the twentieth century, despite 
fluctuations in international sugar prices. In 1920, however, Cuba experienced an 
economic crisis, and many Cubans were forced to sell their sugar mills to American 
investors. From that time until Castro assumed power, American businessmen and 
venture capitalists, as well as Cuban landowners, actively participated in the production 
and export of cane sugar, with the approval of the U.S. government.
By the late 1950s, American interests effectively dominated Cuba’s agricultural 
sector. American and Cuban landowners had incorporated vast tracts of the country 
into the Latifundia. For example, twenty-two sugar companies controlled one-fifth of 
Cuba’s agricultural land. As a consequence, the living standards of peasant farmers 
declined, in comparison to the urban population. For example, about 15 percent of 
Cuban peasants had running water, as compared to 80 percent of urban dwellers. About 
nine percent of peasants had electricity, as compared to 83 percent for those in urban 
areas (Perez 1993:88-89). As peasants became marginalised from the rest of Cuban 
society, hostilities increased towards wealthy sugar plantation owners, as well as 
towards Battista’s administration. In March 1958, for example, members of the The 26 
of July Movement led by Fidel Castro burned cane sugar fields all over the island, 
destroying about 2 million tons of sugar (Perez 1993:90).
In 1959, Castro assumed power and promised to end Cuba’s dependency upon 
cane sugar. As a result of his new priorities to gain assistance for security and 
development in the Cold War era and the persistence of old patterns of economic 
dependence upon sugar exports, Castro’s aspirations to diversify became subject to the 
market demands of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s new dominant partner. Consequently, 
Castro’s administration really had no viable option but to continue channelling scarce
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resources towards increasing sugar production at the expense of progressing 
agricultural development through diversification.
The example of American-Cuban relations before 1959 clearly shows that the 
negative aspects associated with asymmetric exchange between strong and weak states 
are not unique to relations between socialist and developing states, nor can the damage 
sustained be blamed solely upon one particular configuration of power at a given time 
in history like the Cold War era. Galtung’s ideas about the structure of economic 
imperialism, in particular, have explanatory merit in this case. Cuba became 
economically dependent upon the United States, as a consequence of the structures 
identified in commodity concentration. In this case, as a consequence of over-reliance 
upon sugar, American foreign investors were able to penetrate the main sectors of the 
Cuban economy and to shape Cuba’s strategies for economic development and 
agricultural progress substantially for half a century. In respect of political and military 
ties, however, the American-Cuban example also reminds us that certain asymmetries
tti thassociated with 19 century imperialism persisted well into the 20 century. For 
example, politically, Cuba’s constitution was tied to Washington policy documents for 
thirty years, and, militarily, American troops retained the right to intervene directly in 
Cuban affairs whenever internal stability was threatened. Regardless of how the 
negative patterns of Cuba’s asymmetric exchange with the United States were set in 
motion, the effect of Cuba’s long-term dependence upon one major partner increased 
that country’s vulnerability to domestic and external crisis and exerted an adverse 
impact upon its long-term prospects for progressive development.
Relations between International Organisations and weak states
Thus far, the ideas about the asymmetric exchange and the negative patterns 
likely to adversely affect prospects for development in Third World countries have 
been used to explain past relationships between powerful and weak states. Do these 
ideas have any utility in explaining or forecasting the adverse implications of 
asymmetric exchange in the twenty-first century? In close bilateral relationships 
between powerful and weak states today, it remains likely that patterns of exchange 
similar to those formed before and during the Cold War will persist as a direct 
consequence of the vast disparities in the power and capability of the two states 
involved.
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At the beginning of the 21st Century, however, the importance of special 
bilateral configurations like Soviet Union’s relationship with Ethiopia that were 
initially formed on the basis of security concerns appears to be declining. This raises 
an interesting question. In a world that purports to becoming more globalised, 
particularly in respect of the structures recommended for economic and political 
organisation, can some of the insights about the negative patterns of exchange in 
bilateral relationships offered in this thesis also be used to explain asymmetric 
relationships between powerful and weak sovereign states within inter-governmental 
organisations (IGOs)? Although such an analysis lies beyond the remit of the thesis, I 
shall conclude this study by suggesting that the impact of IGO policies upon weaker 
member states should be the focus of further research.
There is one major difference between the degree of independence that leaders 
of poor countries enjoyed during the Cold War and their position now. In the case of 
Soviet Union’s relationship with Ethiopia, I argued that ruling elites in poorer states 
actually exercised considerable control over the selection, adaptation and 
implementation of the models for political, economic and agricultural development in 
powerful states that they emulated. Since the end of the Cold War, however, it seems 
that the power of governments in poorer states within IGOs to control the pace and 
process of model replication has declined. Consequently, their vulnerability to external 
crisis has intensified.
Negative aspects associated with the IMF’s influence over the importation of 
western-oriented strategies and structures for economic progress into Indonesia and 
South Korea in the Asian economic crisis of 1997 demonstrate this. Under the terms of 
the IMF’s structural adjustment loans (SALs), approved by the Group of 5 (the highest 
contributes, including the United States, Germany, Japan, France and Britain) in 1986, 
ruling elites of countries in economic crisis gained access to SALS if they agreed to 
implement prescribed domestic reforms. Removing barriers to foreign trade and 
investment, devaluation, and privatisation were deemed to be particularly important.
Over time, however, the strategies that had initially been created by the IMF to 
cope with crisis in one particular period came to be regarded as the best patterns for 
governments in developing countries to replicate in order to recover from economic 
crisis. When the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, for example, the IMF assembled 
a rescue package worth more than $100 billion for Thailand, Indonesia and South 
Korea (Kreiger 2001: 414). In order to gain the funds, however, ruling elites were
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expected to introduce patterned prescriptions for domestic restructuring that had 
previously been uniformly applied by IMF officials: in particular, devaluation, raising 
interest rates and decreasing public spending. These prescriptions, however, worsened 
the economic situation and substantially increased prospects for political and social 
instability at the regional level and increased prospects for a global economic crisis. In 
Indonesia, for example, the IMF’s insistence on the closure of sixteen banks triggered a 
bank panic and accelerated the fall of the rupiah. As the crisis worsened, agricultural 
monopolies were dissolved, businesses went bankrupt, and unemployment soared. 
Economic dislocation, in turn, intensified political and social unrest, culminating in the 
fall of Suharto’s administration. In South Korea, before receiving their $58 billion 
share of the IMF’s rescue package, officials agreed to accelerate the opening of 
financial equity markets to foreign investment, to reform and restructure financial and 
corporate structures and to increase transparency and accountability (Krieger 
2001:473). In this case, policy implementation was facilitated by the election of the 
more liberal human rights activist Kim Dae Jung as President in 1997. IMF reform 
prescriptions not only loosened ties between the government and Chaebols (indigenous 
corporations, usually family based, which had controlled business operations in the 
country for a long time), they also created new opportunities for the major capitalist 
powers to penetrate South Korea’s domestic economy. Overall, however, IMF policies 
did very little to help the average Korean recover from the devastating effects of 
economic crisis.
In respect of economic and agricultural development, coalitions of dominant 
states advocating free trade within IGOs like the WTO seem to be exerting more power 
over the destinies of poorer states to compete within a global market. The most 
powerful states are gaining increased market access to sell their exports on a global 
basis at the expense of local producers and manufacturers in many developing 
countries. In the banana war of the late 1990s that pitted a coalition of Latin American 
states led by the United States against the European Union (EU) and a small group of 
Lome member countries producing bananas, fragile monocrop economies like the 
Windward islands were pushed into economic crisis as a consequence of the WTO’s 
ruling that the EU must create a level playing field for banana imports. Moreover, 
largely as a consequence of WTO pressures on the EU to end preferential exchanges, 
Lome member countries lost many of their former preferential trading advantages in 
the Cotonou Agrement for 2000-2020 concluded in the year 2000. Will the free trade
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conditions being championed by the dominant economic coalitions in the World Trade 
Organisations really create fairer trading conditions for all member countries, or will 
such policies only strengthen the position of the most powerful?
Research findings in the third part of this chapter clearly indicate that the 
adverse impacts of asymmetric exchange are not unique to the Soviet Union, nor 
should they be confined to a particular historical period. As I have shown, similar 
patterns of dominance and dependency were demonstrated in the United States of 
America’s relationship with Cuba before the Cold War started and some negative 
patterns of asymmetric exchange similar to those formerly associated with inter-state 
relations have become increasingly visible inside of important international 
organisations like the IMF and the WTO since the Cold War ended.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in this thesis, ruling elites in developing countries stand to 
gain a great deal from transactions with stronger states. If relations become too 
exclusive, however, and the coupling is retained for some time, adverse consequences 
for the weaker state are likely to occur. The Soviet-Ethiopian relationship, for 
example, involved far more than the changing interests of ruling elites whose interests 
and priorities were sometimes compatible and sometimes conflicting. A special 
relationship developed between ruling elites in these two states of vastly unequal power 
in the Brezhnev era, largely as a consequence of Cold War competition and ideological 
bonding.
Although evidence indicates that Mengistu’s administration had a lot to do with 
the relationship’s progression, the negative patterns of asymmetric exchange that 
subsequently developed adversely affected Ethiopia more than they did the Soviet 
Union. This negative impact continued long after Gorbachev assumed power and some 
of them persisted even after both sovereign states had fragmented. Politically, 
Gorbachev’s endorsement of Mengistu’s military government and approval for that 
regime’s control over the process of Ethiopia’s transformation into a civilian socialist 
state reduced prospects for establishing a civilian government more tolerant of ethnic, 
cultural and religious diversity. Militarily, Soviet weapons and equipment artificially 
prolonged the political life of one group of Ethiopians at the expense of others and
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facilitated the process of Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation. In addition, Gorbachev’s 
arms provisions also provided opportunities for militant opposition forces, as well as 
Ethiopian officials, to develop too much reliance upon military solutions to domestic 
problems. Economically, relations with the Soviet Union became prohibitively costly, 
as preferential arrangements declined in importance and the costs of Soviet imports 
increased markedly. In addition, Ethiopia’s substantial indebtedness to the Soviet 
Union survived the fall of both administrations to become a potential source of conflict 
between officials of the Russian Federation and the Ethiopian population. In respect of 
agricultural development, the extent of Soviet influence over Ethiopian development 
policy may be debated, but Gorbachev’s approval and support for Mengistu’s 
resettlement and villagisation schemes did encourage Ethiopia’s ruling elite to divert 
scarce resources towards a select number of large ventures at the expense of the 
population.
Analyses of the Soviet Union’s relationships with other friendly non-capitalist 
states demonstrated some marked similarities to the Soviet-Ethiopian case. In respect 
of interests, evidence indicated that ruling elites in Angola, Mozambique and Cuba had 
exercised considerable control over the selection, adaptation, implementation and 
rejection of the models that they emulated, just as they had in Ethiopia. At a structural 
level, research findings indicated that the negative patterns of asymmetric exchange 
identified in the examples of Angola, Mozambique and Cuba were similar to those that 
had characterised the Soviet Union’s relationship with Ethiopia.
Adverse impacts in four areas became visible in the Brezhnev period, persisted 
well into the Gorbachev era and continued to pose problems for ruling elites in those 
Third World countries after the demise of the Soviet Union. First, the Soviet Union 
adversely influenced political developments in these weak states by exercising its 
power to support certain local elites at the expense of other political rivals and to 
provide them with the military means to prolong their tenure in power. Second, Soviet 
arms provision escalated prospects for domestic and regional conflict in these countries 
and allowed Third World leaders like Castro to engage in military interventions around 
the globe. Third, the Soviet Union reduced prospects for economic independence and 
growth by fostering trade dependency through the provision of key imports deemed 
requisite to industrialisation and militarisation and encouraging leaders of poor states to 
accumulate exorbitant military debts. Finally, the Soviet Union adversely affected 
prospects for agricultural development by endorsing their own strategies and structures
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for socialist transformation, agricultural modernisation and the restructuring of peasant 
society, despite dubious success rates at home, and, by so doing, encouraged 
governments in poor states to divert scarce resources towards large, expensive 
agricultural projects at the expense of the population. These drawbacks seemed to 
characterise the long-term impact of asymmetric exchange generally in the Soviet 
Union’s relationships with non-capitalist Third World states.
However, relations between the United States and Cuba prior to 1959 make it 
clear that patterns of asymmetry similar to the ones identified in the Soviet Union’s 
relationships with Third World states deemed to be friendly are apt to develop in close 
relationships between powerful and weak states over time, regardless of ideological 
persuasion. Although the interests of ruling elites in both states drive the relationship 
along, the poorer state remains more vulnerable as a consequence of the vast disparities 
that exist in respect of capability and power. The weak state may gain substantial 
benefits initially, but these are likely to be outweighed by the adverse impact of 
negative patterns of of asymmetric exchange in the longer term. These effects are most 
likely to become visible when a major event such as a radical change in leadership 
adversely affects the positive dynamics originally set in place between two compatible 
sets of ruling elites. Cold War conditions may have aggravated the process of 
asymmetric exchange, but similar patterns have been demonstrated in relationships 
between powerful and weak states in the past, and they continue to appear in the 
present.
In a world becoming more global in respect of the capitalist ideologies and the 
structures currently recommended for effective political and economic organisation, 
some negative patterns of asymmetric exchange that have been specifically associated 
with inter-state relations in the past also seem to be appearing in relationships within 
inter-governmental organisations like the IMF and the WTO. This manifestation of 
asymmetric exchange should become the focus of future research.
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